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Preface and Overview of Thesis 
 
Worlds Apart? The Political Economy of Communication, Information and 
Institutional Investor Media Usage in Global Financial Markets 
 
On 3 June 1997, while residing in Bangkok, I awoke to discover that, under repeated pressure from 
offshore currency speculators, the Reserve Bank of Thailand had abandoned the baht’s peg to the 
US dollar, resulting in money market trading immediately driving down its value by 20%. This was 
not a complete surprise; over the preceding few days there were rumours of limousines pulling up 
outside the major banks on Silom Road and members of the political/military/business elite rushing 
in and out carrying suitcases stuffed with US dollars, so a devaluation was clearly anticipated. But 
the baht’s precipitous decline and its social impact were not. By the end of the year, the baht’s 
value had halved. World Bank monitoring reports (1999, 2000) revealed the impact of the crisis on 
Thai social indicators between 1996 and 1998 (the years either side of the main crisis): 
Unemployment levels increased by 150%, rural poverty levels increased by 13%, urban poverty 
levels increased by 25%, drug-related arrests increased by 31%, abandoned newborns increased 
by 20%, orphanage admissions increased by 22%, outpatient treatments for depression increased 
by 52%, and suicides increased by 41%. Meanwhile, the aftermath of the baht’s loss of value saw 
an increase in inflation from 4.4% in 1997 to 10.2% in 1998.  Furthermore, within twelve months 
following the crisis, government expenditure on education had declined by 9% while the public 
health spending declined by 15.2%. These figures demonstrate that the consequences of financial 
crises extend well beyond the agents directly involved in financial speculation and can have a direct 
and deleterious impact on the lives of ordinary people.  
 
With first hand experience of how global financial forces could manifest themselves in the lifeworld, 
and having a background in communication studies, it was evident that information and perceptions 
played a significant role in the (dys)functioning of financial markets. I became highly motivated to 
investigate how the media/communication systems used by the institutional investors whose trading 
decisions shaped the trajectories of global capital actually worked. The salience of the research (still 
in progress at the time) was underlined in spectacular fashion when problems in the US sub-prime 
mortgage securities sector triggered the most serious systemic financial crisis since the Wall Street 
crash of 1929.  The banking system effectively stopped issuing credit, causing a world-wide seizure 
of market liquidity. The ‘credit crunch’ has already seen governments inject  unprecedented 
volumes of dollars into the banking sector to stabilise the markets. However, neither the long-term 
efficacy of such gestures nor the ramifications for the public whose tax dollars will fund the bail-out 
for decades to come are yet apparent. Despite calls for re-regulation, there is no indication that the 
underlying nature/origins of these events are sufficiently well understood to prevent their 
recurrence. There is therefore a pressing need for new perspectives on financial markets.  
 
The thesis presented has two broad objectives. Theoretically, it aims to develop a political economic 
framework foregrounding reflexive communication/informational processes to explain how global 
financial markets operate and to explore how communication-related changes in these markets are 
implicated in a reconfiguration of the relations among state, capital and civil society. This includes 
consideration of the extent to which global financial markets have become an autopoietic system 
operating independently from other social subsystems and insulated from democratic accountability. 
Empirically, the thesis presents and analyses data generated through a survey and series of 
interviews involving institutional investors based in New Zealand who operate in global financial 
markets. This research examined how traders and analysts prioritise different types of media and 
information to inform their investment decisions and also included several observational visits to 
trading floors at Deutsche Bank, ANZ Bank, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The analysis of 
the findings focuses on whether they broadly confirm or invalidate various arguments that financial 
communication processes involve more than the transmission of information representative of 
external market conditions, but rather, reflexively constitute market reality on different levels. This 
analysis is then used to draw conclusions concerning the democratic implications of financial 
market autopoiesis.  
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Note on structure of thesis 
 
There is a broad range of literature relevant to media/ communication/ information- related 
processes in financial markets, and it extends across several social science disciplines, including 
political economy, cultural economy, economic sociology/ geography and behavioural finance. At 
the time the research project was conceptualised, the work focusing on financial markets within the 
mainstream of communication/media studies literature was limited, but it expanded significantly 
during the process of conducting the research and writing the thesis. The events surrounding the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis and credit crunch (which developed in the middle of analysis and write-
up) were also a consideration, although for practical reasons, material published after December 
2008 has not been included. Although the principal theme of the thesis concerns the political 
economic implications of the communication/ information processes in financial markets, explaining 
how financial markets actually operate has necessarily required the collation and integration of 
several bodies of literature. Similarly, the need to place the questions concerning financial market 
autopoiesis and democratic accountability in a macro-political economic framework while 
emphasising communicative processes also required consideration of the literature on globalisation, 
social systems and capitalist accumulation.   
   
The conventional narrative sequence of  a thesis would present a review of the literature to 
contextualise and rationalise the proposed research question, before outlining the methodology and 
going on to present the findings and the analysis of the data. Although this sequence will be 
approximately followed, the structure of this thesis will entail some variations. The project aims to 
develop a theoretical framework emphasising reflexive communicative processes to facilitate the 
transcoding of key ideas across a range of literature. The quantity of material means that strictly 
adhering to the conventional sequence above would result in a significant proportion of the thesis 
consisting purely of thematising the secondary literature. The approach will indeed entail a review of 
several areas of the literature in turn. However, the intention is to simultaneously evolve the 
theoretical framework as the review uncovers successive layers of communication-related 
processes in financial market activity. Where relevant, elements of the empirical and theoretical 
findings will be ‘fed forward’ into these earlier sections where its early inclusion will help illustrate 
key points and increase thematic coherence.  
 
In order to avoid inconsistent eclecticism in the development of the theoretical framework 
(particularly in regard to drawing on political economy and cultural economy) there is a need to 
show the metatheoretical reasoning behind the transcoding of concepts in respective approaches. 
In conjunction with the extensive range of literature, this has required discussion that extends the 
depth but also the length of the thesis. The review of literature and development of the theoretical 
frameworks extends across several chapters to contextualise the research and foreground the 
communicative aspects of some quite complex financial market processes.  
 
The introductory chapter outlines several political and economic issues arising from the 
contemporary context of financial markets and the central role  communication/ information/ media 
systems play in their global operations. It also provides an introduction to some of the key 
theoretical issues and provides a rationale for developing an analytical framework foregrounding 
communication processes. It also introduces the main research questions and indicates the 
methodological approaches deployed to answer them.  
 
The second chapter develops the basic framework for the analysis. It reviews several approaches in 
social theory that have attempted to bridge/synthesise structural and agency-oriented accounts of 
social action, and examines three cultural political economy perspectives. The reason this is 
important is that financial processes are based on transactions involving symbolic objects into which 
financial values are collectively inscribed and constantly renegotiated. The symbolic ontology of 
monetary/financial systems nevertheless exhibit structural characteristics which are explained in 
political-economic terms. The basic framework developed involved conceiving of financial activities 
in terms of intersubjective codifications which coordinate meanings among agents and demarcate 
the channels and modalities of actions available in different arenas.  
 
 XV 
The third chapter provides the main review of literature with a primary focus on the material 
specifically related to media/information/communication in financial markets. It provides more 
background on the development of new financial media/information systems and introduces several 
key themes including the significance of financial media discourses, the evidence for media ‘effects’ 
on traders, and institutional compromises in the work of analysts and financial reporters. This allows 
the identification of several aspects of financial communication systems that might be considered to 
be reflexively constitutive of financial markets.  
 
The fourth chapter discusses different conceptions of ‘globalisation’ and emphasises the centrality 
of new communication technologies and the increased volumes, spatial extension and temporal 
compressions of financial markets. It also provides discussion of the ways in which the processes 
associated with globalisation have reconfigured the articulations among state, capital and civil 
society. 
 
The fifth chapter follows on from the discussion of globalisation and reviews different formulations of 
autopoiesis. This is distinguished from the arguments in economic sociology concerning 
embeddedness. The intersubjective codifications framework is deployed to conceptualise 
distinctions between different social arena (or colonising penetrations thereof), while communicative 
reflexivity/ endogenous feedback within a subsystem is posited as an index of autopoietic tendency 
within financial markets. 
 
The sixth chapter focuses on capital accumulation regimes, focusing on the challenges of adapting 
the Marxist framework to contemporary financial processes and explaining the ways in which the 
internal contradiction of Marx’s accumulation circuits have been regulated/managed through a 
series of spatial-temporal ‘fixes’ (as noted by Harvey, 1999). These involve significant 
reconfigurations of the relations between state, capital and civil society (such as those stemming 
from the demise of the Bretton Woods system and Keynesian macroeconomics and the shift 
towards Friedmanite neoliberal/monetarism) and new institutional arrangements to provide 
macroeconomic governance. The evidence of financial market ‘deepening’ relative to the industrial 
economy suggests that there is a symbolic component to such ‘fixes’ involving the expansion of 
fictitious capital values. However, such a formulation does not neatly dovetail with the Marxist 
framework.  
 
The seventh chapter addresses the link between Marxist political economy and cultural economy in 
respect to the conception of money, credit, and by extension, fictitious value. Different accounts of 
monetary forms are considered and intersubjective codifications framework is deployed to provide 
an account of how monetary forms simultaneously provide the modes/channels for expressing 
economic agency and structurally constrain that agency. The chapter also examines the institutional 
origins of credit-money in capitalist society, and develops this into a formulation of the symbolic 
process through which fictitious capital values is generated. 
 
The eighth chapter develops the intersubjective codification framework and the account of 
informational reflexivity. This symbolic ontology of fictitious capital and informational reflexivity  are 
deployed here to provides an account of how the expansion of financial market values may provide 
a ‘symbolic fix’ to the contradictions of accumulation, albeit an intrinsically unstable one. This 
framework is then used to transcode Minksy’s (1977) financial instability model of financial crisis 
onto a neo-Marxist account of the contradictions of accumulation (emphasising how reflexive 
feedback loops and break-downs in the intersubjective codifications underpinning trading models 
arise. Short case studies of the communicative processes underpinning the LTCM hedge fund crisis 
and the credit crunch are provided. 
 
Chapter nine provides a discussion of the methodology underpinning the empirical study of 
institutional investors’ usage of media and information and explains how the quantitative survey, 
trader/analyst interviews and trading-room observations were developed and implemented. 
 
Chapter ten presents and discusses the quantitative survey findings on investor ratings of 
importance and objectivity for various financial media/sources and information types. After exploring 
relevant correlations,  factor analysis is used to condense the variables. The findings suggest a 
distinction needs to be made between publicly-available news media and institutional network 
 XVI 
sources, and also between fundamental market information and reflexive information (monitoring of 
other market actors). 
 
Chapter eleven presents and discusses the qualitative interview and observational findings, and 
provides triangulation with the quantitative data. The data provides strong evidence for the 
arguments concerning informational reflexivity but does not support a radical account of complete 
self-referentiality in the communication systems underpinning financial markets. However, the 
findings show that institutional networks provide traders with critical data about capital flows and 
shifts in the frames used to inform trading decisions. A short case study related to the Official Cash 
Rate announcement from both the view of the Reserve Bank and the trading floor is presented to 
illustrate some of the reflexive processes.  
 
Chapter twelve concludes the thesis. It considers the implications of the findings for the key theories 
and concepts emerging from the literature on media and financial markets. It also reviews the 
implications of the findings for the neoliberal contention that financial markets have become more 
open and democratic and for the proposition that communicative reflexivity indicates that the 
financial markets have become an autopoietic system.  
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Worlds Apart? 
The Political Economy of Communication,  
Information and Institutional Investor Media  
Usage in Global Financial Markets 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and Background 
 
 
Rationale and aims of thesis: 
 
The broad aims of the project are twofold. In broad theoretical terms, it aims to make an original 
theoretical contribution to the field of communication studies, by i) demonstrating how the adoption 
of a refined political economy framework emphasising reflexive communication/ informational 
processes can help explain the operation of contemporary global financial markets, and ii) by 
exploring how communication-related changes in these markets since the 1970s could be 
implicated in the reconfiguration of the wider social relations between state, capital and civil society.    
 
More specifically, the study aims to provide original empirical evidence indicating how institutional 
finance professionals1 based in New Zealand who operate in global financial markets prioritise 
different types of media and information to inform their investment decisions. This will include 
analysis of the implications of these findings in respect to whether they support or invalidate 
hypothetical claims concerning a reflexive relationship between the communication of financial 
information and market reality. This will entail addressing the following objectives:  
 
• Develop an analytic framework that can be used to conceptualise and explain financial market 
phenomena in terms of communicative/informational processes and allow relevant theories and 
concepts from different sub-fields to be integrated.  
• Provide an empirical description of media/information source prioritisation by institutional 
traders/analysts in making investment decisions across four major financial market areas 
(stocks/equities, bonds/ interest rate securities, currencies/forex, and derivatives).  
• Measure and correlate trader/analyst meta-knowledge about media/information used in 
investment decisions; i.e. perceptions of the relative perceived importance and objectivity of 
media/ information sources and also the relative perceived importance of different types of 
information used in investment decisions. 
• Identify convergences and divergences in perceptions of media importance and objectivity 
across four different areas of financial market trading.  
• Assess the implications of the findings for theories positing a reflexive/constitutive relation 
between financial information and market reality. 
• Assess the extent to which the findings generally support or confirm claims that financial 
markets have become more publicly accessible/ democratically accountable or become 
increasingly autopoietic/decoupled from other spheres of society.  
 
                                                 
1
 Note that in some financial literature ‘institutional investors’ refers primarily to traders working in fund 
management companies and excludes investment banks.  In this thesis, the term ‘institutional’ is used more 
broadly to denote investment professionals engaged in financial trading (and/or analysis) within investment 
banks, brokerage houses, hedge funds, pension funds and other corporate organisations with substantial 
involvement in financial markets where the money being invested is primarily not their own.  Institutional 
investors are thus contrasted with individual investors and day traders who engage in financial markets using 
their own money for personal gain.   
 2 
The context of contemporary financial markets 
 
Money may make the world go round, but the global communications infrastructure and financial 
information systems are what allow money to go round the world. The convergence of computing, 
telecommunications and other electronic media since the 1970s, in conjunction with financial 
deregulation, has led to important shifts both in the scale and nature of international financial 
markets.  
 
The total value of world financial assets increased from approximately US$12 trillion in 1980 to 
US$167 trillion by 2006 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, 2008). Of that US$ 167 trillion, US$54 
trillion is represented by equities (company stocks), US$45 trillion by bank deposits (monetary 
holdings), US$43 trillion by private debt securities (mostly corporate bonds), and US$26 trillion by 
government debt securities (treasury bonds). On top of this, by 2006, the global derivatives market 
was worth a further US$10 trillion in gross market value, and US$477 trillion in notional value2 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2008; Band of International Settlements, 2007a).  By way of contrast, 
industrial market production, represented by World GDP, was a ‘mere’ US$48 trillion in 2006 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, exponential increases in information processing capacity and the volume, velocity and 
extension of electronic financial transactions have seen the daily global market turnover of foreign 
exchange (forex or FX) derivatives expand from US$880 billion in 1989 to US$3.21 trillion in 20073 
(Bank of International Settlements, 2005, 2007a). While forex markets generate the largest 
turnovers (see table below), other areas of the global financial markets also generate massive 
trading volumes.  In 2006, US$280 billion was traded daily in equities (GoForex, 2007) while 
US$947.3 billion was traded in government bonds (SIFMA, 2007). Meanwhile, in 2007, the overall 
daily turnover in global OTC derivatives4 markets was US$4.2 trillion (BIS, 2007b, 2007c).  
 
Fig 1. Average Daily Turnover on Global Foreign Exchange Markets5 (US$ billions) 
 
Instrument 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Spot transactions 317 394 494 568 386 621 1005 
Forwards 27 58 97 128 130 208 362 
Swaps 190 324 546 734 656 944 1714 
Estimated gap in reports 56 43 53 61 28 107 129 
Total ‘traditional’ turnover: 590 820 1190 1490 1200 1880 3210 
Total Forex turnover  650 880 1150 1650 1420 1950 3210 
Figures derived  from Bank of International Settlements (BIS), (2005, 2007a) 
                                                 
2
 Derivatives are contracts whose value to the buyer or seller changes according to the price movement of another 
underlying asset within a specified time frame. On the most basic level, a  simple futures or options derivative might entail an 
agreement to buy/ sell a commodity or other security at some price agreed today, thereby protecting the contract holder 
against the risk of unforeseen price movements. The cost of the derivatives contract is only a fraction of the capital value of 
the underyling asset in question, hence the ‘notional’ value is much higher than the market value of the capital exchanged 
between the counterparties. See later discussion for more information about how derivatives markets operate.  
 
3
 By way of contrast, the New Zealand  forex market had a daily turnover of just US$13.007 billion in April 2007 (Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, 2007). The New Zealand Dollar has nevertheless been the centre of some singificant trends in global 
currency trading (notably in ‘carry trade’ strategies) which has increased its representation in global capital flows. (BIS 
2007b) 
 
4
 Over-the-counter or OTC derivatives are private financial contracts between two counterparties, sometimes of a bespoke 
nature. Exchange derivatives are generic contracts which are standardised and routinely traded through exchanges or as 
securities in their own right, e.g. commodities or FX futures.  The US$4.2 trillion is in notional value, not gross market value. 
 
5
 All BIS figures are calculated for the month of April in the corresponding year. Figures are adjusted for ‘double counting’ 
(i.e. exchanging currency for currency counts as a single transaction, not two). Spot transactions involve immediate 
sale/purchase of currencies ‘on the spot’ at the current rate. Forwards are a form of derivative contract involving and 
agreements to buy/sell currencies at a spot rate in the future. Swaps are related to forwards, but involve a two-way 
transaction with both parties buying and exchanging forex and/or floating and fixed interest rates on different currencies (see 
Forextheory.com, 2007). ‘Traditional’ turnover is calculated differently from exchange-rate adjusted figures which inlcude 
adjustments for variations in echange rates within the period that the data was collected. The figures are not adjusted for 
inflation. Note that the dip in 2001 figures came in the period of market turmoil following the collapse of the ‘dot-com’ bubble.  
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These colossal flows are comprised predominantly of speculative investment capital controlled 
primarily by institutional investors in investment banks, pension funds, insurance brokerages, hedge 
funds and other investment firms and brokerage houses (although transnational corporations are 
also significant financial actors and there is growing participation from individual investors). Global 
capital flows are an index of the essential agency of capitalism, i.e. to constantly seek new 
configurations of investment to maximise returns. Global financial markets operate around the clock 
(although major exchanges have set opening hours during the week) as do most major financial 
institutions (with trading desks in different parts of the globe opening as others close). Trading 
desks are filled with streams of real-time market information and financial markets respond with 
real- time sensitivity to fluctuations in prices and other market data.  Economic news from one major 
financial centre can generate real-time reactions in stock, bond and foreign exchange markets 
across the world (Anderson et al., 2007).  
 
The expansion of the scale of financial market trading has entailed not only unprecedented 
increases in the basic volume of monetary flows but also unprecedented increases in financial 
market activity as a proportion of global economic production (Wade, 2006; Pazarbasioglu et al., 
2007; McKinsey Global Institute, 2008).  The total value of global financial securities was roughly 
equivalent to world GDP in 1980 (109%) but by 2006, this ratio had increased to 348% (US$167 
trillion in financial market capitalisation compared with US$48 trillion in world GDP). Many of the 
advanced industrial economies now have a financial ‘depth’ of over 400% GDP (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2006, 2008). As will become clear, these trends have significant implications not only for 
the relations between financial markets and  industry, government and civil society, but also for 
capitalism itself.  
 
This expansion and extension of global financial market activity and increasing financial deepening 
has been facilitated by the development of communication and computing infrastructures through 
which flows of market information and capital itself are mediated. Communication infrastructures 
link trading desks around the world to major exchanges and specialised financial media systems 
such as Reuters and Bloomberg which not only  provide financial actors with real-time information 
but also with the interface through which most investment transactions are now undertaken. New 
electronic media (notably the internet) have also extended the opportunity to directly participate in 
the financial system to wider (albeit relatively privileged) sections of the general public.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the adoption of free market policies 
and financial liberalisation in the former communist polities in Eastern Europe and China throughout 
the 1990s were heralded by the political right as the ultimate triumph of capitalism and a 
confirmation of the intrinsic relationship between the political freedom entailed by democracy and 
the economic freedom entailed by neoliberalism (e.g. see Friedman, 1999). However, the spatial 
extension of free trade regimes and the increasing scale of financial market activity across 
geopolitical boundaries has entailed complex shifts and disjunctures in the social order of many 
countries (Appadurai, 1990; Sassen, 1996). Economic-financial globalisation has been facilitated 
and accommodated by important adjustments in the relations among the institutions of state, capital 
and civil society within and across national spaces (see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999). 
For example, the mobility of deregulated transborder capital flows circulating through electronic 
networks in unprecedented volumes (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008) often contrasts with the 
relative immobility or inertia of labour which remains subject to political constraints on migration and 
the spatial inertia of embedded familial relations.  
 
This partly reflects an important shift in macroeconomic policy  from the 1970s onwards away from 
the Keynesian paradigm toward the neoliberal/ monetarist paradigm. The former framework allowed 
governments autonomy over domestic borrowing and expenditure while using controls on currency 
pegs and restrictions on capital flows to maintain economic stability. The Keynesian emphasis on 
full employment and counter-cyclical government spending to boost flagging economies out of 
recession led to inflationary trends which sometimes failed to avert recession (stagflation). This 
posed a threat to both to capitalist accumulation (which requires constant economic growth) and the 
value of existing capital assets (since inflation reduces the buying power of money over time). In 
contrast, the neoliberal/monetarist framework regarded free capital flows and currency stability as 
essential to market efficiency and therefore required domestic spending and full employment goals 
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to be subordinated to these fiscal priorities (Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor, 2003; Best, 2005; see 
also Chapter 3 discussion of financial globalisation and the macroeconomic policy trilemma).  
 
From the late 1970s onwards, the Fordist mode of capital accumulation also underwent an 
important shift. Accumulation based on returns on investment in industrial production was under 
threat as the spatial and temporal inertia of commodity production/ consumption in inflationary 
environments led to diminishing returns. Meanwhile, the opportunities for accumulation offered by 
financial market investment were expanding and massive amounts of capital began to gravitate 
towards the financial system (Sweezy, 1997; Harvey, 1999; Bellamy Foster, 2008). As noted above, 
by the end of the 1970s, the scale of global financial markets exceeded world GDP. This financial 
deepening and shift in the primary mode of accumulation towards ‘financialization’ (Sweezy, 1997) 
was facilitated by the new modes of trading made possible by new communication technologies 
(NCTs) and new financial instruments (NFIs) along with the relaxation of controls on international 
capital flows. Thus the shifts in macroeconomic paradigm and primary mode of capital accumulation 
are intertwined with adjustments in the relations among state, capital and civil society.  
 
The relentless drive of institutional investors operating in global financial markets to maximise and 
accelerate the returns on capital exerts an increasing pressure on corporations which are obliged to 
reduce costs and maximise production and profitability in order to meet transitory shareholder 
expectations (Henwood, 1998). The accumulation imperatives of finance capital have begun to 
exert potentially unsustainable pressures on industrial capital (Jesson, 1999; Froud et al. 2000). 
CEOs and CFOs are often obliged to focus their business strategies on short-term efficiency gains 
to maximise share-price as well as (or even at the expense of) the long-term stability of their 
companies (as exemplified by the collapse of Enron). Increasingly, corporations have adopted 
strategic information strategies to manage how company news is communicated to investors in 
order to optimise share value (Golding, 2003; Davis, 2006a, 2007).  
 
Concomitant with these developments, the parameters of domestic macroeconomic policy available 
to national government are becoming shaped by negotiations in politically remote supranational 
trade and finance forums (such as the WTO, OECD, APEC, and WEF, as well as the IMF and 
World Bank). Civil society typically has minimal formal representation and potentially binding policy 
decisions are largely insulated from direct democratic accountability. Although national 
governments remain principal actors in these forums, they may find themselves under pressure to 
adopt neoliberal policies in order to attract foreign investment, maintain business confidence and 
avoid capital flight (see Hope, 1998; Chossudovsky, 1999; Singh, 1999). Particularly in developing 
countries, domestic economies are vulnerable to the shifting perceptions and sentiments of offshore 
traders (see Rothkopf, 1999; Kunczik, 2002).  
 
The volatility of contemporary financial markets has been underscored by a series of recent crises 
and panics. For example, the 1997-98 South East Asian currency crisis, and the global ‘credit 
crunch’ that followed in the wake of the 2007 US sub-prime mortgage crisis (still unfolding at the 
time of writing) have had significant consequences for the lives of many ordinary people with no 
direct involvement therein. Even in countries with more robust economies which have not suffered 
from major market crashes or sudden currency devaluations, the threat of capital and industrial 
production migrating to countries with cheaper labour, weaker unions and lower taxes imposes 
economic contingencies, uncertainties and pressures on lifeworld conditions which cannot be 
negotiated through appeal to democratic process and which are regarded as externalities by 
financial market actors. Likewise, even within ostensibly democratic societies, the social contract 
between civil society and nation-state does not readily extend to remote, off-shore shareholders, 
fund managers and investment bankers (Mooers, 1999; see also Sassen, 1996).  
 
Although financial market hazards of this nature are not entirely new, the underlying mechanisms 
remain obscure to the vast majority of people. However, the repercussions of financial crises on the 
lifeworld (e.g. inflation, job losses) may accentuate civil society’s awareness that its exposure to 
financial risk is incurred through political-economic arrangements intended to accommodate the 
accumulation imperatives of global capital (Hope, 1998). Public misgivings about the exposure of 
the lifeworld to financial markets’ lack of accountability represent a potential crisis of legitimation for 
capitalism, ironically at the ostensible zenith of its ideological ascendancy. In that regard, the public 
protests against globalisation and capitalism at meetings of the World Trade Organisation and 
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World Economic Forum, however disparate or vague in focus, might be regarded as nascent 
expressions of the disjuncture and reconfiguration of relations between (and within) state, capital 
and civil society. On that point, it is clear that there is also the potential for disjuncture between the 
interests and priorities of domestic and global capital and also between industrial and financial 
capital (see Henwood, 1998; Bellamy Foster, 2008).  
 
Phenomena such as the 1997-98 Asian currency crisis and the 2000-01 ‘dot-com’ bubble  (which 
saw companies whose profits were merely figments of speculators’ collective imaginations being 
traded on the Nasdaq for billions of dollars) raised important questions about the rationality and 
sustainability of the financial markets. These concerns have not been restricted to the political left, 
but have been acknowledged by high-profile proponents of capitalism and free markets. For 
example, in 1996 the (then) Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, famously expressed his 
concern about the ‘irrational exuberance’ that had driven financial market values out of proportion to 
the industrial economy (Greenspan, 1996; see also Shiller, 2000). The prescience of his recognition 
that the increasing deepening, complexity and leveraging of financial market activity also entailed 
an increasing fragility whereby the failure of a single institution or minor crisis could generate a 
global systemic crisis has only become apparent in hindsight. Similarly, former World Bank chief 
economist, George Stiglitz (2002) has called for greater regulation of financial markets. Meanwhile, 
even some of the world’s most successful investors such as George Soros (2002) and Warren 
Buffett (2003) have respectively warned of financial market irrationality and unpredictability and the 
potential for new modes of trading to generate volatility and crisis.  
 
At the time of writing (late 2008) the financial markets are in the midst of what appears to be a near-
systemic crisis related to a loss of liquidity in the inter-bank lending system and a drying-up of the 
global availability of credit (see later analysis). This so-called global ‘credit crunch’ has already seen 
trillions of dollars wiped off the value of stock exchanges  (inviting comparisons with 1929), and the 
implosion of the value of entire classes of financial security (notably mortgage-backed collateralised 
debt obligations or CDOs). The long-term consequences of the crisis are still unfolding, but its 
impact has already seen financial giants like Lehman Brothers file for bankruptcy and other major 
Wall Street institutions such as Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch bought out after facing potentially 
massive losses. Interestingly, the ‘credit crunch’ has also precipitated unprecedented state 
intervention in the financial markets, with the US government having already invested $700 billion to 
rescue struggling banks and prop up an increasingly fragile financial system (with even larger future 
packages being mooted by Congress and similar bail-outs under consideration by governments 
across the EU).  
 
The bail-outs (and buy-outs) of vulnerable banks by governments is intended to boost market 
confidence and increase the availability of credit (and hence market liquidity). But such measures 
are ideologically problematic across the political spectrum and are certainly misaligned with the 
monetarist tenet that the state’s role in the economy should be minimal. The crisis is still unfolding, 
so even short-term projections about the implications of such intervention are uncertain (see BBC, 1 
November 2008). The current moves in the USA, UK and several other countries towards 
nationalising parts of the banking system are certainly not inspired by any socialist agenda, nor do 
they mark a return to a Keynesian macroeconomic model. Nevertheless, the scale of the crisis 
would seem to indicate that the ideological certainties of the monetarist macroeconomic paradigm 
have been undermined in spectacular fashion. In Harvey’s (1999) and Jessop’s (2000) terms, the 
capitalist system has generated precisely the kind of systemic crisis of accumulation that Marx 
anticipated, and the primary state and market agents of capitalism are now seeking a new 
spatial/temporal ‘fix’ and a set of international institutional arrangements that can restore and 
restabilise economic growth.  
 
An important issue arising here concerns the extent to which global financial markets have become 
increasingly autonomous from other social spheres and institutionally desensitised to non-financial 
externalities and indeed, the impact of financial markets on the polity and lifeworld. The interface 
through which financial agents engage with the networks of interconnected trading floors and 
exchanges is constituted by arrays of electronic screens displaying a phenomenal range of market 
data and analytic charts. But in the operational schemata of the financial trader, at least during the 
process of making decisions about where to move capital, no significance is attached to factors 
unrelated to the instrumental calculus of accumulation. The aggregate, non-financial implications of 
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financial market activity are therefore externalities. Insofar as unemployment, industrial pollution, or 
longer-term declines in the industrial economy are taken into account in trading floor decisions, it is 
usually only because such data helps inform the models being deployed to optimise returns on 
investment. 
 
Given the scale of financial market activity and the seeming indifference of investment institutions to 
externalities that have profound effects on the lives of ordinary people with no direct involvement in 
finance, it can be tempting to suppose that the financial markets have become a kind of closed, 
autopoietic system whose increasingly obscure, symbolic, self-referential and self-replicating 
functions have minimal connection either to the industrial economy or the lifeworld (see Baudrillard, 
1975; 1981). However, it is important not to overstate how far the financial system has become 
differentiated or disembedded from other spheres of society (Jessop, 2001a, 2001b). It is 
problematic to proceed on the assumption that financial markets have become radically 
disembedded through some teleological/ epochal shift into a postmodern era. differentiation (or de-
differentiation) among the various social subsystems in contrast to their integrated embeddedness 
in some former pre-industrial period (see Granovetter, 1985; Fligstein, 2001; also discussion on 
embeddedness in later chapters). The global financial markets clearly retain important (albeit 
complex) connections to the industrial economy, state and civil society/ lifeworld, and their 
continued function still depends on various regulatory/ policy regimes as well as production/ 
consumption of goods and services in the industrial economy. The contention of this thesis is not 
that markets have become more or less embedded but that the nature of their embedding has 
changed such that the financial sphere has imposed its instrumental fiscal priorities non-reciprocally 
on the other social spheres/ arenas.  
 
This is not only because of endogenous increases in the complexity and scale of financial market 
activity, but also because of important ideological and macro-economic policy shifts across other 
spheres/ arenas that have facilitated financial market expansion. Such re-embedding needs to be 
understood as part of a continuing series of spatial-temporal fixes (Harvey, 1999, 2003) or re-
regulations (Aglietta, 1979; Jessop, 2001a, 2001b). These are required to stabilise and sustain the 
capitalist system of accumulation through increasing the ratio of returns on capital investments over 
ever-shorter periods. Such ‘fixes’ are not one-off events but an evolving set of contingent 
institutional and policy arrangements involving a range of political and economic agents whose 
strategic interests may converge and diverge at different times (Jessop, 2001a, 2001b; Best, 2005; 
Sassen 2006). Arrangements developed in response to one threat to accumulation (such as the 
current set of government-backed bail-outs of the banking sector in response to the ‘credit crunch’) 
may inadvertently give rise to new codifications of financial practices which then generate 
subsequent crises. Consequently, the reconfiguration of relations with other social spheres/arenas 
as they attempt to accommodate financial imperatives can entail complex disjunctures and 
dislocations.  
 
For example, the imperative of institutional investors to exploit even the tiniest marginal differences 
in the returns on investments and the need to base calculations thereof upon reliable estimates of 
potential price volatility (Henwood, 1998; Golding, 2003) may translate into the imposition of 
perverse incentives on publicly- traded companies to meet profit expectations (see Singh, 1999; 
Jesson, 1999; Froud et al., 2000). Companies may respond to relentless shareholder demand for 
increased profitability (in terms of dividends and share-price increases) by transferring operations 
overseas to reduce taxation, wage expenditure, regulatory compliance costs, or sometimes cutting 
jobs to meet short-term earnings targets (even when this threatens the company’s longer-term 
sustainability). There is concomitant pressure on companies to manage price-sensitive information 
flows in order to maintain market confidence and share value (Golding, 2003; Davis, 2006a, 2007). 
This was evidently an important factor in the Enron debacle (see Blackburn, 2002).  
 
The scale, velocity, complexity, and opaqueness of contemporary financial markets periodically 
raise questions about their rationality and morality, especially during periods of crisis when 
implosions of value in the financial sector have tangible repercussions for the industrial economy 
and the lifeworld (Hope, 1998). However, to sustain such a critique, it is not sufficient to invoke 
populist mythologies of the intrinsic irrationality or greed of investors because these do not provide 
an empirically convincing explanation of why investors behave in particular ways. As Leyshon & 
Thrift (2007) suggest, it is not helpful to assume a priori that the scale and complexity of financial 
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trading is intrinsically problematic, although these factors may reduce the transparency of markets 
and render regulation/ surveillance more difficult. The intrinsic complexity of financial investment 
instruments may render them inscrutable by the layperson (and arguably the average financial 
journalist) and encourage mythologisation as a substitute for analysis of the processes they 
embody.  
 
However, as  Bryan & Rafferty (2006) observe, it is not adequate to single out a particular element 
of the financial system such as derivatives or collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and contend 
that their very nature renders them dysfunctional or normatively suspect, then metonymically 
attribute all the ostensible problems in the financial markets to them (although that has not 
prevented prolific investors from making just such assertions; e.g. Warren Buffet’s [2003] criticism of 
derivatives as ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’). The tendency to blame crises on the latest 
financial innovation is somewhat reminiscent of the moral panics over media effects, which have 
ascribed nefarious influences to everything from comic books and television to video games and the 
internet. The positing of overly-simple causalities to either media or new financial instruments is 
both empirically and heuristically unsatisfactory because this tacitly places the phenomena in 
question in a ‘black box’, offering a mythical explanation that occludes the need for further analysis.  
 
Scepticism about such claims is therefore necessary, but it is nevertheless important not to dismiss 
the significance of particular financial innovations in helping precipitate crises (see Minsky, 1977, 
1982; Kindleberger, 1996).  Analysis of precisely how new financial instruments (NFIs) and new 
communication technologies (NCTs) might be implicated in the destabilisation of markets and the 
reconfiguration of the relations between the financial sphere, the industrial economy, state and civil 
society is needed. The contention of this thesis is that such analysis requires consideration of 
communication processes in financial market activity.   
 
Concerns about financial markets have a long history, of course, and in certain respects (such as 
the geographical extension of financial investments, occurrence of speculative scandals/ company 
collapses and involvement of the general public) they are arguably neither more globalised nor 
prone to bubbles and crises than in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries (see Minsky, 1977; 
Kindleberger, 1996; Held et al., 1999). Although continuities need to be acknowledged6, a 
compelling argument can nevertheless be made that from the 1970s onwards, technological 
developments, particularly the convergence of computer, satellite and telecommunication systems, 
along with institutional and regulatory changes, led to important and unprecedented changes in the 
way financial markets function. These include: 
 
1. Substantial increases in the velocity, volume and extension of financial market activity as well 
as transborder capital and market information flows.  
2. Spatial-temporal reconfigurations of the networks of interaction interconnecting the key 
spaces/nodes in which financial decisions/ investment transactions take place.  
3. Financial deepening in terms of the ratio of the scale of financial markets to the industrial 
economy (see earlier statistics) and the increasing proportion of financial sector revenue in 
company profits.   
4. The emergence of new financial models, new financial investment instruments (NFIs) and new 
modalities of trading, which in turn entail shifts in the calculation (and commodification) of 
financial risk and the interlinkage between various financial securities. 
5. The expansion and acceleration of financial market information production/ dissemination, 
simultaneously facilitating and intensifying the demand for real-time market monitoring and 
constant streams of data on an increasing range of financial variables (reflecting the new 
financial models and modes of trading).   
 
                                                 
6
 For example, Held et al. (1999) point out, the markets of the late 19th Century were arguably global in their 
spatial extensity, although contemporary volumes of trading exhibit greater velocity and intensity. Barnett et al. 
(1999) meanwhile, point out that the flows of trade, telecommunications, and money continue to follow the 
broad contours of the World System, and in some respects the spatial topography of global markets is  
becoming increasingly concentrated in ‘core’ nations (although the growth of GDP in India, China and Brazil 
over the last decade would now modify this observation).  
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The development of increasingly sophisticated financial media and communication systems not only 
serve to provide more market information, faster; they have also been a crucial factor in facilitating 
the exponential increases in the velocity, extension and volume of global capital flows. Indeed, in 
several respects, communication processes are not just representative of, but actively constitute 
financial market reality. For example, the electronic infrastructure which permits the dissemination 
of market news, also comprises the channels through which trading transactions are themselves 
mediated and through which feedback about market activity is monitored. Moreover the meaning 
ascribed to financial discourses and specific informational signals (such as ask/bid displays on 
trading screens or analyst buy/sell recommendations) are more than just some form of 
superstructural icing overlaid on the base economy ‘cake’. Indeed, such communicative processes 
are responsible for constantly recreating (and destroying) financial values. Thus the networks of 
institutional actors whose aggregate agency determines the trajectory of global capital flows and 
whose intersubjective meanings collectively determine the daily fluctuations of prices are also the 
locus of potentially immense political-economic power.  Financial communication/ information 
systems therefore play an integral role in the financial markets’ influence on the global economy as 
well as on national economic, political and social conditions. Precisely what role they have played 
requires a closer empirical examination of the production, distribution and reception of news and 
information within financial markets.   
 
A critical political economic approach with a focus on media and communication can provide a 
framework capable of highlighting key regulatory, financial and institutional arrangements that drive 
and constrain global market processes and the activities of related media/communication systems, 
particularly on a macro-structural level (see, for example, Bryan, 2001; Kunczik, 2002; Hope, 2006). 
However, explaining the role of information, mediation and symbolic processes in financial markets 
also necessitates the incorporation of theories, concepts and empirical material across several 
other academic disciplines/fields, including behavioural finance, economic geography economic 
sociology and cultural economy. For example, socio-cultural frameworks can be particularly helpful 
in understanding specific agencies of market actors on a micro-institutional level (see Knorr-Cetina 
& Bruegger, 2002a; Beunza & Stark, 2004). Moreover, socio-cultural approaches to finance are vital 
in analysis of the symbolic forms that constitute market transactions and through which financial 
values are generated (see Simmel, 1990; Zelizer, 1994; Pryke & Allen, 2000).  
 
Significantly, these theories imply that the expansion of the financial market values central to 
contemporary capital accumulation regimes are ontologically inseparable from the theories and 
concepts market actors deploy to define and analyse market events and performatively ascribe 
intersubjective meanings to them (see Callon, 1998; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). Furthermore, such 
analyses suggest that there is reflexive relation between financial market reality and financial 
information; rather than being representative of an external/ independent set of market conditions, 
some forms of financial information may directly constitute those conditions. This underlines the 
importance of understanding how that information is produced, disseminated and interpreted, and 
invites questions concerning power and control over financial media and investor usage thereof. 
However, these processes are potentially significant in explaining macro-level processes such as 
the implications of financial market activity for other social spheres, including industry and 
government. As Leyshon & Thrift (2007) observe, socio-cultural analyses of financialization have 
often emphasised either the macro-level questions of how far the symbolic/ cultural dimensions of 
finance lead to changes in the industrial economy, the polity and the lifeworld, or the micro-cultural 
dimensions of investment institutions and trading practices. However, the links between the two 
often remain unarticulated. This is an import reason why this thesis intends to examine the 
communication/ media processes underpinning financial trading activity at the same time as it 
draws on those findings to make observations about the reconfiguration of relations among state 
capital and civil society. 
 
This needs both a political economic and a cultural economic perspective to work in tandem; if a 
seamless metatheoretical synthesis is not possible, then at least they need to be induced to hold 
hands for long enough for one to inform the other. However, incorporating cultural economic 
conceptions into a political-economic framework necessitates a metatheoretical reformulation of the 
structural/material conception of the economic ‘base’ to break down its classical dichotomous 
relation with the ‘superstructure’. More specifically, it requires an analytic framework that can meld 
together insights from political economy and cultural studies while avoiding fundamental 
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inconsistencies that may stem from a casual eclectic fudging of structural and agency-based 
analyses.  
 
The development of a bespoke framework suited to such a task requires a modification of the 
typical narrative sequence of  presenting a review of relevant literature in order to identify the 
relevant themes and gaps in the field prior to the specification of research questions. The range of 
material that needs to be discussed and synthesised means that it would be cumbersome to 
present the entirety of the literature review prior to the specification of the research questions. A 
brief overview of the empirical dimension of the project will therefore be presented in the 
subsequent section in order to give the reader a prior sense of the central issues that will drive the 
project. The review of the literature and the refinement of the theoretical framework will then be 
developed concurrently across several subsequent chapters and sections.  
 
 
Empirical approach  
 
The project intends to investigate the political economy of the relationship between communication/ 
information systems and financial markets, which as mentioned, requires the incorporation of a 
cultural economy perspective to take account of the symbolic aspects of capital and the reflexive 
relationship between market conditions and financial information. Studying how the institutional 
investors whose collective agency drives the enormous daily flows of capital through the global 
communication networks actually make use of various financial media/information sources will help 
to explain the nature of that relation in more detail and also provide data from which inferences can 
be made about the broader shifts in the configuration of connections between financial markets, 
industry, civil society and the state.  
 
A study of media and information usage of institutional traders and analysts in New Zealand will be 
the empirical component of this thesis. Although New Zealand is a small market in global terms, 
there are some sound reasons for choosing it, apart from the practical considerations of researcher 
location and the availability of contacts in local financial institutions. Firstly, the size of the local 
financial markets means that major institutional investors will have significant operations outside the 
NZ market (and indeed, many of the larger institutions are branches of much larger global 
investment corporations) and a relatively high proportion of their investment activities will involve 
internationally traded securities (a point confirmed by preliminary discussions with finance 
professionals). Particularly in the case of local branches of global financial institutions such as 
investment banks, traders and analyst activity is necessarily coordinated with the global strategies 
of their parent organisation. In this regard, the relatively small size of the New Zealand financial 
markets (NZ stock capitalization was NZ$62 billion in April 2008; NZX, 2008) and the relatively 
limited volume of Kiwi dollars in the international money markets means they are particularly 
sensitive to influence from global market trends. For example, there was a spate of currency 
speculation in the Kiwi dollar in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and consequent 
instability of the US dollar, caused by overseas investor capital seeking more stable currencies to 
hold. The surge in demand required central bank intervention to reduce the money market 
exchange rate of the Kiwi dollar in order to cool speculation and price volatility and also to avoid its 
creeping value from affecting NZ exports (NZ Herald, 18 June 2007).  
 
Secondly, New Zealand underwent some of the most radical neoliberal reforms in the OECD during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Jesson, 1999). Although the New Zealand economy is considered relatively 
advanced, it is highly deregulated and provides an interesting example of a developed market 
economy which arguably comes close to the neoclassical ‘ideal’. Thirdly, although the majority of 
the literature from which the core theoretical arguments have been developed originate from 
outside New Zealand, this also means that the study may help confirm whether some of the global 
financial market trends identified in this literature are also apparent in smaller markets. 
 
The main empirical study entailed a survey of 65 institutional traders and analysts generating 132 
separate data sets across 4 financial market areas/ asset classes. The data sets were generated 
from a survey (on-line and mail) including 66 Likert-scale questions soliciting ratings of the 
perceived importance and objectivity of 25 different financial media/ information sources and  16 
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different types of market information. The survey also included an optional section inviting open-
ended responses to questions about media usage in the financial markets.  
 
The survey data was supplemented by 41 in-depth interviews with a range of financial traders 
analysts, and other finance professionals (including two financial reporters). The majority of these 
were conducted during a series of visits to  Deutsche Bank, ANZ National Bank and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand. These visits also included several periods of access to the trading floors of 
those institutions, during which time non-participant observation of trading activities was possible.  
 
The focus of the proposed research and some basic data collection and methodological 
considerations are indicated in the table below.  
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Fig. 2  Primary Research Questions and Methods 
 
 
Research Question Data Required Method of Collection/ 
Analysis 
RQ1 How have communication-
related changes in these 
markets since the 1970s 
contributed to a reconfiguration 
of the wider social relations 
between state, capital and civil 
society?  
Secondary literature and 
statistics on financial 
globalisation; case 
studies of financial crises 
and impacts on 
government policy, social 
welfare or democratic 
process.  
Develop theoretical 
framework emphasising 
symbolic/ communicative 
processes in financial 
markets and apply to 
secondary examples to 
demonstrate connections.  
RQ2 How do institutional finance 
professionals in New Zealand 
prioritise different types of 
media and information to inform 
their investment decisions? 
Trader and analyst meta-
knowledge about media 
usage and perceptions of 
traders & analysts in 
regard to the importance 
and/or objectivity of 
different types of media 
and information in their 
professional work.  
-Exploratory quantitative 
survey of institutional traders 
and analysts in New Zealand 
-Triangulation through in-
depth interviews with traders 
and analysts  
-Non-participant observation 
of trading room activity.  
RQ3 What are the implications of the 
empirical data on media usage 
and perceptions of media and 
information importance/ 
objectivity for the theories of 
informational reflexivity in 
financial market processes? 
Data analysis from RQ2 -Statistical correlations of 
perceived media/source 
importance with perceived 
media/ source objectivity.  
-Correlations between 
perceived media/ source 
importance and perceived 
importance of different types 
of market information. 
-Triangulation with evidence 
from interviews and 
observations.  
RQ4 Are there convergences and 
divergences in perceptions of 
media importance and 
objectivity across different 
financial market-types?  
 
Break-down of data from 
RQ2 into asset/market 
categories of 
stocks/equities; 
bonds/interest rates; 
currencies; derivatives 
-Statistical analysis of survey 
data on trader and analyst 
perceptions of 
media/information.  
RQ5 To what extent are the findings 
generally consistent with claims 
that financial markets have 
become more or less 
democratic/ publicly accessible 
and  accountable.  
Analysis of RQ2-4 plus 
consideration of findings 
in context of RQ1   
-Use findings from survey 
and interviews to determine 
whether the media/sources 
and/or information types 
most important to institutional 
investors are likely to be 
publicly available. 
-Use findings to reflect on 
theoretical framework and 
evidence/ cases from 
secondary literature to 
confirm or invalidate 
arguments about financial 
reflexivity, autopoiesis and 
impact on civil society.  
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical Frameworks 
 
 
Economics and Political Economy 
 
There are both academic and social policy reasons for interrogating the way contemporary financial 
markets operate, not only in terms of the internal, institutional processes underpinning trading and 
investment, but also the implications of these processes for other sectors of the economy and their 
relations with and impacts on state and civil society. However, orthodox economic theory has 
tended to emphasise the formal modelling of economic behaviour and rational decision-making, and 
has paid relatively little attention either to the potential disjunctures emerging between finance 
capital and industrial capital or to other spheres of society. Indeed, particularly in regard to 
neoclassical approaches, non-economic social institutions such as the state are regarded as the 
principal source of financial inefficiency and market distortion (see Attari & Mello, 2003; Edwards, 
2002; Ju & Wei, 2007; Kerr, 2008; Stanton, 2008). Although neoclassical approaches do recognise 
the importance of information in market processes and pricing systems (e.g. see Hayek, 1945; 
Stigler, 1961), this tends to be conceived in mechanistic terms, assuming that market prices are an 
expression of all available market information, accurately reflecting external, objective economic 
conditions (Shleifer, 2000).  
 
The issue of the (a)symmetrical distribution and access to market information is prominent in some 
of the literature (e.g. Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970). However, formal neoclassical analyses tend to 
conceive of communication as an automatic and mechanistic transmission process, while 
information is presumed to exhibit an unproblematic representational correspondence to market 
reality and needing no processing by rational financial actors. Crucially, this perspective overlooks 
communication processes involving polysemic interpretations (Babe, 1995), the operations of media 
systems in the production of the information upon which investment decisions are based, and also 
the institutional factors shaping the motives and relations among financial actors who make capital 
investment decisions. Critical, substantive analysis of global financial market activity and its 
significance for the reconfiguration of relations among state, capital and civil society and the 
communication processes within them must therefore draw on material from outside the economic 
mainstream.  
 
Several relevant areas of social theory will be briefly outlined below in order to indicate the 
theoretical grounding of the study being proposed here, and also to indicate how and why a 
communication perspective can make a specific contribution to the analysis. Once the study’s broad 
metatheoretical assumptions have been explained, a brief commentary on the work on economics 
and finance in the communication studies literature will be included to identify theoretical and 
empirical gaps and provide a rationale for the empirical focus of the study. A more complete 
discussion of specific literature will be developed in subsequent sections, but the range of material 
to be considered necessitates a preliminary overview here. 
 
Although much of the academic work of interest here originates from outside mainstream 
economics, there are nevertheless several areas of economic theory which provide potentially 
useful frameworks for progressing the type of analysis being proposed. In particular, behavioural 
finance studies have provided empirical psychological analyses of investor decision-making which 
complement (and in some cases, correct) formal models of market efficiency, rationality and utility-
maximisation (e.g. Shiller, 2000; Shleifer, 2000). The emphasis on market psychology raises 
important questions about the production, distribution and reception of the market information 
investors respond to, and suggests that, at least periodically, investors can be prone to herd-
behaviour, following short-term trends or market ‘noise’ rather than the evidence of market 
fundamentals. This work has also raised important questions about the institutional conditions 
under which market information is generated and disseminated and also the relationships between 
financial analysts, traders and media reporters.  
 
Such findings have been complemented by work on the relationship between investor psychology,  
market cycles, and financial bubbles/crises. Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (1977; 
1982) is especially relevant here, since his extension of Keynes’ work links investor psychology to 
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credit cycles and identifies an intrinsic financial market tendency toward periodic crisis endogenous 
to the capitalist system itself. While these approaches offer a stronger empirical basis for 
understanding how the financial markets operate, they do not, in and of themselves, provide a 
sufficiently broad theoretical framework for pursuing the normative and political implications of their 
findings beyond the economic sphere.  
 
An alternative possibility for progressing the analysis comes from the political-economy tradition. 
Contemporary reinterpretations of the classical liberalism of Smith and Ricardo (or at least 
contemporary interpretations thereof) have provided the framework for the macroeconomic 
prescriptions insisting on the efficiency of free-market mechanisms in both economic and social 
policy since the 1970s. The subordination of Keynesian policy models (emphasising autonomy in 
domestic spending and full employment) to monetarist imperatives (emphasising free trans-border 
capital flows, floating currency markets and low inflation) has helped facilitate the liberalisation of 
global trade relations through the progressive disestablishment or quarantining of state regulations. 
The theoretical and normative assumptions of the neoclassical/ neoliberal models, especially 
concerning the functional efficiency of capital allocation and the rational agency of individual market 
actors are problematic, however. Recent market bubbles and crises, along with the accumulated 
empirical evidence from studies of financial trading activity, suggest that the financial markets are 
neither rational nor efficient in the way contemporary liberal political economic perspectives assume 
(Henwood, 1998).  
 
Nevertheless, neoliberals point to the increasing availability of new publicly-accessible information 
and communication technologies (notably the internet) which provide non-institutional investors with 
an interface with financial news and trading systems as evidence of the increasing democratisation 
of the global financial markets (Friedman, 1999; Emmons, 1999; Norberg, 2003; Shiller, 2003; see 
also Pineiro et al., 20057) although other economic analyses are more sceptical (see Frank, 2000; 
Jomo, 2001; Haley, 2001, Erturk et al., 20078). Claims of financial democratisation are evidently 
limited by class-related factors such as differences in access to technology, education, and of 
course, capital itself. The nature of such economic structural arrangements and their normative 
implications are not easily addressed from a neoliberal perspective. However, this is, of course, a 
central concern of the (neo)Marxist political economy tradition, and insofar as this study constitutes 
both an empirical examination and an immanent critique of contemporary global financial capitalism, 
the theoretical and normative assumptions of the neoliberal politics and economics need to be 
recognised and problematised.  
 
Marx’s critique of the rise of industrial capitalism and its structural contradictions relates economic 
processes to wider political and normative-ideological arrangements. Marx’s (1996) framework 
primarily explains the structural changes in the emergence of 19th Century capitalist society. His 
analysis in Das Kapital is suspicious of financial accumulation because the generation of surplus 
value through ‘fictitious’ capital is inconsistent with the labour theory of value. Marx’s analysis of 
different accumulation circuits and the role of monetary forms in facilitating a shift from economic 
production based on use-value (C-M-C) towards exchange value (M-C-M’) and eventually to non-
productive financial exchange (M-M’) is nevertheless useful for two reasons: Firstly, it distinguishes 
between the modes of realising surplus value in the industrial economy and in the financial markets. 
Secondly, it provides the basis for understanding how capital’s imperative to realise surplus value 
leads to the spatial extension of markets (characteristic of economic globalisation and moves 
toward deregulation in the 20th Century) and also how the drive to temporally compress 
accumulation cycles to optimise the realisation of surplus value leads to crisis. Applying Marx’s 
framework to the workings of financial markets as they have evolved since the 1970s necessitates 
further theoretical development however.  
 
                                                 
7
 Interestingly, Pineiro et al.’s (2005) study examined whether political democratization had a positive impact 
on economic growth and market efficiency, implying that democracy was not conceived as a desirable end in 
itself but as a means to realising economic/ financial ends. 
8
 Erturk et al. (2007) point out that the claims made by proponents of the ‘democratization of finance’ thesis 
regarding the opportunities for all households to make money through financial investment is overstated, 
notably because of the lack of financial literacy and the opacity of financial products to non-experts.  
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Harvey’s analyses of how spatial-temporal reconfigurations of capital provide ‘fixes’ to accumulation 
crises (1999; 2003) have usefully updated and extended Marx’s insights, while other economic 
geographers have examined how the growth and extension of global financial markets has entailed 
a reconfiguration of economic space and interaction. Such work is complemented by ‘regulationist’ 
school analyses of the destabilisation of relations between state, capital and civil society arising in 
response to changes in modes of economic production and accumulation and how the autopoiesis 
of the global financial subsystem may complicate realignment with other social systems (Jessop, 
2001b). This framework is complemented by the analysis of socially constructed risk insofar as 
these changes can be understood as responses to uncertainty (Beck, 1999). This is particularly 
important in regard to financial markets where the calculation, commodification and transfer of 
economic risk is a central feature of contemporary modes of trading (MacKenzie, 2002, 2003a; 
Bryan & Rafferty, 2006).  
 
Another political economy tradition, originating with Veblen and Galbraith, emphasises institutional 
analysis, how decisions and actions of agents are enabled or constrained in institutional context 
(Babe, 1995; Mosco, 1996). Institutional political economy rejects the formal rationality and free 
agency ascribed to the individual in the liberal tradition and also the class-related structural 
determinism of  (vulgar) interpretations of Marx. It is also suspicious of the normative prescriptions 
of liberalism and Marxism and therefore tends to emphasise a more empirical approach to 
analysing power relations and economic transactions. Importantly, institutional analyses recognise 
that individual agents undertake action in arenas constituted by the interplay (and contestation) of 
diverse institutional norms, interests and power-relations (Flew, 2006; Thompson, 2007). Power and 
interests are not fixed structural conditions but inhere in the arenas of interrelations among 
institutional actors (see Hindess, 1989). Moreover, a conception of social structures as contingent 
networks of inter-institutional relations that are potentially impermanent and subject to contestation/ 
renegotiation can help build a framework for relating economic processes to political and cultural 
ones and also micro-level action to social systems.  
 
Economic Sociology, Cultural Economy, and Market Embeddedness  
 
Accounts of the historical evolution of social/economic epochs typically posit that economic activity 
in traditional society is inextricably embedded/ entangled in socio-cultural and political practices and 
spaces but becomes increasingly differentiated from other arenas/ spaces of social action as 
modern industrial society emerges (see Polanyi, 1957; also compare with Tonnies’ 2001 [1887] 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft).   
 
The need to identify the nature of the articulation between economic and financial processes and 
other spheres of social action has also been a prominent theme in the growing body of work in the 
sociology and social geography of economics and finance (e.g. Smelser & Swedberg, 1994; Dodd, 
1994; Zelizer, 1994; Leyshon & Thrift, 1997; Callon, 1998; Slater & Tonkiss, 2001; Dobbin, 2004; 
Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2005).  These works encompass a range of perspectives on different market 
phenomena, but there is a common acknowledgement that economic/ financial exchanges 
facilitated through monetary forms are phenomena embedded in social political and cultural 
relations, and cannot be adequately  understood through formal economic frameworks alone.  
 
The sociology of monetary forms is an interesting case in point. The seminal work of Simmel (1990) 
and Weber (1964) and the more recent sociological and anthropological theorists (e.g. Dodd, 1994; 
Zelizer, 1994; Ingham, 2004) have highlighted the social, political and normative relations that 
underpin the generation and legitimation of monetary forms used to mediate economic transactions. 
Even market exchanges involving material goods with an objective physical form presuppose 
intersubjective agreement on matters such as transfers of property rights, valuation/pricing, and the 
mutual recognition of money forms to constitute payment and enact/ perform such transactions (see 
Chapter 7). In this sense, economic/ financial activity is necessarily embedded because it 
presupposes social processes of interaction involving shared codes and norms to demarcate 
particular channels/ modalities of economic action and coordinate the attribution of meanings/ 
values to those actions.  
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A range of anthropological/ ethnographic perspectives on economics and finance has also emerged 
parallel to these sociological developments. This ‘cultural turn’ encompasses a range of theoretical 
perspectives on various aspects of markets (e.g. see Abolafia, 1998; Ray & Sayer, 1999; Du Gay & 
Pryke, 2002; Amin & Thrift, 2004). Common to these analyses is recognition of the embedded 
nature of economic exchange in cultural relations and analytic foregrounding of the normative and 
symbolic dimensions of markets which render economic activity meaningful to different agents. 
Cultural economy has included analyses of discursive formations and economic (re)presentations, 
financial market aesthetics, identity-formation and spatial deterritorialization/ reconfigurations of 
markets.  
 
Of particular relevance to this study are anthropological perspectives on mediation, symbolic 
exchange and ethnography of financial institutional activity (e.g. Abolafia, 1998; Knorr-Cetina & 
Bruegger, 2002a, 2002b; Beunza & Stark, 2004). Indeed, the development of new computational 
and information/ communication technologies capable of processing/ manipulating symbolic forms 
has created new channels and networks of near-instantaneous interaction and given rise to 
complex new modes of economic action through new financial instruments (such as futures 
derivatives which can symbolically generate linkages of agency between materially unrelated 
markets/ securities across space and time- see Pryke & Allan, 2000).  
 
Recognition that the expansion of contemporary financial market activity has involved new forms of 
communication and symbolic exchange is central to this thesis, but that does not necessitate the 
assumption that markets have evolved an entirely new symbolic ontology in contrast to some earlier 
materialistic form. Some cultural studies and postmodern accounts of economics and finance have 
nevertheless pointed to a further epochal development as the industrial economy involving the re-
embedding or de-differentiation of the cultural and economic spheres of action, and even the 
superseding/ absorption of material economic processes by immaterial symbolic/ informational ones 
(e.g. Baudrillard, 1975, 1981; Jameson, 1991; Crook et al., 1992; Lash & Urry, 1994; see also 
Castells, 1996).  
 
The ‘cultural turn’ in economic analysis has not arisen from theoretical developments driven by 
corresponding changes in market phenomena. Apart from the potential for complex, 
reflexive/performative relationships to arise between economic/financial theories, discourses, 
practices and reality9, theoretical changes have derived largely from the deployment of new 
frameworks in the analysis of existing phenomena.  Accounts of economic disembedding and/or re-
embedding therefore need to clarify whether they are positing that markets themselves have 
undergone ontological, epochal shifts, or whether recent sociological/ anthropological analyses of 
markets have brought new epistemological frameworks to bear on existing socio-cultural 
dimensions of markets that orthodox economics had hitherto overlooked. Analyses of historical 
shifts in the articulation of the economic systems and institutions to cultural and political systems 
and institutions as different modes of production have evolved demonstrate the need to reformulate 
arguments which assume economic disembedding/ re-embedding. While the social relations, 
regulatory forms and cultural norms presupposed by any mode of economic production do change, 
they remain intrinsic and cannot be differentiated out of the economic sphere.  
 
For example, financial deregulation may change the nature and extent of state governance, but 
state-based legal systems continue to underpin market activity. The increasing autonomy of central/ 
reserve banks from domestic government policy does not reduce the political nature of their 
economic activities, such as setting official cash rates or defending a currency’s exchange rate. 
Likewise, although corporations and banks are criticised for overlooking the values and norms that 
obtain in lifeworld arenas (for example, in prioritising shareholder profits over concerns about 
impacts on unemployment or the environment), this in no way indicates that the normative aspects 
of their market activities have been excised. Rather, it indicates that they are underpinned by 
different norms and values within those arenas. While this may seem an obvious point, it is 
                                                 
9
 The reflexive or ‘performative’ relationship between economic theory knowledge and discourses and its 
potential not merely to represent but to constitute economic reality will be discussed in more detail later in 
relation to the communicative/ informational dimensions of financial markets. Note, however, that the 
recognition that  economic ontology and epistemology are intertwined renders the idea of economic information 
and theory simply ‘mirroring’ an external reality problematic.  
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necessary to make it, because functional/systemic accounts of the (dis)articulation between 
economic system and lifeworld can fail to account adequately for embeddedness if it is assumed 
that the lifeworld or cultural system is the necessary source of all normative/legitimation functions 
across all social spheres (see Habermas, 1984, 1987; Dodd, 1994).  
 
The assumption of functional exclusivity in the analysis of social systems becomes problematic 
when accounting for the embeddedness of market activities at the same time as their differentiation 
from other spheres of social activity (see Sayer, 200110).It is therefore important to distinguish 
between approaches which emphasise economic/financial, political and socio-cultural dimensions 
within economic/ financial arenas of action themselves (involving corporate and financial 
institutions/ actors) and those which emphasise economic/financial, political and socio-cultural 
articulations between economic/financial arenas and the arenas of political and socio-cultural 
activity (involving state and lifeworld institutions/ actors). Conceptualising embeddedness and 
differentiation as opposite poles of a single continuum can lead to an intractable tension between 
ontological and epistemological claims: i.e. if the analytical recognition of the cultural aspects of 
economic phenomena is taken as confirmation of the embeddedness of the economic system in the 
cultural system, it then seems contradictory to insist at the same time that the economic system (or 
the financial component thereof) has become differentiated from other social systems.  
 
As Granovetter (1985), Smelser & Swedberg (1994), Dodd (1994), Ray & Sayer (1999) and Du Gay 
& Pryke (2002) have recognised, economic disembedding does not entail the formation of rigidly-
defined subsystems of social function such that economic, political and socio-cultural processes 
become mutually exclusive. Such a formulation is inadequate because economic/ financial action in 
any society and in any epoch necessarily entails normative assumptions and power relations (such 
as the shared conventions and enforcement of property rights and institutionalised monetary forms; 
see Simmel, 1990, Fligstein, 2001).  In that respect, it is incorrect to assert that the economic 
sphere in late/ postmodern capitalist society has become intrinsically more embedded or more 
immaterial, symbolic or informational in form compared with some earlier epoch.  
 
The cultural turn’s ostensible rediscovery of the embedded nature of economic action does not 
necessitate positing that de-differentiation has occurred. On the contrary, so long as one does not 
assume that the embeddedness of activity in the economic/ financial sphere entails the same norms 
and the same power-relations as social actions within political or civil society/ lifeworld arenas there 
is no contradiction entailed in asserting that contemporary markets remain embedded in socio-
cultural and political relations while becoming increasingly differentiated from state and civil society/ 
lifeworld. Thus financial markets are always ‘embedded’ in the sense that all investment activity 
presupposes regulatory arrangements, as well as institutionalised norms and symbolic codes of 
interaction. This demands a theoretical framework inclusive of socio-cultural processes and power-
relations, However, financial markets are also ‘differentiated’ in the sense that there have been 
shifts the mode of articulation between global financial market processes and those in domestic 
political, lifeworld and industrial economic spaces. In this sense, the economic/ financial system has 
never been disembedded, nor has it recently become ‘more’ embedded; rather, economic/ financial 
activity has been re-embedded in terms of its articulation with social-cultural and political arenas in 
new ways over time.  
 
This recognition that economic action is inextricably embedded in social, normative and power-
relations does not mean that economic processes are necessarily subordinate to cultural or political 
formations either in terms of analytic priority or in terms of institutional power-relations (Sayer, 
2001). Intensification of the relative autonomy of global economic/ financial agents from the 
normative or regulatory constraints of national-level state or civic ones remains entirely possible 
                                                 
10
 Sayer’s (2001) interesting development of a critical cultural political economy framework, building on 
Habermas’ formulation encounters precisely this difficulty in places; e.g. ‘[C]oncrete examples of systems such 
as bureaucratic organisations or markets depend on the actions and, to some extent, the understandings of 
knowledgeable actors. In this sense they are always culturally embedded in and dependent on the lifeworld. 
[…] However, systems have ‘emergent powers’- that  is, powers dependent on but not reducible to the 
lifeworld. What differentiates [systems] from the lifeworld is that they routinise, formalise and govern actions 
through specific signals and rules, such as prices, money, accounting systems, bureaucratic rules and 
procedures, which standardise and fix relationships and responses…’ (2001, p. 698, emphasis added).  
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(see Jessop, 2001a). Financial market activity may have non-reciprocal consequences for industry’s 
ability to meet union wage demands, which in turn may have non-reciprocal influences on the 
wellbeing of families. To insist upon the recognition of embedding is therefore not to deny the 
potential for autopoiesis and the effective separation or subordination of lifeworld, democratic 
process or the industrial economy from/to the global financial markets. 
 
However, as Sayer (2001) and Jessop (2004) point out, cultural economy’s focus on agency and 
meaning, and empirical tendency towards descriptive ethnography sometimes overlooks the 
questions of structural power, control and interests which are central to political economic analysis, 
even though the insights it provides have important implications for these matters. For example, 
without an account of the socio-cultural aspects of economic/ financial activity, it is not possible to 
adequately explain the processes through which prices and values are determined. Neoclassical 
economics assumes that in a free market, information and rational agents drive the discovery of 
‘correct’ pricing corresponding to an objective market value (see Hayek, 1945; Babe, 1995). In 
contrast, Marxist analyses emphasise the centrality of labour-value but then encounter difficulties 
reconciling this with financial market activities not involving commodity exchange.   
 
Recognising the symbolic ontology of economic/ financial actions problematises the notion of 
correspondence between prices and values and, moreover, blurs any simple distinction between 
the representation and constitution of economic reality. This in turn raises fundamental questions 
about how processes of mediation, communication and the nature of information in markets might 
be understood. There is therefore an analytical imperative to integrate the insights from cultural 
economy into a political economy analysis (Sayer, 2001; Jessop, 2004). This requires the 
development of a framework capable of accounting for social structure and social action in order to 
avoid making incompatible metatheoretical assumptions. Despite recognition in the economic 
sociology/anthropology literature that financial activity involves symbolic processes and that 
communication systems play a crucial role in their operation, relatively few analyses actually 
foreground theories specific to communication processes and media systems (although see Jessop, 
2004; Graham, 2006). This may be a product of the academic division of labour between sociology, 
anthropology, economics and communication studies, and there has certainly been a growth in the 
latter field’s literature of economic and financial phenomena. The adoption of a framework 
foregrounding symbolic/communication processes and media systems is therefore intended to 
facilitate this.  
 
Social theories of structure and action 
 
A theoretical difficulty which emerges here is a familiar one in social theory; how to reconcile object-
oriented analyses of macro-level social structures and systems with subject-oriented micro-level 
accounts of individual or institutional agency. The need to move beyond theoretical accounts which 
presuppose an opposition between structure and agency has seen the development of various 
frameworks that account for the reproduction/ transformation of social relations through symbolic or 
communicative actions. Austin’s (1996) and Searle’s (1996) theories of performative speech acts, 
Mead’s (1964) and Blumer’s (1969) conceptions of symbolic interaction and Habermas’ work on 
communicative action (1984, 1987) all point to the generation and restructuring of social relations 
through the deployment of meaningful symbolic forms which not only represent but constitute and 
reflexively perform social actions.  
 
These insights are important when applied to economic/ financial phenomena because they 
indicate that the ontology of the ‘economic base’ in structural political economic analysis cannot be 
explained in terms of  material conditions ‘in the final instance’ (although clearly the physical world 
shape what kinds of exchanges might be possible).  The non-material symbolic/ communicative 
aspects of economic action are not some secondary, superstructural overlay over a primary, 
material base but an equally constitutive dimension. Even simple economic exchanges involving 
basic commodities such as food or clothing cannot be explained in terms of the material properties 
of those goods because the relations of the economic agents depends on the meanings ascribed to 
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those goods11. Economic meanings are therefore not reducible to base conditions. For example, 
economic exchanges involving monetary forms necessarily entail the coordination of intersubjective 
meanings to facilitate the mutual recognition of price/valuation, provision of payment/ legal tender 
and commensurate shifts in property rights between the transactors.  
 
The recognition that symbolic/ communicative processes and the intersubjective coordination of 
meaning are a constitutive dimension of the economic base therefore necessitates the integration of 
cultural economic and political economic perspectives. Mapping out a theoretical approach 
adequate for the purposes of this thesis, requires consideration of several frameworks developed to 
amalgamate or circumvent structural/object-based and agency/ subject-based perspectives.  
 
Actor Network Theory (see Latour, 1993; Callon, 1999; Law & Hassard, 1999) conceives of  social 
agency as emerging contextually in relation to one’s position/node in a network of relations to other 
agents. This recognises that the agency and interests of social actors is not fixed but formed 
contextually in relation to actors in other positions in the network. The continuous construction and 
reproduction of the relations among all the elements comprising the network through the actions of 
market actors/ actants maintains the social formation. ANT has also been used to analyse 
processes of ‘performativity’ in financial markets, whereby the practices of agents embody their 
institutional knowledge and theoretical models, thereby blurring financial market epistemology and 
ontology (see MacKenzie, 2004). In respect to the way financial transactions manifest economic 
theories and reproduce prices/values performativity challenges the neoclassical conception of 
economic representation and reality. This insight is important to the development of a deeper 
understanding of the social/ symbolic ontology of economic action, and the constitutive (as opposed 
to representative) aspects of economic/financial theory (see, for example, Mackenzie, 2004; 
Stalder, 1997a).  
 
ANT also proposes that non-human elements in the network (mechanisms, technologies, 
institutional systems) can also exert agency as ‘actants’. This is a contentious proposition, but it 
leads to the interesting notion of ‘black box’ systems, i.e. institutionalised practices whose nature 
and internal processes are opaque to those interacting with them (which could include technologies 
but also financial instruments, investment algorithms, or credit ratings). However, ANT’s formulation 
of the ‘actant’ assumes an equivalence between human and non-human agents, which can be 
problematic in regard to explaining how non-human actants ascribe meanings to the network or 
their actions. This limits ANT’s capacity to explain how interests and agency emerges from 
actor/actant positions. Indeed, notions such as ‘performativity’ would seem to presuppose some 
form of conscious (and arguably intersubjective) agency. As Couldry (2004) cogently observes, 
ANT rightly recognises that the performative processes that that inscribe and constitute material 
relations depend on interpretation, but as a generalised analytic framework, ANT does not account 
well for the on-going processes of interpretation and reinterpretation needed to explain the 
reproduction of network relations involving human cognition. ANT’s recognition of performative 
processes and ‘black box’ phenomena may be nevertheless be applicable to economic/financial 
processes. 
 
In contrast, Bourdieu (1977; 1993) proposes a dualistic relation between structure and agent. He 
identifies different types of socio-cultural field, entailing distinct codifications of meaningful social 
action that are internalised by individual agents as habitus and expressed through those agents’ 
actions through the deployment of different forms of capital (socio-cultural as well as economic). As 
King (2000) has suggested, although Bourdieu’s framework usefully highlights the intersubjective 
origins of the social field, the process by which the habitus becomes an internalised subjective 
expression of external social structure implicitly ascribes a priori objectivity to the social field that 
seems inconsistent with the intersubjective conception of its origins. In this regard, the field/habitus 
framework does not fully account for the processes of performativity identified in ANT. Although the 
                                                 
11
 Quite apart from recognition of ownership rights and acceptable means of payment, the value placed on 
material commodities may depend on the agents’ knowledge of their physical properties as well as their 
cultural meanings. Thus an item of clothing may be warm but not fashionable while a food may be tasty but 
also fattening. For example, the value of asbestos as a fireproofing material changed radically once it was 
discovered that it was also carcinogenic. This  is explained by changes in human knowledge about the material 
and according shifts in attitude towards it, not a change in its material qualities related to labour.  
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duality of Bourdieu’s broader field/habitus framework is not best suited to the purpose of integrating 
political economy and cultural economy, the emphasis on intersubjectivity among conscious, 
knowing agents is important because this recognises that the formation of social fields/ structures 
involves the creation of corresponding meaning among different actors. Thus habitus can be 
conceptualised in terms of the cognitive resources and codes of symbolic exchange/ action that 
permit the inter-subjective coordination of social meaning. If the locus of this notion of habitus is in 
the mind of each individual agent, and the intersubjectivity/ correspondence among agents can be 
explained through communicative processes, then there is no need to posit the existence of an 
objective field/ social structure as a pre-existing form that is then internalised. However, before such 
a framework incorporating this conception can be developed, there are some further theoretical 
approaches that need to be taken into account. 
 
Giddens’ theory of structuration (1979, 1984), meanwhile, conceives of social structures as both 
medium and outcome of social action. The duality of structure means structures have no 
independent ontology separate from the instances of social action that manifest and reproduce 
them, which is an important point of distinction from Bourdieu’s field/habitus formulation. The 
conception of structure here does not assume a fixed, deterministic force opposed to human 
agency, but as a mechanism for enabling as well as constraining social action. Giddens regards 
structure as manifest immanently through instances of social action. Although social action 
reproduces social structure, it can also potentially transform it. Here there is a distinction between 
the practical consciousness and discursive consciousness of social agents; the former refers to the 
largely tacit knowledge of shared rules/ conventions that underpin social action (like a native 
language speaker’s implicit grasp of grammar) while the latter refers to more explicit self-conscious 
recognition of those conventions which enable social actors to reflexively act upon and re-shape 
them. 
 
Structuration theory has been criticised both for exaggerating the ability of agents to reshape social 
structure (Baber, 1991) and for lapsing into an objectivist position which inadvertently reifies 
structure (King, 1998; also note his parallel criticism of Bourdieu’s notion of field; King, 2000). It is 
interesting to note that the critiques of Baber and King are premised on defending a strong 
objectivist and subjectivist position respectively. Baber (1991) insists that structuration theory’s 
duality of structure formulation fails to transcend the structure/agency problem because for structure 
to enable action, it cannot be instantiated only in the moment/space of the action, as Giddens 
argues. King’s (1998) critique, meanwhile, asserts that Giddens conflates the notion of structure as 
a set of intersubjective conventions/ rules is distinct from the social system as an institutional 
context of action and that this leads structuration theory’s positing of a duality of structure into 
precisely the objectivist position that Baber considers it to lack.  
 
Following Winch (1958), structuration recognises that for action to be social it must follow rules 
shared intersubjectively among actors, thereby allowing meaning/ social significance to be ascribed 
to that action in context. Conceiving the intersubjective ontology of social structure in terms of tacitly 
shared knowledge of the social rules that permits the coordination of meaningful social action 
obviates the need to posit the existence of metaphysical structural entities distinct from the social 
actors themselves. However, the agent’s capacity to reinterpret the intersubjective rules may not be 
sufficient to transform them; polysemy should not be conflated with autonomy12. While 
acknowledging the potential theoretical utility of the insights and intentions of structuration, the 
refinement required to avoid overstating either the transformative power of agency or its structural 
constraint extends beyond the formulations of Giddens, Baber and King.   
 
Cultural Political Economy  
 
There have been several specific attempts to develop a framework capable of reconciling a 
culturalist perspective with that of political economy. Mosco (1996, 2004) has acknowledged 
Giddens’ structuration as a useful framework, but his critical interest in power leads him to locate 
                                                 
12
 Interestingly, the confusion of polysemy with autonomy is also a shortcoming of the ‘popular’ cultural studies 
approaches that suppose variability in audience readings of media texts implies resistance/ empowerment 
(see, for example, Fiske & Hartley, 1978).  
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this as a dimension within a political economy framework that remains incomplete without the 
additional contribution of cultural studies. Indeed, despite recognising the cultural dimensions of the 
economy (most notably in relation to the ‘dot com’ bubble and the mythologisation of the potential of 
digital technology and cyberspace that underpinned financial market overconfidence in 
telecommunications and internet stocks), there remains a tension between the recognition that 
political economic and cultural processes are mutually constitutive. Mosco’s ‘bridging’ approach 
tends to treat the respective frameworks of political economy and cultural studies as opposite poles 
on a continuum. This draws on the insights of both without contradictory eclecticism, but also 
without synthesising them into a seamless framework.  
 
Another approach to developing a cultural political economy is that of Sayer (2001). While 
accepting cultural economy’s corrective to the reductionist tendencies of mainstream economics 
and its failure to take account of cultural embedding, he is sceptical of cultural economy’s own 
tendency to reduce explanations of economic processes to the lifeworld. For Sayer, cultural 
economy’s emphasis on embeddedness overlooks the potential for economic and political systems  
to bring about disjunctures with the lifeworld and disrupt cultural embedding (such as the 
depersonalisation of market relations that monetary systems facilitate) as recognised in the works of 
Marx, Polanyi and Habermas. This tendency to overstate embeddedness means cultural economy 
risks engendering an uncritical descriptive ethnography that overlooks concerns about the ways 
normative dimensions of market activity might be implicated in the creation or perpetuation of 
structural inequalities. Sayer therefore proposes a critical cultural political economy to encompass 
both approaches while retaining a focus on power relations.  
 
The starting point for developing this framework is Habermas’ (1984/1988) distinction between 
lifeworld and system, although here Sayer rejects what he regards as the cognitivist/ linguistic 
assumptions underpinning Habermas’ conception of the lifeworld. The specific reasoning 
underpinning this is that Sayer understands communicative action in the lifeworld to be a conscious, 
deliberative process (akin to Giddens’ notion of discursive consciousness) and therefore incapable 
of accounting for tacit, non-cognitive structural processes more akin to Giddens’ practical 
consciousness or Bourdieu’s habitus. Sayer regards system forces (whether economic or political-
legal) as emergent macro-phenomena, independent of (but consequential for) agent activity (2001, 
p.689, also p.692).  
 
His formulation also entails the conceptualising of the lifeworld as the source of cultural identity, 
discourses, norms and meanings, within which market systems are embedded. In maintaining this 
type of duality, Sayer’s rendering of Habermas assumes the same objectivist position which is the 
target of King’s respective critiques of Giddens and Bourdieu (1998, 2000).  The point here is not to 
reject the distinction between lifeworld and system per se, but to question the supposition that the 
basis for this distinction is that norms, discourses, meanings and identities inhere only in the former. 
Although Sayer insists (citing Fraser, 1995) that culture should not be conflated with lifeworld nor 
economy with system (2001, p.693), he also points out that concrete economic institutions exist in 
both system and lifeworld (p.690), arguing that the distinction between them is ‘fuzzy but 
illuminating’ (p.695). Although Sayer is right to problematise the task of specifying the precise line of 
differentiation between system and lifeworld, his conception of the latter as the functional source of 
cultural identity, norms, discourses and meanings in which the former is embedded implies that 
precisely such a line has implicitly been drawn.  
 
Sayer nevertheless makes a strong case for the development of a critical cultural political economy 
and demonstrates the complexity of separating out culture and lifeworld or economy and system. 
However, the theoretical framework he posits still cannot comfortably accommodate political 
economy alongside cultural economy. One key impediment to this is the structural/ objectivist 
assumption made in moving away from the linguistic/ cognitive aspects of communicative action, 
toward a more formal analysis of economic systems ‘disconnected from norms and values’ (Sayer, 
2001, p.689). This means there is no adequate account of how agency and structure, and indeed, 
the socio-cultural and material dimensions of the economy, are mutually constituted. Although 
Sayer rightly recognises the importance of agents’ interpretations of signals and rules, he considers 
this inapplicable to the analysis of ‘delinguistified’ economic systems such as money (2001, p.689). 
This may be explained by Habermas’ own contrast (1984/ 1987) between communicative and 
instrumental rationality (in which the former emphasises creation of mutual understanding as a 
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basis for transforming social relations while the latter emphasises goal-oriented accumulation). 
Perhaps ironically, though, this diverts Sayer’s analysis away from a potentially useful focus on 
communicative/ symbolic processes in a more general sense that might have helped develop the 
combined socio-cultural and political-economic framework to which his work aspires.  
 
Jessop (2004)13, meanwhile, has developed a somewhat different approach, adopting critical 
semiotic analysis alongside cultural political economy or CPE. This framework recognises the 
constitutive role of semiosis in economic and political processes and ‘adopts the ‘cultural turn’ in 
economic enquiry without neglecting the articulation of semiosis with the interconnected 
materialities of economics and politics within wider social formations’ (2004, p.159). Semiosis is 
defined by Jessop as the ‘intersubjective production of meaning’ (2004, p.161) which he deploys 
generically to refer to a range of processes encompassed by the cultural turn (including 
argumentation, narrative, rhetoric, hermeneutics, identity, reflexivity, historicity and discourse) on 
the basis that they are all ‘causally efficacious’ (p.161), i.e. performative and constitutive of 
economic reality rather than merely representations or interpretations of a distinct and separate 
positivistic ontology.  
 
Although Jessop’s generalisation of semiosis arguably over-simplifies important distinctions 
between these various cultural/ semiotic processes, the intention is to develop a broad framework of 
analysis that can accommodate his evolutionary-institutionalist approach to political economy14. 
This broader conception of semiosis also avoids associating the production of meaning solely with 
linguistic processes15. For Jessop, the recognition that political and economic forces are 
discursively constituted and, as such, need to be understood as contingent social formations is an 
important corrective to the tendency to reify market forces in mainstream economics and classical 
Marxism: 
 
‘CPE examines the role of semiosis and semiotic practices not only in the continual 
(re)making of social relations but also in the contingent emergence, provisional 
consolidation, and ongoing realization of their extra-semiotic properties. […] For if 
social phenomena are discursively constituted and never achieve a self-reproducing 
closure, isolated from other phenomena, then any natural necessities (emergent 
properties) entailed in the internal relations of a given object must be tendential.’ 
(Jessop, 2004, p.161). 
 
This is a crucial argument since it ascribes a central role to communicative processes and 
intersubjective meaning in political-economic ontology. However, the reference to ‘extra-semiotic 
properties’ suggests that economic activity cannot be reduced to semiosis alone. Jessop (2004, 
p.162) goes on to argue that the contingencies of the economic totality emerging from the ‘chaotic’ 
aggregate of all interactions in the ‘actually existing economy’  are so unstructured and complex 
that it is impossible to adequately conceptualise the economy as a discrete object of calculation or 
governance. Instead, economic activity must be oriented toward partial subsets of this totality in the 
form of discursively constituted ‘economic imaginaries’ abstracted and materially reproduced 
through the actions of economic agents (see also Pryke & Allen, 2000). 
 
Jessop argues that to avoid completely arbitrary semiosis, ‘these imaginaries must have some 
significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to real material interdependencies in the 
actually existing economy and/or in relations between economic and extra-economic activities’ and 
suggests that their incomplete nature and inevitable exclusion of variables/processes impose limits 
on the ‘efficacy of economic forecasting, management, planning, guidance, governance and so on’. 
Incommensurate semiosis among individual economic agents deploying different schemata/ 
                                                 
13
 Note that both Jessop and Sayer hail from the sociology department at the University of Lancaster. 
14
 Much of Jessop’s  work  is a development of Regulation School neomarxist political economy and focuses 
on the ways that different regimes of global capital accumulation evolve and how contingent institutional 
configurations of state and capital can (de)stabilise those regimes in particular historical contexts (e.g. see 
Jessop, 2001a, 2002b).   
15
 This issue is also recognised by Sayer (2001), but his attempt to circumvent this problem, in the absence of 
an alternative broader conception of communicative processes, leads him to posit an objectivist conception of 
unconscious systemic forces. 
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imaginaries does not lead to ‘inappropriate variation’ on a meso- or macro-scale because this is 
prevented by ‘recursive selection of semiotic practices and extra-semiotic processes’ (2004, p.162). 
The emphasis on semiosis and social action as a constitutive but not unconstrained/ unstructured 
dimension of the economy would seem to bear some resemblance to the notion of structure as both 
outcome and medium of action in structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Jessop rightly notes that  
the social structuration of capitalist formations involves semiosis and that the formation, 
reproduction, selection and transformation of social relations inevitably entails the generation of 
meaning (2004, p.164). 
 
The recognition that capital accumulation regimes are contingent and take different forms in the 
context of historical, institutionally-specific arrangements (e.g. the shift from Atlantic Fordism to a 
knowledge-based economy) is important. However, Jessop’s distinction between an ‘actually-
existing’ economy with ‘extra-semiotic’ dimensions in order to account for the limitation of semiosis 
and the relative coherence of economic activity among different actors is problematic: The 
argument that processes of economic forecasting or governance are necessarily incomplete 
because the economic imaginaries toward which economic action is oriented are partial 
representations of the totality implicitly assumes a distinction between representation and reality 
incongruent with the recognition of performativity and the constitutive aspects of semiosis. Indeed, 
Jessop posits a dialectical relationship between semiotic and structural dimensions of the economy 
to explain how texts not only generate meaning and thereby social structure, but how material, non-
semiotic aspects of social structure limit the range of meanings and structures semiosis can 
produce (2004, p.163).  
 
Jessop therefore eschews what he regards the semiotic reductionism assumed in some versions of 
cultural economy: ‘The risk here is that one cannot distinguish in material terms between capitalist 
and non-capitalist economic practices, institutions and formations- they all become equally 
discursive and can only be differentiated through their respective semiotic practices, meanings, and 
contexts and their performative impact.’ (2004, p.171). As such, ‘CPE aims to steer a path between 
‘soft cultural economics’ and ‘hard orthodox economics’ ’(p.171). He goes on to argue that, ‘a 
Marxist CPE would robustly reject the conflation of discourses and material practices and the more 
general discourse imperialism that has plagued social theory for two decades.’ (pp.171-172).  
 
Although Jessop’s formulation is intended to challenge orthodox economics’ rigid demarcation 
between cultural and economic processes by recognising the semiotic aspects of economic activity, 
the position outlined here reasserts the materiality of those processes to avoid discursive 
reductionism. Consequently, this formulation inadvertently reimposes the very dualism between an 
objective material economy and the discursive/ semiotic dimensions of the economy that CPE is 
intended to redress16.  This does not sit comfortably with Jessop’s insistence that all economic 
processes nevertheless entail a semiotic or discursive dimension, and it renders claims about 
performativity and the constitutive (as opposed to representative) aspect of economic semiosis 
problematic. The inconsistency appears to stem from two assumptions: a) that semiosis cannot on 
its own constrain social/ economic action, and that without the restriction of material reality or the 
‘actually existing economy’, semiotic selectivity would not be sufficient to ensure the coordination of 
meaningful economic action; and b) that the material dimension of economic reality is non-semiotic.  
 
The first issue could be addressed by recognising that the conventions underpinning any form of 
semiosis, whether that be meaningful social action or linguistic utterances presupposes 
intersubjective agreement of code. As with syntactical structures in language, actors are not 
unrestricted in the ways they can speak, even when selectivity in linguistic utterances can, over 
time, transform the codifications that ensure intersubjective intelligibility. Likewise, non-linguistic 
social activity must follow intersubjective conventions demarcating the channels and modalities of 
meaningful action, and these codifications, while immaterial, both enable and constrain what 
actions are possible (for example, there are unwritten but nevertheless specific codes governing 
gift-giving, stipulating giver/receiver roles, occasion, and the appropriate form of present).   
                                                 
16
 Jessop may be assuming a distinction between semiosis and discourse here, but  discourse was included as 
one of the communicative aspects of semioisis in his earlier definition (2004, p.161).  
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In regard to economic behaviour, these codifications would include mutual recognition of 
symbolically constituted social relations including contractual agreements, legitimate monetary 
forms, and property rights which may relate to material forms (such as commodities) but which are 
themselves immaterial (although clearly the physical world places objective limitation on what kinds 
and quantities of goods and services can be produced and exchanged). Indeed, as Marx (1996) 
himself recognised, capital itself is a social relation, which is especially evident in the creation of 
financial securities based on credit with a fictitious value reflecting the anticipated future payment of 
debt.  
 
Thus Sayer and Jessop both recognise that communication and shared meanings play an essential 
role in economic processes, but their respective formulations lead them into difficulties: Sayer’s 
(2001) approach to cultural political economy rightly discerns the limitations of a linguistic 
conception of social action, but dispenses prematurely with communicative processes in a wider 
sense. Similarly, Jessop’s (2004) approach recognises that economic action entails intersubjective 
meaning but regards semiosis as an inadequate basis to account for the structural, material 
constraints on economic agency.  
 
The development of a more nuanced cultural political economy that foregrounds communicative 
processes, is nevertheless possible through the formulation of intersubjective codifications17 which 
demarcate and distribute access to the different channels and modalities/ genres of social action 
and allow social actors to ascribe shared meanings to their interactions. This does not entail a 
reductionism whereby base material conditions are assumed to have a semiotic/ discursive 
ontology, but rather, that  the social actions involving changing relations to those conditions (such 
as the sale of material commodities) become defined as socially real through inter-subjective 
codification18 (ISCs). Nor does this formulation suggest a completely fluid, unconstrained agency 
whereby actors can transform social structures by subjective acts of interpretation; polysemy is not 
autonomy. The intersubjective basis of the codification process circumscribes the channels, 
modalities and resources available to any given actor, even though it is possible for some social 
actions to transform those codifications (such as a government passing a new law obliging or 
prohibiting some form of behaviour, or market speculators driving the valuation of a financial 
security up or down by heavy trading behaviour).  
 
A further approach combining political economy and cultural economy has been developed by 
Graham (2006; see also Graham, 2000, 2002) in his work on ‘hypercapitalism’. This emphasises 
the mediated aspects of economic relations, particularly the central role of NCTs in accelerating and 
extending trading activity and also in helping create the meanings and valuations that underpin 
financial markets. Graham rejects both the idealist reductionism assumed in some postmodernist 
versions of cultural economy, and also any simple dualistic distinction between base and 
superstructure. Significantly, he asserts that actions that create economic meaning are constitutive 
of material relations, and that the creation of economic value and the reproduction/ transformation 
of economic relations involves social action:  
 
‘Under conditions of hypercapitalism, forces and relations of production; base and 
superstructure; the valorisation process; material and non-material production; and 
production and consumption are analytically inseparable because of the immediacy 
and pervasiveness of the social and technical domains in which they operate and 
because of their intimate involvement with language and thought.‘ (2006, p.84).  
 
                                                 
17
 The term ‘codification’ is used here in preference to ‘code’ in order to denote its applicability to both 
linguistic/ semiotic processes and rule-governed forms of meaningful non-linguistic social action and symbolic 
exchange, including economic transactions.  
 
18
 Thus the existence of a house is a physical fact, but its ownership by one person and not another is a social 
fact, even though the object of this relation is ‘material’. The existence of a monetary debt between two 
counterparties is a social fact, and even if this potentially involves the exchange of a physical monetary form 
such as coins or notes, the demarcation of those objects as  money is also a social fact, even though money is 
used to mediate material relations among actors that involve physical objects.  
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Parallel to the work on cultural political economy by Sayer (2001) and Jessop (2004), Graham 
recognises the need for a framework that accounts for shared meanings in economic/ financial 
processes and an emphasis on mediation to connect political economic and cultural economic 
analyses. Although Graham is less explicit than Sayer or Jessop about the specific challenges of 
synthesising political economy and cultural economy, Hypercapitalism is premised on the 
recognition that Marx’s work can be usefully developed to take account of sociological and cultural 
perspectives on contemporary market phenomena. Toward this end, Graham adopts a linguistic 
perspective drawing on a linguistic reading of Marx19 (Fairclough & Graham, 2002) and Halliday’s 
(1993) sociolinguistics. Graham recognises that access to the institutional positions and symbolic 
resources to engage in such actions can be privileged (thus public statements issued by a central 
bank official,  finance minister, or market analyst might induce market movement, while the same 
statement made by someone with no such status would probably be ignored). These privileged 
discourses or ‘expert dialectics’ underpin specialised forms of knowledge-production that ‘have 
reached the point at which the value of whole nations can literally be ‘talked up’ or ‘talked down’ by 
people in privileged positions’ (Graham, 2006, p.6).  
 
Graham adapts Maturana & Varela’s (1980) notion of autopoiesis to link the reproduction of the 
knowledge economy to language; ‘Once human knowledge becomes a primary commodity in 
political economy, language becomes the primary means of production, exchange and evaluation’ 
(2006, p.56). Graham proceeds to link this to Halliday’s (1993) argument that language exerts direct 
control over physical systems, facilitated by the evolution of increasingly technologised forms of 
language and manifested through new media technologies (2006, p.76).  
 
The recognition that cognition, mediation and communicative processes are necessarily involved in 
the reproduction of human systems is important. Following Halliday (1993), Graham places 
language at the centre of his framework. Although he acknowledges that there are different kinds of 
meaningful social action with symbolic significance, Graham (2006) states that; ‘I argue that 
language in the strictest sense- spoken or written words- is the ultimately coordinating element in 
which social perceptions of value are created, modified, and mediated.’ (p.57), and further explains 
that; 
 
 Because human social and cognitive systems are constituted, coordinated, and 
maintained in the domain of language, and because language is a fundamentally 
social phenomenon, a socially grounded approach to language provides the most 
appropriate analytic for understanding the systemic and creative role of language in a 
global knowledge economy’ (p.59).  
 
Graham goes on to emphasise that; 
 
‘The meaning of a piece of music or a painting can only be shared in language. The 
meaning of any event, practice, thing, person or circumstance can only be shared in 
language. Despite the proliferation of different modes of meaning, such as still or 
moving images, language remains the domain in which these modes attain socially 
shared meaning.’ (p.64, emphasis added). 
 
And moreover, that; 
                                                 
19
 Graham (2006) and Fairclough & Graham (2002) emphasise the linguistic and philosophical origins of 
dialectics to demonstrate that Marx’s critique of political economy can be understood as a critique of the 
language of political economy and that Marx’s framework encompasses an account of the production of 
meaning and values as intrinsically material processes. These arguments are an important corrective to the 
criticism of Marxism as an overly materialistic approach that either overlooks superstructural processes in the 
constitution of the economic base or conceives of the former as a simplistic reflection of the latter. However, 
Graham’s identification of a linguistic dimension in Marx’s work is not sufficient to recast it within a cultural 
political economy framework. For example, the centrality of the labour theory of value inhibits Marx from fully 
developing his account of the creation of ‘fictitious’ financial values in the M-M’ circuit; the recognition that 
these are incommensurate processes was problematic for Marx, suggesting that ‘real’ value in material 
production is distinct from illusory symbolic value. Recognising that both industrial and financial production 
involve symbolic valuation processes is an important cultural economic contribution, but it is not readily 
compatible with classical Marxism. (See later discussion of  Marx and Hilferding).  
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‘Language is the primary means of exchange. This holds for all kinds of valuable 
knowledge, from currency trades, to advertising and political propaganda, to secrets 
sold by inside traders on the stock market, to the inventors of new techniques for 
manipulating DNA.’ (p.73) 
 
Graham’s emphasis on the relationship between the production of knowledge and the creation of 
economic value is certainly important. However, the emphasis on the emergence of the knowledge-
economy implies that this shift away from material production to symbolic production is a 
contemporary phenomenon linked to the emergence of new forms of mediation (see Baudrillard, 
1975; Lash & Urry, 1994)  rather than a fundamental process implicit in any era of economic 
activity.  
 
As Graham goes on to argue, ‘Thought and language have themselves become the primary objects 
of production, distribution and exchange within [hypercapitalism]’ (2006, p.72), and; 
 
‘[Q]uite literally, perception, language, meaning, consciousness, and consequently, 
knowledge and identity, have been progressively dragged into systemic capital and 
subsumed under its mechanisms of appropriation. If we are to understand the effects 
of new technologies of mediation, we must understand their relationship to, and impact 
upon language’ (p.75).  
 
Furthermore, he asserts that, ‘A focus on language practices once again appears to be the only 
way to assess changing perceptions and social relations in newly mediated political economic 
systems.’ (p.84, emphasis added). These arguments suggest that the significance of language/ 
communication processes in the reproduction of economic systems is contingent on the recent 
emergence of new media technologies as opposed to something more fundamental and intrinsic to 
all forms of capitalist economic activity.  
 
Nevertheless, Graham’s recognition that new communication technologies and forms of mediation 
have played an important role in the development of increasingly abstract financial instruments and 
changed the way economic value is created is central to the development of a framework linking 
political economy and cultural economy. The difficulty here is that this theoretical task extends 
beyond the  linguistic framework that he insists is the only viable basis for such an endeavour. Here, 
a latent tension emerges between Graham’s indications that many types of social process are 
meaningful and that linguistic processes are to be conceived here in quite general terms, and his 
insistence (following Maturana & Varela) that the generation of shared meaning and the 
reproduction of social relations are specific functions reducible only to language.   
 
There are aspects of social action and system reproduction that cannot be easily explained solely in 
terms of linguistic processes, including many forms of economic or financial activity. Financial 
calculations, pattern-recognitions, market mood-gauging and intuitions are not fundamentally 
linguistic activities.  It is recognition of precisely this limitation that leads Sayer (2001; see above) to 
reject the potential of a cognitive/ linguistic framework for cultural political economic analysis 
because it places too much emphasis on agents’ conscious deployment of the rules governing their 
social interactions and does not explain meaningful social activity based on rules that are tacit or 
subconscious (or, to use Giddens’ terminology, it does not distinguish between discursive 
consciousness and practical consciousness).  
 
If Sayer is premature in discounting the potential of a linguistic framework to provide a link between 
political economy and cultural economy, Graham is arguably premature in endorsing it. 
Interestingly, in both cases, this arises because communicative processes in the broader sense 
have been conflated with linguistic processes in a narrower sense20. Sayer’s recognition that many 
                                                 
20
 Parallel to Graham’s foregrounding of language, Jessop (2004), emphasises semiosis as the generic social 
process to account for meaningful interaction and provide a link between political economy and cultural 
economy. However, whereas Jessop ultimately retreats from semiotic reductionism (and in doing so assumes 
a dualist/ objectivist position that renders his metatheoretical objective problematic), Graham persists with the 
linguistic framework (arguably resulting in the very reductionism that he is seeking to avoid ).  
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forms of social action are based on tacitly-assumed, subconscious rules that cannot be explained in 
terms of linguistic interaction (such as economic transactions using money) becomes an important 
consideration here: Graham’s focus on linguistic utterances does not readily account for the 
broader social codes and non-linguistic political, economic and ideological formations or specific 
institutional arrangements which shape agents’ access to the privileged discourses.  
 
Graham’s framework recognises the embeddedness of economic processes in cultural and  
political-legal arrangements. Accordingly, he notes that new abstract financial instruments require 
legitimacy and legislative establishment at national or supranational level (2006, p.10). However, 
the mediation/ articulation between and reproduction of various social systems is not fully explicable 
through a linguistic framework. The development of supranational institutions and practices such as 
global financial activity evidently involves shared codes/ rules that exhibit coherence in spite of a 
wide diversity of languages. For example, the systems that allow currencies and other financial 
securities to be traded around the clock in New York, London and Tokyo must exhibit some 
underlying commonality that overcomes local linguistic differences. Interaction between these 
markets presupposes a deeper, structural, inter-subjective coherence to render them mutually 
intelligible and to allow the same fiscal valuations to obtain across different national and institutional 
spaces. This coherence is not reducible to language.  
 
Although economic and financial processes are evidently influenced by linguistic interactions, 
whether that be news about market activity or analysts sharing rumours, the active negotiation or 
performance of economic value involves non-linguistic processes of calculation/ modelling, and 
trading activity in the form of financial transactions which communicate (and indeed, perform) 
market valuation (see later). Heuristic, non-literal analogies with language aside, these are not 
reducible to the sort of linguistic specificity posited in Graham’s (2006) framework, although as with 
Sayer’s (2001) and Jessop’s (2004) approaches, this correctly points toward the importance of 
theorising the production of social meaning in order to develop a workable synthesis between 
political economy and cultural economy.   
 
Graham (2006) rightly recognises the privileging of monetary and financial systems under 
‘hypercapitalism’ and the extension/ colonisation of the logic and values of capital accumulation into 
other spheres of social activity. Importantly, he also notes the relation between NCTs and NFIs, and 
the significance of communication systems and symbolic processes in the generation of financial 
values: ‘Language is the source of money-values and is now globally mediated through new ICTs. 
Systemic hypercapitalism privileges money-values at the expense of perceptions about what human 
societies are and what they mean.’ (p.84) and moreover, ‘human perceptions have become 
systemic capital’s primary objects of production’ (p.85). Graham also recognises that the base/ 
superstructure or the material/ non-material dimensions of the economy are ‘analytically 
inseparable’ because they are constituted by information shared symbolic meaning (pp.84-85) and 
he usefully points out that capital accumulation has increasingly emphasised financial values 
through future imaginaries which ‘exist only in the minds of specific people’ (p.85; see also Pryke & 
Allen, 2000). He duly notes Marx’s insights concerning the social nature of capital, but suggests that 
Marx overlooked the significance of communication technologies and assumes that the tangible/ 
material economy would remain of primary importance in the creation of value21.  However, under 
hypercapitalism, monetary forms and fictitious financial values are ‘mediated, legitimized and 
defined in language’ so as to create the ‘illusion of value’ and this has a ‘grossly distorting role’ 
because the economy becomes geared to producing fictitious value, rather than social utility22 
(p.85).  
 
Graham’s critique is certainly salient, but the notions of ‘distortion’ and ‘illusion’, coupled with the 
contrast made between value in the tangible economy and the symbolic/ informational economy 
                                                 
21
 It is perhaps Marx’s oversight of communication processes themselves rather than  technologies per se that 
is the limitation here. Telegraph was still a new development at the time he wrote Capital, and it is only since 
the 1970s that the combination of computation with telecommunications has helped transform financial 
markets. 
22
 This would appear to be the same analytic distinction between exchange-value and use-value that Marx 
identified. Interestingly, while Marx does note the emergence of a purely financial circuit of accumulation (M-
M’), Graham does not discuss this, which is perhaps surprising given its relevance to his argument here.  
 27 
suggest that the constitution of financial value through linguistic processes is a contemporary 
phenomenon associated with hypercapitalism rather than something fundamental to all economic 
processes. The distinction between the normative logics of use-value and exchange-value is 
categorically different from the distinction between the tangible/material economy and the 
symbolic/informational economy. The processes that ascribe both social utility and exchange values 
to commodities or financial securities always involve the creation of intersubjective meaning. 
However, this does not necessarily entail conscious, reflexive deployment of the underlying codes. 
This poses a problem for a language-based account of financial value creation. Graham usefully 
notes, following Marx’s account of reification, that money forms exhibit a self-referential logic that 
becomes ‘hypnotic, numbing and impenetrable’ and consequently, ‘Now that the imaginary source 
of money is sufficiently obscured, money appears to take on an objective form, independent of 
people, history and circumstance.’ (2006, pp.97-98). However, it is difficult to conceive how the 
nature of money can be simultaneously rendered obscure and necessarily articulated through 
words. The implicit codes and norms that must be intersubjectively assumed in order to allow the 
tacit reification of monetary systems cannot be easily explained in terms of language. Indeed, 
Graham now appears to retreat from his earlier assertion that language is the source of money-
values, suggesting that; 
 
‘With a minimum of slippage, one might easily be fooled into thinking that money is a 
language […] But such a seemingly massive system of qualitatively homogenous 
promises- however expedient- can only be analyzed on its own terms, that is to say 
quantitatively.’ (p.97, original emphasis).  
 
The limitation of reducing all processes of social and economic meaning to linguistic processes now 
becomes apparent; the logic of monetary values is not a function of language, and on that point 
Sayer’s (2001) wariness of relying on a linguistic framework is justified. The conscious aspects of 
language use do not map onto the quantitative symbolism of monetary exchange . Specifically, the 
theoretical element Graham’s linguistic framework lacks here is an account of what Giddens (1984) 
refers to as ‘practical consciousness’ in his account of structuration theory. Explaining the implicit 
intersubjective codes underpinning meaningful economic interaction, the reification of money and 
the symbolic creation of value requires a broader conception of communicative processes than the 
more narrowly linguistic one Graham  posits. Parallel to the limitations of Jessop’s deployment of 
semiosis, Graham’s emphasis on language recognises the need to account for intersubjective 
meaning in order to link political economy and cultural economy but does not provide quite the right 
theoretical tools for the task.  
 
Graham (2006) duly recognises the central importance of new communication technologies and 
financial news systems like Reuters in providing both the information and the technical 
infrastructure for electronic financial transactions. These new media facilitate the extension of 
financial processes spatially and play an important role in the temporal extension of financial 
abstraction and the creation of financial securities representing fictitious values. Graham notes the 
potential for economic values to be generated by the mythological force of key opinion leaders, and 
he cites an example of remarks by George Bush inadvertently triggering market jitters that led to 
significant stock market losses. 
 
However, Graham does not explain precisely how the linguistic utterances of market opinion-
leaders affects share price. The words of a central banker or a government leader may be 
influential, but they do not performatively generate or annihilate financial market value in the 
manner supposed here.  How such utterances translate through the financial media into 
transactions on trading floors is not explained. Meanwhile, the role the financial media play in 
creating the intersubjectively agreed frames of reference that underpin financial market values is 
not explained. A more nuanced and empirical account of how the financial media actually mediate 
market meanings is needed here.  
 
Nevertheless, Graham’s Hypercapitalism provides both important insights into the active social 
creation of financial value through the creation of intersubjective meaning. Although his emphasis 
on language leads to some theoretical awkwardness, it serves to underline that foregrounding 
communication processes in market phenomena is not only an interesting way of linking political 
economic and cultural economic perspectives, but is indispensable to the task.  
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It is beyond the scope of this study (and probably any project) to reconcile all these perspectives 
dealing with structure/ agency and political economy/ cultural economy into a unified social ‘theory 
of everything’. Nevertheless, in order to develop a framework capable of relating economic/financial 
actions on a micro-level to shifts in macro-level social structures/ formations without entailing 
fundamental contradictions or casual eclecticism, it is necessary to disentangle some of the key 
conceptual elements from the over-arching theoretical approaches in which they respectively 
originate. The aforementioned approaches have at least one broadly common thematic; they all 
offer insights into  the reflexive reproduction of social structure through the performative/ constitutive 
actions of individual agents interacting though inter-subjectively agreed codifications which govern 
the symbolic meaning and relational functions of those actions and demarcate the channels and 
modalities through which those actions can be performed. There is therefore potential for a 
communication-oriented framework to abstract and analyse the reflexive relation between/ within 
social structure and action and thereby accommodate the key insights of both cultural economy and 
political economy. 
 
An integrated framework: Intersubjective Codifications (ISC) 
 
The formulation of a framework capable of analysing both the political economic and cultural 
economic dimensions of contemporary financial phenomena requires an account of social structure 
and action which foregrounds communicative processes and intersubjective meaning. The 
conception proposed here considers structure and action not as distinct phenomena, but rather, as 
mutually constitutive formations. It is therefore important to emphasise that conceptions of  ‘the 
market’ or ‘the economy’ or ‘the financial system’ assume a contingent formation which, while 
potentially enduring, may be contested or subject to negotiation. The ontological substance  of 
market reality depends on the social actions which constitute and reflexively reproduce it. This 
formulation of social structure does not assume that he agency of individual actors is 
unconstrained, however. Access to the symbolic forms or the institutional spaces/nodes which allow 
their legitimate deployment as a meaningful social action may well be restricted by the broader 
network of institutional formations which comprise the context of that particular arena. Clearly, there 
is unequal access to capital, and many who do have it lack the requisite knowledge, technology, or 
status to engage in financial trading. Moreover, even when directly related to material objects, 
economic actions in the form of payments and changes in property-relations are nevertheless 
symbolically constituted. The social codes demarcating the legitimate channels and resources 
required to engage in meaningful social action simultaneously constrain and enable social action. 
The systems of codification which facilitate the coordination of market valuations and meanings are 
therefore not ontologically independent of the actors in whose minds they inhere, even if their 
regularities and intersubjective coherence permit them to be conceived, perceived and analysed as 
if they were independent, external structures/forces.  
 
Positing that the codifications demarcating the available channels/modes of meaningful interaction 
inhere within the minds of actors comprising the institutionalised networks of  intersubjective 
agreement and practices changes the conception of social structure. Thus ‘structure’ is conceived 
here not as an external metaphysical force but in terms of shared cognitive models (both implicit 
and conscious) demarcating the channels of meaningful social action available to the agents 
occupying particular institutional nodes/spaces. Structure also entails agents’ reflexive incorporation 
of the expectations of other agents’ actions into their own frameworks of understanding, decisions 
and actions. From this perspective, economic agents’ actions are mediated not through external, 
immaterial social forces but through the internalisation of intersubjective codifications derived from 
the discourses and interactions with other actors in their respective institutional arenas. In turn, 
those inter-subjective codifications are confirmed, legitimated and performatively reproduced by the 
actions of the economic agents engaging with each other through the scripted modes of interaction 
those codifications demarcate23.  
                                                 
23
 By way of illustration, consider how motorists come to adhere to the rules requiring them to drive on one side 
of the road or adhere to traffic signals at junctions. The painted line down the centre has a material form, but 
for these demarcations to have any influence on driving behaviour, the motorists must ascribe the same 
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Reformulating the conception of structure as a shared cognitive set of codes demarcating the 
modes and channels of meaningful symbolic action (and which in turn are shaped and reproduced 
through those actions) avoids deterministic accounts attributing causality or agency to metaphysical 
structures while allowing for the constraining and shaping of agency in different institutional arenas. 
This does not constitute a denial of structure-like patterns/ regularities along the axes of class, 
gender, or race, nor does it deny that there can be predictable outcomes of material/spatial 
conditions, however.  The formulation here avoids the overstatement of agency, because the focus 
on intersubjectivity and the potential for codification to constrain as well as enable action precludes 
the conflation of interpretative semiosis with power, or polysemy with autonomy.  
 
The notion that the production of shared meanings is central to social action also gravitates the 
focus toward the individual actor, since it is only in the minds of decision-making/ action-taking 
agents that intersubjective codifications inhere. However, insofar as agents must formulate and 
perform their decisions and actions in the context of specific institutional spaces, they cannot be 
separated from institutional priorities/goals and normative practices. In this regard, agency and 
interests are neither reducible to indeterminate individual agency, nor attributable to determinate 
structural positions. Rather, interests and agency are constantly reproduced within the network of 
inter-institutional relations that define a given arena of activity such as the financial markets (which 
does not mean, of course, that there are not relatively enduring priorities, such as the imperative of 
businesses to maximise profits). Although ontologically-speaking, the intersubjective codifications 
reside in the minds of individual agents, epistemologically, the institutional nodes/spaces within 
which agents operate are therefore prioritised as the primary locus of analysis.  
 
The focus on institutional context and the revised notion of social structure/ action also has the 
potential to relate aspects of institutionalist and neo-Marxist political economy with economic 
sociological perspectives, particularly in regard to the articulation and reconfiguration of financial 
market formations/arenas to those of the industrial economy, state and civil society.  Again, this is 
facilitated by a focus on institutional contexts and decisions/actions performed by agents in one 
arena that are consequential in shaping and constraining the decisions/actions of agents in others. 
Institutional priorities and norms are internalised in the intersubjective codifications of the agents, 
but as with macro-structures, these are not rigidly fixed or deterministic. Rather, institutional norms 
and priorities are both enduring and contingent on the contextual network of relations among 
different institutions comprising an arena of action. For instance, an event affecting the price of a 
key commodity like oil (such as war involving an OPEC nation, the discovery of a new supply or the 
publication of a high-profile policy report linking fossil fuels to climate change) would influence the 
norms and priorities many other financial/economic, political and social institutions (and ensuing 
changes in their respective activities may in turn have further impacts). The anticipated responses 
and adjustments of other institutions to such events will need to be factored into decision-making. 
The node/position occupied by any institutional agent vis-à-vis other institutional actors within any 
given arena will therefore facilitate some modes of action while inhibiting others (thus the 
anticipation of  trading activity by other market actors will reflexively shape each one’s own 
decisions, hence the possibility of market panics and bubbles). The framework being developed 
here will help provide a conceptual articulation between micro-level decisions in the financial sphere 
and practices and concomitant macro-level adjustments of other social institutions and forms. 
 
Once the intersubjective codifications of a particular institutional arena are routinised, the 
maintenance and reproduction of the institutional network is performed by the actions of the agents 
comprising that network. Moreover, the expectation that other agents will behave according to the 
channels/modes of action thereby demarcated is internalised into the norms and models guiding 
decisions and action. The routinisation of practices and on-going confirmation that the 
intersubjective codifications guiding social action remain meaningful and valid may come to obscure 
their socially constructed nature with the result that actors follow them either unconsciously or 
respond to them as if they were reified external structures or non-negotiable institutional conditions 
These implicit codifications are roughly akin to Giddens’ notion of practical consciousness or the 
                                                                                                                                                     
meaning to them and shape their driving decisions and behaviour according to the inter-subjective codifications 
of that arena.  
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ANT notion of ‘black box’ processes. The individual agent’s confidence (or lack thereof) that other 
actors will collectively behave according to the established channels/modes of action within any 
given arena will therefore shape and constrain his or her own decisions and actions. (For example, 
in a stable economy, institutionalised confidence in the currency allows transactions to take place 
without conscious concern about the continued validity of that money-form; in unstable economies, 
acceptance of the standard currency may require conscious confirmation of the institutional 
arrangements underpinning its usage which are normally taken-for-granted, such as the expectation 
that others will accept it as payment in the future. If trust in the domestic currency breaks down, 
more stable foreign currencies may be adopted in preference for some transactions).  
 
The intersubjective codifications coordinating the interactions among agents may be relatively 
enduring over time. However, far from being fixed or permanent, they are subject to constant 
renegotiation and reformulation, although this contingency may not always be apparent to the 
individual agent. Codifications may evolve over time through incremental, collective shifts in the 
meaning of symbolic forms (thus a new financial model may diffuse through the market rather like 
the incorporation of slang vernacular or syntactical forms into mainstream language). In regard to 
economic behaviour, modes/channels of action which are perceived to confer some kind of 
advantage (such as increasing profits) will be increasingly adopted while those incurring 
disadvantage will be increasingly ignored.  
 
Changes in intersubjective codification may be brought about by extraneous contextual factors or 
arrangements that influence the inter-relations among the actors comprising the existing institutional 
formation. These nevertheless entail adaptations to the respective intersubjective codifications of 
other institutions/ arenas. For example,  laws may prohibit or oblige particular practices or restrict 
access to the channels/nodes of certain modes of symbolic action (such as public disclosure of 
information and prohibition of insider trading). Established channels/modes of action consistent with 
intersubjective codifications may also be deployed in new ways. Even highly formalised systems of 
intersubjective codification may exhibit ambiguities that can facilitate the adaptation of existing 
modes of action to new functions (e.g. the use of futures contracts not for the risk-averse purpose of 
insurance, but to commodify risk and amplify potential earnings through leverage- see Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2006). In this sense, the inter-subjective codifications enable social action to be reflexively 
directed towards reformulating those codifications. If such endeavours are successful, either 
because other agents recognise and adopt the modified codification (whether this relate to copying 
the latest fashion in clothes or an advantageous financial trading model) or because compliance is 
enforced (for example, in the case of a formal authority passing a new regulation requiring or 
prohibiting particular forms of social action) then new modes/channels of action which do not 
correspond to established codifications may displace or supersede established practices and 
necessitate their intersubjective reformulation (e.g. the development of electronic brokerage 
systems has gradually replaced ‘pit-trading’ in many exchanges, requiring the modification of the 
intersubjective codifications which previously governed trading behaviour). The conscious 
recognition of codifications and the utilisation of the channels/ modes of action thereby facilitated to 
modify/ transform the codifications is akin to the structuration theory notion of reflexive 
consciousness.  
 
A further process which may lead to a shift in intersubjective codification involves a conscious, 
reflexive response to the predictable patterns of actions of other agents collectively interacting 
through the established modes/channels. In contrast to the unconscious internalisation which may 
stem from responding to these regularities of behaviour as an external/independent structures, 
implicitly accepting them as a given condition of existence, it may also be possible to modify ones 
decisions and actions to take account (and indeed, take advantage) of others’ adherence to those 
codifications. Actors who identify regularities in the collective responses of other actors to particular  
symbolic actions may be able to reflexively modify/adapt their own decisions and behaviour 
accordingly, and in doing so extend the existing modes/channels of action. The ‘rules of the game’ 
themselves reflexively become a part of the game, so to speak. If this new modality of action 
confers some advantage to the agent (or incurs disadvantage to the actors who continue to act 
through the existing codifications because they unconsciously accept them as constants, as in the 
structuration theory concept of ‘practical consciousness’ or ANT’s ‘black box’) then its adoption will 
reconfigure the intersubjective codifications (and possibly destabilise the previous regularities of 
action). For example, some hedge funds have been known to deliberately trade in volume to 
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precipitate short-term price fluctuations that can be exploited, and listed companies manage 
information flows to ensure that earnings announcements exceed investor expectations to boost 
share-price (Golding 2003).  
 
Foregrounding Communication  
 
One of the metatheoretical challenges of this study is the need to link together concepts and 
insights from several different analytical perspectives, a task somewhat analogous to arranging the 
pieces from several different jigsaws into a coherent picture. The focus on communication 
processes entails affording analytic priority to intersubjective codes and the production of meaning 
through particular channels and modes of symbolic interaction. This entails inevitable prioritisation 
and, to some extent, arbitrary selection and exclusion. The evolving complexity of global society, 
media systems and financial markets is such that such a framework cannot realistically aspire to be 
either complete or definitive, and there is no pretension here to provide a ‘theory of everything’.  
 
The analytical value of drawing on different theoretical approaches to identify key processes and 
conceptual linkages between them is that this can generate insights into the workings of financial 
markets that no single theory can achieve on its own. ‘Communication’ does not constitute a 
singular/ discrete theoretical approach in itself but rather, an inter-disciplinary thematic emphasising 
variables that account for the generation of shared meaning. The universality of communicative 
activities in all social processes is what provides the conceptual chassis onto which concepts from 
other disciplinary approaches to economic/financial analysis can be mapped.  
 
This is neither arbitrary theoretical favouritism nor casual eclecticism, however. As the preceding 
discussion has indicated, the significance of communication as a basis for integrating the insights of 
cultural economic analysis with those of political economy has been recognised elsewhere (Sayer, 
2001; Jessop, 2004; Graham, 2006). Indeed, the central importance of information to any kind of 
market activity and the symbolic ontology of financial transactions makes it very difficult to account 
for the creation of financial value and capital accumulation without emphasising communication.  
 
The development of the theoretical framework here in some respects parallels the ‘transcoding’ 
approach of Fredric Jameson (Hardt & Weeks, 2000). The analysis of contemporary financial 
markets envisaged in this thesis does not entail the diversity of theoretical sources (encompassing 
literary criticism, aesthetics and psychoanalysis as well as Marxism) drawn upon by Jameson in his 
own discussions of capitalism and finance (1990; 1997). However, it shares his imperative to map 
key concepts and processes from one paradigm onto another without proclaiming one to be 
ultimately more fundamental than the others. As Hardt and Weeks explain, Jameson’s transcoding 
is;  
‘ a process of translation that allows us to move from one theoretical paradigm to 
another, taking the best that each has to offer. […] Such movement among and 
combination of different methods and perspectives is not eclectic or incoherent 
because dialectics historicizes each theoretical position and relates one to the other 
[…] In this sense then, Marxism stands not above but among the various theories, in 
the interstices, as the means of connection, communication and translation.’ (2000, 
p.20)  
 
Jameson (1997) notes that theorising contemporary financial markets must include a 
transdisciplinary account of cultural forms, new information technologies and globalisation because 
they are deeply interlinked in the contemporary economy. Whereas his approach uses Marxist 
dialectics as his mediating framework, the aim here is to use communication as the mediating 
thematic to draw the various theories and concepts together.  The theoretical framework being 
proposed is admittedly bespoke, but this is not just for the sake of ‘building a better mousetrap’ (see 
Jameson 1997, p.247) but because the ontological complexity of the financial phenomena being 
analysed requires it.  Insofar as the conception of intersubjective codification can allow cultural 
economic and political economic analysis of financial phenomena to inform each other without 
fundamental contradiction, its utility may be more generic in scope.  
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Chapter 3: Perspectives on Finance and Communication:  
Review of the Literature 
 
 
It is well-recognised that information and communication technologies and media institutions are an 
integral component of the global capitalist system (e.g., see Golding & Murdock, 1997; McChesney 
et al., 1998; Schiller, 1999; Webster, 2000; McChesney, 2008). Numerous critical political-economic 
analyses of the communication industries have demonstrated how media corporations have helped 
to cultivate capitalist/ consumerist ideology, legitimate governments or policies expedient to 
corporate interests and/or circumscribe the scope of deliberative, democratic participation (e.g. 
Schiller, 1989; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1999). The media and communication 
industries have helped establish both the technical infrastructures and the ideological formations 
essential for the spatial extension and temporal compression of capitalist accumulation regimes. 
New communication technologies (NCTs) have been central to increases in scale, speed and 
volume of capital flows as well as to the development of new financial instruments (NFIs) and 
modes of financial trading. Moreover, financial information systems and news media evidently play 
an important role in informing the decisions of investors and shaping the trajectories of the 
enormous volumes of capital flowing electronically around the world. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, the growth of financial market activity in ratio to world GDP since the 1970s has significant 
implications for the balance of relations between governments, private business and civil society.  
 
This is a crucial issue for any critical political economic account of how communication systems and 
contemporary capitalism are related. However, political economic analyses of how economic/ 
financial factors shape and constrain the production and dissemination of information by media 
institutions (and the broader social, political and economic implications thereof) have paid relatively 
little attention to how communication processes and media systems shape the activity of financial 
institutions themselves. However, mediation, information and communication processes in 
economic/financial activities have become an important theme in the growing amount of literature 
examining these phenomena from the perspectives of (among others) sociology, geography, 
psychology/ behavioural finance, and anthropology/ cultural studies. Inevitably, these approaches 
vary in their respective emphases and conceptions of communication processes. The theoretical 
challenge, therefore, is to sustain a critical political-economic analysis of the broad role of 
communication and media systems in global capitalism while incorporating the key insights into 
communication processes and functions/uses of financial media/ information systems within the 
financial system itself that have been developed from other theoretical perspectives. 
 
The theoretical boundaries between the various approaches are not absolutely discrete (and are 
subject to contestation) and yet studies with a similar empirical focus can vary significantly in terms 
of the analytic frameworks deployed. Given the extensive range of literature that needs to be 
discussed, a brief comment on the structure and rationale of this section is needed. The literature 
review is intended to provide an overview of the key literature comprising the academic field(s) upon 
which the thesis draws, identify the theoretical and empirical themes (and gaps) emerging from that 
research and its relation to the thesis, and thereby provide the academic rationale for the research 
being undertaken. Furthermore, it is intended to form the basis for the progressive development of 
an analytic framework capable of incorporating a range of insights into communication, mediation 
and informational processes in financial markets from different theoretical perspectives. As such it 
will progressively introduce empirical and theoretical material as the reader needs to be aware of it 
(such as examples of different trading practices or financial instruments) rather than having many 
separate sections explaining these. The diversity of material under discussion means that some 
conceptual issues arise in parallel and therefore cannot easily proceed in the form of a linear 
narrative sequence.  
 
The review of literature is therefore arranged as follows: The first section provides a relatively brief 
overview of the key themes and issues related to financial market processes developed in 
academic fields of enquiry outside of communication/ media studies. The subsequent section is 
more extensive and examines the literature specifically examining financial media and 
communication (which will introduce in more detail some of the specifically relevant research in the 
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first section). This section is further divided into several themes to enable the material to be 
introduced with a degree of coherence while progressively building on the themes introduced 
previously, although in some cases a single author’s work may be mentioned in several places. In 
the case of each theme, conceptual/ theoretical tensions and overlaps will be identified and issues 
that need to be resolved in the thesis will be noted. The most detailed discussion of the specific 
research to which the thesis is most directly related is, for the most part, left until the later sections 
in order that the preceding sections provide the background needed to appreciate their significance. 
The key research questions emerging from the literature review will be identified along with 
indications of how they are to be answered empirically and methodologically. For narrative 
purposes, the discussion of other literature will then continue in subsequent chapters. This includes 
the development of the main theoretical framework, the discussion of globalisation, communication 
and capital accumulation, and the discussion of reflexive communication/ informational processes in 
financial markets as conceptualised using the theoretical framework. At this point the theoretical 
issues emerging from the literature will be resolved in order to provide a basis for discussing the 
empirical findings of the study.   
 
Part 1: Theoretical approaches from outside communication/ 
media studies 
 
Sociological approaches to economic analysis have been influenced by the seminal work of Weber 
(1964), Parsons & Smelser (1956) and Polanyi (1957) but there has been a substantial amount of 
more recent literature (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Smelser & Swedberg, 1994; Carruthers & Babb: 
2000; Fligstein, 2001; Slater & Tonkiss, 2001, Dobbin, 2004). A perennial theme is the 
embeddedness of economic activity in social-cultural systems and networks of relations usually 
overlooked in neoclassical economics. This emphasises the need to consider economic processes 
in the wider institutional context of political, social and cultural arrangements and, importantly, 
challenges the neoclassical emphasis on the rational economic agent as the focal point of 
economic analysis. As Babe (1995) points out, although many sociological and economic analyses 
entertain implicit ideas of information/ communication, these are often not clearly conceived. On one 
level, communication is understood to play a role in forming the relations within/between social 
subsystems (see Parsons & Smelser, 1956; also Galtung, 1999). In respect to monetary/ financial 
systems, the role of communication in the institutionalisation of legitimate currencies and financial 
instruments has been highlighted (e.g. see Dodd, 1994; Ingham, 2004). Sociological perspectives 
raise important questions about for formation of economic institutions and the nature of economic 
action and invite a more nuanced conception of communication in economic processes. 
 
Socio-technical approaches to economic analysis have examined the way in which the knowledge 
of economic actors helps to reproduce and ‘perform’ economic relations, suggesting a reflexively 
constitutive relation between knowledge/ theory and market reality (see Callon, 1998; Smart, 1999, 
MacKenzie, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; also Mackenzie & Millo, 2003). Thus the adoption of particular 
modes of calculation the incorporation of particular metrics into trading frames/schemata may come 
to have a self-fulfilling quality whereby financial market prices come to correspond to the ways that 
investment actors model market behaviour. As Davis (2006c) points out, this is far from automatic 
or uniform: Investment schemata vary across markets and evolve over time. And the concept of 
performativity is arguably used too generically in regard to financial calculation or ‘metrology’ . The 
relation between economic knowledge, information and prices will be explored further as different 
conceptions of financial reflexivity are developed (see later).  
 
Geographic perspectives (e.g. Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1999, 2003; Massey, 1999; Leyshon & 
Thrift, 1997, 2007) overlap with the sociological in some respects, but their relevance to 
communication systems tends to be on the production/ reconfiguration of market spaces and their 
links to macro-level political and economic arrangements. The role of communication systems in the 
reconfiguration of financial spaces and the changes in the significance of  those spaces (notably 
through the facilitation of transborder capital flows outside the spheres of state regulation and new 
modes of economic agency through electronic information and investment technology) are an 
important consideration in conceptualising contemporary globalisation. Drawing on Actor-Network 
Theory, Leyshon & Thrift (1997) point to changes in the international monetary and financial system 
linked to shifts in the network arrangements among national states, media systems, new financial 
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services and new information/ computing technologies (such as automated trading systems). In 
later analyses (2007), they point to finance capital’s search for new spatialities of stable income 
streams (made possible partly through NCTs) which can be securitised. New spaces of agency and 
power-relations among various state and market actors play a constitutive role in the emergence of 
new monetary and financial systems. Massey’s work likewise notes the significance of 
communication systems, but emphasises cultural/ interpretative variation across new social spaces 
at the same time as noting that power-relations related to spatiality are unequal. Massey’s analysis 
of ‘power geometries’ offers a more culturally-inflected alternative to structuralist neo-Marxist 
approaches. Nevertheless, Harvey’s arguments concerning capital accumulation and the need for 
spatial-temporal fixes provide the most promising link to other bodies of theory (notably 
‘Regulationist School’ macroeconomic analysis- see Jessop, 1990; 2001a) that cannot be 
overlooked in explaining the spatial extension of global finance. However, the contingencies of 
space, power and agency noted by Leyshon and Thrift need to be taken into consideration (this 
conception is also broadly consistent with Stalder’s [2001] account of network flows and nodes- see 
later). These geographic perspectives indicate that particular spatial and temporal configurations 
must be considered in explaining communication processes in financial markets.  
 
As Babe (1995) suggests, the conception of communication and information in economics often 
presumes a mechanistic transmission process. However, some psychological approaches to 
economics, notably in the field of behavioural finance (e.g. Shleifer, 2000; Shiller, 2000, 2003; 
Subramanyam, 2007), focus on investor decisions and price movements in response to market 
signals. Despite the moniker, this is not limited to behavioural analysis, and includes consideration 
of cognitive processes. Although critical of orthodox economic models of pricing which ignore 
investor psychology, behavioural finance’s emphasis on irrational factors affecting pricing often 
assumes that there are rational, ‘correct’ market prices for securities based on fundamentals which 
become ‘distorted’ in practice. Several studies of investor psychology have examined aspects of 
financial information usage. Schiller’s (2000) study of investor perceptions of news stories 
preceding crises found that the items rated as most important were those concerned with previous 
crashes or major declines, suggesting that the news media may played a role in sensitising 
investors to the possibility of crisis. In another study, Tippet (2000) analysed Australian equity 
investor perceptions of the importance of different ethical and governance factors in making trading 
decisions. Tippet found that the most important governance and ethical issues concerned directors’ 
pay, professional business practices, and promotion of Australian economic growth. In contrast, the 
least important issues included failure to conduct social/environmental audits, aboriginal rights, and 
uranium mining. Wood, Kosedag & Stephens (2007) analysed US fund managers’ perceptions of 
government economic indicators, print media and broadcast media. Their analysis revealed that the 
fund managers focused on relatively few public media, suggesting that despite the enormous 
volumes of market information now available, only a few key sources were likely to be of interest to 
institutional investors.  The Wall Street Journal and (to a lesser extent) Barron’s were regarded as 
the most important print media, while CNBC’s Squawk Box and Wake Up Call and Bloomberg TV’s 
Morning Markets were the most highly valued broadcast content. Others, such as Money magazine 
were found to be of relatively little importance to fund managers. Interestingly, Wood et al.’s study 
differentiates between different print publications and individual programmes on CNBC and 
Bloomberg TV. However, somewhat unhelpfully, they do not present the overall ratings or rankings 
and drew their conclusions about importance from collating statistical t-tests between the ratings for 
each pair of media. Wood et al. (2007) acknowledge that their findings leave open the question of 
why fund managers make more use of some  public media rather than others, and moreover, their 
detailed breakdown of public print and broadcast media means that their study does not compare 
public media with private/ institutional information sources. Another study by Schwarzkopf  (2007) 
examined investor attitudes towards information source credibility its importance in investment 
decisions. Credibility in this context is defined in terms of whether an information source inspires 
belief in the representation (see Beaulieu, 2001). Schwarzkopf’s analysis focused on how US 
investors ranked sources of information about companies, how important source credibility was to 
them, and also how widely different types of financial information were used. Interestingly, the study 
ranked sources of pre-audit company earning estimates and sources of non-financial performance 
measures, including a selection of both publicly-available and private/institutionally restricted media.  
The results are displayed in the table below: 
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Fig.3 Investor Financial Source Rankings 
 
Rank Sources of unaudited 
earnings estimates: 
Sources of non-financial 
performance measures 
1 Analysts’ consensus CPA assurance report 
2 Self (one’s own estimate) Individual analyst 
3 Press release in WSJ Press release in WSJ 
4 Friend in industry Industry study 
5 CEO comments Trade newsletter 
6 Individual analyst CEO Comments 
7 Company web site Local business reporter 
8 Internet chat room Company web site 
9 Unsolicited newsletter Internet chat room 
                      Derived from Schwarzkopf, 2007 
 
As Schwarzkopf (2007) observes, there was a strong consistency in the ranking of analyst 
consensus, indicating that intersubjective validation of earning estimates and market expectations 
among ostensibly independent experts (although this may be problematic given the evidence that 
analysts can themselves be guided by prevailing peer opinion; see later). In contrast, there was 
much less value placed on information provided by industry newsletters and chat-rooms where the 
credibility of the source was unknown. As Schwarzkopf points out, this would suggest popular 
concerns about the irrational influence of such sources is overstated (although this study does not 
concern non-institutional day-traders). Schwarzkopf’s study suggests that the form and medium 
through which companies disclose information may influence credibility, which also has implications 
for the practice of investor relations (see Hong & Ki, 2007; also see Golding, 2003; Davis, 2006b, 
2007).  
 
Other psychological studies have examined market reactions and price movements in response to 
news announcements in key financial media (particularly the Wall Street Journal and CNBC; see for 
example Beneish, 1991; Sant & Zaman, 1996; Lee, 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999; Huberman & Regev, 
2001; Busse & Green, 2002).  The evidence of price movements in response to public news invite 
important questions concerning whether this is attributable solely to the information itself or the 
expectation that other investors will respond to it (a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy). Although 
behavioural finance generally pays minimal attention to the symbolic, constitutive ontology of 
market information, there is potential to extend these studies from a communication studies 
perspective. These analyses help build a picture of the intersubjective codifications that underpin 
financial investment practices. However, it remains unclear which media are potentially most 
important in informing investment decisions, the extent to which their credibility affects usage, and 
what kinds of information investors are seeking. It is also unclear whether or how media/information 
usage across different market sectors varies, and whether there are differences in the value 
investors place on publicly-available information sources/channels versus private ones.  
 
In contrast, cultural/ ethnographic approaches (e.g. Zelizer, 1994; Abolafia, 1998; Ray & Sayer, 
1999; Singh, 2001; Du Gay & Pryke, 2002) emphasise communicative processes in regard to 
issues such as identity and inter-subjective meaning in economic activity, although the attention 
paid to interpretative agency can sometimes de-emphasise consideration of broader political-
economic arrangements (e.g. Zelizer’s [1994] analysis of cultural variation in the ‘earmarking’ of 
monetary forms prioritises agency and cultural context over macro-structural processes such as 
credit systems and accumulation circuits). Meanwhile, several micro-ethnographic studies of media/ 
information usage in finance institutions (e.g. Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger, 2002a, 2002b; Beunza & 
Stark, 2002, 2004) have analysed how information systems in financial institutions influence 
relations among investors and how they make sense of their decisions/ actions. These are 
significant because they relate the institutional organisation of media systems and information 
displays to the intersubjective codifications governing investment decisions. 
 
Cultural economy is therefore an important sub-field but there is a tendency, particularly in the 
micro-ethnographic studies, to overlook the implications of their analyses for macro-level political 
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economic arrangements and accumulation regimes (although some culturally-inflected approaches 
emphasising symbolic goods do- see later). Although Thrift (1999) points to the rise of  ‘soft 
capitalism’ and the emphasis on new managerialist cultures as a productive force/ source of 
competitive advantage in their own right, he also observes that, ‘The cultural turn involves, then, 
acts of homage to the importance of capitalism, which at the same time, act as a means of 
forgetting all about it and getting onto more interesting things’ (p.135). Thrift also points to a 
valorisation of new business cultures which, coupled with new technologies and spatialities of 
economic agency, ‘form an emergent and increasingly powerful “cultural circuit of capital” which has 
only existed since the 1960s’ (1999, p.144). Leyshon and Thrift (2007) also point out that socio-
cultural approaches to financialization have focused either on the implications of financial activity for 
the macro-relations between state capital and civil society, or on the micro-social dimensions of 
financial institutions and investment practice. Although both identify important processes, the 
interlinkage between these two levels of analysis is often left unexplored. The significance of the 
‘cultural turn’ is the extension of the analytic frameworks applicable to economic phenomena 
through emphasising the socio-cultural dimension in all forms of economic activity. The cultural turn 
also demands reconsideration of the ontology of the economic ‘base’, particularly in regard to the 
constitutive/ performative potential of economic knowledge which renders problematic any positivist 
distinction between ontological and epistemological claims in the sphere of financial exchange.  
 
Other approaches have linked cultural forms to shifts in the mode of production. These include 
Baudrillard’s (1975, 1981, 1993) work on sign-value and Lash & Urry’s (1994) analysis of symbolic 
goods in the contemporary economy. For Baudrillard, just as commodity production based upon 
use-value becomes superseded by exchange-value in industrial capitalism (i.e. Marx’s C-M-C and 
M-C-M’ circuits respectively), so sign value comes to supersede exchange value in the postmodern 
era. The reproduction of sign values through simulacra means signs are no longer structurally 
grounded in/ constrained by objective material representations. Social identity and values thus 
become increasingly-self-referential. Baudrillard (1993) suggests an emancipatory role for symbolic 
exchange beyond the confines of material capitalist accumulation. In a related analysis, Lash and 
Urry (1994) likewise identify a shift away from the industrial production of material goods to 
symbolic/ informational goods and the emergence of a sign-based knowledge economy. There is no 
doubt that the commodification of symbolic/ informational consumer goods and services has 
become a key feature of the contemporary economy in most industrialised capitalist economies. 
However, as Dodd (1994) and Miller (2002) have suggested, these phenomena do not necessarily 
point to any epochal shift in fundamental political-economic arrangements, let alone the redundancy 
of material production.  
 
It is therefore important to differentiate between; a) the intensification of the production of symbolic 
economic values in terms of a creeping extension of the relations of economic exchange and capital 
accumulation into the sphere of cultural relations and identity formation, and; b) the intensification of 
the production of symbolic economic values in terms of the expansion of capital accumulation 
through financial market processes involving increasingly abstract forms of securities/ financial 
instruments which do not correspond directly to material economic conditions. The latter is 
evidenced partly by the disproportionate growth of financial market values as a proportion of GDP, 
but also by financial transactions denoting exchanges which, in practice, would not be materially 
possible. For example, some derivatives trading involves creating simulacra of transactions in the 
underlying securities/ commodities on scales that would not be feasible if undertaken using their 
‘referent’ objects24. Lowenstein (2000) suggests that NFIs are “the equivalent of financial veg-o-
matics […] slicing and dicing financial assets into potent, newfangled securities.” (2000, p. 59), 
while Lewis points to the use of NFI to conduct financial exchanges “that could never exist in the 
real world”  (1989, p. 163). Such phenomena raise important questions about the nature of financial 
representation and value and the ontological status of trade in financial securities that entail no 
obvious material production as part of the value-creation process.  
 
                                                 
24
 Dunbar (2000) notes that the infamous LTCM hedge-fund, whose trillion dollar derivatives portfolio collapsed 
in 1998, almost precipitating a systemic crisis, engaged in derivatives trades which included artificially 
replicating the effect of selling of UK ‘gilt’ bonds in volumes that exceeded the total volume of gilts on the 
market.  
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Thus many of the new theories concerning cultural circuits of economic activity have focused on 
new modalities of exchange that modify, but do not supersede or extend beyond the basic 
processes of commodity production and exchange (Marx’s M-C-M’ circuit). However, in other 
respects, the cultural economic arguments concerning the role of shared meanings in the 
production of value and self-referential sign-values are highly relevant to the massive growth of the 
financial markets and the evidence of unprecedented financial deepening over the last thirty years 
(not to mention the magnitude of the current global credit crisis). The insights concerning 
signification/ representation and economic value might be developed further in relation to Marx’s 
(1996) often-overlooked third circuit of accumulation (M-M’) involving the generation of fictitious 
financial values (which Marx himself found difficult to reconcile with the labour theory of value). 
However, linking cultural economic frameworks to a Marxist one requires a bridge or synthesis 
between political economy and cultural economy (see earlier discussion of Sayer, 2001; Jessop, 
2004; Graham, 2006). This will be developed as the thesis progresses. 
 
The various outlined above all offer potentially useful analyses of  how contemporary markets 
operate and suggest important angles of  enquiry for communication/ media scholars. The 
theoretical and empirical emphasis on communication, information and media can help to explain 
key processes in financial markets which are both central to their functioning and understated from 
the perspective of alternative theoretical frameworks. Babe (1995) points out that, although 
neoclassical economics acknowledges the key role of information in the efficient determination of 
market prices, it implicitly conceives of communication in technical-functional terms involving the 
mechanistic transmission of data. This theoretical ‘blindspot’ overlooks processes of mediation, 
representation, interpretation and meaning without which many market phenomena (such as the 
inter-subjective coordination of pricing and values) cannot be adequately explained. One might 
contend, however, that the critical political economy approach to media also has a ‘blindspot’ 
insofar as its emphasis on economic ‘base’ conditions and material production does not readily lend 
itself to analysis of semiotic issues of representation along the lines of postmodern cultural 
approaches to economic/ financial analysis. No critique of communication, mediation and 
informational processes in financial markets can proceed without  recognition of the symbolic 
processes underpinning the generation of financial values. However, as will become clear, the 
symbolic ontology of monetary forms and financial values is not a contemporary aberration made 
possible by new media technologies, but a fundamental and constitutive dimension of markets. 
 
As indicated earlier, there have been numerous political economic studies of how media systems 
are increasingly driven by the need to maximise revenue, and also the role of those systems in 
shaping ideological and policy environments aligned to the interests of advertisers and corporate 
shareholders (e.g. McChesney et al., 1998; Golding & Murdock, 2000). Although these studies have 
critiqued the broad structural relations between media systems and capitalist accumulation regimes, 
critical analyses of how media systems operate within financial markets and empirical studies of 
communication processes in financial institutions have been rather less common. This probably 
reflects both the complexity of the subject matter and also the limited opportunities to access 
financial institutions for extensive empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a 
steady growth in the communication studies literature on financial phenomena, but as with the 
approaches of other social sciences, several theoretical and theoretical themes can be identified in 
this work.  
 
Part 2:  Communication- specific studies of financial markets 
 
Communication infrastructures and financial networks 
 
Communication technologies have been indispensable to the spatial extension and the temporal 
acceleration of financial markets since the 19th century. They provide both the information required 
by investors to make trading decisions and (since the 1970s), they have provided the electronic 
channels and interfaces through which buying and selling transactions are conducted around the 
globe. Carey (1995) points out that the development of the telegraph had a profound influence on 
financial markets. Firstly, it separated the flows of market information and market commodities. 
Prior to electronic communication, information required physical transmission just like a material 
commodity and the velocity of both was limited to the speed of the fastest train or ship. Secondly, 
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the availability of near-instantaneous news about prices and market conditions across national and 
soon, continental, distances significantly decreased the opportunities for arbitrage across markets 
in different geographical locations (simply speaking, arbitrage involves finding two markets that 
price the same commodity or security differently and exploiting the price difference). However, if all 
market actors are informed of the prices being paid in other markets, there will be a convergence of 
ask/ bid ‘spreads’ in those prices. As Carey notes, ‘before the telegraph, markets were independent 
of one another [such] that the effect of one market on another was so gradually manifested as to be 
virtually unnoticed’ (1995, p.155). Concomitantly, this brings about a shift in emphasis from the 
exploitation of price differences across space, toward the exploitation of differentials across time: 
 
‘The effect of the telegraph is a simple one: it evens out markets in space. The 
telegraph puts everyone in the same place for purposes of trade; it makes geography 
irrelevant. The telegraph brings the conditions of supply and demand to bear on the 
determination of a price […] it eliminates opportunities for arbitrage by realising the 
classical assumption of perfect information. But the significance of the telegraph does 
not lie solely in the decline of arbitrage; rather the telegraph shifts speculation into 
another dimension. It shifts speculation from space to time, from arbitrage to futures 
[…] as the telegraph closed down spatial uncertainty in prices, it opened up, because 
of improvements in communication, the uncertainty of time.’ (1995, p.156).  
 
Carey notes that the shift in speculative activity entailed not just an intensification of the demand for 
timely market news. He argues that this also entailed a ‘decontextualisation’ of markets whereby 
local conditions of supply and demand became increasingly irrelevant to prices. For Carey, this 
rendered market activity more ‘mysterious’ ‘less apprehensible’ and ‘powerful’ (1995, p.157). In 
other words, there was a disembedding from local socio-economic relations as a consequence of 
the interlinkage with spatially displaced market activity, at the same time as it became more difficult 
to discern the nature of the remote agencies driving price movements. Furthermore, Carey argues 
that these developments also ‘sundered’ the relation between commodities and their 
representations (see also Pryke & Allen, 2000). Futures contracts enabled the execution of trades 
at a set price denominated at a future point in time. Although these could be used to insure 
commodity producers and buyers with a use for the commodity from unexpected price fluctuations, 
the futures contracts could also be used by financial speculators to profit from those price 
movements without any actual physical exchange of commodities25. Thus the contracts themselves 
became a security that could be traded independently of the commodities with their values being 
derived from the price movement of the denoted commodity (hence the term ‘derivatives’). As Carey 
suggests, ‘the warehouse receipt, which stands as a representation of the product, has no intrinsic 
relation to the real product’, a phenomenon indicative of ‘the progressive divorce of the signifier 
from the signified, a process in which the world of signifiers progressively overwhelms and moves 
independently of real material objects’ (2005, p.158). Moreover, Carey argues that the development 
of futures markets required standardised grading of commodities in order to allow uniform pricing 
and exchange across markets without the need for verification of quality prior to each transaction. 
This is a precursor to the ‘colonisation of space’ and the formation of global markets with 
standardised pricing and time-zones.    
 
Carey’s analysis posits an important link between media systems and the spatial extension and 
temporal compression of capital markets and accumulation regimes. Importantly, he notes that the 
                                                 
25
 For example, futures contracts can be used to ‘short sell’ a commodity (or security) by entering into a 
contract to sell the commodity at an agreed price at a specified future date. If the price of the commodity 
declines below the agreed price by the specified date, then the contracted seller could in theory oblige the 
counterparty to purchase the goods at an inflated price. In practice though, the contracted buyer compensates 
the seller by paying the notional difference in value. If the price of the commodity were to increase, however, 
then the a short-seller who does not currently own the denoted goods would in theory be obliged to buy them 
at the higher price and supply them to the buyer at the lower price. In practice, however, the difference in value 
would normally be the only required transaction. Speculators can use futures/ options derivatives to leverage 
or amplify their effective trading volumes, since for any given amount of capital, a substantially greater volume 
of derivatives contracts can be purchased compared with the notional commodity/security. When prices in the 
latter fluctuate, this significantly amplifies profits (and potentially losses).  As Pryke & Allen (2000) and Bryan 
and Rafferty (2006) point out, these practices also involves the quantification and securitisation of abstracted 
financial risk itself.  
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separation of informational and material commodity exchange provides the basis for Marx’s notion 
of commodity fetishism and the distinction between use value and exchange value. However, there 
is a further process that needs to be recognised here; the ontological separation of commodity use-
values and financial exchange values also provides the basis for the formation of fictitious capital 
involving the attribution of value as as-yet-unrealised monetary gains. Furthermore, the uniformity of 
commodity standards and pricing is not sufficient to account for the formation of contemporary 
futures markets; a more important consideration, particularly in derivatives trading is the use of new 
financial technologies in the performative calculation/ quantification of financial risk, which in turn 
allows abstracted risk liabilities to be securitised and, traded. As Bryan & Rafferty (2006) observe, 
this also permits commensuration of values across a whole range of financial securities and capital 
investments (these issues will be discussed more completely in a later chapter).  
 
The recognition of the informational/symbolic dimension of finance capital also challenges the 
notion that the ostensible divorce between the signifier and signified in economic relations is a 
specifically contemporary postmodern phenomenon linked to a recent culturisation of markets (see 
earlier comments on the ‘cultural turn’). Indeed, the basic process by which future prices for 
commodity exchange could be fixed in the present long precedes the development of the telegraph. 
Electronic communication infrastructures are a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in the 
emergence of the global futures markets. The recent increase in the volume of futures trading (and 
other related financial markets) is linked to new communication technologies and new financial 
instruments develop out of a specific array of political-economic institutional arrangements and 
agencies.   
 
Barnett, Salisbury, Kim and Langhorne (1999) conducted an extensive study of networks within 
global flows of monetary transactions, telecommunications activity and trading activity across up to 
198 countries. This network analysis identified correlations between the three dimensions and 
identified key nodes and strongly interconnected sub-networks which the authors argue are broadly, 
albeit not perfectly, consistent with the core/semi-periphery/periphery relations posited by world 
system theory (WST). Trade flows reflected a single major cluster with a distinct core and periphery 
as posited by WST. The structure of the global economy based on monetary flows (measured here 
in terms of credit card transactions and bank-to-bank exchanges) was found be concentrated 
among a group of major western industrial nations with a semi-periphery comprised of emerging 
economies in East Asia with a larger peripheral group (although there were some regional 
variations).  However, it is also important to note that the monetary data used by Barnett et al. did 
not include non-bank financial market transactions or foreign direct investment (FDI). Nevertheless, 
an examination of the largest 25 stock exchanges by capitalisation may provide another indication 
of the primary centres of global financial activity (World Federation of Exchanges, 2007): See table 
overpage: 
 
As the stock exchange figures indicate, financial market activity has three primary nodes, centred in 
New York, London and Tokyo. Yet even within those nodes, on an institutional level, the trading 
activity itself is globally networked; the major investment banks and brokerage firms operate around 
the world and around the clock, and their institutional agency as key drivers of global capital flows 
exhibits an market omnipresence that is not reducible to discrete nation-state spaces. As Carey 
(1995) suggests, there has been a ‘decontextualisation’ of markets such that the buying and selling 
transactions may take place in/ through the major exchanges, but the agents undertaking the 
trading may be located off-shore and across time-zones. Barnett et al. (1999) concur that 
telecommunications media and monetary flows themselves are ‘space adjusting technologies’, and 
acknowledge the WST framework does not apply readily to all the patterns of flows indicated in the 
network study.  
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Fig. 4   Top Stock Exchanges by Capitalisation 
 
 
 Top 25 stock exchanges 
by market capitalisation  
Capitalisation  
(US$ Trillion) 
1 New York SE 16.282 
2 Tokyo SE 4.627 
3 Euronext* 4.418 
4 Nasdaq 4.389 
5 London SE 4.207 
6 Shanghai 3.018 
7 Hong Kong 2.974 
8 Toronto TSX Group 2.294 
9 Deutsche Borse 2.119 
10 BME Spanish 1.832 
11 Bombay (Mumbai) 1.611 
12 National SE India 1.455 
13 Australian SE 1.452 
14 Sao Paolo 1.403 
15 OMX Nordic 1.378 
16 Swiss Exchange 1.326 
17 Korea Exchange 1.256 
18 Borsa Italiana 1.134 
19 Johannesburg SE 0.940 
20 Taiwan SE Corp 0.748 
21 Shenzhen SE 0.741 
22 Singapore  0.569 
23 Mexican Exchange 0.427 
24 Athens Exchange 0.269 
25 American SE 0.263 
*Euronext includes exchanges in Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon 
(statistics derived from WFE, 2007, prior to credit crunch) 
 
 
A rather different communication network approach to analysing flows of finance can be found in 
the work of Stalder (1997b, 2001). Drawing on McLuhan’s media theory (citing McLuhan & 
Zingrone, 1995), Stalder argues that monetary flows are a ‘medium without content’ (1997, p.1) and 
that new communication/ information technologies have been a key driver of contemporary financial 
networks; 
 
‘The financial markets are, unlike any other aspect of today’s economy or culture, 
completely embedded in computer networks [and] many of its instruments are 
unthinkable in any other media environment. Their phenomenal growth over the last 
two decades is a direct result of the power created by the linking of high-end 
computational hard- and software with nearly unlimited, or at least abundant 
telecommunicational bandwidth’ (1997b, p.2, emphasis added).  
  
Although this may seem unduly deterministic26, Stalder (1997a, 1997b, 2001) makes several useful 
points about communication media and finance. The first concerns issues of financial 
representation and the disruption of the relation between the financial signifiers and referents in 
respect to monetary forms and new financial instruments like derivatives (see also Carey, 1995). 
                                                 
26
 The emphasis on the importance of communications/ information technology as a driver of financial markets 
seems potentially deterministic, but Stalder (1997) also points out that the emergence of global capital markets 
depended on several intersecting political-economic trends and institutional arrangements. In his later piece, 
Stalder (2001) explicitly distances himself from a determinist view of technology, although his arguments are 
still developed in a framework assuming McLuhan’s focus on mediation.  
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Noting the growth of trading in abstract financial securities and the propensity of traders to engage 
in herd-like behaviour and generate self-fulfilling prophecies, he suggests that there is no longer 
any clear distinction between verifiable news about market events and the circulation of unfounded 
rumours. As will become apparent, this is a recurrent theme in the literature on financial media, 
although the origins, nature and extent of such tendencies are contested. Stalder suggests that 
communication technologies have accelerated financial market processes such that the circulation 
of information becomes increasingly self-referential and decoupled from the circulation of 
information in other social/ economic systems. At this point, the neoclassical assumption that 
economic fundamentals grounded in material economic processes are the determinants of financial 
values is no longer sustainable. Consequently, financial markets have become a closed system, the 
complexity of which requires the development of new paradigms and models.  
 
Stalder develops his conception of financial networks further in a later article (2001), drawing on 
Castell’s (1996) notion of the network society and the ‘space of flows’ in which immaterial forms of 
social action escape the confines of material space and time. He suggests financial networks 
exhibit such characteristics, but differentiates between the abstract flows of immaterial information 
and capital and material nodes which are ‘structures built at the recurrent intersection of different 
flows of data which they, at the same time, process and redirect’ (2001, p.11). Nodes and flows are 
thus conceived as mutually constitutive, with the node being the point at which data is processed 
and transformed into useful information (which may be automated through automated expert 
systems such as programme trading). Nodes may vary in the way they process data, and the flows 
they generate may be polarised, going to or from particular nodes with differing degrees of intensity. 
Stalder suggests that the basic function of financial nodes is to process data into information and 
drive the buying or selling responses which continue the flows. In turn, these responses generates 
signals that the network then needs to process; ‘The action of one node immediately becomes new 
data for the other nodes, as the network coordinates itself in endless feedback loops’ (2001, p.15).  
 
Stalder’s observations about networks raise a number of theoretical issues which require further 
consideration and clarification. Firstly, the notion that the omnipresent real-time market monitoring 
and feedback made possible by new media/information technologies has driven the development of 
new, increasingly abstract models of investment practice is broadly consistent with the observations 
of Carey (1995) concerning the narrowing of arbitrage opportunities (see also later discussion of 
Davis, 2005; Clark et al., 2005). Consideration of institutional arrangements is also important in 
accounting for the mutual recognition, intelligibility and legitimacy of financial concepts, models and 
instruments. Some forms of financial information also do more than describe/ represent market 
reality with a relative degrees of accuracy. For example, a central/ reserve bank’s announcement of 
the official cash rate (OCR) or a rating agency’s downgrading of a country’s sovereign debt brings 
about a shift in the meaning of particular monetary symbols which in turn affects the value of 
commodities and securities and changes the basis upon which investors engage in trading 
transactions. Thus financial ‘flows’ include information and communicative actions that directly 
transform market conditions.  Stalder is right to problematise the abstract self-referential nature of 
money and market information, as well as the significance of feedback loops. He also raises an 
crucial question about the institutional conditions necessary for treating financial information at ‘face 
value’, but his formulation of how networks function does not fully account for the performative and 
constitutive aspects of financial information and communication processes. These themes will be 
developed further throughout the review of the literature and subsequent chapters. 
 
Financial media institutions 
 
There have been several accounts of historical changes in the institutions of financial news and 
journalistic practices. Parsons’ (1989) detailed analysis of the evolution of the financial press since 
the 19th Century explains how changes in the media were institutionally linked to changes in 
financial markets and policy arrangements. He identifies shifting tensions between journalistic 
norms and political-economic interests underpinning the financial media and also the potential 
influence of financial media content on market pricing mechanisms (themes also addressed by 
Porter, 1998; also Saporito, 1999).  For Parsons, the power of the financial media stems not so 
much from effects on audience opinions or investor reactions but from their capacity to generate 
economic discourses which help coordinate shared meanings across an elite business-political 
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nexus and  construct  ‘the economy’ and (more recently) ‘finance’ as discrete spheres of business 
activity and policy concern.  
 
Other studies of financial media have examined the emergence of the financial wire services and 
other specialist financial media as institutions, or analysed how new financial information services 
have brought about changes both in news production and trading practices (Palmer et al., 1998; 
Gavin, 1998; Craig, 2001). The convergence of telecommunications, computing and satellite 
technology allowed wire services and electronic brokerage systems like Reuters, Instinet and 
Telerate (and, from the 1980s onwards, IMS which became Bloomberg in 1983-4) to offer not only 
real-time market news, but electronic trading platforms which provided investors with a direct 
market interface through which financial transactions could be processed (see Holley, 1995; Palmer 
et al., 1998; Craig, 2001). From the 1980s, electronic brokerage systems allowing securities to be 
bought and sold from private trading rooms have largely replaced the traditional ‘pit trading’ forums 
in the exchanges (Bartam, 2003). Despite periodic challenges to their dominance from other real-
time financial news services and brokerage platforms, Reuters’ and Bloomberg’s development of 
increasingly specialised and customisable investor services for different markets has made them 
permanent fixtures on the institutional trading desk, and several of their direct competitors have now 
closed or been bought out. This trend saw Reuters acquire Instinet in 1987 (although this was sold 
on to NASDAQ in 2001), the Quotron stock quote service in 1994, Bridge Information Systems in 
2001, Multex.com Inc. in 2003, Telerate and Ecowin in 2005, and Clearforest/Text Analytics in 2007 
(see Matloff, 2003; Bartram, 2003; FundingUniverse, 2008). 
 
The major wire services are now accompanied by a range of new financial media services including 
specialised television channels and internet services, but as Matloff (2003) points out, their market 
growth over the last decade has been far from smooth (perhaps suggesting a more contingent 
media trajectory than Clark et al.).  Bloomberg and Reuters both developed their own financial 
television services, but Reuters decided to discontinue its channel in 2001, mainly because of 
limited ratings and high overheads (Bartram, 2003). Time Warner’s venture into financial television 
in the form of CNNfn was similarly discontinued in 2004 (although CNNMoney.com is a significant 
online presence). The dominant financial television player has doubtless been NBC Universal’s 
CNBC, which grew rapidly after taking over the Financial News Network (FNN) in 1991 
(FundingUniverse, 2008). CNBC offers region-specific 24-hour business and financial news across 
the world. Meanwhile, News Corporation’s Fox Business Network (FBN) was established in 2007, 
ostensibly to compete with CBNC. A further significant development in 2007 was News 
Corporation’s acquisition of Dow Jones, which included the Dow Jones Financial Information 
Service along with key print titles like the Wall Street Journal and Barrons as well as the 
Marketwatch.com website.  Another major shake up in the financial media was the 53% buy-out of 
Reuters by Woodbridge to create Thomson Reuters PLC in 2008 (see Reuters, 2007; Business 
Week, 2008). These events underline the fact that despite their specialisation, financial media are 
subject to very similar market pressures as mainstream media organisations.   
 
Internet services are another financial media sector that has seen rapid growth over the last 
decade, although the dominant online actors remain the major wire services, financial press and 
television operators. Financial websites include  subscription-only financial analysis and investment 
advice (e.g., I-Metrix, Money.net, Morningstar, and InsiderIntelligence.com), electronic brokerage 
services for non-institutional investors (e.g., Schwab Corp., Scottrade, TD Ameritrade, E*Trade, 
Fidelity and ING Sharebuilder), and a plethora of free investment-related websites, blogs and 
chatrooms. The latter vary enormously in content and quality, but one of the best-known financial 
websites, TheStreet.Com, offers free market news,  top stock picks, and analyst buy/sell 
recommendations as well as none free financial newsletters.  Financial internet services have 
certainly extended active trading opportunities to individual investors outside of banks and 
investment institutions. As Porter (1998) notes, there is a long history of financial media catering to 
investors among the general public who buy and sell financial securities through traditional brokers. 
However, the availability of real time financial news and the provision of an interface with the market 
through online brokerage systems is new, and these factors have extended the channels and 
modalities of trading activity available to the public (Choy et al., 2002). Specifically, the individual 
investor’s agency no longer needs to be mediated through a proxy actor and transactions on 
financial exchanges can be undertaken directly.  
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This has led some neoliberal commentators to suggest that the opening up of the exclusive world of 
the financial elite to the general public represents a radical democratisation of financial markets 
(see Emmons, 1999; Norberg, 2003). As Thomas Friedman has proclaimed; ‘Soon everyone will 
have a virtual seat on the New York Stock Exchange […] For the first time in American history, both 
Joe Six Pack and Billionaire Bob are watching CNBC to see how their shares in the market are 
faring’ (1999, p.105). He then concludes that, ‘[G]lobalization is the product of the democratizations 
of finance, technology and information’  (1999, p.285). It can certainly be argued that thanks to the 
new financial media, asymmetries of access to financial information between professional/ 
institutional investors and individual/ public investors have been significantly reduced. However, 
new financial media and electronic brokerage systems confer neither the expertise to interpret 
market information nor the capital required to actually buy and sell securities. The precise numbers 
of online day-traders are difficult to calculate, but Kleinberg (2008) notes that in 2000, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission  reported that up to 33% of US stockholders were trading 
online. The Wall Street Journal (2008) noted that as of November 2008, individual investors were 
responsible for almost 20% of  the new capital being invested in US financial securities.  
 
New financial media have certainly extended increases the turnover rate for securities, which in turn 
intensifies short-term price fluctuations, which thereby increases the opportunities to make short-
term profits, which therefore increases the need for real-time market news in order to make 
investment decisions. However, as Shiller (2000) has pointed out, when a substantial volume of 
trades are conducted on the basis of ‘noise’ or market momentum (i.e. following short-term 
buying/selling trends and transitory sentiments of the market ‘herd’), the market ‘fundamentals’ used 
in established models of calculating value cease to be the primary determinants of price 
movements. This raises important questions about the extent to which  financial media themselves 
are implicated in market volatility. Although some of the behavioural finance and cultural economy 
literature has touched on these themes, they remain under-explored from a communication studies 
perspective.  
 
Financial news production 
 
Various analyses have explored financial news worker practices, particularly reporter-source 
relations and the extent to which potential conflicts of interest among journalists, companies and 
financial analysts/traders modify or compromise the norms of news production. The formation of 
financial news as a specific subgenre has evolved since the 19th Century. Parsons (1989) and 
Porter (1998) both identify changes in the demarcation of business/ financial newsbeats, the 
formation of financial reports as a specialist subgenre and the evolution of particular institutional 
pressures within newsrooms. Financial news production has also undergone some significant 
changes since the 1970s, in line with the technological and financial developments mentioned 
earlier. Aronson & Sylvie (1997)  have argued that these factors have had a significant impact on 
the norms of financial news production. Compressed news cycles reduce the range of sources that 
can be consulted and increases dependency on primary definers (see Hall et al., 1978) to provide 
the analytical frames to make sense of market events (see Davis, 1998). Malmqvist (1998) has 
similarly noted that factual correctness can be compromised by the pressure for immediacy in 
financial reporting: ‘Time is the dominant journalistic value- even over accuracy. ‘Time has become 
the one and only competitive factor. The choice between “fast and fairly correct” and “slow and 
really correct” is not practical for today’s economic reporters. Speed is decisive” (p.163).  
 
Malmqvist also suggests that both reporters and market analysts tend to conform to the prevailing 
views of their peers; ‘no market actor wants to get too far away from the average view, as that might 
be interpreted as being insufficiently informed. There is an obvious risk that the combined effect of 
the market and reporting processes, interdependent as they are, could strengthen each other and 
establish a self-fulfilling chain of events.’ (1998, p.164). Matolcsy & Schulz’s (1994) study of  errors 
in Australian financial journalism also concluded that time constraints lead to dependence on expert 
sources, but they also argue that a lack of financial knowledge among market reporters is another 
contributory factor. One reason for this is the development of new financial instruments (NFIs) and 
complex modes of trading based on sophisticated mathematical models that could not be put into 
practice without such technology (see Henwood, 1998; Lowenstein, 2000). As Parker (1997) and 
Williams (1998) point out, even well-informed financial journalists are unlikely to have the specialist 
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mathematical or econometric expertise required to understand new market models and financial 
instruments, and this makes it more difficult to critically assess the claims of sources. Lenzner 
(1997) suggests that there is well-informed financial journalism in the more specialist financial wires 
and financial magazines which do not report in real time and have space for more in-depth analysis. 
The increasing complexity of finance markets may also narrow the range of expert sources able to 
comment authoritatively. Rothkopf (1999) notes the emergence of an elite tier of key analysts and 
officials whose views are routinely consulted on financial issues, even when the evidence suggests 
they are compromised by vested interests. This raises questions about the extent to which financial 
reporting is subject to source capture. Neumann (1998) and Sherman (2002) respectively argue 
that the financial media remained largely uncritical and complicit with elite sources in the 1997 SE 
Asian crisis and in the 2001 Enron debacle.  
 
Financial media and financial analysts 
 
The potential for conflicts of interest to emerge between financial analysts, the clients of the 
investment banks/ brokerage houses that employ them, and the wider investment community is in 
many respects parallel to the well-documented conflicts of interests that can emerge in news 
production.  Just as editors and reporters may find their professional independence circumscribed 
by shareholder interests, advertiser demands, dependency on elite sources, complaints/ threats of 
litigation and normative/ ideological constraints (e.g. see Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Herman, 
1999), analysts operate in environments where their independence can be compromised by vested 
interests. Analysts are often employed by investment banks and brokerage houses which earn 
substantial amounts of revenue from providing services to corporations seeking to raise capital by 
selling shares or issuing bonds. These ‘sell-side’ analysts may have both formal and informal 
incentives to encourage investment in the client company, and their reward and promotion systems 
often reflect those interests (Womack, 1996; Kurtz, 2000; Cunningham, 2001; Davis, 2002b; Hong 
& Kubik, 2003; Golding, 2003). The tendency for analysts to issue unduly sanguine 
recommendations on client companies has been well documented (Shiller, 2000; FSA, 2002). As 
Dignan surmises, ‘Analysts are sheep. […] Many analysts are spoon-fed by the companies they 
cover in return for access. Throw in the fact that analysts also work for firms that normally have 
underwriting ties, and you can figure out why Wall Street’s sages are usually bullish most of the 
time. […] Simply put, there’s no glory in going out on a limb.’ (2000, p.1).  
 
Rothkopf (1999) and Kunczik (2002) both point to a tendency towards self-referentiality among 
financial analysts and financial reporters, particularly in regard to their coverage of overseas 
markets. Limitations in time and resources as well as the concentration of their institutional 
presences in major financial centres promotes dependency on an elite network of primary definers 
which often entails analysts and reporters providing analysis of market events in remote locations 
on the basis of information they glean from media reports and each other. As Rothkopf comments;  
 
‘[W]ho does the media turn to for analysis? Experts. And who are the experts? They 
are a very limited group of academics, Wall Street executives, former government 
officials and media commentators. When one reads an article or watches a television 
interview programme, one hears primarily from a small coterie of familiar faces- and 
hears from them over and over again. […] Thus, while the media seems increasingly 
diverse, its sources are remarkably homogenous and close-knit. […] Analysts- 
themselves members of the elite- assess these situations based on what they hear 
from people just like themselves-other elites.’ (1999, p.89-90). 
 
 
Analysts and financial public relations 
 
Hong & Kubik (2003) suggest that the reputation of a brokerage house or investment bank analyst 
covering a given area of the market is an important factor in determining company choice of an 
underwriter for IPOs. This can provides a perverse incentive for analysts for tout for client business 
by being unduly sanguine in their recommendation of stocks and other securities such as corporate 
bonds (Fisher, 2002). Indeed, as Henwood (1998), Vickers & Weiss (2000), Davis (2002a; 2006b, 
2007) and Golding (2003) have all pointed out, the distinction between financial analysis and 
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financial public relations (usually referred to as investor relations or IR in financial circles) has 
become increasingly blurred, particularly in regard to the active management of market 
expectations through well-timed information subsidies to the financial media. Indeed, managing 
investor perceptions as well as public opinion has become increasingly important to corporations 
since the 1990s. Forecasts of a company’s future earnings are factored into current market prices, 
so failure to meet the market’s consensus expectation (negative surprise) can result in heavy selling 
which drives down the share value sharply, and makes investors regard the company as an 
unreliable performer (Golding, 2003). Analysts may therefore revise their forecasts and earnings 
estimates to tone down the market expectations because it helps ensure that the eventual earnings 
announcements are framed as a positive (or ‘non-negative’) surprise, thereby encouraging 
investors to hold or buy the stocks (see Shiller, 2000; Golding, 2003; Chan et al., 2003).  
 
One implication here is that the way market ‘facts’ are framed in media report scan influence 
investor valuations and price. As Kurtz (2000) suggests, the public profile afforded to market 
opinion leaders through financial media like CNBC has helped confer celebrity status on top-ranking 
analysts. This enhances the reputation of their bank/brokerage, especially when analyst comments 
trigger trading activity, and helps ensure that their opinions are sought by clients as well as 
reporters. Clark, Thrift & Tickell (2005) concur and suggest that; ‘Advertising and commercial 
interests dominate [CBNC] so why should we expect “independent” advice as if the audience’s best 
interests are served by the program? […] Much of the commentary and opinion given out on 
channels like CNBC is closer to advertising than independent advice and should be understood as 
such.’ (p.175). 
 
Financial media and analyst influence on market prices 
 
Financial analysts are clearly a primary source of information for financial media. For example, one 
of CNBC’s best known features is “Squawk Box” which hosts various financial experts sharing their 
ostensible wisdom on market trends and making recommendations for investments to the audience 
(Vickers & Weiss, 2000; Busse & Green, 2002). Market news reports, especially those involving 
stock recommendations and analyst upgrades/downgrades, appear to trigger buying and selling 
activity and increase price volatility, at least in the short term. Individual day traders are implicated 
here because their investment strategy involved buying and selling securities on the same day 
(‘flipping’) to take advantage of short-term price movements. Interestingly, Jones (1996) that media 
convergence and the increased range of unmediated channels linking market actors directly to 
investors may reduce journalistic influence and increase analyst power. There is certainly 
substantial academic evidence that analyst comments carried in various financial media can be a 
trigger for buying and selling activity which moves market prices, at least in the short term (Beneish, 
1991; Barber & Loeffler, 1993; Liang et al., 1995; Sant & Zaman, 1996; Lenzner, 1997; 
Cunningham, 2001; Busse & Green, 2002; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Beunza & Garud, 2005). Indeed, 
Kurtz (2000) and Vickers & Weiss (2000) suggest that when the source of market news is a well-
recognised celebrity analyst, their comments on stocks and other securities could move the market 
regardless of the substance or accuracy of their claims. 
 
Studies of US financial market price movements in response to media reports by Barber & Loeffler 
(1993), Sant & Zaman (1996), Vickers & Weiss (2000) and Busse & Green (2002) all found that 
analyst recommendations carried in the media appeared to generate a distinct pattern of trading27: 
Initially, there are significant short-term price movements (in a direction broadly consistent with the 
positive/negative content of the reports) but this is followed by a more gradual reversion back 
towards the initial price. This became so characteristic of CNBC reports that it became known as 
the ‘Squawk Box Bounce’ (Vickers & Weiss, 2000). The common denominator here appeared to be 
the over-reaction of individual investors and day traders to stocks given media attention and/or the 
temporary price-surges this created. Significantly, this would suggest that the proliferation of real-
time financial reports has facilitated (and arguably encouraged) ‘noise trading’ or ‘momentum 
                                                 
27
 Barber and Loeffler studied responses to the Wall Street Journal ‘Dartboard’ column, Sant and Zaman 
focused on Business Week’s ‘Inside Wall Street’ column, while both Vickers & Weiss and Busse & Green 
examined CNBC’s ‘Squawk Box’.  Another study by Anderson et al. (2007) examined real-time global fiinancial 
market responses to US macroeconomic news. They noted that equities, bond and currency markets reacted 
differently to this news, but found evidence that market responses were globally interlinked.  
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trading’ (in the sense that investors appear to be responding to market epiphenomena such as 
perceived trading trends and temporary price fluctuations, rather than changes in the underlying 
market ‘fundamentals’ such as company earnings. Sant & Zaman (1996) suggest the interaction 
between investors and financial media can generate self-fulfilling prophecies whereby prices move 
because investors collectively expect them to move and trade accordingly (see Merton, 1968). 
Interestingly, the respective authors of the above studies all noted that investing on the basis of 
public media announcements permitted abnormal returns to be made only in the very short term, 
and many uninformed investors following the trend would lose money when the price movements 
reverted. This would tend to suggest that the financial media’s generation of self-fulfilling market 
prophecies does not normally pull prices out of line with market fundamentals in the long-term, 
although Shiller (2000) points out that neoclassical models of equilibrium pricing reflecting objective 
market conditions do not account for longer-term aberrations (see also Soros, 1994). Studies of day 
traders and non-institutional investors (see Barber & Odean, 2008; Frieder & Zittrain, 2006; Bohme 
& Holz, 2006) suggested that financial media could draw attention to securities and increase the 
aggregate level of trading regardless of the actual news content or the credibility of the source. 
However, such ostensibly irrational responses to market information among non-institutional 
investors should not be assumed to demonstrate media ‘effects’ in any direct sense or be 
representative of institutional investors (see Davis, 2005).  
 
Accuracy and framing in analyst and media reports 
 
The fact that the propensity for analyst bias is well documented in the academic literature and the 
financial media seems difficult to reconcile with the equally well documented evidence that analyst 
recommendations and public statements can trigger trading activity that moves market prices. It 
seems implausible that any professional institutional investor (or more than a minority of individual 
day traders) would be unaware of the problem and accept analyst recommendations to buy or sell 
at face value. Beunza and Garud’s (2005) content analysis of analyst reports did find evidence of 
diversity in forecasts by the more senior commentators. Interestingly, they also found that the 
ranking of analysts (notably by Institutional Investor magazine in the US) did not depend primarily 
on the accuracy of their forecasts/ recommendations. Instead, perceived industry knowledge and 
quality of written reports were regarded as the most important analyst qualities by investors.  They 
account for this by arguing that the practical value of analyst reports to investors was derived not 
from predictive precision, but from their provision of  common cognitive frames/ schemata that 
allowed investors to categorise financial securities, draw analogies with comparable securities and 
discern the key metrics/ variables liable to influence them (e.g. investment decisions in an online 
book retailer could be very different depending on whether one evaluated earnings performance in 
the same frame as high street bookshops  or other ‘dot-com’ companies). This foregrounding of 
intersubjective frames and the coordination of meaning would also seem to complement Smart’s 
(1999) argument that an important aspect of bank analysts’ work is the transformation of 
quantitative market data into a more qualitative, narrative form that can be communicated so as to 
coordinate inter-subjective meanings ascribed to market events by market actors.  
 
Although Beunza & Garud’s (2005) study of analyst report content does not directly confirm 
reception processes, earlier studies have examined framing processes in economic decision 
making and other forms of ‘bounded’ rationality (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; March, 1986). 
Their analysis is nevertheless important because it shifts the focus of inquiry into financial media 
beyond functional questions of representational accuracy and behavioural impacts on pricing 
towards questions of how media might play a role in coordinating intersubjective meanings about 
financial markets. This would seem consistent with Shiller’s (2000) suggestion that financial 
‘experts’ in the media help to focus investor attention on particular market variables, schemata or 
models (see also Arnoldi, 2006). This framing may encourage investors to classify different 
securities as similar in nature (such as ‘high-tech’ stocks), or form ‘psychological anchors’ attaching 
collective significance to an arbitrary reference point (e.g. consider the market euphoria when a key 
index benchmark like the Dow Jones hits a new record high).  
 
Shiller’s (2000) findings on investor perceptions of financial media and media content suggest a 
somewhat ambivalent role for financial media, however. On the one hand, he argues that market 
events generally occur independently from and prior to financial media coverage; i.e. the news is 
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driven by external market events (which may include aggregates of smaller events, none of which 
are newsworthy in their own right, but which have a collective influence on price movements). On 
the other hand, financial news can sometimes shape how market events unfold. This may be simply 
because the content of the news (including analyst recommendations) reveals new fundamental 
market information that traders respond to rationally (which is entirely consistent with the 
neoclassical model). However, the financial media may also influence market events through the 
process of reporting those events: For example, real-time market reports provide investors with 
constant feedback about the behaviour of other investors. This may give rise to an ‘attention 
cascade’ or ‘information cascade’ whereby the investor behaviour becomes mutually imitative or 
herd-like in their focus on particular types/ sources of information (such as the views of celebrity 
analysts) and subsequent investment decisions. Shiller (2000) considers these processes to be 
implicated in the formation of market bubbles and crises. This would suggest that financial media 
play a role in amplifying informational feedback loops and self-reinforcing symmetries in investor 
attention and/or trading activity (see later notes on information and reflexivity).  
 
Lenzner (1997) argues that financial news is often formulaic and focused on short-term ‘noise’ (i.e. 
price fluctuations, trading momentum and other transitory market signals that obscure the longer-
term ‘fundamentals’). He also notes a tendency for financial journalism to attribute market events to 
over-simplified, proximate causes because the news genre demands ostensibly rational 
explanations for events even when nobody really understands why prices have moved. In the 
absence of explanations capable of being presented in a news genre,  the mass media may either 
deploy standard metaphors about financial activity that seem to have literal meaning (e.g. by 
attributing agency to ‘the markets’ behaving in a bullish/ bearish manner) or present formulaic 
market information (such as descriptions of quantitative shifts in standard indexes and currency 
pairs) as if the explanation was immanent in the data (Parker, 1997). As Lenzner suggests, “Stock 
market reporting is purely ceremonial. Nobody really knows exactly what makes the market move 
up and down, it’s a bit of a fantasy world.” (1997, p.16). However, as Lenzner (1997) points out, 
real-time financial media feed on the demand for news that their own continuous market updates 
help to generate: Because traders react to financial reports, market prices fluctuate and so traders 
need constant updates to monitor how the market is reacting (see also Vickers & Weiss, 2000; 
Kurtz, 2000). Shiller (2000) suggests that institutional investors monitor publicly-accessible media 
like CNBC because their clients often ask questions in relation to issues they hear about through 
these channels. Another reason institutional investors might also have an interest in monitoring 
mainstream mass media is because knowing that a price movement could be linked to analyst 
comments in the news may help differentiate shifts attributable to media-related ‘noise’ from more 
fundamental factors affecting the market.  
 
Financial discourses and the media 
 
Another theme in the literature has been the examination of media discourses on economics and 
finance particularly in terms of how these (re)presentations not only reflect or represent but help to 
generate shifts in the normative and ideological suppositions commensurate with regulatory, 
institutional and technological changes in the economy. As mentioned earlier, one particularly 
significant change since the 1970s has been the gradual dismantling of Keynesian macroeconomic 
arrangements in favour of neoliberal/ monetarist policies. This shift in macroeconomic policy has 
entailed a significant rebalancing of the relations among the spheres of state, capital and civil 
society. At the same time, the facilitation of free capital flows and market re/deregulation has 
required the deprioritisation of government expenditure on a wide range of public services. In short, 
the imperatives of global capital have come to be prioritised over those of civil society.  
 
As Parsons (1989) points out, financial discourses in the media have played an important role in the 
legitimation of historical policy shifts and the normalisation of neoliberal/ monetarist policy 
arrangements among policy makers and the business community. The popularisation of ‘new right’ 
economic ideas was facilitated by the engagement of influential theorists with the media at the 
same time as the economic upheavals of the 1970s were opening up new spaces for debate and 
issue-framing.  Most notable here was Milton Friedman, whom Parsons suggests was crucial in the 
legitimation of monetarist ideas through commentaries on television and through general media like 
Newsweek magazine. Krugman (1994) has also identified the importance of ‘policy entrepreneurs’, 
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suggesting that the legitimation of the neoliberal ideas such as the privatisation, deregulation and 
lower taxation was made possible through journalistic discourses on ‘supply side’ economics (see 
also Brown, 1994).  
 
Other studies have shown how financial media discourses have helped cultivate public attitudes 
towards finance that, particularly since the 1980s, have helped normalise the gradual atrophy of the 
welfare state and public services and the increasing emphasis on the individual’s private 
responsibility for their own financial security (Cheney, 1998; Hope, 1998; Fairclough, 2000; Thrift, 
2001; Greenfield & Williams, 2001, 2007). Cheney points to the proliferation of particular forms 
economic rhetoric that has led to a valorisation of economic rationality and popular business 
concepts such as ‘efficiency’, ‘competition’, and ‘quality management’ even when the practical 
consequences of applying those values entail inefficiencies, limitation of competition and decreases 
in quality. Economic rhetoric does not inflect discourse only in the sphere of business and finance, 
but pervades those of the polity and lifeworld: ‘economic discourse has come to subsume many 
political and social discourses such that it often seems that everything is redefined in purely 
economic terms in order to have great practical significance. (Cheney, 1998, p.31). This suggests 
the media have played an important role in legitimating the re-ordering of relations between the 
financial sphere and other spheres of social activity. Although Cheney identifies the importance of 
considering how particular rhetorical forms influence economic norms and rationality within 
business management, he does not really extend his examination of economic rhetoric into analysis 
of how this may inflect the formation of economic relations on a broader social level.  
 
Thrift (2001) also makes a contribution to the literature on financial discourse and rhetoric, arguing 
that the emergence of the ‘new economy’ in the 1980s with its emphasis on new managerial 
practices and valorisation of the financial sector stemmed largely from ‘rhetorical fabrication’ 
involving romanticised mythologies of business (such as the Gordon Gekko- style aestheticisation 
of greed as sexy; see Leyshon & Thrift, 1997b) which underpin the performative reframing of 
economic and financial reality. Interestingly, Thrift asserts that the media played a constitutive role 
in the new economy as the primary conduit for financial information and that the media rhetoric 
fetishizing new financial opportunities (notably the hi-tech stocks on the NASDAQ) in the new 
economy ‘worked to the extent that it began to re-describe market fundamentals’ (2001, p.425). The 
performative aspect of rhetoric here assumes that media discourses do more than merely describe 
or legitimate financial conditions; rather, they constitute changes in those conditions, notably in the 
formation of a new market culture.   
 
For Thrift, it was the emergence of this new cultural formation that drove the development of 
financial information and communication technologies. Indeed he argues that the primary driver of 
the ‘new economy’ as the new brand and key-word of capitalism was the cultural circuit of capital 
which developed from the 1960 and which Thrift describes as ‘a machine for producing and 
disseminating knowledge to business elites’ (2001, p.415) that has a symbiotic relation to the media 
(p.416). The normative valorisation of those technologies in the new market culture led to capital-
intensive investment in the development of NCT infrastructures to support financial activity which in 
turn required that it be deployed and institutionalised in financial practices;  “My aim is to show that 
many of the new developments in ICT are the results of a technological forced march resulting from 
the rhetorical push of the cultural circuit of capital and the resultant sheer weight of investments 
from finance. In large part, ICT was created anew by the new market culture” (2001, p.414) 
 
Thrift’s position here certainly challenges materialist/ functionalist accounts of the growth of financial 
markets, particularly in its foregrounding of cultural relations as a driver of infrastructure 
developments. However, Thrift’s intriguing suggestion that capital investment in NCTs generated its 
own impetus for implementation must also recognise the functional trading advantage in utilising 
any technology that enables market information to be accessed or processed more quickly than 
one’s rivals. The trading edge conferred by NCTs cannot be reduced to rhetorical/discursive 
formations alone. Thrift’s formulation here can be taken further by a clearer differentiation of the 
constitutive roles respectively played by financial information/communications media and the 
rhetorical forms they help to proliferate. The constitutive functions of financial media as the 
channels of economic activity are therefore related to but distinct from the constitutive functions of 
their content.  
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Greenfield & Williams’ (2001, 2007) analyses of economic discourses in Australia identify a key role 
for the media in the framing and legitimation of neoliberal policy arrangements and the emergence 
of a new finance culture. Their arguments parallel those of Cheney and Thrift in regard to the 
rhetorical/ discursive underpinnings of financialization and the valorisation of market deregulation as 
an extension of democracy. An important theme addressed more specifically by Greenfield & 
Williams is the  role of the state and key government/political actors in actively producing the policy 
arrangements needed to accommodate financial accumulation (both domestically and 
supranationally through forums such as the WTO) and the implications for civil society. In particular, 
they critically examine how Keynesian welfare expectations such as pension provision have been 
increasingly supplanted with neoliberal notions of individual financial responsibility, and link this to 
shifts in media discourses and the ways in which public audiences are engaged/ interpellated on 
financial issues. Although ideological contestation within those discourses remains, there has been 
a significant increase in the amount of public media content dealing with financial issues. On one 
level, this may sensitise audiences to the elite status of finance. For example, Greenfield and 
Williams (2001) identify a significant growth in the advertising of financial investment opportunities 
to the general public. They also identify a shift from the presentation of financial investment as just 
one dimension of the economic sphere towards it being presented as the predominant  logic and 
driving force for business and social policy (Greenfield & Williams, 2007). On another level, coupled 
with the re-framing of financial issues as significant for the general public, media presentations of 
finance may increase financial literacy (at least among more educated audiences) but at the same 
time as they help to rationalise political policies which erode civic entitlements and circumscribe 
political participation.  
 
Importantly, Greenfield and Williams also point to the constitutive role of media presentations and 
financial discourses, specially in the formation of a new financial rationality underpinning the 
audience’s sense of identity as economic actors and citizens. This involves the demarcation and 
legitimation of particular ways of conceiving/thinking about the economy as well as (drawing on 
Hindess, 1988) undertaking meaningful economic action. In this regard financial rationality 
‘comprises the techniques of calculation and the assumptions […] that enable neoliberalism to be 
enacted’ and has ‘narrowed an earlier economic rationality so that an already crimped attention to 
social policy in the earlier rationality has been further attenuated’ (2007, p.420). This is an important 
argument in understanding the media’s role in facilitating changes in macroeconomic policy 
arrangements. However, it should be noted that the constitutive role of financial discourses 
identified here relates more specifically to media content and audience engagement with a focus on 
shifts in the public’s positioning and agency in relation to finance capital and the state concomitant 
with the growth of finance as the central driver of accumulation. This is related to but distinct from 
Thrift’s broader (if fuzzier) formulation of the constitutive role of financial rhetoric as a driver of 
financial NCTs  and also the more specific constitutive forms of media channels and performative 
modes of action within financial markets themselves.  
 
Despite the growing emphasis on financial markets in public media and the claims of increasing 
financial literacy, their mechanisms and the nature of their relation to the industrial economy have 
arguably remained relatively obscure and politically irrelevant to the majority of ordinary citizens. 
However, when financial crises threaten savings, pension schemes and jobs, their seemingly 
transcendent, if omnipresent, significance intrudes more tangibly into the lifeworld. In such 
circumstances, civil society may become sensitised to its own involuntary exposure to financial 
hazards and how political-economic arrangements intended to accommodate the accumulation 
imperatives of global capital affect their own lives.  As Hope comments; 
 
‘When financial systems falter or collapse, the socio-economic fall-out becomes 
transparently apparent. It then becomes possible to debate the historical and 
geographic origins of the crisis at hand. This creates opportunities for oppositional 
criticisms of national elites, major corporations, and international lending institutions. In 
response, these vested interests may openly politicise themselves and thus intensify 
oppositional criticisms.’ (1998, pp. 32-33).  
 
A cursory examination of US and UK media coverage of the unfolding credit crunch suggested 
normative ambivalence in regard to the reporting of government moves to buy-out, bail-out or 
otherwise guarantee bank holdings and prop up the credit system. Some general (i.e. non-financial) 
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news media have been quite forthright in their moral indignation at state bail-outs of banks and 
willingness to question whether the financial actors ostensibly responsible for the crisis are being 
held accountable (see, for example, CBS, 2008; Daily Mail, 2008). Other general news media have 
reflected discrepancies in the range of opinions among business and political elites (e.g. see BBC, 
3 October 2008; Guardian, 2008; New York Times, 2008; also Fox News, 2 October 2008 and 19 
November 2008). Perhaps because of their access to elite market sources or their business 
audience constituency, the specialist financial media appear more inclined to emphasise the 
responsibility of the state to provide solutions. For instance, in the decisions of the US government 
not to endorse an initial US$700 billion bail-out package have been framed as a failure of policy, 
suggesting that rescuing the banking system was regarded as an automatic obligation, not a option 
rightly subject to democratic deliberation (see CNBC, 2008; Financial Times, 2008). It would be 
premature to generalise from these examples, but they do suggest that there is potential for media 
discourses to become critical of finance. Public misgivings about the exposure of the lifeworld to 
financial markets hazards therefore represent a potential crisis of legitimation for capitalism, 
ironically at the ostensible zenith of its ideological ascendancy. 
 
Financial media and the constitution of financial reality 
 
The recognition of the constitutive nature of financial media content and discursive/ rhetorical forms 
in the operation of financial markets is an important theoretical development because it challenges 
the conception of market information being simply representative/ reflective of an objective/ 
separate market ontology. However, there is a need here to differentiate between the constitutive 
role of media discourses in the broader ideological formations that legitimate the particular 
institutional arrangements that have underpinned the growth of financial market activity since the 
1970s, and the more specific discourses and communicative processes which underpin the 
definitions/ framing of market reality and specific financial practices within investment institutions 
themselves. There is therefore scope for further investigation of how financial communication 
processes actually constitute market reality and how institutional investors engage with media in 
their trading activities. 
 
It seems clear that financial news can generate trading activity and move market prices. However, 
there are very different ways of explaining these processes. The neoclassical perspective would 
suggest that information about fundamentals (supply, demand, price-earnings ratios, etc.) more or 
less accurately reflects an external market reality and thus allows efficient pricing28. However, the 
assumption that market facts can be represented unproblematically and that valuations/ prices 
reflect objective conditions that are true independently of market actors’ collective (mis)perceptions 
and emotional dispositions are not sustainable. This is a central theoretical concern of the study 
being undertaken in this thesis. The communication-based literature that informs this line of critique 
therefore needs to be discussed here, partly to position the thesis in relation to this work and also to 
introduce some further contextual information about financial market functions that need to be 
recognised as a pretext for further development.  
 
Matolcsy & Schulz’s (1994) study of errors in financial journalism noted that what key market actors 
do/ say can be market-moving, even when they are subsequently shown to be mistaken. Jones 
(1996) notes that analyst reports affect market prices, primarily because of the influence they exert 
on institutional investors who trade securities in large volumes. However, as other studies of the 
impact of analyst recommendations in financial media suggest, prices may move not because 
significant new factual information has been disclosed but because investors respond to the 
momentum and direction of price-movements, often anticipating the (over)reactions of other market 
actors (Beneish, 1991; Sant & Zaman, 1996; Lee, 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999; Huberman & Regev, 
2001; Busse & Green, 2002). This may indicate that investors base buying and selling decisions not 
on the ostensible validity of market information, but on the expectation that other market actors will 
                                                 
28
 The efficient markets hypothesis (see Shleifer, 2000) basically assumes that prices reflect all publicly 
available information and that any market news is immediately expressed in prices as traders respond 
rationally to it through buying and selling activity. This implies that; a) communication is an automatic process, 
overlooking interpretative processes, and b) that trading is essentially a ‘random walk’ and that there is minimal 
advantage to be gained from purchasing information or expert advice because market prices reflect all the 
available information.  
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respond to the claims opinion leaders; a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy (see Merton, 1968). This is 
consistent with Keynes’ (1936) suggestion that market behaviour is analogous to a newspaper 
beauty contest in which readers were invited to pick the winning contestant from a series of 
photographs. Political incorrectness aside, because the winner was determined by readers’ 
responses, the accuracy of one’s guess was determined not by discerning any objective quality of 
beauty, but anticipating the aggregate response of the other readers.  
 
Although it is necessary to be sceptical about attributing the power to move markets to the financial 
media or market analysts (it is only buying and selling activity which directly affects prices), there is 
evidence to suggest that some key opinions can be reliably expected to drive trading behaviour. 
Central/reserve bank announcements are evidently very important, partly because they can change 
official cash rates29 and implement other monetary policies that directly affect the value of the 
national currency on the foreign exchange markets (and thus the real level any national debts 
denominated in foreign currencies) as well as domestic imports/exports. Consequently, central bank 
statements can strongly influence investors, and as NZ Reserve Bank officials confirmed (author 
interviews #30 & #32), they have to be extremely judicious in their communications with the media 
and the markets, since ambiguities and misunderstandings can trigger unwanted market 
movements (see later examples). The central bank policies in the largest economies, notably the 
US, also affect global financial markets through their influence of the availability of key currencies 
used in international trade. The practice of analysing every action and statement of central bankers 
has been likened to cold war ‘Kremlinology’ where all kinds of behaviour get scrutinised and 
analysed (from body language to meetings attended, to fast food deliveries) in case it reveals subtle 
indications of the direction central bank policy might be taking (BBC, 2001). Indeed, one finance 
professional revealed that hedge funds sometimes employed private detectives to shadow central 
bankers and report on who they had meetings with or changes in their routines (author interview 
#7).  
 
The international ratings agencies (the three most significant being Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, 
and Fitch) also play a central role in assessing the levels of investor risk across a variety of financial 
securities. Importantly, the ratings30 assigned to interest rate-based instruments includes the debt 
securities through which national governments and corporations borrow money and are therefore 
crucial to the functioning of the global credit system. The upgrading or downgrading of national or 
corporate debt also affects the value of interest-rate based securities (generically known as bonds). 
The ratings issued by the major agencies form an important common reference point for financial 
traders and analysts assessing the risk level of securities, and institutional investors often engage in 
trading within specified ratings parameters. This means they are prohibited from purchasing 
securities with lower-grade ratings and may be obliged to sell off securities that slip below the 
prescribed level. Any change in ratings, especially around the usual investment-grade threshold of 
‘BBB’, will often trigger substantial buying and selling activity and thus affect prices.  
 
The institutionalised reliance on ratings as a key component or frame in the decision-making 
schemata/frames of analysts and traders arguably gives them the status of a market fundamental. 
In this regard, they are a clear example of how financial theory is ‘performed’ by financial actors and 
manifested as a market variable with discrete ontological status. The ratings agencies’ issuance of 
                                                 
29
 The official cash rate or OCR sets the interest rate at which the central/ reserve bank will lend or borrow the 
national currency without limitation. This determines the basic rate at which credit denominates in the national 
currency can be issued as credit, and therefore has significance for the whole economy. it is also a central tool 
of monetarist policies which prioritise regulation of the money supply. Market interest rates are usually slightly 
higher, but do not normally deviate significantly from the OCR, and will tend to rise or fall in ratio.  
 
30
 For example, Standard & Poor’s (2008) basic rating system ranges from AAA (extremely strong capacity for 
repayment, such as the sovereign debt of most major industrial economies) to D (in default due to non-
payment). Many institutional investment firms have prescribed ratings parameters, and are prohibited from 
holding or buying securities below a specified investment grade (usually BBB although this can vary). Debt 
securities below BBB are generally considered to be speculative, entailing increasing levels of risk, while those 
below B are often referred to as ‘junk bonds’. Although many major institutional investors will not purchase 
securities graded below BBB, hedge funds and other speculative investors commonly do, especially if they 
consider the calculated return to be relatively favourable in comparison to the level of risk.  
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ratings is therefore more than just an interpretation or representation of financial reality, it is 
constitutive of that reality. This is underpinned by the uncritical deference usually paid to them by 
the financial media. Indeed, as one financial reporter suggested, within the key wire services like 
Reuters, the ratings agencies were considered to be ‘God’ and any statements they issued would 
be immediately reported as gospel because of their potential to move the market (Journalist 
interview #B).   
 
Kunczik (2002) provides an important analysis of how ratings agency sovereign debt ratings and 
media representations of national economies interact to shape international flows of capital. Noting 
the socio-psychological basis of money and financial value in relations of trust31, he argues that a 
nation’s public image can shape financial market attitudes towards investment and that ‘monetary 
policy is at least partially image policy’ (2002, p.42). News representations of events in different 
countries therefore play a potentially important role in the formation of analyst and investor 
impressions assumptions about their economic and political stability. This represents a particular 
challenge for less developed nations (LDCs) whose representation to global audiences typically 
depends on mediation by the international news media whose primary reporting agendas will tend 
reflect the priorities and norms of audiences in the advanced industrial economies. Thus the 
national image of an LDC as portrayed in the media influences international investment institutions’ 
perceptions of risk when making decisions about loans or foreign direct investment involving that 
country. Studies of ratings agency decisions (e.g. Edwards, 1984; Cantor & Packer, 1996, 1997) 
suggest a range of social, political and economic/financial factors are considered in the 
determination of credit ratings by the major agencies. Kunczik notes that the precise weighting of 
the algorithms/ models deployed is not made public, although political-economic stability and a 
good historical record of debt repayment are evidently a priority. However, countries whose 
economic institutions and policies resemble those of the industrial nations are more likely to be 
amenable to assessment and comparison, while those which are unfamiliar, complex or difficult to 
measure or frame in terms of familiar models are more likely to result in analyst uncertainty. Kunczik 
notes, in line with the earlier discussion of financial analysts, that the ratings agency analysts can 
be prone to an homogenous and sometimes self-referential institutional perspective on the world 
(see also Rothkopf, 1999) and that reputations may suffer more if an optimistic rating fails to predict 
negative developments (negative surprise) than if a conservative rating fails to anticipate positive 
developments (positive surprise). That would suggest that unfamiliar countries (or corporations) 
which entail uncertainty or resist straight-forward classification and risk quantification will tend to be 
disadvantaged.  
 
Although ratings agency analysts will have access to a range of specialised information sources 
about markets and the countries on which they provide ratings. The IMF (1999) noted that on 
average, each agency analyst was responsible for covering seven sovereign states. Moody’s 
(2008) currently covers 100 sovereign nations but has offices in 27 countries, while Standard and 
Poor’s (2008) also covers 100 countries and has offices in 23 countries, but even assuming there is 
at least one analyst responsible for sovereign debt ratings in each one, this would still mean that in 
75% of cases, they will monitor economic developments primarily from overseas. Rothkopf (1999) 
notes that at the time of the Asian crisis, Moody’s had only one analyst based in New York  
handling the sovereign ratings of five SE Asian economies in addition to a further five in the Middle 
East, and points out that the financial media often suffer from a similar lack of local presence, 
especially in less developed countries. Kunczik (2002) suggests that such arrangements entail a 
degree of analyst dependence on media representations for impressions about economic and 
political developments especially in remote/ unfamiliar countries. He also notes that both reporters 
and analysts tend to rely on similar sources of information (as well as each other) and identified the 
potential for countries to be stereotyped by analysts and investors in line with their media image 
and news frames32. Bryan (2001) also identified national news frames as a factor shaping investor 
perceptions of  Australia’s vulnerability to the emerging currency crisis in SE Asia in 1997-98. 
                                                 
31
 Kunczik cites Georg Simmel’s seminal work on the relations of trust underpinning monetary forms 
(1900/1990) and also that of early economic psychologist Albert Aftalion (1923-  reference not available in 
English) who pointed out that currency exchange rates are related to trust in the respective nations.  
 
32
 For example, Bulgaria complained that the conflict in the Balkans during the 1990s inhibited investors who 
framed it alongside Bosnia and Serbia and ascribed economic risks to it accordingly. Meanwhile, positive news 
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Kunczik (2002) also points out that there is a political dimension to the issuance of ratings. Because 
the ratings can strongly influence investor responses, a downgrade or upgrade of national debt may 
have a significant impact on the national economy, especially if a change in ratings crosses the 
investment-grade threshold. The need to avoid capital flight (sudden large-scale withdrawals of 
investment capital from a country and selling of securities denominated in the national currency) 
and sustain inward  flows of global investment capital clearly influences the scope of 
macroeconomic policy in many countries (both developed and less developed). Kunczik mentions 
instances where the ratings agencies’ emphasis on the policy models associated with the growth of 
the SE Asian economies during the 1980s-90s led to biases unfavourable to LDCs following 
different economic development models in other regions. Countries seeking a rating in order to 
attract or retain investment may be subject to pressure to adopt policies which will be interpreted 
favourably through the schemata employed by rating agency analysts. A study of global financial 
regulatory regimes by Soederberg (2002) pointed out that, rather like the IMF, the ratings agencies 
have actively promoted policies favourable to the expansion of neoliberal capitalism. She notes that 
the Mexican government negotiated a domestic tax reform favourable to international investors 
under pressure from Standard and Poor’s to ensure that it helped qualify for the award of an 
investment-grade rating (and on that basis, on could also reasonably speculate that policy 
alternatives which the ratings agencies indicate might lead to a negative re-evaluation of the rating 
might well be inhibited). The trade of legislative concessions in return for what is, ultimately, a 
symbolic evaluation subject to the institutional bias of analyst models and media reports, suggests 
that not only that information is a constitutive dimension of economic reality, but that the ability to 
manipulate or control access to market symbols is a source of significant political influence from 
within institutional spaces not accountable to civil society.  As Kunczik observes; 
 
‘The media and the analysts seem to rely on the same information sources. […] A 
small group of analysts has the power to affect the quality of life of billions of humans 
by rating the creditworthiness of the respective countries. […] There is always the 
danger of self-fulfilling prophecy, which is evident when, for instance, mass media 
reporting convinces the rating industry that a certain developing country (emerging 
market) has only itself to blame for its problems because the people living there were 
lazy or incapable, and/or the government was corrupt and incapable.’ (2002, p.60).  
 
The concern of governments about their national public image among the investment community 
and their credit ratings identified by Kunczik and Soederberg can be supported by other examples. 
After the 2002 Brazilian election which brought Lula Da Silva to office, the left-leaning president’s 
inaugural speech (Lula da Silva, 2003) emphasised macro-economic stability and inflation controls 
in order to reassure foreign investors that no radical change was imminent in order to avoid a 
market panic and capital flight. Such concerns are not fanciful; the 2004 election in India (the 
world’s largest democracy by population) produced an unexpected result which saw the Congress 
Party-led coalition elected, with Sonia Gandhi (as party chair and official leader of the opposition) 
ostensibly the prime minister-elect. The election result panicked the financial markets and led to the 
suspension of trading on the Mumbai stock exchange after it suffered its biggest ever crash 
(Independent, 19 May 2004; Moscow Times, 18 May 2004). Despite the mandate of the electorate 
and pleas from her own party supporters, the negative reaction of investors to the political 
uncertainty led Gandhi to step down in favour of former finance minister, Manmohan Singh (an 
economist considered a fiscal conservative and hence reassuring to investors).  
 
Kunczik’s (2002) analysis posits an interesting link between media representations of countries, the 
issuing of ratings and national economic conditions. Essentially this calls into question the 
                                                                                                                                                     
about Indonesia’s economic growth, and its positive association with other growing SE Asian economies (up to 
1997) overshadowed investor concerns about government corruption and growing political and financial 
instability. Kunczik also points out that after the 1998 Russian debt default, the independent Baltic states were 
treated as identical to Russia even though their national debt was not in default.  Meanwhile, in 2000, Mexico 
was ‘decoupled’ from a generic perception of Latin Amercian economic volatility when the financial media 
reported an expectation of an upgrade in its credit rating. These ratings were more a response to a shift in 
investor and analyst perceptions/expectations linked to news frames than an accurate evaluation of economic 
conditions in these countries. 
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economic orthodoxy that economic conditions are more or less accurately represented by media 
and that ratings are a reliable guide to those conditions. On the contrary, he suggests that national 
imagery in the media influences ratings and investor perceptions and thus the flows of capital in or 
out of the country in question, in other words, a kind of media-driven self-fulfilling economic 
prophecy. Cantor and Packer’s (1996) study of the predictive accuracy of ratings found that ratings 
agency announcements have a significant influence on investor perceptions, particularly on 
speculative-grade sovereign debt (although this was less apparent in investment-grade sovereign 
debt).  
 
However the ratings agencies’ capacity for self-fulfilling prophecy is not automatic. For example, in 
the run-up to the SE Asian currency crisis, few financial agencies were signalling the risks publicly. 
Indeed, many were conspicuous in their failure to signal a warning, including the IMF, World Bank 
and most of the ratings agencies. (Kunczik [2002] notes that Moody’s did begin downgrading 
Thailand and Korea before the crisis hit, but Rothkopf [1999] notes it was late in issuing a sub-
investment grade rating, even after IMF bailouts were being formulated). The IMF subsequently 
revealed that it had been expressing concerns about Thailand privately to its officials and claimed 
that it did not issue any public warning partly because it was concerned that this would precipitate 
the very event it was trying to prevent, and partly because public disclosure of financial information 
government and corporate actors often provided confidentially would inhibit their willingness to 
engage openly with the IMF (see IMF, 1999; Fischer, 1998; Rothkopf, 1999). The IMF (1999) also 
noted that the ratings agencies were themselves were inhibited from downgrading sovereign debts 
in the affected countries because they recognised that this could precipitate a self-fulfilling crisis. 
Whether or not hindsight suggests this was a prudent stance to take, it does indicate that there is a 
conscious recognition within these institutions that their announcements do more than describe 
economic/ financial conditions. However, one repercussion of downgrading after the crisis began to 
unfold33 was that the rating agencies themselves appeared to over-compensate for their initial 
hesitancy in their efforts to reconcile their ratings with the rapidly-unfolding events (IMF, 1999; 
Kunczik, 2002). As a result, the ratings of the sovereign debt in the region dropped to junk-grade, 
which triggered capital flight because many financial investors were institutionally obliged to dispose 
of their holdings in SE Asian bonds and securities denominated in the affected currencies. Kunczik 
suggests that the ratings have a pro-cyclical influence on markets, enhancing investor confidence 
during periods of growth and exacerbating panic during crisis.  
 
These processes raise important questions open about the extent to which analysts depend on the 
media for the information they use to make recommendations or assign ratings. The monitoring of 
other analysts’ opinions through the media and the media’s reliance on analysts as primary definers 
also suggests a potential for self-referential correlations to form between analyst opinions and 
media reports (see Malmqvist, 1998; Rothkopf, 1999; Kunczik, 2002). As Malmqvist observes, ‘[N]o 
market actor wants to get too far away from the average view, as that might be interpreted as being 
insufficiently informed. There is an obvious risk that the combined effect of the market and reporting 
processes, interdependent as they are, could strengthen each other and establish a self-fulfilling 
chain of events.’ (Malmqvist, 1998, p.164). 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Space precludes a full analysis of the events, but the author was resident in Bangkok at the time of the crisis 
and some observations would seem appropriate. Thailand, was the first country to suffer from sudden currency 
devaluation, and its situation was typical of the other nations affected. Despite the rapid growth of the economy 
during the late 1980s, the gradual slow-down of the Thai economy by the mid 1990s was making it increasingly 
difficult to continue increasing the profitability upon which the repayment of the loans was premised. The Thai 
baht was pegged to the US dollar, which obliged the central bank to maintain its value at that rate in the 
currency markets. Currency speculators realised that the pegged value of the Baht was unstable, and saw an 
opportunity to make large profits by short-selling the currency. This entailed borrowing heavily in Baht, and 
immediately selling it on at current prices in exchange for other currencies. The hope was that the value would 
decline, allowing the speculator to repay the loan at a discount and pocket the difference. Moreover, as the 
speculative activity became apparent, this signalled that expectations were moving against the Baht, making it 
more likely that holders of the currency would try and sell, which would help drive down the price and oblige 
the central bank to spend more of its foreign reserves maintaining the peg to the dollar. The Thai central bank 
initially succeeded in defending the peg but eventually admitted defeat and allowed the currency to float, 
incurring a 20% drop in value overnight.  
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There are several processes through which self-referentiality and feedback loops might predispose 
markets toward self-fulfilling prophecy that need to be differentiated. Three basic forms of reflexivity 
or self-referential communicative/ informational processes can be discerned: Firstly, the formation of 
a intersubjective world view and the common use of similar institutional models and schemata to 
make sense of the market environment (including demarcation of what counts as a market 
fundamental and what kinds of market variables matter). Secondly, the deployment of specific 
symbolic/ communicative actions which constitute shifts in market reality. This would include the 
crystallization of prices through buying and selling activity34 but also the issuance of institutionalised 
price-sensitive signals (such as credit ratings) in contexts where financial institutional schemata and 
systems trigger trading responses to specified price-changes or rating upgrades/ downgrades). 
Thirdly, inter-dependent corroborations of opinion and shared perceptions/definitions of unfamiliar 
events among analysts and journalists through media representations, monitoring of key opinion-
leaders and/or cross-referencing with peers through professional networks. 
 
Together, these processes would suggest that the truth-value of market information cannot be 
conceived in terms of representative correspondence with objective/ external market conditions. 
Rather, the signified referents of financial signifiers are constituted by inter-subjectively coded/ 
performatively calculated objects of knowledge among investors. For example, the external validity 
of credit ratings depends on institutionalised trust among the actors in financial systems which 
define ratings as the set-points to which they are sensitive. Thus the ratings themselves become 
‘performed’ into a discrete market ‘fundamental’ and thereby constitute a price-sensitive component 
of market reality. However, the fact that trading and  market prices can move in directions contrary 
to media reports and ratings nevertheless indicates that it is important not to overstate the potential 
for self-fulfilling prophecy; the relation between ratings and market prices is not directly causal in 
any simple sense, and investor trust in the intrinsic validity of agency credit ratings since the Asian 
crisis and the still-unfolding ‘credit crunch’ has almost certainly been dented.     
 
Other studies of media reports on financial crises in different countries and analyses of how 
financial news framing of these events also suggest that the media may, in some circumstances, 
contribute to some form of self-fulfilling market expectations in regard to the contagion of crisis. 
Bryan’s (2001) analysis of Australian news framing of the 1997-98 SE Asian currency crisis 
suggests the media influenced market perceptions of Australia’s proximity and vulnerability to the 
crisis. Indeed, the definition of market events as a ‘crisis’ is itself a contested process and, as  
Bryan notes, the initial reports framed the Thai baht’s fragility as a domestic financial issue 
stemming from weak economic fundamentals. The notion of an ‘Asian crisis’ was subsequently 
imposed as currency values in Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea became unstable and primary 
definers began discussing the risk of ‘contagion’35. Bryan identifies a tension between endogenous 
and exogenous sources of the crisis. Some of the early media reports considered the role of off-
shore hedge funds and currency speculators, and raised the issue of these financial raiders looking 
for new financial targets, the implication being that Australia might not be immune. However, the 
emphasis of key market analysts and the Reserve Bank of Australia on the economic differences 
between Australia and the Asian economies was subsequently reflected in the media framing which 
shifted toward endogenous financial problems in the affected SE Asian countries. Bryan (2001) 
points out that this framing tended to assume a national/ regional unit of analysis which de-
emphasised the significant interlinkages between Australian businesses and markets in SE Asia. As 
                                                 
34
 Soloski & Picard (1996) point out that institutional investors, especially fund managers operating huge 
portfolios, can buy and sell in such volume that their trades themselves move the market prices. Although this 
may often be inadvertent, some hedge funds sometimes deliberately deploy volume-trading to try and create a 
momentum in buying or selling that then becomes self-fulfilling (at least temporarily) when other ‘noise traders’ 
basing their decisions on short-term price movements  ‘jump on the bandwagon’ and follow the trend (see also 
Henwood, 1998; Golding, 2003).  
 
35
 The notion of contagion is itself an interesting discursive element; the pathological metaphor implies the 
transmission of financial problems from the ‘infected’ to the ‘uninfected’. However, it is problematic to conceive 
of a financial crisis in any country as ‘domestic’ in spatial or geopolitical terms; the respective markets 
comprise of networks of globally interconnected investment institutions, and the capital flows their aggregate 
agency generate are manifested through electronic spaces that are rarely reducible to discrete geopolitical 
spaces.  
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Kunczik (2002) similarly argues, the (dis)association of one country with others in financial media 
discourses can lead investors to perceive (dis)similarities which then affect valuations and trading. If 
media framing had linked Australia to the afflicted SE Asian economies, the market perception that 
contagion was possible would have damaged investor confidence and increased the likelihood of a 
crisis being precipitated as a self-fulfilling prophecy. This underlines the point that financial media 
and analyst reports are not merely descriptive of market reality, but play a constitutive role therein, 
particularly during uncertain periods. As Bryan comments, 
 
‘In short, the Asian crisis is a remarkable case of the need to make sense of the 
unexpected and the potentially disastrous. Those at the front line were the financial 
market economists and journalists. […] They were active participants in the process. It 
is in the nature of financial crises that they run on rumours and herd mentality. Nor is 
there a singular and clearly delineated concept of a “financial crisis”. Information is 
everything. The financial market economists by their actions and the journalists by their 
words generate as well as respond to the path taken by the crisis.’ (2001, p.15; 
emphasis added).  
 
Choy et al.’s (2002) study of Singaporean media coverage of the 1997-98 SE Asian crisis suggests 
that analyst reports and media coverage may amplify pro-cyclical over-reactions to market cycles 
and contribute to the generation of bubbles and crashes (see later notes on Minsky). During periods 
of volatility (rapid price change), investors intensify their real-time monitoring of market news while 
the opportunities for fact-checking and reflection are compressed. As Choy et al. suggest, “ In times 
of crisis, dependency on the media escalates. The influence on the financial press widens in 
periods of economic uncertainty and stock market fluctuation” (2002, p. 104).36  However, their 
finding that market prices in the SE Asian crisis did not directly align with analyst and media 
predictions suggests that the relationship between media reports and price movements is far from 
causal or automatic.  
 
Another study by Clark, Thrift and Tickell (2005) had identified several interesting features and 
functions of financial media. They distinguish between the financial data and imagery presented on 
financial screens in terms of their interactive and passive character. ‘Passive’ presentation of 
financial data such as the daily market summaries in the news media is often not up-to-date and is 
intended to ‘feed curiosity rather than market trading’ (p.173). In contrast, ‘active’ components of the 
screen, including presenter reactions to information convey a sense of real-time dealing room 
urgency. In other words, the textual form of financial news is constructed so as to interpellate the 
audience as if they were actively engaged in market trading. Although some individual traders may 
well rely on public media for the information upon which to base investment decisions, this seems 
odd, given that the majority of the general audience would have little practical use for the 
information presented. This would suggest that the primary function of these media, whether 
intentional or not, is the discursive valorisation of financial issues and legitimation of their priority 
over other areas of social life. However, Clark et al. go on to suggest that the media play a role in 
influencing institutional investors;  
 
‘Even if they no longer hold to the purity of the rational markets hypothesis, economists 
of finance presuppose that investors are not responsive to the media: much of the 
theory of finance maintains that the fundamentals of asset allocation strategy and the 
largely under-represented and unremarkable imperatives of market competition 
dominate price formation. […] These presumptions are, however, based on a false 
premise. Institutional investors are highly susceptible to external influences in their 
decision-making processes.’ (2005, p.175) 
 
This suggests that that the financial media are a source of ‘external’ influence in the sense of 
bringing ostensibly ‘irrational’ non-market criteria to bear on investment decisions. However Clark et 
                                                 
36
 However, Choy et al. then proceed to argue that this means accuracy in the media is especially important 
during periods of bubble and crisis. This implicitly reverts to the problematic notion of the market as an 
objective/ external state of affairs which can be more or less accurately represented by analyst reports in the 
media.   
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al. then proceed to blur the distinction between internal/external market influences by suggesting 
that the financial media shape the accepted frames and definitions of markets and thereby help to 
bring about ‘nascent transformations of what counts as finance’ (2005, p.166). For Clark et al., then, 
financial media intensify investor monitoring of markets across a range of variables and drive the 
development of new models and forms of calculation. They query the neoclassical assumption that 
fundamentals drive prices because financial media images continually impose ‘alien logics of 
calculation’ (p.177) and promote heterogeneity in market expectations (which implies variation in 
trader/ analyst projections of future prices and thus translates into current transaction prices- see 
Golding, 2003; Davis, 2006c). Indeed, despite the increased availability of market information, the 
increased volumes of market data do not directly confer practical knowledge. Discerning which data 
is reliable and salient and processing it is therefore an increasingly complex challenge. Clark et al. 
posit a link between these media/ informational developments and a break-down in the uniform 
taken-for-granted acceptance of standard investment models such as the Black-Scholes options 
pricing equation, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Value-at-Risk (VAR) formula. 
Consequently, differences in attitudes and expectations among investors are have become factors 
that increasingly need to be factored into investment decisions.  
 
This is an interesting argument, because it points to the potential of financial media to promote the 
fragmentation of investor opinion and heterogenisation of the schemata investors assume to make 
trading decisions. This contrasts with some of the earlier arguments concerning the relationship 
between analysts and reporters and the propensity of the financial media to reflect and reinforce the 
prevailing opinions of an elite group of commentators (e.g. see Rothkopf, 1999). Clark et al.’s 
suggestion that the media may break down institutionalised confidence in traditional investment 
models would likewise appear to contest the arguments of Parsons (1989) concerning the role of 
the financial media in assisting the formation and legitimation of dominant market theories. If the 
media’s role in the evolution of market models and opinions is regarded as a continuous process 
then the ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ tendencies might be regarded as complementary, not 
contradictory. However, this requires further empirical investigation. Although Clark, Thrift and 
Tickell (2005) evidently consider the emergence of new financial media forms (including a growth of 
financial content in popular media and a growing participation in finance by the public investors) to 
be highly significant, they also point out (citing Craig, 2001) that the supply of financial news has 
simultaneously become concentrated in the hands of a few key providers like Reuters and 
Bloomberg. If the media do play a key role in the evolving formation of market models and 
redefinition of fundamentals, then questions arise about the types of financial media and information 
used by investors to make their trading decisions. The studies on financial media usage by Wood et 
al. (2007) and Schwartzkopf (2007) suggest a level of homogeneity in investors’ prioritization of 
information sources. However, other studies by Beunza & Stark (2004, 2005) point to constant 
revision of those priorities. Again, this is indicative of both an empirical and theoretical need for 
further study.  
 
Clark et al. (2005) go on to argue that the value of financial securities is bound up with media 
images and that these play a role in ‘imposing new rhetorics and other forms of (in)disputability on 
the finance industry’ (p.166). They also emphasise the expansion of financial literacy and public 
participation in markets, pointing out that financial representations on screens are ‘part of the 
ecology of everyday life’ (p.173). The media play an important role in the formation of market 
sentiment; market news circulates until it changes prevailing perceptions and thereby generates the 
pretext for further news. Clark et al. also argue that the celebrification of financial media 
personalities/ commentators does not only represent finance but ‘embodies’ it, such that the 
representation of personalities and their opinions ‘is itself a source of profit’ and concomitantly, 
‘finance is increasingly governed by a rule of fashion: styles of practice, personalities and products 
come and go’37  (p.168). They also note that money and finance are ‘theatrical’ in nature and exhibit 
an ‘explicitly performative character’ (p.168).   
                                                 
37
 Clark et al.’s  notion of financial fashion and personalities driving profits seems similar to Baudrillard’s notion 
of sign-value or Lash & Urry’s symbolic economic forms. However, while these factors may shape transitory 
perceptions of what might be desirable/ valuable, it is important to differentiate this from the process by which 
symbolic fictitious values are performatively created through the trade in financial securities by which prices are 
crystallized.  
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Clark et al. are right to argue that the relation between media and finance entails ‘not just an 
epiphenomenal but a constitutive shift’ (2005, p.166). However, explaining the role of the media in 
the formation of market sentiment and the mechanisms by which media performances enact 
financial reality, create new fundamentals and generate profits requires more nuanced 
differentiation. The tension between heterogeneous and homogenous market perceptions and 
sentiments is important here: There is a difference  between the relatively enduring, institutionalised 
conceptions/ theories/ models/ frameworks which underpin the mutual recognition of the objects, 
channels and modes of financial activity among market actors, and the continuously-evolving 
decision-making schemata used to inform specific trading actions. The former entails shared 
knowledge performatively reproduced by/ embodied in financial activity including mutual recognition 
of property rights, types of tradable security, monetary/payment forms, and the modes of action 
required to engage in meaningful transactions. This would also include recognition of the basic 
theoretical ideas and institutional codes of practice required in order to ascribe meaning to market 
events (such as recognising market fundamentals and knowing how to respond when these 
change). These implicit forms of financial knowledge and codification are still subject to periodic 
revision, as the emergence of new financial instruments (NFIs) and modes of trading over the last 
three decades have demonstrated. However, if they were radically heterogeneous, then markets 
would cease to function, at least in any globally coordinated manner. Although the knowledge and 
codifications that permit meaning to be ascribed to financial transactions in a coordinated manner 
need to be intersubjective, the models and schemata used in trading decisions may vary between 
actors. For example, some traders calculate valued based on fundamentals and invest in securities 
which their models indicate are currently under-priced  Others base their decisions on modelling 
cycles of price movements in order to anticipate market upswings or downturns  (‘technical’ 
analysis/trading). Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2007) found that different market areas (stocks, 
bonds, currencies) responded differently to financial news announcements (with price shifts in 
equities markets being more strongly correlated with media reports, possibly because a higher 
proportion of individual investors invest primarily in stocks and rely more heavily on public media).  
 
As Greenfield & Williams (2007) point out, media systems and NCTs help relay financial rationalities 
and knowledges between different institutions and social spheres, including providing the frames of 
reference through which politicians and the public come to understand their respective relations to 
the markets. Financial media also assist in the diffusion of financial innovations when new securities 
and trading practices are developed, and form the infrastructure necessary for conducting particular 
forms of financial calculation and transactions. Financial discourses and rhetorics help constitute 
the relations and practices of financial actors through establishing shared models/ frameworks to 
coordinate meanings and demarcating the channels and modes of financial action. However, it is 
important to recognise that these are not primarily derived from or driven by media content. The 
‘theatre’ for this kind of performance is the trading room not the TV screen. Clark, Thrift and Tickell’s 
(2005) argument that the media are not just epiphenomenal but constitutive suggests a link 
between financial discourse in the public news media and trading room practices. Over time, shifts 
in the contingent inter-subjective codifications and models demarcating the criteria for calculating/ 
predicting financial values mean that fundamentals themselves are subject to revision. Indeed, as 
the ‘irrational exuberance’ of the dot-com bubble or the enthusiastic trading in exotic securities 
based on sub-prime mortgage debt suggests, the criteria upon which investors base their trading 
decisions may become decoupled from any tangible referent point in the industrial economy.  It is in 
these cases that it becomes meaningful to talk of the media’s role in creating financial ‘fashion’ 
trends. Epiphenomenal media imagery may effectively come to constitute ‘fundamentals’ if enough 
market actors began to attribute market significance to particular variables given attention in 
financial media discourses (especially if it becomes evident that other market actors are 
incorporating them into their investment schemata). It may be possible for such variables to be 
performatively transformed into an enduring fundamental and require modification of  standard 
trading models. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the probability; media-driven bubbles 
and panics do not usually ignore core fundamental factors such as supply, demand and price-
earnings ratios on a long-term basis. However, there is certainly scope for further investigation of 
how financial actors engage with the media and the extent to which financial reports shape their 
investment decisions. 
 
 59 
Aeron Davis (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) has made a significant contribution to precisely this 
domain of inquiry in his work on media/ information usage by fund managers in the London Stock 
Exchange. In contrast to some of the behavioural finance studies which have examined correlations 
between price fluctuations in financial securities and the timing of market news announcements 
without investigating media usage/ reception-end processes by traders (e.g. Sant & Zaman, 1996; 
Busse & Green, 2002), Davis develops his arguments about financial media ‘effects’ based on 
empirical evidence of how fund managers use information (using in-depth interviews). His analysis 
suggests that while there was little evidence of direct effects in the opinion/behaviour-altering 
manner assumed in early mass communication models, financial media reports were nevertheless 
found to influence investment decisions. He rightly notes that the apparent impact of media reports 
on prices must take account of the ‘active elite audience’ and the institutional context in which the 
role of traders requires analysis of the available market information and making capital investment 
decisions on that basis.   
 
Davis (2005, 2006a) identifies three forms of financial media effects on investors38. The first is the 
‘consensus indicator’ effect, which stems from the media’s role in reflecting and reinforcing the 
prevailing views of financial analysts. He found that whether or not traders personally agreed with 
the views of analysts, they still regarded knowledge of analyst consensus to be an important 
indicator of current market thinking, even if their trading strategy was ‘contrarian’ (i.e. consciously 
modelled to diverge from popular market sentiment). Although market consensus on earnings 
estimates or pricing expectations might not correspond to the standard models or ‘fundamentals’, 
these may still be used as benchmarks against which drifts in market sentiment over time can be 
gauged. The second type is the ‘anticipatory effect’ which refers to trading decisions being based 
on second-guessing how  other investors are likely to respond to media announcements. As Davis 
duly notes, the process by which traders attempt to gain an advantage by pre-emptive buying or 
selling in anticipation of an imminent market movement based on expectation of aggregate investor 
reactions has long been recognised (e.g. Keynes, 1936). Indeed, studies by Beneish (1991), Sant 
and Zaman (1996), Busse & Green (2002), and Frieder & Zittrain (2006) point to price movements 
occurring prior to media announcements allowing better-informed investors to profit from the 
predictable (over)reaction to the forthcoming information. Of course, this presupposes that the 
anticipating investors are somehow able to  anticipate not only the reaction of other investors but 
also the timing and content of the news. Davis suggests that the close relationship between market 
analysts and financial reporters allows the former to tip off colleagues and clients about the 
forthcoming report, thereby allowing them to take a position in the market ahead of other investors 
(in the case of CNBC, exploitation of the ‘Squawk Box bounce’ effect on prices became so 
notorious that the channel attracted SEC attention and adopted measures to restrict leaks of news 
about which analysts were due to appear on the programme)39.  
 
The third type of effect identified by Davis (2005) is the ‘panopticon media effect’. This entails 
generation of herd-like behaviour stemming from a combination of the information-saturated 
financial environment, wherein all market activity is monitored in real time, and a range of 
institutional constraints and pressures on large investors, especially those managing funds on 
behalf of third parties (e.g. pensions, insurance, mutual funds). He suggests that the intense 
monitoring and benchmarking of fund performance made possible by new communications 
technologies has helped produce a relatively homogenous set of parameters within which many 
institutional investors are obliged to operate (e.g. benchmarking against particular indexes).  For 
Davis, along with the consensus indicator and anticipatory influences, this predisposes many 
                                                 
38
 One could argue that a ‘media effects’ framework is somewhat misleading here; Davis nuances his position 
on the directness of effects by emphasising the professional activity of the investment audience. The 
ostensible influence exerted by the financial media is premised on the recognition that any effects are 
attributable to the specific ways this particular audience engages with them. Thus it would be equally plausible 
to frame the analysis of the findings in terms of investor ‘uses and gratifications’. This does not obviate the 
utility of Davis’ empirical findings, however.   
 
39
 Davis (2005, 2006a) also notes that some investors take advantage of index-based funds’ obligation to 
maintain portfolios proportional to the constituent securities. Thus if a company is newly introduced to an 
exchange (initial product/public offering or IPO) or de-listed from an exchange, a large number of institutional 
investors will be obliged to buy or sell off the respective stock in considerable volume, and pre-emptive trading 
can profit from the index funds predictable mode of operation. 
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institutional investors towards herd-like behaviour. This is partly attributable to homogeneity in 
investor operating practices but there is also a degree of security in following indexes and market 
consensus since this avoids conspicuous under-performance.  Davis (2006a) also points to investor 
usage of very similar public and private financial media sources in homogenising investor 
perceptions and cites a MORI study in 2000 that, interestingly, found that fund managers rated 
newspapers as more important than financial wire services. However, his own study of UK fund 
managers revealed that despite the ostensible exclusivity of some private financial information 
sources (e.g. top analyst reports) there was also considerable homogeneity in the use of this 
information, suggesting that any asymmetrical advantage it conferred would be diluted. 
 
As with anticipatory processes, it is important to emphasise that the ‘panopticon effect’ is not solely 
linked to media content, but arises as an interplay between the real-time monitoring potential of new 
communication technologies and specific investment practices. Essentially, the ‘herding’ effect 
reflects symmetries not only in the availability/distribution of market information, but symmetries in 
the modes of agency within investment institutions. These need to be differentiated because as 
Babe (1994, 1995) observes, one of the important correctives a meaning-based communication 
perspective can bring to the neoclassical assumptions of informational efficiency in market pricing is 
the recognition that the same market information does not necessarily produce the same meanings 
or predispositions to buy/sell among different market actors. The financial media’s role in producing 
basic informational symmetries among market actors is more evident than their role in generating 
symmetries of institutional agency, which requires an account of other socio-economic and 
regulatory factors shaping trading practices.  As Davis (2007) duly notes, the intensification of the 
flows of market news is partly attributable to new regulatory regimes obliging informational 
transparency and restricting options for non-disclosure (see also Best, 2005)40.   
 
Davis (2005) argues that  the manifestation of these various ‘effects’ on the level of the individual 
trader can, when aggregated across the market, lead to a general reinforcement of market trends 
producing more frequent and more extreme price movements; in other words, the overall market 
effect of financial media is an increase in systemic volatility. He cites Sant & Zaman’s (1996) 
findings that analyst reports in the media were a) less likely to trigger price movements the greater 
the number of analysts making the same recommendation, and b) when price movements did occur 
that they were often stronger in smaller ‘low-cap’ stocks than in ‘high-cap’ companies. He suggests 
that the former can be accounted for by the likelihood that where a large number of analysts concur, 
they are responding to information that is already widely disseminated and is therefore unlikely to 
confer any investment advantage because any trading liable to move prices on the basis of that 
information has already been triggered41. Following Sant & Zaman (1996), Davis (2005) also 
suggests the influence of media announcements may be greater when there are few alternative 
sources of information about  the securities in question; smaller companies generally receive less 
attention from analysts and the media, so the relatively low level of information about them makes it 
more likely that new/ advantageous information might be revealed from such reports42.  
 
Although there is still the potential for asymmetrical distribution of market information through 
inequalities in media access, selective distribution/ withholding of information by informed actors 
and processing lags/ delays in executing trade orders, real-time financial news media generally 
ensure that most market information is made available to all investors simultaneously. 
Paradoxically, despite the enormous resources devoted to ensuring the provision of immediate and 
continuous flows of market news, this reduces the likelihood that any significant trading advantage 
will be gained through accessing the information (although significant disadvantages might be 
incurred without it). As Davis (2005, 2006b) notes, public news media are unlikely to be a primary 
source of the types of information professional institutional investors base their trading decisions on. 
                                                 
40
 Interestingly, transparency and public disclosure requirements are one area of financial market trading that 
has been subject to greater regulation under the neoliberal policies developed over the last three decades.  
 
41
 Note that this is consistent with the claims of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) which suggests that 
market prices always reflect all publicly available market information (Fama, 1970).  
 
42
 As Golding (2003) points out, the stocks of smaller ‘low cap’ companies are also more susceptible to price 
fluctuations when they are traded in any volume. 
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Nevertheless, all the fund managers he interviewed cited the Financial Times as an important 
information source. At other times though, they relied more on private channels (e.g. contacts with 
the managers of traded companies). This raises important questions about the interplay between 
different sources and types of financial news and information. Davis (2005, 2006) and Clark, Thrift & 
Tickell (2005), suggest that financial news may help investors  identify emergent market trends and 
may play a key role in enabling investors to monitor a range of variables outside of standard market 
fundamentals in an attempt to gain an edge in their trading decisions. This may include the 
behaviour of other investors/ financial institutions in order to discern market sentiment, likely 
responses to media reports and the likely future direction of price movements. Extending the 
arguments of Davis and Clark et al., this would imply that even if financial media reports are not 
directly used to inform institutional investors’ trading decisions, they may help them discern shifts in 
the prevailing schemata influencing trading decisions.  
 
The complexity of financial information flows has implications for the stability of financial system. In 
another analysis, Davis (2007) critiques the influences of market liberalisation and financial 
information flows on the efficiency of the London Stock Exchange. There is a tension between the 
regulatory and technological developments that have given rise to the informationally-symmetrical 
real-time media environment and the interests of investors who ‘seek exclusive, private, alternative 
(or commodified) sources of information to gain a trading edge’ (2007, p.160). Davis identifies three 
key financial information sources in the London Stock Exchange; media reports, brokerage analyst 
(sell-side) research and fund manager (buy side) research (see also Schwarzkopf, 2007).  
However, the production of financial news and information production is subject to similar economic 
pressures for cost-reduction and efficiency as other areas of the media industries, and with the 
same propensity for commensurate compromises in quality. In regard to financial news, Davis notes 
that resourcing has been squeezed with the result that there are fewer specialist reporters and 
greater journalistic dependency on analysts and information subsidies provided by financial PR/IR 
offices (see also Davis, 2002b). Noting the strong like between journalists, analyst sources and 
companies, Davis (2007) observes that,  
 
‘Since journalists regard analysts as the independent ‘experts’ on companies and 
regularly use their comments, this has become yet another form of company-supplied 
information subsidy for financial journalism’  (p. 164) and that in the course of his 
research it ‘became apparent that financial news coverage had become overly 
influenced by the very companies journalists reported on’ (p.164).  
 
In regard to sell-side brokerage research and analyst reports, he notes that the de/reregulation or 
‘big bang’ introduced by the 1986 Financial Services Act broke up the old City oligopoly, allowing 
new entrants to the brokerage and market making system43 (see also Leyshon & Thrift, 1997b). 
Davis also points out that as an increasing number of sell-side brokerage analysts competed to 
supply the information demanded by fund managers, despite the ostensible plurality of provision, 
this resulted in significant compromises in the quality of information and market efficiency; 
 
 ‘ [M]uch information is repetitive and over-produced, incurs high hidden costs, and is 
of poor quality and corrupted. […] a large proportion of analysis consists of the same 
information being repackaged and presented by multiple intermediaries. 
Public/investor relations practitioners, journalists and analysts all pick up, process and 
pass on the same company-generated information’ (2007, p.169).  
                                                 
43
 This was in many respects comparable to the 1999 repeal of the 1933 US Glass-Steagall Act, which had 
separated commercial banking services from investment banking and brokerage services in the wake of the 
1929 Wall Street crash. This de/reregulation also increased competition for financial services and drove down 
brokerage commission rates, which had the side-effect of reducing the revenues available for research. At the 
same time, larger investment firms and banks were permitted to buy up brokerage houses, taking their 
operations ‘in-house’ to be operated parallel with other important business activites involving client companies. 
Davis suggests this is the origin of the conflicts of interest within the banking and brokerage sector responsible 
for the systematic bias in analyst recommendations, noting that ‘analysts had become subsidized, rewarded, 
pressurized and threatened by companies, in much the same way journalists are by powerful news sources’ 
(2007, p.166).  
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Davis further suggests that some fund managers have responded to the expense and inadequacy 
of financial information by adopting alternative trading strategies that rely less on media and analyst 
sources. He argues that index-tracking and programme trading allow fund managers to ‘do away 
with research altogether and manage their investments electronically and purely in relation to the 
internal market’ (2007, p.169), and that this reduces market efficiency. Davis’ critique of the self-
referential processes in the production and dissemination of financial information bears some 
resemblance to those of  Malmqvist (1998), Rothkopf (1999) and Kunczik (2002). However, as 
noted earlier, it is important to differentiate between different points of critique here. Davis’ notions 
of ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ markets and ‘(in)efficiency’ linked to information quality need 
consideration here. The recognition that investors may base their trading decisions on factors such 
as price momentum, anticipations of ‘herd’ behaviour, index-tracking the market average or 
technical models of market cycles contrasts with trading strategies based on traditional market 
fundamentals, and challenges orthodox theories of how financial markets work in practice. However 
if, as Thrift et al. (2005) have suggested, new financial theories and information systems have given 
rise to the evolution of new ‘fundamentals’, then it is problematic to suppose that; i) market reality is 
comprised of immutable base conditions with an objective/ external nature independent of the 
perceptions of market actors; ii) these conditions can be more-or-less accurately represented in 
financial media; and iii) if trading activity rationally reflects accurate market information, then the 
prices of securities will be driven to their ‘correct’ levels.   
 
An important question arising here concerns whether the market inefficiencies identified might be 
rectified if reregulation were to redress the ostensible bias/ inaccuracy/ corruption/ distortion in 
financial information and trading practices. Rothkopf (1999) suggests that providing more open/ 
transparent access to non-disclosed high quality information would help rectify problems with self-
referentiality. In contrast, Best’s (2005) critique of financial transparency regimes suggests that 
requiring more/better/faster market information misconstrues the problem such measures are 
supposed to redress. The argument that the corruption of market information through institutional 
biases has incentivised trading based on ‘internal’, self-referential market signals and resulted in 
prices with a ‘distorted’ relation to external fundamentals underplays a significant point that Clark et 
al. (2005) and Davis (2005) both allude to: That investors’ increasing usage of ‘internal’ market 
information based on noise, price momentum and self-referential monitoring of prevailing investor 
sentiments, stems from the diminished trading advantage to be gained by using ‘external’ market 
information (fundamentals) precisely because this is symmetrically accessible to virtually all other 
market actors in real time. Thus it could be argued that the problems Davis (2007) identifies have 
arisen because of informational ‘efficiency’ rather than because of ‘distortion’44.   There is therefore 
a tension between analyses which tacitly assume financial news/ information to be a more or less 
accurate representation (or distortion) of an objective/external market reality which help ensure 
rational trading and the discovery of correct pricing, and analyses that problematise representation 
and conceive the role of news and financial information in terms of constructing and constituting 
markets. Financial reality is not a publicly-accessible phenomenon, and market events cannot be 
directly discerned even if one has a Bloomberg terminal or access to a financial exchange or 
trading room. Media (re)presentations of financial markets therefore require enunciation by expert 
actors whose institutional knowledge and shared meanings performatively define market reality (see 
Corner, 1998; Greenfield & Williams, 2007).  
                                                 
44
 The analyses of mediation processes and information in financial markets discussed thus far (including 
Davis’ work) provide a compelling basis to question these neoclassical conceptions of market reality and 
representation. In places, however, Davis’ position on informational efficiency and representative accuracy is 
more ambiguous. For example, he notes that trading strategies which avoided the use of ‘external’ market 
information ‘did not appear to operate efficiently’ (2007, p.162), and have the potential to ‘disconnect trading 
prices from real prices’ (p.169). Elsewhere, he notes that the quality of analyst information has been ‘corrupted’ 
by vested interests (p. 166, p.169), and goes on to comment that, ‘Information may be more universally 
available but its quality, and hence trading utility is questionable. It is less diverse or pluralist in nature and its 
producers are not rewarded for greater accuracy or attempted objectivity’ (p.172). He concludes that while 
de/reregulation in the City promoted greater efficiency ‘in financial market terms’, the failure to consider the 
‘independence and objectivity, quality, cost, and efficiency of production’ of financial information has resulted in 
the London Stock Exchange becoming, ‘in plain economic terms, less efficient and cost effective’ (p.172-173).  
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Representation, reflexivity and reality in financial media 
 
From the preceding discussion of the literature, there are five ways in which media systems and 
communication processes could be said to play a constitutive, reflexive role in financial market 
operations 45: 
 
1. Media/information technologies provide the material infrastructures/ interfaces through which 
financial practices are embodied. Electronic networks enable the transmission of real-time 
market information and trading transactions while computing systems allow rapid analysis of 
data and the performative calculation of financial theories/ algorithms required by new modes of 
trading and NFIs.  
 
2. Media discourses shape the common frames of reference through which financial phenomena 
and their relation to political and civic life are broadly conceived. On a wider social level, this 
would include the legitimation of macroeconomic arrangements, the [de]valorisation or finance 
as an elite sphere and the promotion of new economic subjectivities and norms (such as the 
notion that individuals must take personal responsibility for their own financial wellbeing). Within 
the financial markets themselves, public media discourses may provide indications of relevant 
events and developments in other social spheres, as well as indications of the current climate of 
thinking among financial opinion leaders. 
 
3. More specialist financial discourses emerging from the high-end financial media and networks 
of professional investors/analysts play a more directly constitutive role in the formation of the 
intersubjective codifications that delineate the channels and modalities of meaningful action 
within financial markets. This would include the performative designation of new financial 
instruments and investment schemata/models, and the shared frames demarcating market 
‘fundamentals’ (i.e. the variables/ criteria by which market values are calculated). This will be 
termed implicit or performative reflexivity.  
 
4. Financial transactions themselves crystallise market valuations in prices (including also ask-bid 
expressions of valuation at which transactions can be undertaken) and which can themselves 
move the market if undertaken in significant volume (see discussion of money and financial 
values in chapters 7-8). Other directly constitutive financial actions would include the 
deployment of reserve bank interest rate announcements, top analyst buy/sell 
recommendations and rating agency gradings where such price-sensitive signals have become 
so deeply entrenched in prevailing trading schemata that they constitute shifts in the market 
reality as it is currently defined and therefore trigger trading and move prices. This will be 
termed explicit or transactional reflexivity.  
 
5. Flows of many other forms of news and information upon which investment decisions could be 
based are also potentially ‘price-sensitive’ depending on the criteria of prevailing investment 
schemata. This might include news about key fundamentals (such as company earnings and 
price trends in key indexes). However, financial markets are also potentially sensitive to signals 
endogenously generated by their own operation. News of shifts in market sentiment/ 
expectations (e.g. bearish/bullish) and indications that key market actors are evolving their 
trading schemata and paying attention to new investment opportunities, different news 
sources/expert opinions, or new variables in the politics or industry can feed back into 
investment decisions. This suggests that investors monitor each other for signs of changes in 
overall market perceptions, moods, and trading frames/schemata (which could potentially 
produce longer-term shifts in the codifications demarcating fundamentals).The processes by 
which financial market self-monitoring can lead to transitory shifts in the variables currently 
driving price movements will be termed contingent or game reflexivity.  
                                                 
45
 The notion of reflexivity has several meanings in different areas of social and economic theory. (Giddens, 
1990; Lash & Urry, 1994; Beck et al., 1994, 2003; Lynch, 2000; Lash, 2003; Pels, 2000; Soros, 1994). The 
conceptions of reflexivity salient to this analysis are an extension of George Soros’ (1994) formulation which 
suggests that the relation between market fundamentals and price movements cannot be understood in terms 
of independent-dependent variables; rather, they influence each other.   
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Chapter 4: Globalisation, Communication and Finance 
 
There is an enormous literature on the various social phenomena associated with the notion of 
‘globalisation’. Although the focus of this thesis is concerned primarily with contemporary financial 
processes, the way in which developments in financial markets over the last thirty or forty years 
have been accompanied by commensurate reconfigurations in the relations with other spheres of 
social action is important. Indeed, a broad question the thesis seeks to address is whether financial 
markets have become de-coupled from the industrial economy, the state and civil society. If 
financial markets do have an autopoietic tendency then it is necessary to theorise this in terms of 
how their relation to other social spheres has become reconfigured. As such, a selective review of 
some of the prevailing conceptions of and empirical evidence for globalisation is necessary. 
 
As a starting point, Galtung (1999) model of the modern social system is instructive. This identifies 
three spheres or ‘pillars’ of social action; state, capital and civil society, each exhibiting a 
characteristic ‘logic’ underpinning their respective institutional forms, operational values and 
particular forms of social action: Thus ‘capital logic’ is concerned with productive efficiency and 
capital accumulation; ‘state logic’  is concerned with expanding and centralising political control and 
regulation; ‘people logic’ is concerned with lifeworld values, gratification of human needs, and 
preservation of cultural practices, identity and freedoms. Although the discreteness of the spheres 
and homogeneity of their logics is overstated in Galtung’s model, it emphasises the centrality of the 
media system as a kind of ‘fourth pillar’ constituting the interface between state, capital and civil 
society. This not only recognises that the configurations among them are contingent, it foregrounds 
communication processes as critical in shaping them. This allows the ‘logics’ demarcating the 
spheres to be transcoded into the intersubjective codifications framework. As a starting point, then, 
globalisation might be conceived in terms of shifts in the prevailing codifications and modes of 
interaction within and between state, capital and civil society.  
 
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton (1999) also analyse globalisation in terms of political, economic 
and cultural reconfigurations. The ‘transformationalist’ perspective46 (also see, for example, 
Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Sassen, 1996, 2006; Rosenau, 2003; Sklair, 2001) 
posits that globalisation entails a reconfiguration of social relations through the intensification of 
transborder interaction and a restructuring of the institutional and governance arrangements 
underpinning the global system. However, global processes exhibit too many contingencies and 
contradictions to be conceived as a monolithic force unfolding ineluctably according to a unilinear, 
teleological logic. Accordingly, local responses to social forces manifested globally can vary 
because different institutions and actors respond contextually to those forces in pursuit of their 
respective agendas. Rosenau’s (1990, 2003) analyses of global processes similarly points to the 
complex formations of interlinkage and isolation across different spaces and collectivities of interest. 
His notion of ‘fragmegration’ posits a tension between the centrifugal and centripetal processes of 
globalisation; the former involving localisation, decentralisation, and fragmentation, the latter 
involving globalisation, centralisation and integration. However, this complicates the role of 
traditional political institutions and produces struggles and contradictions in the formation of 
transnational governance regimes, particularly in regard to the conflicts and alignments that emerge 
through the interplay of various governmental, corporate and civic institutions seeking to advance 
their respective agendas within different spheres and levels of society.  
 
To conceptualise global processes, Held et al. (1999) (see also Held & McGrew, 2003, 2007). use 
the concepts of ‘extensity’, ‘intensity’, ‘velocity’ and ‘impact’. Extensity refers to the expansion or 
stretching of political, economic or cultural networks of interaction across spatial boundaries (both 
                                                 
46
 Held et al. (1999) identify two other paradigms of thought here. The ‘hyperglobalist’ perspective (see for 
example, Ohmae,1990; Fukuyama, 1992; Friedman, 1999) broadly corresponds to a neoliberal-functional view 
of the benefits of expanding free market capitalism and the increasing redundancy of the nation state. The 
‘sceptical’ position (see, for example, Hirst & Thompson, 1996, 2002; Sparks, 2007) broadly corresponds to a 
neo-Marxist or World Systems view that the nation state remains a key locus and agent of capitalist activity 
and that market globalisation is largely a continuation of imperialist capital accumulation imperatives.  
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geo-political and social), such as the increased transborder activities of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) or the increased number of people travelling overseas.  Intensity refers both to the 
frequency and volume of interaction and also the magnitude of interconnectedness between the 
spaces across which the interaction occurs, for example, the huge growth in the volume and value 
of financial transactions and the increased flows of capital and information through communication 
infrastructures among the key financial nodes in London, New York and Tokyo. Velocity refers to 
the speed at which flows extend across space over time enabled by transport and communication 
technologies, such as the flows of financial information and computerised trading activity. However, 
velocity might also be extended to the compression of time in political decision-making  or news 
reporting. Impact refers to the political, economic and cultural consequences/ outcomes of the 
increasing extensity, intensity, and velocity of social processes, with the explicit recognition that 
such impacts may vary across different geopolitical and social spaces. Held et al. identify four 
modes of impact; on decision-making processes; on institutional forms and agendas; on the 
distribution of resources and related collectivities of interests, and on the (re)structuring of relations 
between political, economic and cultural institutions and the shaping of global forces constituting the 
environment in which those institutions operate. This framework has an obvious application to 
financial markets: the extensity of financial markets through new communication infrastructures 
have linked together exchanges and investors in all the major market centres across the world. 
 
The intensity of financial market flows has likewise undergone a significant increase, both in the 
relation to the volume and frequency of trading transactions and information flows, as well as in 
terms of the density of interconnections between financial centres. Similarly, the velocity of financial 
activity and flows of market information have increased enormously with the development of news 
communication technologies. Increases in velocity would also apply to the temporal compression of 
financial systems (e.g. computerised ‘algo’ trading systems used to exploit transitory spreads in 
prices) and the emergence of round the clock trading. It might also be extended to the compression 
of capital accumulation circuits (i.e. the period between investment and returns) and the circulation 
of money itself47. The impacts of financial markets can be seen in numerous ways, including 
government macroeconomic decisions to maintain investment-friendly environments, the 
development of supranational market institutions and financial governance regimes, and the 
reconfigurations of the relations between governments and civil society in response to the market 
discipline imposed by deregulated capital flows. By foregrounding communication processes and 
the intersubjective codifications underpinning the channels and modalities of financial activity, Held 
et al.’s framework might be usefully transcoded to emphasise the links between the development of 
new communication technologies (infrastructures) and dominant financial modalities of investment 
activity with the increased extensity, intensity, velocity and impacts of global finance in relation to 
other social spheres (institutionalisation and stratification). More specific analysis of potential 
impacts will become clearer as the discussion progresses and other perspectives on globalisation 
are considered. 
 
Appadurai’s (1990) much-cited conception of globalisation from a cultural economic perspective 
posits a topographical/visual metaphor of ‘scapes’ to describe points of conjuncture and disjuncture 
that have manifested as these scapes intersect. The five forms he identifies are ethnoscapes 
(patterns of travel, migration, diasporic distributions) technoscapes (spatial distributions of 
technologies and also technical knowledge/skills), finanscapes (monetary concentrations and 
capital flows), mediascapes (the distributions of communication hardware but also the flows of 
content, imagery and discourses) and ideoscapes (the distribution and contestation of ideological 
formations and key conceptions such as freedom, rights, citizenship, and the narratives and 
discourses that underpin them). For Appadurai, global flows arise in the spaces of disjuncture 
among these various scapes, de/reterritorialising the various scapes (these disjunctures suggest 
contradictions analogous to Rosenau’s [1990, 2003] notion of fragmegration, although Appadurai 
places less emphasis on power-relations and governance). None of the scapes is given 
                                                 
47
 The velocity of money refers not only to the speed of transactions through the use of electronic banking or 
credit systems, but to the number of times a unit of monetary capital is deployed in transactions within a period 
of time. If a dollar is used to buy a commodity or security, and the seller immediately uses it to engage in 
further buying, then the same unit of currency can facilitate multiple trades. A single dollar used ten times over 
by different market agents facilitates the same amount of trade as ten dollars used just once.  
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deterministic primacy, but Appadurai notes the significance of the finanscape and the mobility of 
capital made possible by NCTs and NFIs (technoscapes) as a driver of migration (ethnoscapes) 
which can in turn change the complexion of the ideoscape and open up new market demands for 
information, news, cultural products and so forth (mediascapes).48  
 
Insofar as the manifestation of conjunctures or disjunctures are specific to particular spaces/ arenas 
of activity, so the alignments or tensions may vary across contexts. Held et al.’s framework might 
also be usefully synthesised here, specifically in regard to mapping the extensity, intensity, velocity 
and impacts of the scapes and the disjunctures among them over time and space. For example, the 
technologies, institutional practices, media systems and ideological formations that allow the 
functioning of financial trading are highly concentrated in key centres like London, New York and 
Tokyo, but virtually non-existent across large areas of many developing countries, especially in rural 
areas. The extensity of the finanscape is broad (there are financial flows of some kind throughout all 
but the most remote societies) but the spaces where financial extensity coincides with the greatest 
intensity and velocity are more restricted. This is not merely a matter of national development. The 
global finanscape’s intensity of interconnection within the trading rooms of Wall Street or the City of 
London contrasts markedly with the low socioeconomic spaces in the vicinity where the inhabitants’ 
interface with global financial networks is as limited as  those in downtown Mogadishu. Thus the 
contours of the finanscape provide minimal interface with the flows of capital in those spaces not 
intersected by the mediascape and finanscape. Again, the ISC framework can be used to transcode 
the analytic traction of the scapes here: Mediascapes provide the channels and networks of 
financial transactions and market information flows while the technoscapes and ideoscapes 
underpin specific modalities of financial practice (such as new trading models and NFIs). The 
spaces where these three scapes intersect give rise to the flows of capital that constitute the 
finanscape (which in turn distributes capital in ways that influences migration/ ethnoscapes).  
 
As Bell (2007) notes, Appadurai’s conception of global scapes and flows bears some comparison to 
the analysis of globalisation by Castells (1996, 1997, 1998). This series of works identifies the 
centrality of new communication and information technologies in the formation of new spaces and 
flows of social action, complicating the relations between state, capital and civil society.  The 
emergent ‘network society’ reconfigures political, economic and cultural relations through the ‘space 
of flows’ (1996). This entails the reterritorialization and interlinkage of key nodes of social activity 
through electronic communication systems (particularly within the most technologically-dense 
‘global cities’ or ‘technopoles’). The space of flows reconfigures social action in ways that no longer 
corresponds to the material/geographic ‘space of places’. Moreover, insofar as the acceleration of 
electronic communication facilitates the effective annihilation of space through time49, real-time 
technologies that allow instantaneous actions and feedback also enable a compression and 
recodification of temporality. Castells suggests the space of flows is bound up with ‘timeless time’ 
where the linear sequences and rhythms of clock time become blurred into instantaneity; a 
perpetual present (see later section on temporality). A tension emerges between the electronically 
networked social actors and actions bound up in the timeless time within the space of flows and the 
social actors and action which remain bounded by the space of places and linear temporality. To 
adopt a term from Wark (1994), global flows are ‘vectored’ in the sense that they are directional and 
function only between particular spatial-temporal coordinates, facilitating channels/ modes of social 
action between certain sites of agency but excluding others. In this regard, the space of flows might 
be conceived not only as a network of communicative infrastructures, but also as the extension of 
very particular sets of intersubjective codifications constituting the channels of particular forms of 
social action and also distributing access to the material and symbolic resources to undertake those 
actions. The nodes of control over the global flows of capital around the world are institutionally 
privileged. In Appadurai’s terms, the space of flows can be found in the conjunctures of the 
technoscape, mediascape, ideoscape and finanscape.  
                                                 
48
 It should be noted that the categorisation of Appadurai’s five ‘scapes’ is not entirely discrete. For example, 
the mediascape and ideoscape overlap somewhat in regard to ideological formations and discourses, while the 
mediascape and technoscape overlap in regard to communication infrastructures and networks.  
 
49
 As noted by Marx in Grundrisse (1973/1859). Also see Giddens’ (1990) notions of ‘space-time distanciation’ 
and of ‘action at a distance’.  
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Sklair (2000, 2001; see also Hardt & Negri, 2000)50  posits the formation of a ‘transnational 
capitalist class’ (TCC) as the driver of globalisation. The TCC is premised on ‘global system theory’, 
which is intentionally differentiated from world systems theory (see Wallerstein, 1996, 1999). On this 
point he distinguishes between three conceptions of globalisation along criteria quite similar to Held 
et al. (1999). The ‘transnational’ conception (which Sklair himself endorses) suggests that analysing 
globalisation requires a shift in the unit of analysis to transnational institutions and processes, but 
retains the nation state as one of a range of significant actors within many of those institutional 
forms and processes. Sklair’s global system and TCC provides both an account of globalisation that 
foregrounds capital accumulation but also an account of societal change that extends beyond the 
classical Marxist , world system and Regulation School emphasis on state-backed  imperialism. 
Sklair (2000, 2001) regards transnational activity as taking three major forms; political, economic 
and cultural, which is again consistent with Galtung’s (1999) formulation. However, the TCC 
engages in these activities in spaces that do not correspond to national boundaries. In that regard, 
the balance of relations between the three spheres has been complicated by the emergence of the 
TCC as a global  formation. The TCC is a driver of globalisation in several respects. Increasingly, it 
finds a common set of political-economic and ideological interests articulated around global market 
activity, particularly because of the common shareholder interest in optimising and accelerating 
accumulation and the spatial extensions of mobile capital. The TCC therefore seeks to extend its 
control over economic production, policy/regulatory regimes (both at domestic and international 
level) and cultural/ ideological formations in order to accommodate the imperatives of capital. Sklair 
also emphasises the significance of economic discourses in the legitimation of TCC policy interests 
and business/investment practices. For example, the ideological valorisation of business (and 
especially financial) epistemologies has naturalised their logics/codes (e.g. efficiency and 
competitiveness) as institutional norms within other spheres. One outcome of this has been the 
extension of benchmarks and standards which reflect the imperatives of capital accumulation into 
other arenas of social action. Sklair also points to the ideological shaping of policy agendas in 
supranational forums (whether economic or cultural/environmental) which align social policy to TCC 
interests. This an important vector through which global capital reconfigures the relationship 
between itself, the state and civil society (see also Sassen, 2006). These processes transcode 
reasonably well into the intersubjective codification framework: The systems of shared knowledge 
and coordinated meaning that underpin the channels and modalities of financial activity become 
integrated into the spaces of policy formation at national and global level, such that the norms, 
models and schemata deployed within finance inflect institutional priorities in other spheres. While 
Sklair does note the importance of discourse/ideology and the media industries, he does not 
elaborate on their significance or underlying processes from a media/communication perspective. 
Those links will be made more explicit as this discussion develops. 
 
Like Galtung and Sklair, Sassen (1996, 2000, 2005, 2006) points out that globalisation has brought 
about a reconfiguration of the relations among the political, economic and civic spheres (particularly 
the relation between citizens and state as markets have expanded across geopolitical boundaries). 
As an increasing proportion of economic/financial activity is undertaken outside the spaces of state 
regulation, there has been a redefinition of the social contract between state and citizens. Sassen 
(1996, 2000) suggests supranational economic institutions have assumed rights akin to a form of 
global economic citizenship. However, this ‘citizenship’ is not a social contract with the state per se. 
Rather, the institutions and processes of global financial markets have increasingly come to occupy 
the spaces of regulation/ governance once regarded as the sovereign role of state.  This feature of 
                                                 
50
 Hardt & Negri (2000, 2004) also put forward an account of a radical reshaping and reterritorialisation of 
globalised capital in relation to civil society. Late capitalism is characterised by the formation of a global 
‘Empire’. In contrast to world systems theory, this transcends the nation state and does not extend from a 
primary imperial centre. Rather, it is comprised of a network of institutional actors who occupy the key nodes of 
political and economic power. This deterritorialised and decentred formation supersedes the traditional power-
relations of the nation state system, and despite its manifold composition, exhibits coherence in its 
supranational logic of  regulation and sovereignty. Although ‘Empire’ is counterposed by the disenfranchised 
‘Multitude’ its homogeneity and coherence is overstated. Sklair’s formulation of TCC is preferred here.  
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globalisation is not necessarily a consequence of any concerted, cohesive  initiative by capital, but 
an aggregation of contributory technological, institutional and regulatory developments:  
 
‘The issue here is not so much that global markets have emerged as a powerful 
mechanism through which those with capital can influence government policy; in many 
ways that is an old story […] It is rather that the operation of these markets calls for 
certain types of economic policy objectives.’ (Sassen, 1996, p.51).  
 
Thus policy comes to be formulated increasingly outside the sphere of democratic accountability, 
and the imperatives/logics of finance begin to pervade other spheres of activity. Markets 
circumscribe the autonomy of national governments partly through supranational trade/policy 
forums (the establishment of which has entailed the active participation of states) and partly through 
the imposition of a macroeconomic discipline whereby the transborder mobility of capital represents 
a constant risk of devaluation/ disinvestment/ increased borrowing costs on governments which fail 
to maintain economic environments aligned to the imperatives of accumulation. For example, 
Sassen (1996) notes that new financial instruments have routinely been used to circumvent 
regulations, and financial deregulation has permitted a far wider range of offshore institutions to 
issue credit at rates that do not always correspond to domestic official cash rates (OCRs). As 
Sassen (2000) suggests, the ‘implicit ground rules’ of policy domestic policy increasingly take on a 
financial inflection (see also Mooers, 1999; Greenfield & Williams, 2007). Nevertheless, this 
hollowing out of the legislature and privatisation of executive power (Sassen, 2006) does not mean 
the state is passively complicit with the erosion of its own sphere of regulatory jurisdiction. On the 
contrary, Sassen (1996, 2000) points to a broad consensus among national governments (at least 
within the more advanced capitalist economies) to promote economic liberalisation, and they have 
actively helped to establish supranational economic policy and governance forums51. 
 
As with Rosenau’s (2003) notion of fragmegration, the ambivalent role of the state in relation to 
financial markets blurs any clear distinction between local/national and global processes. Sassen 
(2005, 2006) identifies two key forms of embeddedness between state and capital here. Firstly, 
governments remain important regulatory actors which continue to enforce and maintain the 
legitimacy of many of the systems of governance essential to the functioning of finance: ‘No matter 
how globalised and electronic, finance requires specific regulatory conditions and hence depends 
partly on the participation of national states to produce these conditions.’ (2005, p.33).  Secondly, 
international market institutions have established both formal and informal forms of regulation which 
become extended into domestic government policy. Sassen (2005, 2006) also points out that the 
evolution of international standards of investment practice play a  role in the formation of global 
governance regimes (see also Sklair, 2000; Best, 2005; Wade, 2007). Examples of this would be 
international accounting/ disclosure practices, the implicit legitimation of the global forex market as 
the ultimate arbiter of national currency valuations, or the negotiation of domestic economic policies 
with ratings agencies to secure the desired investment-grade for government bond-issues 
(Soederberg, 2002; Kunczik, 2002).  
 
Sassen (2006) further develops her analysis of the reconfiguration of relations between state, 
capital and civil society in terms of the formation of new ‘assemblages’ of territory, authority, and 
rights (TAR). These  concern changes in the spaces of regulatory power/ policy formulation and the 
spaces in which different actors’ claims to have their needs considered in regulation/ policy are 
recognised and legitimated. These new ‘assemblages’ of territory, authority and rights across 
supranational spaces the formation of new political subjectivities and sets of rights based on the 
norms of global business, complicating the role of the state and the nature of citizenship. Financial 
market activities are particularly significant here because governments increasingly have to factor in 
financial market reactions into macroeconomic policy decisions. Held et al. (1999) similarly point to 
the increased prominence of ‘transgovernmental’ institutions operating supranationally (such as the 
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 Interestingly, she points out that governance forums such as GATT and WTO do not in principle preclude 
potential spaces for the articulation of civil rights Given the interests of the main state and corporate actors who 
participate in such forums, this is perhaps rather optimistic; it is clear that civic agendas are not the priority 
except perhaps in the sense of promoting consumer rights. Nevertheless, Sassen is correct to point out a 
channel through which civic interests might be articulated. 
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IMF or WTO). Thus national level political and economic activity remains important but the 
boundaries between national/global governance have blurred. Although the state is far from 
redundant, globalised markets and transborder capital flows encourage fiscal discipline and alter 
the relationship between state  capital and civil society. As Held et al. comment: 
 
‘National macroeconomic policy is vulnerable to changes in global financial conditions. 
Speculative flows can have immediate and dramatic domestic economic 
consequences […] Contemporary financial globalisation has altered the costs and 
benefits associated with different national macroeconomic policy options, at times so 
radically as to make some options prohibitively expensive.’ (1999, p. 228/230).   
 
 
Given the preceding discussion of contemporary globalisation, a brief comment is warranted on the 
historical precedents of global financial markets. The recent literature on globalisation has tended to 
emphasise social reconfigurations over the past half-century. Obviously, transnational activity and 
shifts in international political-economic and civic arrangements have far longer historical roots. A 
particularly significant period of financial expansion occurred from the late 19th Century through to 
the onset of the First World War- the ‘gold standard’ era. This precursored the more recent financial 
developments and both historical continuities and disjunctures in global financial activity are 
evident. Foe example, Held et al. (1999) note that during this classical gold standard period, there 
were already extensive transborder capital flows. With the development of telegraphic 
communication, a nascent global credit market had formed with an increased correlation of interest 
rates (see also Carey, 1995). Sassen (1996, 2005, 2006) concurs broadly with Held et al. (1999) 
regarding the evidence of financial globalisation from the late 19th Century to the interwar period of 
the 20th Century. She points out that the relative volume of the international financial market as a 
proportion of national-level economic activity and the relative scale of international flows (indexed 
by the number of government bonds being rated and issued) was comparable to the present day.  
In this regard, financial globalisation cannot be assumed to be a feature of late 20th Century 
capitalism. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s have nevertheless brought about unprecedented changes in financial 
globalisation. The demise of the post-war Bretton Woods regime and the US dollar’s peg to gold, 
along with the OPEC crisis paved the way for the paradigmatic policy shift toward monetarist 
macroeconomics. As Held et al. observe, the consequent liberalisation of transborder capital flows 
gave rise to a ‘dramatic expansion in the extensity and intensity of global financial flows and 
networks’ (1999, p.201). This period of financial globalisation exhibits unprecedented increases in 
the velocity, volume and extensity of capital flows. This is reflected in the closure of price spreads 
and convergence of returns across a range of securities traded globally and increased correlations 
among interest rates (Henwood, 1998).  The fact that there is a now a single market for many 
financial securities (and commodities) exhibiting a uniform world price (i.e. no spreads across 
separate markets) is further evidence of financial globalisation (although regional exchanges may 
carry locally listed company stocks and other securities not traded elsewhere). Sassen (2005) 
points out that the proportional value of transborder transactions in bonds and equities has 
increased in most of the major industrial economies, from a fraction of GDP in the 1970s to several 
multiples thereof by the end of the century (e.g. in the US, the ratio was 4% in 1975, 35% in 1985 to 
230% by 1998). Sassen (2005, 2006) likewise notes the financialization of the economy and the 
significant growth of financial markets in ratio to the industrial economy and world GDP (see also 
Sweezy, 1997; Wade, 2006). Knorr-Cetina (2005) also points to a range of important contemporary 
features of financial globalisation. Financial networks do not extend across all global spaces but 
financial activity is concentrated in deterritorialised nodes disembedded from other social arenas 
(see also Barnett et al., 1999). Indeed, many investment firms operate through global networks 
across time-zones (see Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger 2001, 2002a). For Knorr-Cetina, the new spaces 
and temporalities of market ‘flows’ is a distinguishing feature of contemporary global finance (see 
also Castells, 1996; Hope 2002).It is to this theme that the discussion now turns. 
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Globalisation, NCTs and spatial-temporal shifts in finance52 
 
In regard to contemporary economic developments, particularly financial flows, Castells (1996) has 
developed Daniel Bell’s (1973, 1976) arguments concerning the emergence of a post-industrial 
economy where productivity in the more technologically advanced societies undergoes a 
paradigmatic shift from the manufacturing of material commodities and towards the provision of 
services and non-material goods, such as information/ knowledge. The recognition of a shift in the 
primary mode of production/accumulation during the early 1970s has also been noted by Mandel 
(1975), whose work on ‘late capitalism’ influenced both Jameson (1991, 1997) and Harvey (1990). 
Castells argues that the emergence of the ‘informational economy’ was made possible by the 
development of new communication and information technologies, and points to the 
correspondence between a decline in industrial productivity in the major capitalist economies and 
the development of NCTs and the informational economy during the 1970s. Although Castells is not 
positing a deterministic account of social change based either on economic forces or technology 
(and indeed, posits cultural politics as a countervailing force), he recognises that the extension of 
the capitalist drive for accumulation through technologies as a central feature of globalisation. 
Indeed, this is an important continuity between industrial and informational capitalism: 
 
‘ Firms and nations […] are the actual agents of economic growth. They do not seek 
technology for the sake of technology or productivity enhancement for the sake of 
humankind. They behave in a given historical context, within the rules of an economic 
system (informational capitalism) […] which will ultimately reward or penalise their 
conduct. […] Profitability and competitiveness are the actual determinants of 
technological innovation and productivity growth.’ (Castells, 1996, pp.80-81, 
original bold emphasis).  
 
However, he also points out that the spatial extensity and increased velocity of the market 
processes that enabled capitalism to evolve new modes of accumulation were in turn dependent on 
new technologies. For Castells, the informational economy is characterised not only through an 
increase in the volume of information produced and the technologies that support it, but in the 
creation of economic value through information acting on information. This is evidently similar to the 
notion of the ‘knowledge economy’ which permeated economic policy discourses during the 1990s 
(see Ernst & Young, 1999; also Drucker, 1969; Toffler, 1980). There is also a parallel here with 
Lash and Urry’s (1994) arguments about the emergence of a ‘symbolic economy’ , as well as 
Baudrillard’s (1975, 1981) contention that industrial capitalism based on exchange value was being 
superseded by an economy based on sign value. The shifts in the primary forms of capital 
accumulation will be discussed in more detail later, but there are two points arising from the 
arguments about post-industrial/ informational/ symbolic/ knowledge economies that need to be 
clarified here. Firstly, there is a need to recognise that the development of new communication 
technologies and electronic flows of information and/or capital cannot supersede the industrial 
economy, although they may involve the spatial displacement/ reterritorialisation of industrial 
production. The material infrastructures of the informational economy still depend heavily on the 
industrial production of hardware, even if this involves the production of circuitry more than sheet 
metal. Secondly, there is a need for caution over claims of the ostensible novelty of the symbolic/ 
informational dimension of the economy. The modalities of accumulation have changed with the 
introduction of NCTs and NFIs, but the symbolic dimension of economic activity, particularly in 
respect to the performative inscribing of value into monetary forms and financial securities is an 
ontological constant, not a contemporary distortion of relations that were formerly material in nature. 
 
Castells’ (1996) notion of the informational economy certainly has validity in regard to the 
proliferation of  informational goods, services and technologies as an economic commodity and/or 
the processing of information to render it (more) valuable. The recognition of the process of 
information acting on information as a definitive characteristic of the informational economy (see 
also Graham, 2006) is insightful but Castells’ discussion of economics primarily emphasises 
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 Wayne Hope is acknowledged here for his collegial engagements with the author which have influenced the 
arguments about the spatio-temporal aspects of capitalism being developed here.  
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informational commodity forms, which, in Marx’s formulation, would concern production and 
exchange on the M-C-M’ circuit rather than the M-M’ circuit. The intersubjective codification 
framework nevertheless allows these arguments to be extended to finance. On one level, the 
provision of real-time market information and price movements is essential to the decision making 
of investors operating in the key financial nodes. As such, the information (and the timeliness of the 
information) has an economic value53. Moreover, the production of mass quantities of market 
information and financial data generates the need for systems to filter, prioritise and interpret it. The 
reason high-end trading systems such as Reuters and Bloomberg have become indispensable to 
professional investors is not only because they provide the channels for financial transaction and 
real-time information flows, but because they offer sophisticated screen displays that process 
information and allow more rapid trading responses to changes in market conditions. Meanwhile, 
financial analyst reports are valuable because they provide expert interpretations of market news 
and events in a form salient to the operational models/ schemata of investors54 (respondents #14, 
#10 and #25). This suggests that a key part of the process by which informational forms are 
inscribed with economic value is codification through expert financial systems and institutional 
practices. Indeed, this extends into processes of securitization whereby relations of credit/debt (or 
other forms of fiscal obligation between counterparties) are constructed and recodified into forms 
which are intersubjectively demarcated as discrete financial objects and thereby subject to 
economic exchange. However the ontological implications of such processes are not fully 
developed in Castells’ discussion of finance and the informational economy. 
 
Castells’ (1996) most significant points concerning the operation of financial markets arise in the 
context of his arguments about ‘timeless time’, suggesting that temporality itself is a source of 
financial value in the ‘global casino’. He acknowledges the importance of Harvey’s (1990) 
conception of space-time compression55, particularly in respect to  the increased velocity and 
intensity of financial processes: ‘For the first time in history, a unified global capital market, working 
in real time, has emerged.’ (1996, p.434, original emphasis). Several factors underpin the 
emergence of this market; the convergence of computing and information technologies, combined 
with increasingly specialised and technical financial ‘management techniques’ (including 
programme or ‘algo’ trading) has led to the disintermediation of trading practice. These systems 
provide analysts and traders occupying the key nodes of the financial networks (i.e. the institutional 
trading rooms, particularly in New York, London and Tokyo) to directly interface with the space of 
flows and move massive volumes of capital around the financial networks around the clock. 
However, it is the temporality of finance56 that is primary for Castells: Time becomes a source of 
value partly through institutional investors exploiting marginal spreads between the closing prices 
on exchanges in one time zone and the opening prices on another as different nodes become 
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 See the critique of informational efficiency by Akerlof (1970) and Grossman & Stiglitz (1990). See also 
Shleifer’s (2000) discussion of strong/weak versions of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
 
54
. The most simple forms of which would be buy/hold/sell recommendations or the ratings agencies’ issuance 
upgrading or downgrading of credit risk, although private analyst reports are far more technical and detailed in 
nature.  
 
55
 Castells suggests Harvey’s arguments about space-time compression provides an ‘adequate’ representation 
of the transformations of capitalism (1996, p. 434). This appears to be an assertion that space-time 
compression is the predominant feature of contemporary economic globalisation, rather than an 
acknowledgement of Harvey’s broader neo-Marxist geography of accumulation crises.  
 
56
 Virilio’s (1977, 1997, 2000, 2005) makes some interesting observations on electronic mediation and 
temporality. One key concept relevant to Castells’ analysis of finance is ‘dromology’; the analysis of how the 
accelerating velocity of social processes alters their ontology. Castells’ notion of timeless time would seem to 
point to precisely such a process. It can certainly be argued that the increased velocity of financial trading and 
information flows changes the nature of financial decision-making and thus alters the way markets behave. 
Graham (2006) makes a parallel argument in regard to the way new communication technologies have 
facilitated the development of ‘hypercapitalism’, notably through accelerating the velocity of information and 
capital flows to the point where the lags of circulation and accumulation are compressed into immediacy.  
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active throughout the day57. However, he also points to another temporal  process involved in the 
creation of financial value that is theoretically more profound as well as more contentious: 
 
‘ [A] significant and growing number of financial transactions are based on making 
value out of the capture of future time in present transactions as in the futures, options 
and other derivative capital markets. […] Together these new financial products 
dramatically increase the mass of nominal capital vis-à-vis bank deposits and assets, 
so that it can be said properly that time creates money, as everybody bets on and with 
future money anticipated in computer projections. […] The very process of marketing 
future developments affects those developments, so that the time frame of capital is 
constantly dissolved into its present manipulation after being given a fictitious value for 
the purpose of monetising it. Thus capital not only compresses time: it absorbs it, and 
lives out of  (that is, generates rent) its digested seconds and years.’ (Castells, 1996, 
p.435- 436). 
 
Castells goes on to note that these temporal imperatives of finance conflict with those of the 
productive economy, suggesting that finance disrupts the possibility of capital investment 
anticipating the future (particularly within the productive economy) and parasitically draws capital 
away from industrial investment. This can disrupt other spheres of social life when the financial 
system is driven by ‘subjective perception and speculative turbulence’ (1996, p.436), leading to 
crisis. 
 
Castells’ arguments identify important processes but invite critical scrutiny. The notion that financial 
value (and money itself) is generated through temporal relations is not especially novel. Credit 
systems which derive returns on investments from interest paid on loans are fundamental to 
capitalism. Indeed, the issuance of debt on the expectation of future repayment underpins the very 
basis upon which money itself is created (Simmel, 1900/1990; Rowbotham, 1998). This does not 
depend on the velocity of financial transactions per se although currency markets have certainly 
been transformed by NCTs and real-time trading. What is missing from Castells’ analysis is an 
account of the symbolic/communicative processes through which monetary relations are constituted 
(see later discussion). The result is that the ontology of money is assumed and thus there is no 
basis for examining how new temporalities/real time velocities transform it. Moreover, the process 
through which NFIs ostensibly create value through the dissolution of the future into the present 
hints at a deeper mystery without adequately explaining it. Several other authors have made related 
observations about temporality and financial value. Barrett’s (1996) neo-Marxist discussion of 
communicative processes and capitalist money forms suggests that new financial instruments 
effectively ‘destroy time’, which in Castells’ terminology means superseding the clock-time of the 
space of places in the search for timeless time through the space of flows wherein accumulation is 
unrestricted by material inertias. However, like Castells, Barrett emphasises the importance of 
communication in terms of the capacity of NCTs to accelerate the velocity of capital flows and 
accumulation.  
 
Pryke & Allen’s (2000) cultural economic take on derivatives adapts Simmel’s (1990) socio-cultural 
analysis of money and Virilio’s arguments about the speed and temporality (see Virilio, 1997, 2000). 
They propose the idea of ‘monetised space-time imaginaries’, emphasising the role of economic 
ideas and performative calculation in manifesting temporal abstractions in securitised form to yield 
value. In other words there is a codification process underpinning the inscribing of time and financial 
value in abstract relations in order to render them valid as securities.  Bryan & Rafferty’s (2006) 
extensive discussion of derivatives identifies a ‘binding’ function that creates relations between 
current and future prices. Futures trading performatively crystallise future prices in present frames 
of reference in what Bryan & Rafferty (2006) term the ‘binding’ function of derivatives. Although 
price expectations signalled through derivatives can be erroneous, the trade of standardised futures 
(e.g. for commodities such as oil) on exchanges may shape market expectations of the future value 
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 Global financial institutions such as the major investment banks which trade around the clock ‘pass the 
books’ between trading rooms as exchanges open and close. Rather like a relay race, one zone helps prepare 
those in the next to commence trading seamlessly from the moment their trading day commences.  
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of the underlying assets58. Bryan & Rafferty’s analysis of ‘binding’ is more analytically complete than 
Pryke & Allen’s ‘imaginaries’, but  the latter’s emphasis on symbolic processes is important: 
Ontologically speaking, intersubjective codifications and the performative alignment of trading 
decisions with the models of risk/value calculation are what bind current and future prices, not 
merely an increase in the physical velocity of information and capital flows. This is precisely what is 
left unexplained in Castells’ account.  Specifically, Castells appears to assume that timeless time is 
attained through passing a threshold of real-time velocity (which is still a material process of 
overcoming spatial limitations through acceleration), enabling the absorption of future values into 
the present. However, even quite basic financial activities such as the issuance of credit or the 
trading of bonds and company stocks have always entailed calculations of future prices. This feeds 
investor expectations back into current pricing models (see Golding, 2003). Thus the creation of 
fictitious values through instruments that denote the future prices of other underlying securities is 
not a direct function of velocity but an outcome of the reflexive mediation of market opinion and 
performative semioisis (see chapter 8).  
 
It is helpful here to differentiate between three different notions of velocity and temporality related to 
economics/finance: 
 
1. Physical velocity/temporality is the time required to complete a movement, action or 
informational transmission across space; hence market news and transactions/ trading orders 
can be transmitted faster electronically than via physical mail.  
2. Accumulation velocity/temporality concerns the periodicity entailed in making a capital 
investment and realising a surplus on that investment. Thus the industrial circuits (M-C-M’) are 
subject to material inertias (e.g. the limitations of necessary labour time and the lags involved in 
the construction and transportation of commodities prior to sale), whereas the financial circuits 
(M-M’) potentially allow near-instantaneous returns (or losses) if market prices move favourably 
(this is akin to Marx’s [1996] ‘circulation time’ or Harvey’s [1999] ‘space-time compression’). 
3. Symbolic velocity/temporality can be understood in terms of the (re)presentations of time and 
periodicity and the construction of economic relations (and potential value) through future 
denotations of financial prices and (contingent) obligations for future payment. This would 
include both public expressions of market expectations in the form of analysts’ forecasts/ 
recommendations or credit ratings (which feed back into investment calculations with a potential 
for self-fulfilment) or trading in derivative forwards/ futures which allow contractual 
predetermination of future prices in the present and signal those expectations to other 
investors.  
 
These three conceptions of velocity/ temporality are not mutually exclusive and do overlap; hence 
symbolic velocity/temporality plays a role in accumulation velocity/temporality and stems in part 
from advances in physical velocity (see later discussion of spatio-temporal fixes). However, in 
regard to finance, formulations such as timeless time cannot be understood in terms of physical 
velocity/temporality without reference to the symbolic codification of time and financial value. This 
leads to another issue of contention regarding timeless time:  Financial capitalism’s crisis tendency 
is duly noted but Castells does not explain the origins of its contradictions. The tension between 
finance capital in the space of flows and industrial capital in  space of places is emphasised, but this 
suggests the former escapes the confines of the latter through its attainment of timeless time. 
Hope’s (2002, 2006) work on capitalism and real time is instructive here: His critique of the timeless 
time formulation shows the impossibility of a teleological final accomplishment through which capital 
transcends all its spatial and temporal limitations. Such s financial nirvana is unattainable because 
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  Arshanapalli & Doukas (1997) note that prices denoted in derivatives futures contracts can drive current 
‘spot’ prices involving the trade of the denoted securities This study examined price movements in the S&P500 
index during the crash in 1987. Cross-index arbitrage trading between S&P futures contracts and spot prices 
(i.e. exploiting any spread between stock values that must logically converge in the future) drove the prices 
towards convergence. What is interesting here is that Arshanapalli and Doukas found that the futures prices 
were primarily shaping the spot prices; i.e. the present was being shaped to conform to models of the future. 
(See also Pryke & Allan, 2000; Bryan & Rafferty, 2006). Several interviewees noted that futures derivatives 
could have an effect on the prices of the underlying security because of hedging practices and the need for the 
exposed counterpary to cover ‘short’ positions if prices moved.  
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of the finite and cyclical nature of accumulation both within the industrial and the financial circuits. 
Boom-bust cycles occur in both and in most cases, financial values are indexed at some level of 
abstraction to industrial production and consumption. Hope (2002) argues that Castells has 
mythologized the notion of timeless time and in doing so, overlooked an important tension between 
industrial production and financial markets: 
 
‘Dominant fractions of capital operate against temporal limits. Thus, the extraction of 
monetised profit from the circulation of capital cannot be indefinitely sustained […] 
Sooner or later some profit must be reinvested in raw materials, plant, machinery and 
human capital. […] Capitalism as a whole is torn between conflicting temporalities. The 
prevalent, hyperspeed time of finance capital is at odds with the strategic outlook of 
large-scale production. It is therefore absurd to suggest that capital in general can 
escape from time. Under global capitalism, temporal conflict is a defining feature of 
investment and business operations.’ (Hope, 2002, no page).  
 
Thus for Hope (2002, 2006), the temporal imperatives of finance are increasingly extended into the 
productive economy even as the productive economy remains an important basis for the generation 
of financial values (see also Graham, 2006). This tension suggests a shifting interdependence 
between the two that precludes any final autonomy of finance, but conflicts arise as the financial 
system’s codifications of temporality seek to subordinate those of other social spheres to render 
them amenable to accumulation. Interestingly, in subsequent work, Castells refers to financial 
markets as an ‘automaton’ (Castells 2000; see also Bell, 2007). This suggests that the operations of 
global finance in the space of flows means that finance is increasingly free to pursue its own 
imperatives independently of state, the industrial economy and civil society.  In some respects, 
Castells’ recognition of a tension between the networks of timeless time and the clock time of 
material space is compatible with Hope’s contention. Both identify similar tendencies in terms of the 
emergence of a financial temporality in tension with industrial clock time, but their respective 
approaches place them on opposite sides of an argument concerning the embeddedness of finance 
and the financial markets’ relation to other spheres of social action to become increasingly 
autopoietic.  
 
The contention that financial markets have become increasingly differentiated from other social 
systems as their symbolic/ informational nature allows them to transcend material limitations may 
seem incompatible with the recognition of the symbolic/informational aspects of  financial markets 
insofar as this implies that they have become increasingly (re)embedded in social-cultural relations. 
However, as Jessop (2001a, 2001b) points out, there are different conceptions of embeddedness59 
and these positions need  not entail contradiction. The recognition that there is a normative and 
communicative dimension in any kind of market (i.e. the intersubjective codifications required to 
coordinate the meaning attributed to transactions) does not necessitate acceptance that, on a social 
system level, the financial system is embedded in the cultural sphere. All arenas of social activity 
entail sets of intersubjective codification which underpin their respective modes/ channels of 
meaningful action and institutional subjectivities/practices. The arguments about differentiation and 
embedding on a broader social level (see, for example, Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1985; Callon, 
1998; Jessop, 2001a; Sparks, 2007) concern the extent to which the prevailing sets of codifications 
demarcating different social spheres can be considered to be ‘entangled’ and interdependent. 
Financial markets necessarily have a political and cultural dimension, but this is by no means a 
contemporary development (although there have been changes in financial regulation and culture 
since the 1970s). Therefore acknowledging the social-cultural dimension of financial markets is an 
analytically distinct proposition from making claims about their relative embeddedness or 
differentiation in terms of  systemic/structural relations to industry, state, or civil society. These 
issues will be discussed further in the following section concerning the financial system’s potential 
for autopoiesis.  
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 Jessop differentiates between economic embeddedness on three levels: interpersonal relations among 
actors, inter-institutional networks, and social system, although these may vary across space and time. He also 
points out, following Polanyi  (1957), that the recognition of market embedding in other social systems is 
compatible with an autopoietic tendency. 
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Chapter 5:  Financial Autopoiesis, Code and Reflexivity 
 
One of the thematic concerns emerging in the preceding discussion of globalisation concerns the 
reconfiguration of relations among state, capital and civil society, and also the relation between 
financial markets and the industrial economy. As Held et al. (1999) have suggested: ‘The enormous 
diversity of financial products traded and the complexity of new financial instruments reflect a 
fundamental shift towards an autonomous global financial market in which financial activity is largely 
divorced from the requirements of trade, that is, the exchange of goods and services.’ (p. 221, 
emphasis added). This section will examine the arguments concerning the degree to which financial 
markets might be considered to have become decoupled from other social spheres and also 
highlight the communicative and reflexive processes this would entail. 
 
Autopoiesis is a biological concept developed by Maturana & Varela (1980) to explain self-
reproducing organisms. Although the originators of the concept have expressed scepticism about 
its applicability to social phenomena (Hernes & Bakken, 2003), it has been adapted by several 
social theorists (notably Luhmann, 1995 and Jessop, 2001a, 2002b) to explain how social 
(sub)systems become differentiated and capable of reproducing themselves through endogenous 
processes. Generally speaking, where a system generates the conditions sufficient for its own 
reproduction without dependence on other inputs from other systems, autopoiesis is considered to 
have occurred. However, both Luhmann and Jessop point out that this does not necessarily imply 
radical disembedding or systemic closure60 in the sense of having no interaction with the other 
systems that comprise the broader social environment. Jessop’s (2001a, 2001b)  perspective on 
autopoiesis draws on the regulation school approach to analysing accumulation/governance 
regimes, but  also Polanyi’s (1957) analysis of historical economic differentiation. Polanyi points to 
the economic system’s propensity to become differentiated from other spheres of society in modern 
industrial society, but points out that economic differentiation does not necessarily entail 
disembedding. However, the embeddedness of the economic system is not necessarily reciprocal 
or symmetrical: In modern industrial society, economic activity becomes differentiated from 
traditional social relations but remains embedded in a ‘market society’ configured to accommodate 
the imperatives of accumulation (see Dobbin, 2004). As Jessop points out, this means non-
economic institutional arrangements are required to stabilise accumulation regimes61.  
 
For Jessop,  autopoietic systems are ‘self-constituting, self-organising and self-reproducing’ but  
they also ‘co-exist and co-evolve in complex ways with other systems with which they are 
reciprocally interdependent’ (2001a, p. 217). He explains ‘self-constituting’ in terms of endogenous 
boundary definition (consistent with Luhmann, 2005), and ‘self-organising’ in terms of distinct 
operational codes and programmes. Thus while autopoietic systems do respond to other systems 
which constitute their environment, they do so according to their own endogenous system 
codifications. Insofar as system reproduction requires exogenous inputs, these are co-opted from 
other systems upon which those codifications are imposed. In that sense, the capitalist economic 
system’s embedding in other social subsystems occurs primarily through the extension of its own 
imperatives to other social subsystems while resisting external interventions is characteristic of its 
autopoietic tendency. Accordingly, Jessop notes that the capitalist economic system can be ‘self-
valorising’ (especially in regard to the generation of exchange value) it nevertheless depends on 
regulatory steering from the state and labour power (and consumption) from the lifeworld (2001a, 
2001b). However, the economic system’s autopoiesis means that its internal imperatives can be 
                                                 
60
 In traditional systems theory, cybernetic systems are open to feedback from their environments to maintain 
homeostasis/equilibrium. When the feedback meets the criteria of the system’s internal set points, indicating 
that homeostasis is threatened, the system’s behaviour is modified so as to enable its relation to its 
environment to be maintained. A simple mechanistic example of  a cybernetic system is a heater with a 
thermostat. A heater with no thermostat is a closed system because it cannot modify its function in response to 
feedback from its environment. 
 
61
 Polanyi suggests a ‘double movement’ here whereby the social system attempts to compensate for 
disruptions arising from the economic system’s increasingly autonomous operation in line with its own internal 
imperatives. The ‘double movement’ means that the social system’s efforts to re-embed itself and exert 
controls on market forces produce a society primarily geared to the accommodation of economic imperatives.  
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insensitive to impacts on other systems unless its codifications demarcate these as meaningful. 
However, tensions/ contradictions between the economic system and the political system or 
lifeworld  can destabilise the accumulation regime and lead to a reconfiguration of their relations 
(see Sassen’s [2006] notion of ‘tipping points’). As Jessop observes, ‘the superior dynamism and 
reach of a globalising capitalist economy may cause more problems substantively for other systems 
than they cause for it […] Other systems adjust more to the logic of accumulation than the capitalist 
economy incurs in adjusting to them’ (2001a, p.219).  
 
Jessop (2001a) identifies four inter-related vectors along which the capitalist economic system is 
able to extend its codifications to other subsystems:  
1) The process of commodification extends exchange relations to goods and services in the 
lifeworld such as health and education (see also Hassan, 1999). 
2)  A ‘secondary economic coding’ whereby the logic of commercial efficiency, 
competitiveness and profitability comes to shape decision-making and operational practices 
in non-commercial institutions (particularly under neoliberal ideology) 
3) The structural coupling of subsystems to globalised capitalist markets such that they exhibit 
an ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ in their embeddedness in the economic subsystem.  
4) The hegemonic primacy of accumulation and competition as a norm across all spheres of 
society  and legitimation of structural adjustment of non-economic subsystems as 
necessary to serve economic imperatives  
 
Although he bases his arguments on a more nuanced institutionally-contextual perspective62, 
Jessop (2001a, 2001b) emphasises the indispensability of a (neo-)Marxist perspective to the 
analysis of systemic contradictions in the capital accumulation circuits. These include; a) the 
‘constitutive incompleteness’ of the circuit of capital (i.e. dependence on processes in non-
economic spheres to realise surplus value and ensure capital reproduction), b) the endogenous 
structural tensions that emerge within specific accumulation regimes (i.e. overaccumulation and 
diminishing returns as well as the inability to realise surplus value on commodities as capital pushes 
down the costs of labour and reduces potential demand), and c) conflicts over the management/ 
governance of these contradictions and the negotiation of supra-national institutional formations to 
stabilise accumulation regimes.  
 
The issues surrounding the globalisation of finance and accumulation regimes will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. However, it is interesting to note that Jessop’s discussion of 
economic autopoiesis does not differentiate between the industrial M-C-M’ circuit and the financial 
M-M’ circuit. Although autopoietic tendencies may be exhibited in both, they are embedded 
somewhat differently, and indeed, it could be argued that just as the global economy as a whole 
exhibits an autopoietic tendency in relation to state and civil society (at least in capitalist economies 
that have embraced neoliberalism, willingly or otherwise), this is accentuated in the case of the 
financial system itself which shows signs of an increasingly tangential relation to industrial capital. 
For example, the expansion of financial market activity and stock market values out of proportion to 
growth in the industrial economy and company earnings (Shiller, 2000) raises significant questions 
about whether the neoclassical assumption that financial activity is ultimately embedded in and 
reflective of the industrial economy needs to be inverted. Meanwhile, Jessop’s recognition of 
system codes is useful, but the communicative processes underpinning this are not made explicit in 
his account63. 
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 Jessop (2001a) suggests that the efforts of the political system and lifeworld to avoid being subsumed by the 
economy are ultimately incompatible with the market system, and cannot fully reassert their own priorities 
without undermining capital accumulation. Economic autopoiesis is not a final teleological accomplishment.   
 
63
 Note also that Parsons (1951), Luhmann (1995) and Habermas (1998, 1989) all recognise the importance of 
communication processes in social systems, but they conceive of communication in rather different ways. 
Parsons suggests that that each subsystem has its own ‘language’. Rather like Galtung’s (1999) idea of 
system ‘logics’ it is used to refer to the channels and modalities of social action distinct to each arena. The 
limitation of conceiving social action primarily in linguistic or discursive terms is that where meaningful social 
interaction takes place in non-linguistic modes, it  becomes difficult to maintain analytic consistency without 
imposing non-literal language metaphors. Luhmann also emphasises communication and codification in his 
social systems approach, but as Hernes & Bakken (2003) point out, he separates out social systems from 
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Although  functional systems analysis is not the approach adopted in this thesis, and Luhmann 
(1995) wrote relatively little on finance, Hessing and Pahl’s (2006) analysis of how global finance 
might be understood in terms of subsystem boundaries and autopoiesis suggests several 
applications of Luhmann’s framework that deserve consideration. They point to shifts in the 
mediating forms between the financial subsystem and other social subsystems, particularly in 
regard to credit systems. Here they suggest that the development of new financial instruments and 
deregulation of the banking system has led to a ‘broad shift from the intermediated creation of credit 
toward a new world of disintermediated global finance’ (2006, p.197, original emphasis), and also a 
shift in the locus of financial regulation from the boundaries of the political and economic 
subsystems into the economic subsystem itself.  Hessing & Pahl point out that Parsons’ and 
Luhmann’s approaches both understood social systems to be differentiated in terms of their primary 
forms of mediation/ languages of action. They suggest that relations between subsystems is never 
causal, but (following Luhmann), ‘structurally coupled’ in such a way that the operations of one 
system are articulated with but never directly cause effects in other systems. Thus political policies 
may affect economic behaviour, but the mode/form of that effect remains political (e.g. 
laws/regulations) and its manifestation in the economic arena will be in the form of responses in 
trading behaviour and prices. They also point out (again following Luhmann) that social systems 
arise from ‘global communication complexes’ (2006, p.205) and have an inherently globalizing 
tendency to extend their logics into other social spaces across geopolitical or cultural boundaries.   
 
Four emergent issues need to be mentioned here: Firstly, the notion that each subsystem has a 
unique mode of social action which cannot be directly expressed through other spheres seems 
problematic when one considers that the use of money is common to virtually all social systems and 
institutions, although the ways and ends to which it is deployed may vary significantly between 
spheres (see Zelizer, 1994, Singh, 2001; also see later discussion of monetary forms). Even within 
Marx’s circuit of industrial accumulation (M-C-M’) the investment of money in the production of 
commodities for the purpose of exchange value can only be fully realised when those commodities 
are purchased for the purpose of use-value consumption (C-M-C). Thus economic action mediated 
through money operates within the broader sets of codifications within both the sphere of capital 
and civil society/ lifeworld, but it does so according to different modalities of agency. From the 
perspective of this thesis, intersubjective codifications can be understood to demarcate the 
boundaries of different spheres of social activity, but the particular modalities and channels of action 
are manifold and not rigidly exclusive. However, the recognition of system permeability or porosity 
allows for the possibility of the codifications and logics of one social sphere  being extended non-
reciprocally into others. Secondly, the notion of global communication complexes that underpin the 
extension of subsystem logics would appear to presuppose, not preclude the permeability of 
subsystems. Moreover, the positing of a global communication complex begs the question of how it 
became global and which subsystems (and institutional agencies) are the key drivers of such a 
formation64. Thirdly, the idea that subsystems have an inherent tendency to extend their logics may 
be true where specific institutional agencies work towards achieving such an end, as in the case of 
finance capital but there are many instances of subsystems (such as local cultural formations) 
which have no such need or aspiration. Fourthly, the asymmetrical or non-reciprocal extension of 
one subsystem’s codifications into another does not necessarily presuppose that the channels and 
modalities of action in the former directly supplant those of the colonised system. Hence the logic of 
exchanging labour for wages in order to buy the goods one needs (akin to C-M-C) can be 
accommodated within the industrial accumulation circuit (M-C-M’) just as borrowing money to buy a 
house to live in can be accommodated within the financial accumulation circuit (M-M’). However, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
psychic systems. This complicates the conception of communication and meaning within social systems by 
bracketing off human cognition. Luhmann’s notion of ‘structural coupling’ and assertion of a recursive relation 
between structure and subject resembles Gidden’s (1984) structuration, but falls back on a dualistic conception 
of system as both environment and outcome of social action. For these reasons, Luhmann’s broader approach 
is not easily reconciled with the framework of intersubjective codifications being developed in this thesis, but 
his perspective on autopoiesis offers some interesting insights and will be considered further in due course.  
 
64
 This is also where Luhmann’s notion of communication/mediation among social systems becomes quite 
complicated, and it is not clear whether the notion of a global communication complex involves actual media 
institutions and infrastructures  or whether this is a more generic conception of social systems.  
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subordinate subsystem’s codifications may be circumscribed or modified where they conflict with 
the codifications of the dominant sphere. Thus monetarist economics has required ideological 
legitimation/ accommodation of the employment uncertainties and reductions in welfare required to 
facilitate the mobility of global capital.  
 
Informational Reflexivity and Autopoiesis 
 
Hessing and Pahl’s (2006) extension of social systems theory to global finance provides some 
important insights into the financial system’s potential for autopoiesis. They suggest a need for 
empirical operationalisation and investigation of autopoiesis, specifically indications of self-
referentiality and positive feedback loops in the financial system. This is, of course, precisely the 
empirical focus this thesis is seeking to explore. Accordingly, Hessing & Pahl identify several ways 
in which such a proposition might be validated. Firstly, citing the ethnographic work of Knorr-Cetina 
and Bruegger (2001, 2002a, 2002b), they point out that financial trading practices are spatially 
embedded in a specialist microculture that is globally extended and mediated through electronic 
networks. Trading screens are conceived as an embodiment of the financial system through which 
social complexities and ambiguities are reduced to data presentations intelligible to the actors in 
that system. This account of financial activity can be transcoded in terms of the intersubjective 
codifications that enable the coordination of meanings and financial transactions across the global 
network of investment actors. The trading screens are both a channel of financial action and a 
manifestation of the schemata, models and cognitive processes implicit in the codifications. Insofar 
as these constitute institutional reality for financial actors but remain esoteric to most actors in non-
financial spheres, the networks of trading rooms and exchanges and the symmetry of real-time data 
flows across the screens are indicative of a discrete self-contained subsystem.  
 
Secondly, Hessing & Pahl note the use of technical modelling as a guide to investment, that is, 
basing trading decisions upon historical cycles of price movements on the inductive premise that 
recurrent patterns of financial values will tend to repeat themselves. Although this is a common 
practice within finance65, the point here is that the historical price movements are themselves a 
product of financial market activity and thus the technical charts are at least partially indexed to 
phenomena endogenous to the financial system. Thirdly, citing MacKenzie (2002, 2003a, 2003b; 
see also Mackenzie & Millo, 2003), Hessing and Pahl note the ubiquity of particular models and 
systems of calculation (such as the Black Scholes equation for pricing derivatives options) and the 
potential for such models to performatively render market prices compatible with the calculations 
(which is also a potential form of self-reference with technical trading from charts). The potential for 
self-fulfilling prophecy here stems from the way in which prevailing financial epistemologies produce 
a convergence in investor perceptions and expectations (although such phenomena require more 
detailed consideration of how financial media actually operate). Transcoded, both technical trading 
and the proliferation of particular investment models and theories can be understood in terms in the 
increasing coherence of the intersubjective codifications underpinning financial practices. Making 
sense of an ephemeral world of complex and dense data in a manner that allows market meanings 
to be coordinated requires validation by other market actors. Fourthly, Hessing and Pahl point to the 
way in which accounting practices (and more broadly, governance regimes for financial reporting) 
require the deployment of globally standardised forms of information disclosure and thereby 
encourage businesses and investment firms to adopt increasingly similar forms of operation (see 
also Sklair, 2001; Sassen, 2006). Transcoded, this entails the incorporation of the accounting 
system criteria into the practices of companies, rendering the financial system’s codifications salient 
to the industrial economy. Indeed, Hessing & Pahl note that businesses have become increasingly 
sensitised to how their performance is evaluated by financial investors (hence the rise in 
prominence of the corporate Chief Financial Officer since the stock market booms and busts of the 
1980s).  
 
                                                 
65
 For example, some traders follow the technical charts very closely and trust them implicitly while others view 
them as a way of removing human emotion from trading decisions or use them in combination with market 
fundamentals to help them time their entry in and out of market positions. Some use technical charts to gauge 
long-term trends but not for short-term fluctuations. Others regard the charts with a strong degree of scepticism 
and consider their theoretical validity suspect. (respondents #15, #16, #17, #26, #27), 
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Leydersdorff’s (2007) analysis of the sociology of epistemology and cognitive codification offers 
further insights into how domains of knowledge become differentiated and demarcated (see also 
Graham, 2006). Although he does not analyse financial knowledge and investment behaviour in 
detail, the notion that epistemic domains are demarcated through communicative codification has a 
close parallel with the position being developed in this thesis in respect to autopoiesis. Citing the 
Husserlian conception of ‘horizons of meaning’ that emerge from intersubjective communication and 
Luhmann’s conception of social systems, Leydersdorff argues that the cognitive dimension of 
knowledge structures cannot conceived as being constitutive of social structure except in terms of 
reflexive/recursive processes. He also points out that, ‘using the concept of autopoiesis, 
differentiation can be considered as an endogenous result of the codification of communication’ 
(2007, p.381, emphasis added). The notion that social codifications demarcate the boundaries of 
shared meaning within an arena/ domain of social action lends itself very usefully to the theoretical 
framework being developed in this thesis.  
 
The analytic value of intersubjectivity as a theoretical concept is that it allows an account of the 
regularities and coordination of intentions, actions and meanings among actors without the need to 
posit metaphysical social structures/forces with an ontology independent from those agents. 
Intersubjective codifications demarcate a the boundaries of particular social system in which  
particular forms of social action are meaningful. The codifications of financial investment reflexively 
incorporate models of the market behaviour exhibited by investors whose actions are based on 
those codifications. However, this implicit /performative reflexivity is never seamless or complete 
and the codifications can evolve over time. Indeed, as Mackenzie (2003a, 2003b) and Hessing & 
Pahl (2006) observe, models of economic activity  may lead to performative modification of  the 
actions being modelled. Consequently, even though codifications may reflexively include an 
account of their own processes, they never provide a perfect model of themselves. Indeed, as the 
efforts of market actors to develop more complete accounts of their own arena leads to adoption of 
newer, and more sophisticated models, the very market behaviour being explained may change 
(which is a key reason why efforts to regulate markets often generate new complexities and risks).  
 
Hernes & Bakken (2003) also offer an interesting angle on autopoiesis and reflexivity. They discuss 
Luhmann’s (1995) conception of autopoiesis in relation to three approaches to social theory; 
equilibrium (structuralism/ functionalism), process-based (social action theories) and recursive 
(notably structuration). They suggest Luhmann’s autopoietic theory’s emphasis on communicative 
processes at a social level means that it continues to rely on an objectivist conception of social 
structure. In contrast to Parsons and Luhman but consistent with Leydersdorff, Hernes and Bakken 
argue that autopoiesis needs to be based on a recursive approach (such as Giddens’  structuration) 
that can link structure and process. Moreover, they suggest that  communication plays an important 
role in recursive processes and needs to be understood as more than information transfer;  
 
‘[C]ommunication happens essentially through a process in which a system […] 
interacts recursively with itself, as new information only makes sense in relation to the 
structures created by previous information gathering. The effects of such thinking are 
far reaching in that it replaces dichotomous relationships between stable entities with 
recursive processes within the entities themselves.’ (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p.1513).  
 
Hernes and Bakken therefore recognise that social action and information need to be codified for it 
to be meaningful, and that communicative processes can modify those codifications. They also 
recognise that communicative reflexivity is a central feature of self-reproducing systems (see also 
Stalder’s [1997b] and Knorr-Cetina’s [2005] discussion of self-referential financial networks). This is 
consistent with the contention of this thesis that intersubjective codifications demarcate domains of 
social action and that communicative reflexivity is a key process in autopoiesis. 
 
Interestingly, these arguments were anticipated by Stalder (1997b; see also 1997a, 2001) who 
suggests that NCTs have intensified the self-referentiality of financial information networks and 
decoupled markets from other social/ economic systems. He contends that new media technologies 
have reconstituted the nature of the financial market system such that its relation to other social 
subsystems (including the material economy) has become disembedded : 
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‘Financial networks provide their own complete environment. They are content and 
context at the same time. The surrounding larger social and economic environment is 
structurally separated and its relevance […] is assessed regarding whether it has the 
ability to invade the closed universe of the financial market. […] As a complete 
environment the (financial) networks are fully self referential’ (1997a, p.12).  
 
Thus the identification of self-referential feedback loops in the formation of a network may indicate a 
tendency for systemic closure or autopoiesis. However, insofar as the ‘content’ dimension of the 
network (i.e. flows of information and money) does respond to events and processes extraneous to 
the financial system (for example, oil price fluctuations in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war affected 
currency markets) it is premature to characterise financial markets as completely closed and self-
referential. Nevertheless, Stalder’s suggestion that informational self-referentiality and feedback 
loops could be regarded as an index of autopoietic tendency within the financial system is 
significant. However, this requires further consideration of the nature of autopoiesis and the way 
financial media and information are used by investors. On that point, Stalder (1997b) also notes that 
financial media facilitate real time monitoring of market activity and trading responses such that the 
discreteness of investor actions and reactions feeding into each other becomes a flow driven by a 
‘constant presence’ 66(see also Knorr-Cetina 2005).   
 
Communicative reflexivity is also a feature of Graham’s (2006) work on ‘Hypercapitalism’, although 
his linguistic emphasis differs from the framework being developed in this thesis. He usefully argues 
that an autopoietic perspective on social systems can help to foreground meaning, mediation and 
modes of systemic reproduction. Macro-social systems emerge from micro-level social actions and 
institutional forms and can be self-reproducing and coordinated through language67. Citing 
Maturana & Varela (1990), Graham identifies four reasons for emphasising autopoietic processes 
(2006, p.59): It can help emphasise social continuities as well as changes; it recognises that 
‘systemic cognitions’ (i.e. conscious social codes) demarcate social systems; it foregrounds 
relations among social systems; and it recognises that the potential for autopoiesis arises in a 
network of those social systems coordinated through language (i.e. shared systems of meanings). 
Graham regards capitalist markets as consuming or expropriating the foundations of social life 
through the commodification of language-based forms such as knowledge: ‘The move to commodify 
the creations of language-understandings, relationships, values- is therefore the most thorough 
expression of capital’ (2006, p.60). Importantly, he affords media systems a key role in providing the 
vectors through which the values and norms of the market system are extended into the lifeworld.  
 
‘ Today’s new media conflate the processes of production, exchange and distribution 
of self-valorizing language an d thought within a domain on globally interconnected 
‘things’. Alongside this self-valorizing system of knowledge commodities is its arbiter, 
partner and facilitator- the system of symbolic values that constitute the globalised 
system on monetary exchange.’ (2006, p.81). 
 
Graham also notes that language and media help form the boundary conditions of different social 
systems, demarcating what is within or without that system and suggests that information 
technologies have altered the nature of interaction and therefore system reproduction. He goes on 
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 Stalder also points to the need for ‘reliability’ in an increasingly complex and anonymous environment where 
information flows (both news and financial transactions) need to be processed rapidly, noting that this requires 
the ‘structural separation’ of the financial network from other environments. The continuing efficiency of the 
financial network depends upon investors having the confidence that the information on trading screens can be 
taken at ‘face value’, and that a condition of network membership is being able to provide information with that 
reliability.  
 
67
 Although Graham’s notion of social and economic action recognises the importance of coordinating the 
generation of meaning, his analysis argues that this depends on language and specifically linguistic processes, 
and that the linguistic dimension of the economy arises once knowledge becomes a primary commodity. In 
contrast, the intersubjective codification framework takes a broader conception of symbolic exchange and 
regards the communicative dimension of economic exchange as fundamental to all forms of economic/ 
financial activity. What is unprecedented is not the symbolic dimension of the economy, but the complexity of 
codifications underpinning the extensity, intensity and velocity of finance capital activity.  
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to suggest that the degree and periodicity of a system’s autopoiesis is largely dependent on the 
kinds of technologies deployed in its reproduction (for example, the use of timekeeping as a way of 
quantifying and commodifying labour time helps extend capitalist imperatives into the lifeworld). 
Graham points to the autopoietic reproduction/accumulation of capital value through language. 
Under hypercapitalism, the distinctions between different forms of production/ accumulation have 
become blurred ‘because of their intimate involvement with language and thought’ (2006, p.84) 
such that fictitious exchange values have ‘distorted’ value based on social utility (i.e. use values)68.  
 
Another theme concerning financial embeddedness and autopoiesis stems from Knorr-Cetina 
(2005). New financial information systems have produced a shift from ‘network architecture’, 
wherein investment practices are embedded in the social relations among market actors dealing 
directly with each other (e.g. traditional trading pits) to ‘flow architecture’, wherein market actors 
operate through electronic brokerage screens which disembed trading activity from social 
relations69. Interestingly, Sassen (2005) also comments on flows, noting that electronic trading, 
financial innovations and new forms of securitization ‘lengthen the distance between the financial 
instrument and the underlying asset’ (Sassen 2005, p.22).  Knorr- Cetina’s and Sassen’s arguments 
about flows both point to a further issue: If the relation of financial markets to the industrial economy 
and lifeworld is subject to multiple layers of social and technological mediation entailing increasing 
degrees of theoretical abstraction, it becomes possible for prices to be driven by epiphenomenal 
screen data and performative calculations that are endogenous to the financial sphere and have no 
external referent. Communicative reflexivity in financial markets (e.g. self-fulfilling prophecies driving 
bubbles and crashes) is not a novel problem, but becomes more probable when complex mediation 
processes are involved. These tendencies will be explored further in chapter 8, but this underlines 
the significance of abstract mediation and reflexivity for financial autopoiesis.   
 
Asserting that financial processes are embedded in some form of relations with other social 
arenas/subsystems does not necessarily preclude the simultaneous assertion of autopoiesis. The 
globalisation of financial markets has entailed, to different degrees, the accommodation of its 
codifications and operational priorities by state, civil society and the industrial economy. In this 
regard, embeddedness that entails the non-reciprocal/asymmetrical  extension of one system’s 
codifications upon another may be considered autopoietic. The financialization of the economy 
(obliging companies to optimise profits for shareholders), the de/reregulation of financial activity to 
allow free flows of transborder capital and the consequent pressure on governments to limit 
expenditure and borrowing (and cut back public services and welfare) would all be consistent with 
non-reciprocal embedding on the terms of global capital. At the same time, the financial system can 
be operationally indifferent to the impacts that the increasing extensity, velocity and intensity of its 
flows have on state and lifeworld. In this regard it might be regarded as a closed system which is 
not sensitive to negative feedback from other systems. In other words, the markets do not ascribe 
meaning to many of the non-financial consequences of their own operation, particularly if these are 
locally manifested and pose no systemic threat to market stability. Although autopoiesis is never an 
absolute condition or teleological accomplishment, evidence of self-referentiality in the 
intersubjective codifications underpinning investment practices and/or evidence of their 
desensitisation to conditions in other social systems would be indicative of autopoietic tendency. 
Indeed, informational reflexivity within the financial system may well be a precursor (or catalyst) of 
bubbles or crashes. However, to provide a more complete account of financial globalisation and 
autopoiesis, consideration of how capital accumulation regimes have developed in response to 
various crises of accumulation is needed. This is the focus of the subsequent chapter.  
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 Graham makes a good point, but overstates the linguistic nature of these processes and the extent to which 
the symbolic dimension of markets and the role this plays in autopoietic or colonising tendency is a 
contemporary phenomenon. 
 
69
 Although flow architecture may include networks, the network market does not define the structuring 
principle of a flow market. ‘I use the notion  of a flow in this context to specify a secondary discontinuity, that 
between the spatial or physical world we usually conceive of, and that of a timeworld’ (Knorr-Cetina,2005, 
p.39). Note that the social relationships she refers do not denote the lifeworld as a separate sphere of social 
activity, but the lifeworld within the financial system itself (see Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger, 2001, 2002a). Thus 
she seems to be suggesting a form of secondary financial disembedding, even from the socio-cultural relations 
among market actors.   
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Chapter 6: Global capitalism and financial accumulation 
regimes 
 
Providing an account of contemporary financial globalisation requires a close examination of the 
processes of financial accumulation, particularly the symbolic formation of financial values. From 
the preceding chapters, it is apparent that globalisation is not a monolithic, uniform process. 
Nevertheless, the reconfiguration of relations among state, capital and civil society is a definitive 
theme, and changes in economic/financial activity at an supranational level are evidently a key 
(albeit not the only) explanatory factor. The globalisation of financial activity requires contextual 
consideration of the spatial and temporal imperatives of capital accumulation as manifested through 
a range of evolving institutional formations, regulatory/governance arrangements and modalities of 
social action. Although the theoretical framework being developed here seeks to move beyond 
classical Marxist political economy, the analyses of Marx and successive theorists of capital and 
accumulation nevertheless provide the foundation for understanding the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of economic/financial activity. In particular, the Marxist conception of the industrial and 
financial accumulation circuits (M-C-M’ and M-M’) and the recognition of the propensity for crisis as 
internal contradictions within/between those circuits manifest themselves provides a critical starting 
point for understanding contemporary markets.  
 
Strategies for overcoming this tendency for diminishing returns and crisis have included corporate 
expansion into new markets, the use of new technologies to increase productive efficiency, the 
establishment of new governance regimes, and increasing reliance on financial markets and NFIs to 
generate returns. These attempts to ‘fix’ the contradictions of capital accumulation are not 
monolithic and always involve historically-specific institutional contingencies. For example, the 
expansion of financial market activity since the 1970s stemmed from a nexus of key events, 
pressures and opportunities, including the collapse of Bretton Woods, the OPEC crisis, and 
widespread stagflation in Western industrial economies. The globalisation of financial markets has 
been accommodated by significant changes in regulatory arrangements (notably the shift from 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies to monetarism) and with it the relation of the state not only to 
global capital, but to civil society. Although the expansion of financial market activity in ratio to 
industrial production has helped sustain (fictitious) capital accumulation, it has simultaneously 
increased the risk of systemic market failure. However, these developments cannot be adequately 
explained within a neo-Marxist framework alone. Indeed, the social-cultural and symbolic 
dimensions of finance capital and the role of communication/ information in markets demands a 
conceptual recasting of political-economic relations. Communication processes are central to the 
generation of financial values, both in the sense that financial transactions are themselves a form of 
communicative action, and in the sense that financial media play a critical role in the 
(dys)functioning of markets, including the reflexive processes predisposing them to periodic crisis 
and autopoiesis.  
 
Explaining the drive to secure the free flow of capital and currency stability at the expense of 
government autonomy over domestic spending requires a revised account of Karl Marx’s circuits of 
accumulation (Marx, 1867, 1885, 1894, 1996; see also Leyshon & Thrift, 1997; Kettell, 2006; Bryan 
& Rafferty, 2006). In the second volume of Capital (1894) Marx explains how industrial capitalism 
entails a shift in the dominant mode of production and exchange from the use-value circuit (C-M-C) 
wherein money (M) is used as a medium of equivalence facilitating the exchange of non-equivalent 
commodities (C) that are used to satisfy human needs, to the exchange-value circuit (M-C-M’) 
wherein money is invested in the production of commodities towards the instrumental end of 
realising profits/surplus value (M’). In the third volume of Capital (1894), Marx further develops his 
account of accumulation circuits, particularly in regard to the (often overlooked) money-lender’s 
circuit (M-M’) through which surplus value is realised through interest payments or speculative 
investments in financial securities not directly involving commodity-production and exchange. 
However, this represents a challenge for Marx’s basic framework, since the financial circuit does not 
involve commodities created with labour-value. Indeed, the centrality of the labour theory of value in 
Marx’s work leads to his classification of value created through interest-bearing capital as ‘fictitious’. 
As he remarks in Capital Volume 3, chapter 29, ‘interest-bearing capital, in general, is the 
fountainhead of all manner of insane forms, so that debts, for instance, can appear to the banker as 
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commodities’. Although Marx recognised that the exchange of monetary forms, promissory notes/ 
bills and other financial securities was significant, at the time Das Kapital was being written, the 
scale and centrality of financial markets in the future global economy was not fully apparent70. 
 
Classical Marxist political economy has typically emphasised the macro-structural aspects of 
capital’s predilection for spatial extension and the acceleration of accumulation. Although the 
theoretical abstraction of the accumulation circuits is part of Marx’s structural analysis of capital, 
these are not impersonal macro-forces exerting themselves independently of human agency. 
Rather, they are constituted by institutional drives to optimise and accelerate the generation of 
surplus value. In this regard they can be regarded as historically and institutionally specific forms of 
economic agency. Moreover, by conceiving monetary transactions as symbolic/ communicative 
processes that constitute economic relations, they can be understood in terms of intersubjective 
codifications expressed through the available channels/modalities of economic/financial action. This 
formulation helps to ground structural economic/financial processes in institutional practices and 
specific agencies, and also foreground the symbolic processes entailed in the genesis of 
money/credit and the expansion and annihilation of value in the financial markets. 
 
As Marx’s (1996) analysis anticipated, the sustainability of capital  accumulation is threatened by 
intractable contradictions. Capitalist systems require economic growth in order to extract surplus 
value and perpetuate capital accumulation. Meanwhile, competition among capitalist investors to 
optimise returns on capital investment leads to pressure to secure ever-cheaper labour and 
resources and increasingly efficient methods of production (Marx, 1996; Harvey, 1990). A crucial 
contradiction emerges here: The capitalist’s realisation of surplus value requires that; a) workers be 
paid wages lower than the exchange value of the goods/services they produce, and that; b) these 
goods/services be exchanged for money at prices commensurate with that exchange value. 
However, if the wage-money available for the consumption of goods and services are not equal to 
their exchange value, then some goods and services will remain unsold (unless the capitalist 
wishes to use the extracted surplus value for the purpose of consuming their use-value). In the third 
volume of Capital, Marx (1894) analyses capitalism’s propensity for internal contradiction and crisis 
and the increasing reliance on industrial technology to maximise productive efficiency: As 
technology replaces labour in the production process, less wage money is available for 
consumption (see Luxemburg, 1951/1913; Cox, 2003). Ultimately, the retention of the surplus for 
the purpose of capital reinvestment (especially in the M-M’ circuit which entails no exchange 
involving commodities with use value71) means that the surplus value cannot be fully realised: i.e. 
                                                 
70
 Importantly, as Engels himself remarks in his editorial commentary on the stock  market  in the supplement 
to Volume 3 of Capital, the financial system’s global expansion of the late 19th Century had not been fully 
manifested at the time Marx was writing:  ‘Since 1865, when the book was written, a change has taken place 
which today assigns a considerably increased and constantly growing role to the stock exchange, and which, 
as it develops, tends to concentrate all production, industrial as well as agricultural, and all commerce, the 
means of communication as well as the functions of exchange, in the hands of stock exchange operators, so 
that the stock exchange becomes the most prominent representative of capitalist production itself. […] The 
stock exchange was still a secondary element in the capitalist system. Government bonds represented the 
bulk of exchange securities, and even their sum-total was still relatively small. […] Now it is otherwise. Since 
the crisis of 1866 accumulation has proceeded with ever-increasing rapidity, so that in no industrial country, 
least of all in England, could the expansion of production keep up with that of accumulation, or the 
accumulation of the individual capitalist be completely utilised in the enlargement of his own business. […] In 
order to facilitate the investment of this mass floating around as money-capital, new legal forms of limited 
liability companies were established wherever that had not yet been done, and the liability of the shareholder, 
formerly unlimited was also reduced.’  (Engels, 1894, p.894-5, emphasis in original; See also Hilferding, 
1981/1910; Kautsky, 1911 and Perelman, 1987). 
 
71
 There are three points to consider here: a) the respective concepts of ‘use value’ associated with exchange 
in the M-C-M’ and M-M’ circuits are different (Keen, 2001); b) if one accepts that there are use-values 
embedded in the codifications constituting the financial circuit, this is relative to the capacity of the M-M’ circuit 
to realise exchange value; and c) the goods and services bound up in the exchange of monetary forms and 
fictitious securities through the M-M’ circuit have no use value as ends in their own right; they are only a means 
to the instrumental end of maximising accumulation and realising exchange value. Indeed, as Marx notes in 
Capital Volume 3 (1894) the ‘use value’ of money loaned as credit is its generation of surplus value; thus use 
value and exchange are identical on the M-M’ circuit.  
 
 84 
the M-C-M’ circuit transforming the commodity into money in excess of the cost of production (the 
C-M’ moment) cannot be completed.  
 
A further contradiction stemming from these processes is the over-accumulation of surplus capital 
and the diminishment of returns. Since the capitalist’s motive to invest is to expedite and optimise 
the realisation of returns, surpluses are not primarily allocated towards the consumption of 
commodities (other than material requirements in industrial production). However, just as lags in the 
M-C-M’ circuits can arise from over-production/ under-consumption, a slowing economy can also 
mean that surplus capital accumulates relative to the opportunities for profitable reinvestment 
(Harvey, 1990, 1999; Schoonmaker, 1994; Cox, 2000). This means growing volumes of capital 
chase increasingly scarce outlets offering a reasonable prospect of maintaining future returns at 
current levels. In turn this carries the risk of crisis and a collapse in the value of capital itself. Harvey 
defines the over-accumulation tendency as;  
 
‘[A] condition in which idle capital and idle labour supply could exist side by side with 
no apparent way to bring these idle resources together to accomplish socially useful 
tasks. A generalized condition of over-accumulation would be indicated by idle 
productive capacity, a glut of commodities and excess of inventories, surplus money 
capital (perhaps held as hoards) and high unemployment.’ (1990, p.180 72) 
 
In regard to the framework being developed in this thesis, such phenomena can be conceived in 
terms of the prevailing intersubjective codifications among market actors demarcating channels and 
modalities of economic action such that they exclude the deployment of capital into labour (or 
capital as credit to allow other market actors to invest in labour) as legitimate or rational options. In 
other words, the codes/schemata assumed by the investor cannot categorise sub-optimum/ non-
profitable deployments of capital as meaningful. The institutional logic of accumulation inscribed in 
the codifications imposes a specific agency on the monetary capital that precludes it being used 
toward productive ends where returns are relatively unattractive, even where the broader economic 
system might be damaged if all other market agents make parallel decisions.    
 
However, Marx’s analysis of such contradictions within the financial (M-M’) circuit was not fully 
developed. This was partly because 19th Century financial markets did not exhibit the scale and 
complexity seen in the late 20th Century, but also because their functioning did not sit comfortably 
with Capital’s framework which assumed the labour theory of value and emphasised the relations of 
commodity production and exchange. As Marx observes in the third volume of Capital;  
 
‘In money-lenders’ capital, the form M-C-M’ is reduced to the two extremes without a 
mean, M-M’, money exchanged for more money, a form that is incompatible with the 
nature of money, and therefore remains inexplicable from the standpoint of the 
circulation of commodities […] It is therefore impossible that outside the sphere of 
circulation, a producer of commodities can, without coming into contact with commodity 
owners, expand value and consequently convert money or commodities into capital.’ 
(1996/ 1894, p.132-133).  
 
Although Marx (1894) recognised the importance of technology in increasing productive efficiency 
and accelerating accumulation, he also regarded it as a potential source of diminishing returns 
because its implementation dispensed with the very labour which Marx saw as the source of surplus 
value73. Of course, Marx could not have foreseen the ways in which NCTs would facilitate market 
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 Interestingly, a parallel scenario emerged in the recent credit crunch wherein banks became so risk averse 
that they were unwilling to lend to liquidity-starved businesses and investment firms (and even each other) 
because the lending criteria of their investment models/schemata defined such actions either as too risky or 
likely to be less profitable than directing any available capital toward the aggressive acquisition of flagging 
financial rivals. 
 
73
 Mandel (1975) points to the role of technology in compressing the circuits of accumulation, but suggests this 
can aggravate the internal contradictions of capital and tensions between accumulation circuits, increasing the 
propensity for crisis. However, his analysis emphasises industrial technology and transportation systems that 
developed from the 19th Century onwards does not link this to the major developments in financial 
communication systems during the 1970s. Meanwhile, Keen (2001) has argued that as Marx developed his 
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globalisation and financial deepening in ways that might stabilise accumulation (albeit only 
temporarily) or generate an increasing amount of surplus value outside of the core M-C-M’ circuit. 
Thus the links between communication systems and the expansion of the M-M’ circuit are important 
considerations for any extension of Marx’s framework to contemporary markets.  
 
Early attempts to advance Marx’s still-evolving conceptions of finance in the third volume of Capital 
(1894) by adapting his framework to market phenomena emerging in the early 20th century (notably 
by Hilferding, 1981/1910; see also Kautsky, 1911) provided useful insights into the increasing 
importance of fictitious capital in the M-M’ circuits. However, these also revealed tensions between 
the nature of exchange value and price assumed in the industrial and financial circuits. Hilferding 
identified the importance of shareholder-driven corporations and their structural relation to financial 
institutions and the state. This recognised the alignment of somewhat different institutional agencies 
operating in different circuits toward the common goal of accumulating surplus value. This is 
significant because it recognises that capital investment in circulation on the M-C-M’ circuit was 
increasingly based on bank credit via the M-M’ circuit, i.e. the institutional agency of speculators set 
the parameters of industrial production. The relation between the circuits was the definitive 
characteristic of finance capital for Hilferding.  Although his analysis still regarded labour value as 
primary, Hilferding (1981/1910) anticipated that accumulation crises might be generated by 
contradictions between fictitious value on the M-M’ circuit and exchange value on the M-C-M’ circuit 
(see also Mandel, 1975). Both Hilferding and Kautsky (1911) recognised the central role of money 
in enabling the extraction of surplus value and the liquidity problems that emerge from the tension 
between production and consumption. However, neither anticipated the scale of financial deepening 
through the M-M’ circuit as a mechanism through which the contradictions of capital accumulation 
might be stabilised. Nevertheless, their arguments anticipated the possibility of contradictions and 
crises being off-set by specific alignments of institutional interests, notably interventions from the 
state acting on behalf of capital. As Pineault (2001) observes, Hilferding’s analysis precursored the 
more recent work of the ‘Regulationist School’ theorists (see for example, Aglietta, 1979; Aglietta & 
Breton, 2001; also Jessop, 1990, 2001a, 2001b) which foregrounds the governance systems 
needed to sustain capital accumulation regimes over different periods. As Harvey (2003), Best 
(2005) and Wade (2007) have noted, the reconfigurations of relations among state, capital and civil 
society involved in the shift from the Bretton Woods system to monetarism and the responses to 
successive financial crises have entailed different institutional complexes (see later). 
 
The reason these accumulation circuits are important to the analysis of global financial markets is 
that, understood in the revised sense indicated above, the logic of sustaining accumulation helps 
explain a primary motive of the agencies involved in the renegotiation of the macroeconomic policy 
trilemma and the emergent configuration of the relations among state, capital and civil society. The 
focus on these circuits also serves to foreground the principal orientation of all institutional agents 
involved in modern business and financial markets, i.e. the maximisation and acceleration of returns 
on capital  investment. Marxist accounts of capital’s drive for accumulation often suggest an 
impersonal structural force or a formalised mode of agency (the Marxist equivalent of neoclassical 
economics’ perfectly-informed rational market actor). However, the accumulation imperative can 
also be regarded as an empirically-validated substantive account of how corporations and financial 
institutions generally operate and make decisions74 (see Keynes, 1929; Minsky, 1977, 1982; Keen, 
2001; Pineault, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                     
ideas throughout Capital, he identified processes such as increases in productive efficiency due to new 
technologies that have the effect of increasing the realisation of surplus value without increasing labour value. 
therefore suggests that Marx’s adherence to the labour theory of value was more nuanced than is often 
supposed. It is nevertheless clear that Marx regarded labour as the source of true economic value and use-
value in contrast to the fictitious values associated with non-productive financial exchange through the M-M’ 
circuit.  
 
74
  Many cultural economy theorists point out that economic agents do not follow the neoclassical model of 
rational utility-maximising behaviour (e.g. see Zelizer, 1994; Callon, 1998). This is certainly valid when 
examining non-commercial exchanges in lifeworld contexts. Indeed, socio-cultural ‘entanglements’ may lead 
institutional traders to incur costs assisting rivals unwind  difficult positions in the expectation of reciprocation. 
Some individual investors may be risk-averse and engage in trading primarily to protect the value of their 
existing holdings. As a caution against over-generalisation, these are important considerations. Nevertheless, it 
is important not to over-extend that caution into a denial of any dominant pattern of agency in economic/ 
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David Harvey’s extension of Marx’s analysis (1990, 1999, 2003; see also Cox, 2000; Leyshon, 
2004; Leyshon & Thrift, 2007) provides a useful focus on the macro-social conditions required to 
sustain capital accumulation. Harvey’s identification of the spatial and temporal ‘fixes’ negotiated to 
circumvent or displace the contradictions in the capital relations and the on-set of diminishing 
returns in accumulation emphasises not only the reproduction of capital relations but also, following 
Lefebvre’s (1991) insights75, the reproduction of the spatial-temporal relations that underpin the 
accumulation circuits. Indeed, as Hope (2006) points out, the contradictions of capital accumulation 
can be manifested as the temporal imperatives of finance seek to impose themselves on industrial 
capital. The basic ‘fixes’ involve shifts in the spatial and temporal relations among the various 
institutional agents whose activities produce and sustain the accumulation circuits, demanding 
accommodation through reconfigurations of the articulations among state, capital and civil society.  
A review of the spatial-temporal fixes identified by Harvey (1999) is presented below, but this will 
then be extended to take account of the communicative/symbolic aspects of accumulation.  
 
Spatial fixes 
 
Spatial fixes primarily involve the geopolitical extension and re/deterritorialization of capitalist 
relations of production and consumption. Spatial extension stems partly from efforts to source 
cheaper resources and labour, but also from the drive to cultivate new markets that can stimulate 
consumer demand for surplus production and provide new opportunities for reinvesting 
accumulated surpluses. It might also be argued that the extension of market forces into the public 
sector (e.g. the privatisation of state services) and cultural practices (e.g. the transformation of 
cultural practices into consumer commodities) entail a form of spatial colonisation, but these will be 
discussed later. The logic of accumulation driving  the geopolitical expansion of capitalist markets 
as manifested in contemporary market globalisation was well recognised by early Marxist scholars. 
Luxemburg (1951/1913) noted that for capital to extend itself into new markets in order to sustain 
accumulation, it would depend on state imperialism and military intervention to secure such 
opportunities. In a similar vein, Lenin (1963/1917) regarded the predominance of finance capital 
over industrial capital and the tendency toward competition-restricting cartels and monopolies as 
the defining characteristic of capital’s imperialism phase. However, like Luxemburg and Hilderding, 
he too points to the need for state-backed cartels/monopolies and military intervention to maintain 
the conditions conducive to capital accumulation76.  
                                                                                                                                                     
financial activity. In regard to the everyday motivations of mainstream institutional investor, optimising returns 
unquestionably remains the ulterior motive of all their activities.  
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 Harvey develops Lefebvre’s argument concerning the need for capital to configure spatial relations in a form 
compatible with particular modes of accumulation Lefebvre’s (1991) own extension of Marx’s work entails the 
core insight that spatial relations are not a fixed/ predetermined part of the ‘base’ but socially produced. 
Although this does not deny the material ontology of physical space, Lefebvre identifies a triad of spatial forms 
comprising the production of space : a) espace perçu, which refers to how people perceive and experience 
physical space, although this depends on the second form;  b) espace conçu, which refers to the shared 
conceptions/ codes demarcating the categories/ representations of spatial relations used to attribute meaning 
to perceived space, and the norms/ rules which allow social interaction therein (e.g. recognition of a fence as a 
social relation involving property rights); and c) espace vécu which concerns the lived experience (and 
performative reproduction of) spatial relations through the social practices which take place in perceived space 
through the codes and norms of conceived space (see Rogers, 2002). Interestingly, Lefebvre’s formulation is 
broadly compatible with conception of intersubjective codifications demarcating the channels and modes of 
social action which in turn reproduce them, and indeed the implicit reflexivity of economic spaces.  
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 As Lenin observes: ‘Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts 
enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., 
strengthens the domination of the financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit 
of monopolists. […]  It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from 
the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, 
and that the rentier who lives entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the 
entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the 
domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast 
proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance of the 
rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means that a small number of financially ‘powerful’ states stand out 
among all the rest.’ (1917, no page ref). 
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Although spatial fixes to the industrial M-C-M’ circuit may secure the accumulation interests of 
certain institutions, this is typically achieved by displacing or deferring the contradictions, not 
fundamentally resolving them. Competition among businesses to reduce the cost of production in 
their domestic economy by sourcing labour and resources from overseas (as well as introducing 
labour-saving technologies to increase efficiency) results in a transfer of waged employment away 
from the domestic economy and hence reduces domestic consumer spending to realise the 
exchange value of the commodities being produced. The consequent imperatives to export surplus 
commodities to realise of surplus value in overseas markets (facilitated by initiatives to 
de/reregulate trade led by supranational bodies like the IMF or WTO)  leads to net flows money out 
of the importing economies which cannot then be used to sustain their own accumulation circuits. 
Businesses in advanced industrial economies competing with those in developing/underdeveloped 
countries where labour expenses are significantly lower may be induced to relocate to sustain their 
attractiveness to investors. Disinvestment can have significant consequences for local 
communities77. Thus the spatial mobility of capital represents a constant threat of disinvestment. 
Governments therefore have an imperative to identify alternative sources of economic growth 
(including investing in the infrastructures, technologies and educational training needed to 
encourage growth in the informational/ knowledge-based economy and the financial sector). These 
are important drivers of the reconfiguration of the relations between state and capital (both domestic 
and global), and by extension, of the social contract between state and civil society78.   
 
Temporal fixes 
 
The temporal fixes to the contradictions of capital accumulation overlap with the spatial variety. 
Harvey (1990, 1999) identifies several forms: One involves the stretching of the accumulation 
circuits over time to off-set the problem of declining opportunities for reinvestment by deferring the 
re-entry of invested capital into the M-C-M’ circuit. Tying up capital in long-term infrastructure 
development (notably through foreign direct investment in emerging economies) extends the period 
over which returns are expected, although the rate has to be sufficient to persuade investors to 
commit capital long-term rather than pursuing more flexible, shorter-term alternatives. A second 
basic form of temporal fix entails compression of the accumulation circuit into ever-shorter periods 
of time so as to accelerate turnover and hence the rate that surplus value can be realised and 
reinvested. In the M-C-M’ circuit, temporal fixes may involve reorganising industrial production to 
increase efficiency. This might include deploying robots/ automated production systems which can 
operate round the clock, flexible ‘just in time’ technologies to reduce costs and lags, and/or 
restructuring businesses to focus on high-value services using casualised/outsourced labour. The 
growth of businesses primarily involved in informational goods and value-added services could also 
be regarded as having a temporal aspect, i.e. the diversion of capital away from modes of 
production that entail slower reaccumulation prospects, particularly those involving heavy industries 
vulnerable to physical delays and disruptions (see Marx’s [1973] observations in Grundrisse 
concerning capital’s annihilation of space through time). The shift to ‘flexible accumulation’ that 
Harvey (1999) identifies may therefore have a negative impact on labour and  economic spaces 
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 For example, in New Zealand, the decision by the Bendon clothing company to shift its manufacturing base 
to plants in Asia in 1999-2000 left hundreds of people in the Waikato/ Te Aroha area unemployed, while  the 
2007 closure of the Fisher & Paykel’s circuitry and whiteware factories similarly resulted in the loss of hundreds 
of jobs in Auckland. Both companies cited overseas competition and the relatively high cost of New Zealand 
labour as factors in their decisions  (National Distribution Union, 2008).  
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 Note however, that the advantage such a reconfiguration confers upon global capital is itself subject to 
diminishment. Eventually, through the gradual extension of capitalist production and consumption across 
different national economic spaces and the corporate ‘race to the bottom’ to source the cheapest labour/ 
resources leads to an overall decline in rate of returns on investment. It follows that eventually, there will be no 
remaining spaces of significantly cheaper labour and resources for capital to relocate to. As C.H. Douglas 
wryly observed: ‘We see a good sound reason for the capitalist’s hatred for [socialist] internationalism; failing 
interplanetary commerce, he will have nowhere to  export to, and will be faced with the horrible prospect of 
dividing up the world’s production amongst the individuals who produce.’ (1919, no page).  
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which lack the infrastructure to support these new modes of production (although this should not be 
read as a generalised argument about immaterial/ symbolic production eclipsing material 
industries). These processes may also be accompanied by the increased production of disposable 
or nascent obsolescent commodities (requiring frequent repurchase/ replacement) and the 
deployment of mass marketing and advertising to induce, perpetuate and accelerate consumption 
and capital circulation.  
 
The other modes of temporal fix directly involve the M-M’ circuit, and here, it is worth considering 
the earlier attempts to extend Marx’s incomplete account of financial markets and fictitious capital. 
Hilferding (1981/1910) recognised the significance of banking in structuring the relations between 
the industrial and financial circuits of accumulation: Non-productive investors channel their surplus 
capital through the banking sector which in turn deploys it in the circuit of industrial capital (M-C-M’) 
through credit and financial speculation. Hilferding (1910) nevertheless explains M-M’ circuit 
processes in reference to the M-C-M’ circuit, assuming that fictitious values are a distortion of/ 
parasitic on real use-values linked to commodity production and that the ‘real’ value of money in the 
final instance corresponds to this. As Marx comments in chapter 24 of Capital Volume 3;  
 
‘In M-M' we have the meaningless form of capital, the perversion and objectification of 
production relations in their highest degree, the interest-bearing form, the simple form 
of capital, in which it antecedes its own process of reproduction. It is the capacity of 
money, or of a commodity, to expand its own value independently of reproduction — 
which is a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form.’ (1894, no page). 
 
Luxemburg (1951/1913) and Pineault (2001) point out that neither Marx nor Hilferding provide an 
entirely adequate account of the origins of money, although as Kautsky (1911) observes, Hilferding 
was aware of the potential for paper money to supersede gold as a medium of circulation and 
measure of value. However, for Marx, gold/silver is assumed to provide the commodity-basis for 
money as universal equivalent. Marx’s archetypical capitalist ‘Mr Moneybags’ already possesses 
surplus capital in the form of money before he commits it to the circuits of accumulation. This 
exogenous assumption of money does not take account of the financial system’s endogenous 
generation of money through the issuance of credit/debt.  The socio-cultural dimensions of money 
and credit and the symbolic/communicative actions involved in their creation and usage will be 
discussed further in chapter 7. It is mentioned here though, because the conception of modern 
money/credit forms as an essentially symbolic relation through which surplus (fictitious) value can 
be generated and accumulation fixes might be derived marks an important point of departure from 
the classical Marxist framework.  
 
In regard to temporal fixes, credit-systems make money available for production, consumption or 
investment in the present in return for the lender claiming repayment (with interest) from the 
borrower’s future earnings. Confidence in the borrower’s intent and ability to repay the lender from 
the surplus generated from the loan is implicit, but credit systems typically entail mechanisms for 
ostensibly ensuring the risk of default is minimised (e.g. ratings agencies). Importantly, credit 
systems in and of themselves generate revenue streams which can be commodified/ securitised 
and traded on financial markets (e.g. government bonds/ bills, mortgage securities and commercial 
paper-issues). If the future revenue streams they denote are perceived as reliable, then, just like 
company stocks, they are performatively transformed into transferable assets with an intrinsic 
market value. This is significant because as capital assets they also constitute collateral, enabling 
the holder to undertake further borrowing. However, the stability of the financial values ascribed to 
such assets depends upon the coherence of intersubjective codifications among market actors and 
their aggregate willingness to but and sell those securities at prices that sustain confidence in their 
value. The fictitious nature of their market value stems from the expectations of future revenue they 
will confer upon the holder. Thus the ontology of fictitious values involves the inscribing of future 
valuations into present frames of reference. However, if market confidence in the reliability of future 
revenue payments evaporates, the intersubjective codification is disrupted and the value of the 
asset is semiotically annihilated. Moreover, if that asset also represents collateral upon which other 
credit streams had been extended, then a domino-effect could implode the value of other credit-
based assets. 
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Temporal accumulation fixes through credit, however fragile or transitory, have nevertheless been 
achieved on a number of levels. Retail businesses which offer credit enable potential customers to 
purchase commodities for which insufficient wage-money is currently available (a practice actively 
encouraged by commercial media and advertising). However, as Draut & Silva (2003) have noted, 
debt-levels for an increasing number of US consumers induced into lifestyles based on credit are 
becoming unsustainable. In some cases, families had become dependent on credit not only for 
mortgages but just to cover day-to-day living costs79. On the production side, credit also permits 
industry to afford new investments before the full surplus value of previous investment/production is 
realised. Again though, the use of credit to facilitate these kinds of temporal fix is not sustainable 
indefinitely, for the same basic reason as consumer borrowing: Capitalists who use credit to sustain 
their investments must pay interest out of any surplus value realised (decreasing their net returns) 
while consumers cannot continue to use credit indefinitely because at some point interest 
repayment obligations come to equal (or exceed) their disposable income. Meanwhile financial 
speculators are able to increase (or ‘leverage’) the scale of their investments and amplify their 
profits (or losses) through borrowing capital (note this can also be achieved through the use of 
derivatives). The sustainability of such practices is depends partly on the generation of fictitious 
values in excess of the rate of interest repayment. Credit deployed on the M-M’ circuits may not be 
subject to the same limitations and contradictions as those on the industrial M-C-M’ circuit, but as 
noted earlier, they may engender other forms of fragility, as the credit crunch has demonstrated 
(see later notes on Minsky).   
 
States are themselves largely dependent on borrowing to sustain their own economic activities. The 
issuance of government bonds effectively entails selling the promise of a future repayment of a loan 
with interest, the level of which depends on credit-rating and market confidence in the ability of the 
government to make the payment (as indexed by the ratings agencies). Bonds issues by 
governments in countries with a stable industrial economy are generally regarded as virtually risk-
free. This means that interest rates on secured government bonds typically form the default 
benchmark against which the relative value of returns and risk-levels of all other financial assets 
and investment options are calculated (see Henwood, 1998; Bryan & Rafferty, 2006). Although 
inflation reduces the real value of debt over time, it also erodes the value of monetary holdings and 
other capital assets priced and traded in that currency. As an accumulation fix, this became 
unsustainable because the combination of inflationary cycles of wage-rises and price-increases in 
the 1970s coincided with a decline in economic growth, leading to stagflation (recession with 
inflation) and economic instability (see Zepezauer & Naiman, 1996; Talbot, 2005). Such 
developments provided the pretext for the paradigmatic shift to monetarism and the reprioritisation 
of the macroeconomic policy trilemma (maintaining currency stability by deregulating capital flows 
and controlling government spending) to stabilise accumulation.  
 
Expansion of the M-M’ circuit and fictitious values 
 
A distinction has been drawn between economic transactions involving the M-C-M’ and M-M’ 
circuits. However, this is not quite the same distinction as Marx (1996) made between ‘use value’ 
and ‘exchange value’.  Use-value refers to the utility derived from the consumption of a commodity 
or service associated with the C-M-C circuit where commodities are produced in pre-industrial 
society primarily as ends in themselves because they satisfy some need. The M-C-M’ circuit reflects 
a different mode of agency, and hence a different set of intersubjective codifications: The capitalist’s 
investment in the production of commodities is motivated not by any need for the use-value but by 
the realisation of surplus exchange value. Thus in M-C-M’, the commodity is merely the means to 
the capitalist’s end. In the M-M’ circuit, investors purchase financial securities for their 
interest/dividend payments and/or to sell them on at a profit once the prices have increased. The M-
M’ circuit is constituted by trade in securitised credit/debt (bonds), claims on publicly-traded 
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 In 2003, US household debt reached new a new record level of US$ 9.3 trillion (Laurier, 2004). Likewise, in 
2004, UK household debt exceeded UK£1 trillion for the first  time and many families were in financial trouble 
because their dependence of credit had become disproportionate to their income (UK Independent, 3 July 
2004). Smith (2005) similarly points out that in 1998, household debt in New Zealand was roughly equal to 
disposable income, but by 2005, this ratio had risen to 140% (NZ$117 billion). Smith notes that one of the 
factors underpinning this trend is a decline in real wages relative to inflation and productivity.  
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company revenue streams (stocks/equities), currencies/foreign exchange, and contracts agreeing 
to buy/sell (or providing an option to buy/sell) another security/commodity at some point in the future 
at a predetermined price (derivatives).  
 
Importantly, the M-M’ circuit entails the generation of returns through the trading of monetary forms 
and financial securities/ assets whose value depends on anticipated changes in their notional prices 
(and/or their conferral of rights to other revenue streams or securities). In effect, financial 
accumulation through the M-M’ circuit entails a conflation of prices and values80. Unlike 
commodities in the M-C-M’ circuit, notional financial values need not be realised by an actual sale to 
realise their monetary value in order to constitute accumulation. The increase in an asset’s current 
trading price constitutes a return on investment in anticipation of future liquidation into monetary 
form (although the sale of assets in sufficient volume will drive prices down and systemic crisis 
would ensue if all financial assets were liquidated simultaneously). In effect, the chickens are 
counted before they are hatched. As Pineault argues, ‘The M-M’ form is fetichistic and fictitious 
because, as money-capital engendering money-capital, it is a mere anticipation of the real process 
of accumulation […] surplus value generated by the use of lent money as capital is anticipated 
before any real production takes place as predetermined interest payments.’ (sic). (2001, p.6). 
Harvey likewise defines fictitious capital as ‘capital that has a nominal money-value and paper 
existence, but which at any moment has no backing in terms of productive activity or real physical 
assets […] or commodities’ (1990, p.182). Because there is no commensurate material production 
of commodities with a use-value, there can be no representational relation between the notional 
values of the M-M’ and M-C-M’ circuit. Thus the ontology of fictitious value is semiotic and 
endogenous to the financial system itself, i.e. relative to the intersubjective codifications of market 
actors and their current aggregate interpretations of the available market information. This 
generation of fictitious value exhibit four forms of reflexive semiosis (see also earlier comments on 
temporality). 
 
a) Market expectations of an a security’s future value/trading price and revenue (dividends/ 
interest) are inscribed into its current value trading price (implicit reflexivity);  
b) These expectations assume that the asset could actually be liquidated for cash at the current 
notional denoted  price (implicit reflexivity); 
c) If the trading of a small proportion of the total volume of the holdings in any given financial 
asset/security moves the price (explicit reflexivity), this metonymically extends to the price of 
the entire proportion of that security/ asset (i.e. the transactional prices of the traded assets are 
an index of the assets that are not traded; implicit reflexivity); 
d) The price movements themselves (and/or the pricing signified in futures markets) may feed 
back into expectations and valuations (transactional and game reflexivity).  
 
Crucially, fictitious value-creation on the M-M’ circuit may sustain accumulation at levels exceeding 
that of the M-C-M’ circuit and thereby constitute a kind of ‘symbolic fix’ to the internal contradictions 
of the M-C-M’ circuit. As noted earlier, this does have a temporal aspect, but the processes involve 
semiosis rather than material velocity. Such a formulation requires a revised conception of capital 
value that foregrounds the symbolic dimension of capital and extends beyond the Marxist tenet that 
only labour can create ‘real’ value. While such fictitious gains may sustain the M-M’ capital 
accumulation circuit (at least periodically), the notional values of these assets must be constantly 
reproduced by the communicative action of trading (the action of buying/ selling crystallises prices 
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 There is therefore a significant break with the classical Marxist position here, since Marx regarded fictitious 
values in the M-M’ circuit as distortions of labour value in the M-C-M’ (see Perelman, 1987). This distinction 
must be drawn carefully, however. The difference between financial capital exchange (M-M’) and industrial 
capital exchange (M-C-M’) cannot be sustained solely on the basis of a use-value versus exchange-value or 
means-end argument because both involve the investment of monetary capital to realise exchange-value, i.e. 
profits. Nor can a distinction be made  solely on the basis of materiality: Informational goods and services such 
as legal advice, intellectual property rights, or the fetish-value of a designer label are all bought and sold as 
commodities; meanwhile, gold and salt are material commodities but both have served as monetary forms (i.e. 
financial assets). A workable distinction can therefore be developed in terms of of both asset form and agency: 
i.e. the M-M’ circuit is characterised by  trade in assets where the exchange value of those assets to the agents 
depends principally on expected changes in their notional value, as expressed in current trading price.  
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as an index of the asset’s current market value). In principle, though, fictitious value can keep 
expanding so long as the intersubjective codifications of market agents sustain expectations. The 
limitations of this ‘fix’ will be discussed in chapter 8.  
 
This formulation has a further temporal implication for accumulation regimes which does involve 
material time/velocity: The circulation of capital through the M-M’ circuit can be compressed into a 
tighter time-frame than the M-C-M’ circuit because instantaneous electronic transactions can realise 
notional/fictitious returns on investments and without the material inertias of the industrial sector. 
Indeed, the velocity of capital, in the sense of the frequency/ intensity of potential profit-generating 
transactions a given quantum of monetary capital can perform across time, is higher in the financial 
M-M’ circuit than in the industrial M-C-M’ circuit. As Hilferding (1981/1910) anticipated, when 
financial market investments appear to offer superior accumulation prospects to investments in 
industrial production, then capital will be redirected from the M-C-M’ circuit towards the M-M’ circuit. 
Through the ‘symbolic fix’, financial trading can generate returns on investments at levels and within 
time-frames the industrial economy usually cannot match. 
 
Accumulation by dispossession 
 
Harvey outlines an additional form of accumulation ‘fix’ in his more recent work on contemporary 
imperialism (2003). ‘Accumulation by dispossession’, or what Marx called ‘primitive’ accumulation 
involves coercive political/ regulatory and economic reconfigurations to ensure the continuity of 
capital accumulation. Historically, this analysis essentially unfolds along the contours described by 
the world system and structural imperialist perspectives on Western capitalist expansion (e.g. see 
Wallerstein, 1996, 1999; also Galtung, 1971). Concomitantly, such spatial extensions entailed a 
range of specific institutional arrangements and practices. Although the historical development of 
nationally-driven imperialist relations was an important process in the extension of global capitalism, 
it is necessary to point out that the macro-framework of core-periphery relations assumed in world 
system analysis does not lend itself readily to the specific purposes of this thesis. Core-periphery 
relations do not explain the tensions and alignments of different capital interests within and among 
nation states, and do not provide a sufficiently nuanced account of the key institutional agencies 
and interests involved in shaping financial markets. For example, the global financial hubs of New 
York, London and Tokyo (or more specifically, Wall Street, The City, and Nihonbashi district) are 
interlinked through the concentrated presence of major exchanges and investment institutions and 
the global capital flows that are not apparent in other cities within the USA, UK or Japan.  
 
More contemporary analyses have identified various strategic institutional alignments between key 
(Western) state bodies, multilateral forums and private capital (e.g. Harvey 2003;  Wade & 
Veneroso, 1998; Wade 2007). Harvey’s argument concerning a ‘new imperialism’ identifies the 
continuing use of coercive power by states to secure economic outcomes and permit the continuity 
of capital accumulation. Accumulation by dispossession may take different forms, but this mode of 
‘fix’ involves an alignment of various state and capital interests (on both a national and supra-
national level) and the use of economic pressure, political/regulatory arrangements and (ultimately) 
military force to stabilise a particular regime of capital accumulation. This would include the 
subordination of developing countries to regulatory regimes which remove trade barriers and 
protections from capital volatility. Through the leverage of debt obligations and global financial 
disciplining, crises and devaluations are deflected onto (or induced upon) weaker economies, 
allowing ‘vulture’ capital to buy up assets at fire-sale prices. However, Harvey’s contention that the 
implosion of financial values which accompany periodic accumulation crises can be strategically 
contained/reterritorialised so as ensure devaluations manifest in the spaces outside the core 
financial centres is undermined by two considerations: Firstly, the institutional agencies of global 
capital have interests in a wide variety of securities, including the those dependent on the industrial 
economies in peripheral countries. Secondly, although the financial impact of the credit crunch has 
been felt across virtually all national economies, its effects) have been felt most keenly in North 
America and Western Europe. Indeed, the government bail-outs of the banking sector has 
increased debt-levels and intensified financial market pressure to cut public spending, particularly in 
the USA and UK.  
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Indeed, Harvey’s notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ could applied here to another form of 
capital spatial fix; the extension of capitalist relations into public sector industries and services and 
also the cultural sphere. Graham (2006) points to the extensions of accumulation into services, 
knowledge and cultural forms as a key feature of what he terms ‘hypercapitalism‘. In both cases, 
this involves an extension of the intersubjective codifications governing capital accumulation into 
the institutional practices governing the (re)production of public services and cultural forms.  The 
imperative of neoliberal/monetarist policies to constrain government borrowing/expenditure and 
privatise public services might also be regarded as form of spatial fix insofar as it provides surplus 
capital with new outlets for investment in state/lifeworld spaces. This extension of accumulation 
imperatives entails the recodification of other systems to inscribe them with the channels and 
modalities of action conducive to the extraction of surplus value.  
 
Global Capitalist Developments and the Rise and Fall of Bretton Woods 
 
Although global capitalism cannot be regarded as synonymous with the USA, Harvey (2003) 
suggests that the reconfiguration of global capitalist relations since the 1970s is inseparable from 
the efforts of the United States to maintain its post-war hegemonic position in the face of looming 
economic crisis and impose a ‘new imperialism’. The post-war emergence of the US as the 
capitalist economic and military superpower still left it vulnerable to accumulation crises: American 
industry needed access to overseas markets to sustain production and profitability, and this has 
remained a key driver of US economic, foreign and military policy ever since. The 1944 Bretton-
Woods agreement established the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a peg to 
gold. This macroeconomic regime can be regarded as an attempt to manage a classic policy 
trilemma (see Obstfeld et al., 2003; Best, 2005), i.e. the difficulty of simultaneously sustaining stable 
exchange rates, free-flows of capital and autonomy over domestic government spending. The 
Bretton Woods negotiations established a macroeconomic order in which currency values were 
stabilised through pegs to the dollar, transborder capital flows were tightly regulated, and 
governments were able to sustain spending on welfare and services (hence the classic Keynesian 
policy of counter-cyclical spending to stimulate recovery from recession).  
 
The Bretton-Woods arrangements were destabilised by the growth of off-shore Eurodollar markets 
These allowed money markets among offshore banks to issue dollar-denominated credit at 
favourable rates not directly determined by the Federal Reserve81. As Walter Wriston, Chairman of 
Citibank commented;  
 
‘National borders are no longer defensible against the invasion of knowledge, ideas or 
financial data […] The Eurocurrency markets are a perfect example. No one designed 
them, no one authorised them, and no one controlled them. They were fathered by 
controls, raised by technology, and today they are refugees, if you will, from national 
attempts to allocate credit and capital for reasons that have little or nothing to do with 
finance and economics.’ (Wriston, 1979, quoted in Pemmaraju, 2001.) 
 
The accumulation of US dollars reserves held off-shore (and hence outside the direct jurisdiction of 
the Federal Reserve) continued to expand to a point where the ratio of dollars to federal gold 
reserves could not be sustained (and indeed, some investors began borrowing dollars in order to 
redeem them for gold). Consequently, when the dollar’s convertibility into gold was suspended by 
the Nixon administration in 1971, there was a depreciation in its value. In turn, this meant that the 
international currency system lost its intersubjectively agreed reference point. The break-down of 
the gold-peg codification meant that valuation had to be determined by money-market supply and 
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 As Stalder (1997) and Pemmaraju (2001) point out, this was partly a side-effect of Regulation Q, introduced 
in the wake of the Wall Street crash and the great depression, which placed controls on US interest rates. The 
growth of the Eurodollar market was also fuelled by the strategy of communist states (initially China followed 
by the Soviet Union) to maintain foreign currency reserves outside US jurisdiction. The Eurodollar market was 
highly significant because it not only circumvented many of the Bretton Woods controls on transborder capital, 
but also reterritorialised the control of credit-creation (and hence the generation of money) outside the spaces 
of state jurisdiction. This also meant that the international capital flows circulating outside the sphere of state 
jurisdiction could exert pressure on governments which attempted to intervene in the economy in ways not 
aligned to accumulation imperatives. 
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demand. However, this was about to be complicated by other macroeconomic developments. In 
1973, OPEC had imposed significant price increases (400%) at the same time as its Arabic 
members imposed trade restrictions on nations aligned with Israel following the Yom Kippur conflict. 
Two effects of this were to  increase the flow of Eurodollar reserves to OPEC nations and increase 
the profits of domestic US oil corporations. As Harvey (2003) observes, although the rise in oil 
prices put pressure on other areas of the US economy, its negative effect on its rival economies 
was much greater, and there is evidence that the Nixon administration, along with other elite capital 
interests in oil and banking, negotiated a petrodollar regime with Saudi Arabia that would help 
stabilise demand for the US dollar (see Engdahl 2004; Coppes, 2007;  Marshall, 2007).  
 
 
After a 1973 meeting of the private Bilderberg forum, it appears that the US undertook to sell Saudi 
Arabia weapons systems, provide it with strategic military protection, and support its economic 
development. In return, Saudi Arabia agreed to formally require all its oil payments to be made in 
US dollars (a requirement other OPEC members adopted) and recycle these petrodollars by 
purchasing US Treasury bonds through the Federal Reserve (Emerson, 1985; Coppes, 2007). 
Consequently, billions of petrodollars began to be recycled back into the US financial system. 
Coppes notes that 70% of OPEC revenue was reinvested overseas by major banks in New York 
and London, notably in the form of loans to developing countries, fuelling the debt crises in the 
1980s. As Coppes (2007) observes, when the Federal Reserve raised its interest rates in 1979 
many developing countries with significant debts in US dollars found themselves in the double-bind 
of increasing oil prices and increasing interest obligations. A series of debt crises were precipitated 
during the 1980s (notably in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and the IMF used the ensuing bail-outs 
to pressure beneficiary countries to adopt neoliberal/monetarist policies. As Chossudovsky (1999) 
and Pilger (2002) have pointed out, the IMF has consistently championed a neoliberal agenda. 
Loans are issued on the basis of stringent conditionalities, usually entailing a ‘structural adjustment 
programme’ (SAP) prioritising free capital flows and the stabilisation of exchange rates while cutting 
government spending and privatising state assets. In effect, this meant macroeconomic decisions 
become insulated from democratic accountability. 
 
During the 1990s, currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (and subsequently, Russia) 
again led governments to approach the IMF to prevent debt default or economic collapse. There is 
certainly evidence to demonstrate the social impact of economic crises that extend beyond any 
direct financial consequences on the actors involved. In the case of Thailand, the economic 
fundamentals were not notably weaker than many other emerging economies which suffered no 
crisis (Wade & Veneroso, 1998; Best, 2005), but an unstable political environment led to market 
uncertainty. The IMF had concerns about the economic slow-down and debt-levels, but decided not 
to issue warnings because of concerns that this would affect market confidence and trigger a crisis 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy (Fischer, 2006). However, currency speculators and hedge funds 
correctly anticipated that the That reserve bank would  have insufficient reserves to defend the 
baht’s fixed peg to the US dollar against heavy volumes of selling (see Bird, 2007; Rajan, 2007). 
High levels of short-selling increased the financial markets’ expectations that the currency would 
collapse. Once the Thai central bank had depleted its foreign reserves, it abandoned the dollar-peg 
on 2 July 1997, allowing the baht to ‘float’ freely. As Graham et al. (2000) have documented, the 
international money market reaction drove down the baht’s value by  20% overnight, generating 
huge profits for the speculators By the end of 1997,  the baht was trading at less than half its 
previous pegged value to the US dollar (from 25:1 to 57:1 by January 1998) while the index of the 
Thai stock exchange (SET) had also fallen by 55% (373 compared with 873 the previous January).  
 
The financial impact on Thailand soon extended into the polity and lifeworld: World Bank monitoring 
reports (1999, 2000) on the social conditions in Thailand before and after the crisis reveal the 
following statistical increases in social indicators between 1996 and 1998 (the years either side of 
the main crisis): unemployment levels increased by 150%, rural poverty levels increased by 13%, 
urban poverty levels increased by 25%, drug-related arrests increased by 31%, abandoned 
newborns increased by 20%, orphanage admissions increased by 22%, outpatient treatments for 
depression increased by 52%, and suicides increased by 41%. Meanwhile, the aftermath of the 
baht’s loss of value saw an increase in inflation from 4.4% in 1997 to 10.2% in 1998.  Over the 
same 12 months following the crisis, government expenditure on education declined by 9% while 
the public health spending declined by 15.2%. These figures demonstrate that the consequences of 
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financial crises extend well beyond the agents directly involved in financial speculation and can 
have a direct and deleterious impact on the lives of ordinary people oblivious to their exposure to 
global financial risks.  
 
Harvey (2003) notes that Asian countries with stronger capital controls like Taiwan and Singapore 
were not as badly affected by the crisis suggests that during the 1990s, the growing interlinkage of 
financial markets across the world and the network of relations between the state and finance (both 
on a national and supranational level), together with the negotiation of a ‘new financial architecture’ 
have formalised inter-institutional commitments to a neoliberal, monetarist macroeconomic policy 
model. Harvey suggests this has allowed an alignment of Wall Street, US Treasury and IMF 
agendas to emerge as an elite ‘complex’ of political-economic interests capable of shaping global 
market conditions through a combination of financial and regulatory power (see also Wade and 
Veneroso, 1998; Best, 2005; Sassen, 2006). Wade (2007) has similarly  identified the formation of a 
US-led ‘standards-surveillance-compliance’ complex comprised of finance ministers of the G20 
countries, the IMF, the Basel Banking Committee (under the BIS), the Financial Stability Forum 
(itself comprising G7 finance ministers and central bankers, representatives of the BIS, IMF and 
World Bank, as well as private sector financial bodies). These institutional networks have 
underpinned the ‘new financial architecture’, notably in the form of the successive Basel accords82 
which were intended to stabilise global markets and control risk in the wake of the SE Asian 
currency crisis, and more recently, the credit crunch.. As Wade (2007) points out, compliance with 
such financial governance regimes is typically easier and cheaper for the banks operating in more 
developed economies (e.g. lower capital reserves for lending are permitted if a bank deploys 
sophisticated risk-assessment systems). Wade suggests that such measures confer advantages 
upon financial institutions adopting Anglo-American financial systems and standards as the norm 
while systematically penalising those which do not- or cannot- conform. In regard to the theoretical 
framework being developed in this thesis, the Basel agreements can be understood as the 
utilisation of a supranational forum to extend a preferred set of intersubjective codifications 
demarcating the channels and modes of financial disclosure/ accounting calculus and legitimate 
investment/ banking practices. Control over these codes and norms therefore confers a structural 
advantage on elite financial  institutions. As Wade observes, 
 
‘Efforts at surveillance on the part of the wealthy countries, the IMF and World Bank 
should not be understood as a mere supplement to previous efforts at market 
liberalisation. The drive for ‘transparency’ involves not so much ‘removing the veil’ as a 
massive programme of standardisation around one type of capitalism, thereby 
reinforcing and legitimizing the power of the G7 states and multilateral organizations to 
intensify and stabilise financial liberalization’ (2007, p. 127).  
 
Best (2005) has provided an important critique of financial transparency regimes, particularly the 
‘new financial architecture’  such as the aforementioned Basel accords. Since the macroeconomic 
shift to monetarism and the prioritisation of free flows of capital, governance regimes have tended 
to emphasise the central importance of informational disclosure in order to reduce shocks and 
manage risk attributable to market uncertainty/ambiguity. However, underpinning such systems is a 
positivist conception of market ontology which assumes that resolving ambiguity is primarily a 
‘technical’ matter of disclosing all relevant information to investors. Under the neoclassical 
conception of market efficiency (Fama, 1970; see also Shleifer, 2000) prices are always a rational 
expression of the information available, so the more information that is made available, the more 
prices will accurately correspond to real values. As Bryan & Rafferty (2006) note, this implicitly 
assumes that where information is fully disclosed, prices will reflect fundamentals and any 
discrepancies will immediately be resolved by investors seeking to exploit arbitrage opportunities. 
                                                 
82
 The Basel Accord established under the Bank of International Settlements (the international governance 
forum for central banks) and backed by the G10 group of nations, setting out minimum capital reserve 
requirements to manage credit risk.  The 2004 Basle II accord (updated in 2006) established a more exacting 
set of global standards for managing credit risk in the banking sector, including minimum capital reserves, 
supervisory systems, and measures to impose market discipline (BIS 2006). Ironically, this did not prevent the 
recent credit crunch and banking crisis. Basel III is currently under negotiation but includes proposals for 
increased capital reserve requirements for banks. 
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However, if the measures intended to render markets transparent or regulate risks do not recognise 
the intersubjective, constructed nature of finance (including the potential for investors to circumvent 
regulatory restrictions and exploit loopholes) then they are unlikely to achieve the intended 
outcomes.  
 
Following Harvey (2003), Best (2005) and Wade (2007), the reason the codifications underpinning 
Anglo-American systems of financial governance (notably on financial disclosure practices) have 
been so widely adopted stems from the opportunity for institutions in peripheral economies not 
engaging with the global financial system and its core institutions and systems. This is not just a 
matter of the dominant institutions controlling greater wealth; it is their control over the very 
definitions and schemata of economic reality such that these come to have hegemonic status. The 
demarcation of the legitimate channels and modalities of financial action involves power-relations, 
most notably access to the nodes and channels which determine financial values (including 
definition of the criteria that drive them). Thus the IMF’s imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes and macroeconomic conditionalities in return for loans, the Basel Accord’s 
designations of minimum capital requirements and disclosure obligations for bank lending, or the 
ratings agencies’ criteria for awarding investment-grade ratings all entail the extension of a 
particular set of financial codifications onto industry, government, and lifeworld.  
 
Financial risk and accumulation  
 
Many of the systems of financial calculation that have been developed in recent decades entail 
modeling probabilities and magnitudes of future price movements, specifically in regard to the 
volatility of securities (the standard deviation of prices from their average over time). (Henwood, 
1998).. Financial risk is evidently not an readily-discernible property of market conditions that can 
be empirically verified unproblematically, and its calculation is therefore not independent of the 
models and schemata deployed by market actors (see Best, 2005; Bryan & Raffterty, 2006). The 
calculative practices that enable financial risk to be abstracted and performatively transformed into 
discrete quantum values embedded in securities that can be traded between investors presuppose 
intersubjective codifications to ensure meanings are commensurated among all market actors. 
However, the systems developed to quantify and manage risk may bring about changes in the very 
market behaviour upon which they are based. In other words, the process of modelling and 
calculating market activities may performatively feed back into those activities, potentially altering 
the form or level of risk being modelled. 
 
Beck’s (1992, 1999, 2000) work on ‘risk society’ deserves consideration here, He argues risk is a 
characteristic and inexorable feature of ‘late’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity in the sense that the 
complexities and ambiguities of disembedded social formations resist rational calculation. The 
notion of ‘reflexive modernity’ (see Beck et al., 1994; Beck et al., 2003) suggests a dialectical 
process by which the institutional and technological developments intended to manage one historic 
set of social problems related to modernity in turn give rise to a new set of challenges. Thus the 
systems and technologies developed to secure control over one set of hazards or uncertainties  in 
turn give rise to new hazards and uncertainties in need of control (e.g. the use of pesticides to 
ensure crop yields and avoid famine eventually produces new problems of pollution and biodiversity 
erosion). Risk therefore becomes an intractable and contested feature of late modern society. It 
might appear inviting to place financial processes in such a framework. However, the notion of 
abstract social forces unfolding historically according to some dialectical or teleological process can 
overlook the specific institutional arrangements and the interplay of different agencies that give rise 
to those forces in particular contexts. 
 
On that point, it is worth noting that the financial media and communication technologies that have 
facilitated increases in the extensity, velocity intensity the flows of market information perform an 
important risk-surveillance function in providing investors with almost-panoptic real-time updates of 
market events. However, real-time feedback about market events increases the pressure on traders 
to intensify their monitoring and respond quickly to news. Indeed, as Arnuk and Saluzzi (2008) point 
out, there is increasing deployment of computerised ‘algo’ trading systems which can monitor prices 
and respond to trading opportunities in subliminal time-frames. Consequently, the real-time nodes 
of decision making processes are themselves rendered opaque to the market surveillance and risk-
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management processes. Interestingly, Green (1999) has suggested that Beck has paid little 
attention to financial markets and questioned whether his conception of risk as a product of 
reflexive modernity is applicable to markets83  He nevertheless acknowledges that;  
 
‘What is new is the overt and sophisticated systems of risk management deployed to 
stabilise the system’s inevitable fragility and the high levels of leverage that risk 
techniques and technology supposedly allow […] Financial markets have produced risk 
as an attitude to the future not only to cope with threats but to entrench their systems 
of wealth creation and epistemological authority.’ (Green, 1999, p.81).  
 
Beck’s recognition that the practices of risk management intended to control one set of recognised 
uncertainties and hazards may give rise to new ones does not seem incompatible with such 
observations. However, the aim here is to transcode Beck’s insights into the framework 
emphasising intersubjective codification and reflexivity. New modes of trading have been made 
possible by convergences in computing and media technologies, the development of sophisticated 
networks of financial communication, and increasingly abstract forms of mathematical calculation 
capable of articulating shifts in the obligation/ownership of financial risk in securitised form.  This 
has entailed a redefinition and renegotiation of  the codifications of finance and the channels and 
modalities of financial action through which risk is performatively reified and transferred (notably 
through derivatives instruments). 
 
For example, the  collapse of Barings Bank at the hands of Nick Leeson in 1995 (see Stephen, 
1996), the near-collapse of the LTCM hedge fund which almost caused a systemic financial crisis in 
1998 (see Lowenstein, 2000; Dunbar, 2000), and the Enron debacle in 2001 (see Blackburn, 2002; 
Fusaro & Miller, 2002) all involved sophisticated (mis)calculations of risk related to the innovative 
deployment of new financial instruments and investment practices. Although numerous critics of 
speculative finance have blamed derivatives instruments themselves for market volatility (e.g. 
Berkshire Hathaway chair, Warren Buffet, famously declared that derivatives were ‘financial 
weapons of mass destruction’ 84), this should not be taken to assume technological determinism of 
risk. Indeed, the position of this thesis is that financial risk is produced or performed by the actions 
of financial agents mediated by the intersubjective codifications specific to their arena (including risk 
management practices). Henwood (1998) argues that the deployment of derivatives to manage risk 
by the individual trader or can be perfectly rational from their own institutional perspective, but that 
the aggregate outcome of such practices across the entire market can be an exacerbation of 
volatility and the propensity for systemic risk. Best (2005) similarly suggests that the development of 
new financial instruments and investment practices that allow some kinds of risk to be 
quantified/managed, have the potential to generate new forms; 
 
‘ Although derivatives may reduce the risks taken by an individual investor, they cannot 
reduce the overall level of risk in the financial system […] Derivatives create complex 
                                                 
83
 Green (1999) differentiates beweeen three forms of risk: ‘Modern risk’ refers to a positivist notion of risk that 
can be objectively modelled and quantified. ‘Reflective risk’ refers to modifications of behaviour in response to 
percpetion and experience. ‘Beckian risk’ refers to Beck’s conception of how social systems and technologies 
developed in response late modenrity generate new hazards. Green contends that  financial markets entail 
‘modern risk’ rather than ‘Beckian Risk’ insofar as they involve highly quantitative calculation and are therefore 
‘nonreflexive’. He therefore concludes that this represents a limitation on the applicability of Beck’s framework 
to financial markets. Here, Green understates the salience of Beck’s approach to financial risk because of a 
categorical misdiagnosis: By associating financial caclulation/ quantification with his positivist conception of 
‘modern’ risk, he does not take account of the reflexive/performative aspects of calculation in financial activity. 
 
84
 Buffett commented that ‘[D]erivatives and the trading activities that go with them… [are] time bombs, both for 
the parties that deal with them and the economic system […] Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, 
have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers…Central banks and governments 
have so far found no effective way to control , or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts […] 
[D]erivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially 
lethal.’ (2003, pp.13-15). As Bryan and Rafferty (2006) suggest, it is misleading to assume any and all trade 
involving such instruments intrinsically entails higher levels of risk because one of the more common uses of 
derivatives is to insure or hedge investments, reducing exposure to market volatility.  
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linkages between market segments and can precipitate spill-over effects from one 
market to another. […] Derivatives can increase the overall market volatility by 
exaggerating the changes in the underlying securities in which derivative contracts are 
based. ‘ (Best, 2005, p.131). 
 
In this regard, new financial instruments and trading models designed to manage financial risk have 
reflexively altered the nature of the risks with which financial agents must engage. Indeed, this was 
evident in the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the credit crunch which stemmed from the 
securitization of pooled mortgage-debt, into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in order to 
transform high-risk debt into securities eligible for investment-grade credit-ratings (see Evans, 2007; 
Blackburn, 2008; Mauldin, 2008). Bryan and Rafferty (2006) have noted that the significance of 
derivatives for contemporary financial markets stems not from their intrinsic complexity or potential 
for leveraging investments (thereby amplifying potential profits and losses85). Rather, their impact 
on financial markets stems from performative commensuration among formerly discrete forms of 
capital/ securities (e.g. stocks, bonds, currencies). This arises because the issuance of derivatives 
contracts assumes calculative frameworks in which the risk-return ratios of all forms of capital 
securities become directly comparable. As Bryan & Rafferty (2006) point out, an important 
consequence of this is that financial investors seeking to optimise returns can directly compare the 
relative benefits of different investment options across a wider range of securities than would have 
previously been possible. In turn this obliges the agents responsible for maintaining and increasing 
the value of different securities to be cognisant of their relative performance as securities across all 
the other investment sectors. This has implications for the reconfiguration of relations between 
financial markets and the industrial economy, notably the increasing pressure to ensure rates of 
return for publicly-traded companies are competitive compared with other securities and 
increasingly short-term temporal horizons (Jessop, 1999; Hope, 2002, 2006). A further implication 
of the commensuration derivatives make possible across different forms of capital is the generation 
of interlinkages and price correlations between formerly discrete market sectors. NFIs potentially 
performatively produce relationships between securities not based on any natural, functional 
relationship (thus for example, oil futures and automobile stocks are functionally related, but 
Icelandic sovereign debt and US sub-prime real estate have no natural connection). This again 
underlines the potential for disconnection between the M-C-M’ and M-M’ circuits. 
 
The conception of risk becomes important in explaining how certain forms of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ have arisen. The reprioritisation of the macroeconomic policy trilemma and the 
reconfiguration of the balance of relations among state, capital and civil society may have served to 
defer or displace capital’s predilection for crisis and devaluation. However, policies intended to 
sustain accumulation may entail the asymmetrical redistribution (and socialisation) of financial risk. 
The use of public money by governments to subsidise losses of private capital (‘corporate welfare’) 
has been evident in the massive bail-outs of the banking system in the wake of credit crunch. Over 
a trillion dollars (US) has thus far been committed by US and European governments to stabilise the 
banking system. In some cases, governments have effectively nationalised failing banks (e.g. the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Northern Rock in the UK), but in other cases, governments have 
loaned capital to the banking sector to increase liquidity and-in theory- enable them to recommence 
lending. Paradoxically, governments have raised the capital through sovereign bond issues, which 
effectively entails taking out loans from the private banking sector which is benefiting from the bail-
out86. Thus the public will ultimately pay the banks to service the loans used to rescue them. 
Ironically, the huge injections of public money have thus far not succeeded in encouraging the 
banks recommence issuing credit on a normal basis, and they appear to have done little to 
discourage the practice of paying enormous bonuses to the banking executives who presided over 
the credit crunch. The financial system is now placing pressure on governments in debt to reduce 
public expenditure or risk incurring a decline in credit-rating and the value of bonds/currencies. 
                                                 
85
 The leveraging process is made possible by the fact that derivatives contracts conferring the right/ obligation 
to buy or sell a security at a fixed price in the future cost only a fraction of the notional value of the underlying 
securities denoted. The contract for a security worth $100 might only cost $2.50, but the movement in the price 
of that security can be realised (or incurred) by the parties at full value.  
 
86
 The irony here is that this is precisely the sort of Keynesian counter-cyclical government spending that 
neoliberal/monetarist policies sought to curb.  
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Beyond Marxist political economy 
 
The discussion undertaken so far has outlined the continuing centrality of capital accumulation in 
explaining contemporary macroeconomic developments and many of the social changes associated 
with globalisation. Although Marx’s framework does not explicitly account for many contemporary 
financial market developments, its insights into the operation of the capital accumulation circuits 
and the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism remain highly relevant, particularly when linked to 
considerations of the spatio-temporal fixes that Harvey explains. However, the theoretical 
framework being developed here would propose a revision of the conceptions of the accumulation 
circuits (M-C-M’ and M-M’) as particular forms of capitalist agency manifest in different modes of 
investment practices within particular institutional spaces. Similarly, Marx’s anticipation of the 
important role of fictitious capital in the operation of financial markets never resulted in a complete 
formulation. The work of Hilferding (1981/1910) and Kautsky (1911) progressed this analysis, but a 
tension between the classical Marxist insistence on the labour theory of value, and the problematic 
recognition that fictitious capital cannot be a direct representation or index of labour value (implying 
financial circuit accumulation might somehow be independent of industrial circuit accumulation) still 
remained (see later discussion of monetary forms).  
 
Indeed, it is precisely in the analysis of this issue that a broadly neo-Marxist political economy 
framework needs to take account of some of the insights from cultural economy in regard to the 
symbolic/communicative dimensions of financial transactions and capital accumulation. Explaining 
the potential for financial markets to maintain M-M’ circuit accumulation through the expansion (and 
securitisation) of fictitious values requires recognition of their  symbolic ontology. This mode of 
‘symbolic fix’ involving the expansion of symbolically-constituted notional or fictitious value is 
contingent on communication systems and reflexive information processes which are themselves 
implicated in increased market volatility and ultimately, the autopoiesis of the financial system. 
Although the notion of a ‘fix’ to capital accumulation carries a connotation of permanence, it is 
important to recognise that fixes to the capital accumulation circuits are contingent formations. As 
Harvey (1999, p.96) observes, ‘The “merry-go-round” of perpetual accumulation is not an 
automated or even a well-oiled machine.’  Jessop (1990) has noted that spatio-temporal fixes are 
manifested through specific ‘blocs’ of institutional arrangements in a given set of spaces over a 
given period (see also Meiskins-Wood, 1998; Hope, 2007). As Jessop (1990) notes, though, this 
raises the question of the extent to which the economic conditions in need of ‘fixing’ are external to 
and pre-existent of their ostensible solution.  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis therefore holds that the set of institutional/ regulatory 
conditions subject to any ‘fix’ could potentially be performatively transformed by the negotiated 
redefinition of the intersubjective codifications demarcating economic and financial schemata and 
the available channels/ modalities of action available to different agents87. Crucially, this also means 
that any new ‘fix’ or ‘bloc’ or ‘assemblage’ of reconfigured institutional arrangements may serve to 
generate new risks and contradictions that threaten sustained accumulation, or reproduce the basic 
contradictions in new forms (although this is not dialectically inevitable). Although the processes of 
globalisation involve many overlapping social processes, the institutional interests shaping the 
expansion, extension and acceleration of financial activity indicate that the logic of accumulation 
undoubtedly plays an important role in shaping the overall contours. Financial communication 
systems and new forms of trading have played a critical role in facilitating this reconfiguration of 
relations among state, capital and civil society (and indeed, between financial and industrial capital). 
The increases in the velocity, spatial extension and volume of capital flows and new forms of trading 
made possible by new communication technologies (NCTs) and new financial instruments (NFIs). 
Theoretically though, this requires that the macro-level systemic analysis sketched out so far be 
grounded in more specific institutional practices/ agencies and that key insights from political 
                                                 
87
 Note that this is not to deny  that the economy is partially constituted by an objective material reality. Indeed, 
Marx’s (1996) original argument implicitly recognised that the social relations of economic actors to base 
material conditions are not themselves material, but superstructural. The objects of economic knowledge 
include categories and schemas demarcating social relations to material forms. These are performatively 
reproduced by modes of economic actions embodied through the channels demarcated by the intersubjective 
codifications of the economic arena.  
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economy be integrated with those of cultural economy (most specifically in regard to the 
conceptualisation of financial transactions as symbolic/communicative action and the recognition 
that financial communication/information is not merely representative, but reflexively constitutive of 
market reality).  
 
The analysis of these processes then leads to an argument of the thesis concerning the extent to 
which the operation of contemporary global financial system has become decoupled or 
disarticulated from state and civic processes, and indeed the industrial economy, such that it might 
be considered autopoietic. The reflexive/ recursive character of the communicative/ informational 
processes in financial markets are a key index of such tendencies.  The operation of financial 
communication and information systems in global financial markets and the interactions of financial 
reporters, analysts and traders suggest that the neoclassical model of markets as being intrinsically 
efficient, driven by perfectly rational, fully informed agents, and ultimately benevolent is 
unsustainable. On the contrary, the analysis of how financial communication/information systems 
are used by investors and analysts to make investment decisions that determine the daily global 
trajectories of trillions of dollars suggests that financial markets routinely respond to real-time 
information flows which those markets themselves generate rather than to any set of independent/ 
objective economic conditions.  
 
Apart from implicating financial communication/information systems in the precipitation and 
contagion of market volatility and financial crises, this also suggests an instrumental insulation from 
the constraints on autonomy, risks and impacts that the operation of financial markets impose on 
businesses, governments and the public. The empirical study of media and information usage by 
institutional investors and analysts will help elucidate an important aspect of these processes and 
also serve as an test of the arguments concerning the reflexivity of financial information and thereby 
the disarticulation of the financial system from these other social systems.  
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Chapter 7:  Money,  Fictitious Value and Codification 
 
Monetary forms have been the focus of a significant body of sociological and anthropological 
literature. The seminal analyses in the work of Marx (1867), Simmel (1907/1990), Keynes, (1936) 
Parsons (1951), Parsons & Smelser (1956), Polanyi (1957) Weber (1964) have informed the 
significant expansion in the volume of recent work on the socio-cultural aspects of money, including 
Dodd (1994, 1995a, 1995b), Smelser & Swedberg (1994), Zelizer, (1994), Leyshon & Thrift (1997), 
Rowbotham (1998), Smithin (2000) and Ingham (2004). Although the primary focus of this thesis 
concerns financial markets, money is evidently central to their functions. The contemporary 
literature engages with some complex and, at times, theoretically dense debates concerning the 
technical definitions and ontology of monetary forms, and these debates lie largely outside the 
scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is not possible to provide an adequate account of the 
generation of fictitious financial values and the (de)stabilisation of accumulation regimes without an 
account of money. The following discussion will therefore highlight the communicative processes 
involved in the creation of money and identify linkages with the broader themes of financial 
globalisation and accumulation regimes.  
 
Several theoretical perspectives on money need to be considered, but the initial discussion will 
draw on the sociological analyses of Dodd (1994, 1995a, 1995b), partly because his work provides 
a good overview of the issues and debates concerning the socio-cultural aspects of money, but also 
because he pays particular attention to the role of information and reflexivity in monetary processes. 
This makes transcoding into the theoretical framework of intersubjective codification and 
communicative reflexivity relatively straight-forward. Dodd (1994, 1995a) argues that understanding 
the nature of monetary forms is necessary to explain how the financial system relates to other social 
systems, and observes that there is ‘something uniquely modern about how the unfortunate 
consequences of major transactions can affect the lives of non-participating individuals some 
distance away, often to their sole cost and bewilderment’ (1994, p.x).  
 
Despite its ubiquity and familiarity, Dodd (1994) notes that the concept of money resists easy 
definition, particularly given the range of new financial instruments that have developed since the 
1970s, facilitated by the emergence of information and computing technology. However, there are 
some general points of agreement about the basic characteristics of monetary forms in a modern 
economy, even if the proliferation of financial instruments makes empirical exceptions more 
common. Money needs to be portable, durable, divisible, homogenous in form and easily 
recognisable (hence most monetary forms are based on gold, paper and plastic/electronic forms). 
However, the physical characteristics of money bear no necessary relation to its actual functions. It 
is generally agreed that the functions of money include acting as a medium of exchange, a store of 
value, a unit of account, a means of payment, and a standard of credit/deferred payment. The 
historical and cultural variations in monetary forms mean that there may be no satisfactory definition 
that applies to every empirical instance, and not all money forms will exhibit all these functional 
characteristics in every instance88. As Dodd observes, ‘The movement of funds between different 
monetary instruments and financial assets generates continual shifts in the definition of money’ 
(1994, p.xx).  Nevertheless, the general characteristics noted above are indicative of the nature of 
the intersubjective codifications which need to be in place in order for a monetary system to 
operate. 
 
Drawing on the seminal work of Simmel (1907/1990), Dodd (1994) emphasises the importance of 
institutionalised trust in the future stability of monetary forms as a medium of exchange, store of 
value and means of payment. He suggests that  money presupposes a network of social relations in 
                                                 
88
 Even within modern industrial societies with ostensibly homogenous and seamless money systems, 
distinctions are drawn between M0 (the base supply of ‘hard’ cash in circulation within the economy and held in 
reserve by banks88), M1 (all funds that are currently available for spending excluding bank reserves), M2 (all 
funds currently available plus bank deposits -which may not be held in cash form- with the exception of illiquid 
long- term deposits) and M3 (all available funds including all deposits, institutional money market holdings, and 
any other significant liquid money-type assets) (Lawrence, 2008).  
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which its forms and functions are intersubjectively recognised by economic actors. These functional 
characteristics include: 
 
• Recognition of divisible units of account to allow exchange in any form of commodity (also note 
this assumes that there is recognition of what goods/services can be legitimately regarded as 
commodities available for exchange) 
• A network in which legitimate future usage of the money form is guaranteed (money can only 
be used as payment in the present if there is confidence that it will be accepted as payment by 
third parties in the future). 
• The monetary network exhibits indications of its spatial (and temporal) extension (in other 
words the geographic limitation of its legal validity as well as any related periodicity) 
• The network must assume information about the contractual rules for its legitimate usage 
(again, this would include recognition of commodity forms but more fundamentally, the mutual 
acceptance of changes in the legal relations of ownership and indebtedness when money is 
exchanged in payment).  
• The network must assume commonly shared knowledge about the practices and future 
expectations about other actors in the network (this would include confidence that money will 
continue to be used in similar way and that some basic consistency in price levels for 
comparable goods and services would be observed). 
 
Importantly, Dodd (1994) recognises the centrality of information in monetary systems and its 
importance in underpinning the formation of networks capable of providing the institutionalised trust 
in the monetary form. Dodd rightly distinguishes between the need for interpersonal negotiation of 
trust in a pre-industrial barter system and the implicit guarantee of trust that money systems 
provide. He also notes that theories and knowledge about money are reflexively constitutive, in the 
sense that the way money is conceptualised shapes how it is used and what actions it can perform. 
Dodd uses the notion of monetary information in several distinct senses. This emphasis on 
information is potentially misleading because it does not just refer to the content of communication 
between counterparties involved in an monetary transaction; indeed money functions precisely by 
avoiding the need to verify the validity of the payment and the reliability of the counterparty each 
time a transaction takes place.  
 
The forms of communicative reflexivity mentioned earlier are helpful in transcoding the informational 
dimensions of money that Dodd (1994) identifies into the framework of intersubjective codifications.   
Implicit reflexivity involves the tacit knowledge which market actors must share in order to ensure 
mutual recognition of the legitimate channels and modalities of economic agency and coordinate 
the meaning of any transaction between them (including the recognition of what counts as money 
and the rules governing how it can be used in a given social context). It is on this level that the 
institutionalisation of trust becomes inscribed into monetary forms, enabling its use without constant 
renegotiation and confirmation of its continuing validity among other market actors. This has a 
reflexive character because the mutual designation of particular tokens as money and its 
subsequent deployment as money performatively renders the codification valid and helps reproduce 
its intersubjective nature89.  
 
The other two forms of communicative reflexivity also apply to monetary forms: Explicit/transactional 
reflexivity  involves the deployment of money in economic exchange. The action of buying/selling 
brings about a shift in the social relations of ownership in regard to the goods exchanged and 
payment of debt obligations. Monetary transactions also crystallise prices and express the value the 
purchaser places upon the commodity/asset purchased (see Hayek, 1945). Meanwhile, contingent/ 
                                                 
89
 It is also possible to deploy the channels and modalities of action to reflexively modify the codifications 
themselves. Thus new financial instruments or systems of payment can be developed (typically retaining an 
established unit of account). Furthermore, it is possible to dissolve the codifications and the channels of action 
by declining to recognise them. In regard to monetary systems, currency crises or hyperinflation sometimes 
lead people to refuse to recognise official currencies as acceptable tender and to substitute barter or an 
alternative currency form instead. In Argentina, Russia and Zimbabwe, economic crises have seen the 
adoption of more stable foreign currencies for some types of trading and even the development of community-
based money systems. 
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game reflexivity concerns information about any market variables or other data salient to the 
schemata that underpin economic transactions (including future expectations of other market actors’ 
behaviour). Quite apart from currency trading, the everyday haggling at a market, the anticipation of 
a sale or inflation, and indeed, the future availability of money itself informs how money is currently 
spent, loaned, hoarded or borrowed. 
 
This formulation emphasises implicit codes within a network of agents as the basis for the 
intersubjective coordination of meanings and recognition of the legitimate channels and modes of 
action that money enables in any given context. Variations in these codifications are possible even 
within the same economic system wherein the fundamental features of the monetary system are 
identical90. Thus in some cultures, using money to bribe the police or purchase sexual favours is 
considered acceptable, whereas in others these would be taboo and/or illegal. The work of Zelizer 
(1994, 1998) and Singh (2000, 2001) emphasises the importance of considering how cultural norms 
and values are inscribed into monetary practices. In particular, Zelizer’s notion of ‘earmarking’ 
recognises that the usage of money can be modified by micro-level cultural practices and the 
inscribing of rules designating the scope of legitimate usage (e.g. the codes governing the use of 
housekeeping money or children’s pocket-money). Money is therefore never ‘neutral’; its usage 
presupposes earmarks and the institutional agency of  the transactor, whether that be a housewife 
budgeting at the supermarket or a hedge-fund manager shorting a currency. Dodd points out that 
neoclassical economics does not account either for the socio-cultural processes through which 
money is created and deployed, or for the power relations implied in those processes: ‘Decisions 
concerning what to do with money are a function of sociological, psychological and cultural factors 
[…] Money is not simply a neutral, transparent token mediating the exchange of goods and 
services, but has cultural and symbolic associations generated by its use as a form of wealth and a 
foundation of power’ (1994, p.13).  
 
Political-economic and cultural conceptions of money 
 
Dodd (1994) and Gilbert (2005) both note a theoretical tension between the structural political-
economic analysis of monetary systems on a broad social level, and the ethnographic/ micro-social 
analysis of the manifold forms of monetary practices in specific socio-cultural contexts. There is 
therefore a tension between the structural sociological and political economic account of money and 
those based on an ethnographic and cultural economic perspective. For Marx (1973/1859, 1867), 
the development of money is a crucial development in the alienation of producers from commodities 
and the extraction of surplus value through paying wages disproportionate to the value of their 
labour. Money is therefore a necessary and central component of capital as a source of structural 
power, and it is through monetisation/ commodification of other forms of social interaction that 
capitalist relations extend themselves into other social spheres and incorporate them into the 
circuits of accumulation. However, as Ganssmann (1988, 1998) and Kennedy (2000) suggest, one 
of the key limitations of the Marxist framework is that the symbolic processes involved in credit and 
the generation of fictitious value (the M-M’ circuit) are not easily reconciled with Marx’s labour 
theory of value and the conception of money as a commodity form (gold) acting as a universal 
equivalent. Of course, Marx was well aware of fictitious forms of interest-bearing capital and in 
Grundrisse (1973/1859) he distinguishes between ‘real’ money and symbolic forms91. Keen (2001) 
suggests he also recognised that, in the M-M’ financial circuit, money’s only ‘use value’ is the 
                                                 
90
 As Dodd (1994) and Zelizer (1994) point out, money can take many different forms, and in some traditional 
societies, the practices are quite different from those in industrial capitalism. For example, Gilbert  (2005) 
points to the traditional use of sea-shells for very specific forms of exchange in the Trobriand Islands, (involving 
complex rules governing what can be purchased and who is permitted to engage in the transaction) and also 
the development of a gendered monetary system (in Rossal Island Yap) wherein men and women use different 
forms of currency. Meanwhile, a BBC news report (17 August, 2005) noted that beer bottle tops had become a 
de facto currency in Cameroon, following brewery promotions giving away luxury prizes for tops with a winning 
mark. Apparently the tops were being used to pay taxi fares and bribe the traffic police.  
 
91
 The reason Marx’s formulation is problematic is not because gold is no longer the common denominator or 
referent peg in monetary exchange systems, but because he regards the value of gold-money as stemming 
directly from the labour value invested in its production, whereas the origins of money in contemporary 
capitalist economies stem from credit systems.  
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realisation of profits; thus exchange value and use value become inseparable. However, Marx’s 
analysis of the implications of such developments for the labour theory of value and indeed, for 
capitalism as a whole, were never fully developed. Social-cultural perspectives on money provide a 
basis for extending Marx’s analysis to contemporary financial markets. This is not unproblematic 
though, and theoretical tensions emerge between conceptions of money as a structural expression 
of economic power and the recognition that monetary practices are always shaped contextually by 
human agency.  
 
Kennedy (2000) acknowledges the limitations of the Marxist analysis of money, but seeks to 
reconcile modern monetary forms with the labour theory of value by distinguishing between social 
relations governing the form and content of money (the form being the material tokens and the unit 
of account designated by the state/monetary authority; the content being abstract labour value). In 
capitalism, the direct, natural relation between form and content becomes indirect and alienated.  
Importantly, Kennedy recognises that the symbolic dimension of money cannot be understood in 
terms of merely being a signifier of some other signified quality or substance; it is symbolic in a 
constitutive sense. The symbol itself has no intrinsic value; this is derived from the social trust 
institutionally inscribed in the symbol either through tradition or legal authority (Kennedy, 2000, 
endnote #1; see also Simmel, 1900/1990). This symbolic function of money is nevertheless 
premised on its embodiment of abstract labour value as universal equivalent. Consequently, the 
proliferation of monetary forms (which he attributes to the state) independently of labour value 
generates the problem of fictitious capital: 
 
‘Money cannot be a mere symbol, because it has to be the social embodiment of both 
the form and the content of value; the peculiar, categorical expression of indirect social 
bonds between agents. Such an ontological condition implies that, while the state may 
create symbols of money, it must ultimately resort back to commodity money in order 
to express the form and content of value relations. If history reveals to us that the state 
has gone beyond this, then, following the logic of Marx’s position regarding money, 
one must conclude that the capitalist system has lost its capacity to harness the 
content and form of the value relation to a specific money based on a specific object, 
(for example gold), thus allowing the state the scope to create and multiply symbolic 
forms of money. Money must then be seen to have lost its social power as the 
incarnation of value relations and be seen to have become instead a increasingly 
“symbolic” and fetishistic form of itself.’ (Kennedy, 2000, p.200). 
 
Kennedy recognises the increased dependency on fictitious capital forms for accumulation and 
argues that the increasingly complex money forms on the M-M’ circuit distort any relation between 
the monetary form and labour value as content. However, this appears to lead Kennedy back into 
the very problem his analysis is attempting to resolve:  By positing abstract labour value as the 
content of real money he follows Marx into regarding fictitious symbolic money as empty or unreal. 
Moreover, he explicitly rejects the suggestion of Ganssman (1998) and Goux (1990) that the labour 
theory of value is no longer applicable to contemporary money, arguing that trust is an inadequate 
basis for the stability of monetary forms, given that market agents would be unable to know whether 
their money is real or fictitious. However, this requires Kennedy to reimpose Marx’s analytic 
distinction between real and unreal money.  
 
Goux’s (1990) analysis of Marx and money stems from a psychoanalytic-aesthetic take on 
economic symbolism, attempting to link together social meaning, libidinal energy and commercial 
value. He also recognises money’s tendency to facilitate economic disembedding, but this is 
conceived as repression of the socio-cultural dimension. Noting Marx’s distinction between symbolic 
money and real (commodity-based) money Goux argues that the capacity of the former to supplant 
the latter stems from the symbolic property of (any) money to function as a generic medium of 
exchange. Importantly, he also notes that for symbolic monetary systems to function, there has to 
be unification through some form of common monetary unit/measure to avoid being ‘subject to the 
accidents of multiple contingent evaluations’ (Goux, 1990, p.127). This recognises the importance 
of shared codifications to coordinate the meanings ascribed to monetary symbols. However, Goux 
rejects intersubjectivity as a basis for the social relations underpinning money on the pretext that 
intersubjective relations presupposes embeddedness in the lifeworld, such as the interpersonal 
negotiations of trust and meanings of value (e.g. bartering). If, as Goux’s formulation supposes, 
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intersubjectivity is a process applicable only to conscious negotiation/validation of codifications, 
then its utility for the analysis of economic phenomena would be limited. Furthermore, given Goux’s 
recognition of the need for mutual recognition of monetary forms among market actors, this would 
require the positing of some form of distinct set of economic rules/codes as an ontologically 
independent form/ structure.  
 
The notion of intersubjective codification being developed in this thesis is intended to circumvent 
precisely this sort of dualistic formulation and the problematic tendency to foreground structure over 
agency (or vice versa) that it engenders92. It follows from this formulation that Ganssman (1988) 
and Goux (1990) are right to posit the ascendancy of symbolic monetary forms over commodity 
forms, and to regard the validity of Marx’s labour theory of value as suspect. However, the critique 
goes one step further: Following Simmel (1907/1990), the fiduciary, symbolic dimension of money is 
regarded as a fundamental characteristic of any money system. In that sense, Marx’s theory of 
labour value and assumption of gold as the default commodity form that serves as a  universal 
equivalent in exchange never adequately explained the socio-cultural underpinning of money’s 
fiduciary origins.  
 
Ganssman (1988) develops another neo-Marxist account of monetary forms by developing the work 
of Luhmann (198493, 1995). Although Luhmann’s analytic separation of social and psychic 
processes leads him to conceive of communication in impersonal systemic terms (in contrast to the 
emphasis on intersubjectivity preferred in this thesis) his perspective on money is more salient here 
than the system-language accounts of Parsons and Habermas, mainly because he foregrounds 
processes of communication and codification. As Ganssman (1988) notes, Luhmann explicitly 
opposes Marx’s labour theory of value and recognises that the monetary system is only tangentially 
related to the system of commodity production.  Luhmann usefully recognises that price systems 
and money’s role as a necessary means of economic action structure the scope of available 
economic actions available to different market actors. However, Ganssman points out that 
Luhmann’s autopoietic conception of system codes confined to their respective spheres of action 
leads him to suppose money has no meaning/function outside payment in economic exchange. 
Although (in line with Simmel, 1900/1990) Luhmann notes that money confers generic buying 
power on market agents and that (in line with Marx, 1867) this motivates the acquisition of money 
for its own sake, he does not connect this argument to issues of class or domination. Crucially, 
Ganssman (1988) links this ‘blind spot’ in Luhmann’s analysis (and also the perspectives of 
Parsons and Habermas) to his conception of communication. Although Luhmann recognises that 
monetary codifications are constitutive of economic relations, Ganssman argues that this cannot be 
limited to codes and symbols of payment: 
 
‘The explanation of [monetary] action would require, at least, to specify the rules of 
translation according to which a communication system can bring other systems in its 
environment to follow the goals specified in communication. For example, how are we 
to explain that the promise of a payment, as the purely communication event, induces 
a psychic system to move the organic system associated with it into a sweat shop to 
operate a sewing machine for twelve hours a day? […] To put it plainly, the activities of 
human beings are not restricted to communications. People eat, sleep, love, work, die 
and what not. Of course, Luhmann knows this too. But he is apparently convinced that 
all these activities can be sufficiently understood relying solely on their ‘coding’ in (or 
as) communication. If […] the mode of transforming communication into action is not 
specified, this implies the conviction that actions are all controlled and controllable by 
communication.’ (sic: 1988, p.306).  
  
Ganssman’s recognition of the communicative limitations of Luhmann’s formulation is important. 
However, he proceeds to argue that a symbolic/communicative conception of money diverts 
                                                 
92
 The notion of intersubjective codification recognises that the intersubjective can entail unconscious/ 
preconscious adherence to social codes in order to coordinate the meanings of interaction (see Giddens’ 
[1984] distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘reflexive’ consciousness).  
 
93
 Luhmann’s (1984) discussion of monetary forms and autopoiesis was not available in English but is 
discussed at length by Ganssman (1988). 
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analysis away from questions of how money is implicated in structural power relations94. On this 
point it is vital to note that this criticism is premised on Luhmann’s impersonal conception of system 
communication and codification as it pertains to monetary transactions (as distinct from any 
‘psychic’ socio-cultural process). However, if one adopts a broader conception of communication 
within the intersubjective codification framework, and allows for different forms of informational 
reflexivity/ performativity noted earlier, then it becomes possible to explain how the channels and 
modalities of economic action can be shaped and constrained and how these can entail different 
norms of practice within different arenas. Moreover, if one accepts that symbolic forms such as 
money can performatively constitute shifts in social relations (i.e. as a communicative action altering 
property relations/ paying debt) then it becomes possible to dispense with the unhelpful assumption 
that symbolic forms must be representative of an external referent rather than immanently 
constitutive of social relations. Ganssman’s critical assessment of linguistic and communicative 
conceptions of money identifies several important issues, but with this interpretation, they justify, 
rather than undermine the formulation being developed here.  
 
The symbolic ontology of money and fictitious value 
 
Rotman (1987) observes a series of developments in monetary forms95, each complicating the 
relation of referentiality between monetary signifiers and any external commodity or value as 
signified referent. His notion of ‘xenomoney’ refers to the creation of money through credit issuance 
in foreign currencies, being both depersonalised and disembedded from any context of economic 
reference other than other currency values. Xenomoney  assumes ‘a new signifying capacity which 
[…] assumes the priority of objects of signs in order to deny it; a semiosis in which signs are seen to 
create the very objects they are taken to be depicting, naming and representing’ (Rotman, 1987, 
p.54). Rotman draws on Baudrillard’s (1993) notion of the simulacrum to problematise monetary 
semiotics and rightly argues that money’s semiotic form is not representative, because this would 
presume that its signified referent pre-exists the signifier used to denote it. The assumed anteriority 
of the referent object to the signification system is illusory; rather, it is the monetary signifier (or, 
more specifically, the system of codification which gives meaning to the monetary signifier) that is 
ontologically prior to its own object of reference:  
 
 ‘A dollar bill presented to the US Treasury entitled the holder to an identical 
replacement of itself. As a promissory note it became a tautological world. The dollar 
became, in other words, an inconvertible currency with no intrinsic internal value 
whose extrinsic value with respect to other currencies was allowed to float in 
accordance with market forces.[…] As both object and medium, thing and token, both 
a commodity and a sign for a commodity, money is a dualistic and self-reflexive sign. 
[…] one can make the self-reflexivity of money, its capacity to act a medium of 
exchange for itself, the basis for what it signifies. […] As a sign one can say that 
xenomoney, floating, and inconvertible to anything outside itself, signifies itself. More 
specifically, it signifies the possible relationships it can establish with future states of 
itself.’ (Rotman, 1987, pp.89/ 92). 
 
Leyshon & Thrift (1997) also point to the emergence of ‘virtual money’ that is ontologically distinct 
from earlier forms, suggesting money has become a matter of double entries of credit/debit 
inscribed in computer memories. Again, this points to the self-referentiality of monetary forms 
devoid of any material basis. However, like Rotman, Leyshon & Thrift remain suspicious of reducing 
monetary forms to mythological imaginaries devoid of any external reference and suggest that 
‘Virtual money cannot be reduced to this romance of the unpresentable. It consists of a set of social 
practices just like any other. It is not just a ghost in the machine’ (1997, p.21, original emphasis).  
                                                 
94
 Note that Ganssman’s concern about a communicative approach to money overstating agency is parallel to 
Jessop’s (2004) (misplaced) misgivings about using semioisis as a basis for developing a cultural policitcal 
economy framework. In both cases, the potential for codification to act as a structural limitation of social action 
is not recognised, and both implicitly assume a representative rather than constitutive notion of symbolic forms. 
 
95
 Rotman (1987, p. 103) notes several diachronic stages of monetary form: gold (commodity form), imaginary 
(unit of account based on commodity form), paper (promissory notes independent of commodity form) and 
xenomoney (like paper money but disembedded from national economic context, like Eurodollars).  
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It is evident that ‘virtual’ or ‘xenomoney’ forms operate on a different symbolic basis from 
commodity-based forms. Contemporary money manifests no intrinsic value in its form, and insofar 
but its desirability cannot stem solely from an inscribed promise of convertibility into other monetary 
forms, even if this indexes an increase in future monetary value (such as the redeemable face value 
of a bond at maturity). The value of money stems not from the denoted use-value of any referent 
commodity, or from any implied quantum of abstract labour value, but from its capacity to confer 
abstract purchasing power upon the holder (see Fine & Lapavitsas, 2000). This is the primary 
referent of the money signifier, designated in a fixed quantum of a unit of account (thus a hundred 
dollar bill denotes the holder’s right to acquire/consume a hundred dollars’ worth of some other 
commodity or security). This is what constitutes the social ‘power’ that Simmel (1907/1990) ascribes 
to money and also the reason for Marx’s C-M-C circuit being instrumentally inverted to M-C-M’ and 
then compressed to M-M’ (the form of which underlines the point that there would be little point in 
seeking the return of surplus value [M’] if all it conferred were additional empty monetary signifiers). 
Insofar as abstract purchasing power also signifies the potential for the acquisition of goods and 
services with a use-value, this is better understood as a second order of signification because the 
meaning to the holder as market agent is necessarily ambiguous, depending on their needs and 
priorities as well as the availability and price of goods on the market. In effect, though, the money’s 
use-value (or exchange value if the money is invested in stocks or sits in the bank earning interest) 
remains indeterminate until it is actually used in purchasing transactions.  
 
This account still leaves the question of how the monetary form becomes inscribed with this 
abstract purchasing power, so as to make money itself a desirable end in its own right. The concept 
of intersubjective codification is useful here. Money can only act as money if all the market actors 
comprising an economic network ascribe meaning to monetary forms in a coordinated manner. This 
involves the implicit/performative form of reflexivity through which basic economic 
concepts/schemata/models are intersubjectively defined as socially real. This includes recognition 
of the official unit of account, the legitimate forms  money can take, and the channels and 
modalities of action underpinning its usage in different social contexts. Hence from childhood, we 
learn that to acquire the goods we see and desire in shops, we must had over special types of 
tokens to performatively shift legitimate ownership/consumption rights from the shopkeeper to 
ourselves. The relation between monetary form and codification is mutually constitutive; the 
codifications performatively manifest the monetary form as a social relation just as the deployment 
of the monetary form in transactions reconfirms and reproduces the intersubjectivity of the 
codification.  
 
However, the processes of monetary codification which underpin the intersubjective recognition of 
monetary forms and the performative inscribing of abstract purchasing power to them is not unique 
to contemporary ‘virtual’ or ‘xenomoney’ forms. In fact, it is fundamental to all monetary forms in 
respect to the fiduciary expectations of its validity in future market transactions. Even in the case of 
using gold/silver as the commodity to serve as universal equivalent, this still requires intersubjective 
recognition of its monetary status96. What is substantially different about ‘virtual’ or ‘xenomoney’ 
compared with earlier forms is its mode of reproduction subsequent to the severance of any relation 
between the signifying form and a fixed material commodity. Although the political economic 
significance of this development for the lives of ordinary people has in some respects been 
profound, in regard to the codifications of money, it went largely unnoticed. The capacity of banks 
(and, since financial deregulation, many other corporate and financial institutions in the ‘shadow-
banking’ system) to issue credit, securitised debt/bonds, and derivatives contracts effectively means 
                                                 
96
 Moreover, the recognition that commodity forms like gold or silver themselves are valuable also depends on 
codification, not just labour-value or use-value. The fact that they are relatively rare and difficult to access 
and/or aesthetically attractive compared with other substances is only one factor in this equation. In principle, 
other shiny, dense metallic substances could also been adopted as a monetary form. However, the discovery 
of the hazards of radioactivity severely curtail the use-value of metals like uranium and plutonium except in 
regard to nuclear energy/weaponry. Likewise, until quite recently, asbestos was regarded as a remarkably 
useful material because of its fireproof properties, but the discovery of its carcinogenic potential radically 
reduced its use value. Likewise, knowing blackcurrants are edible but deadly nightshade berries are poisonous  
depends on codifications reflecting human knowledge and social norms. Value is therefore a function of 
coordinated market knowledge and agency not just an objective quality of a commodity’s physical properties.   
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private capital is able to generate monetary units and financial assets ex nihilo. These involve 
performative financial actions enacted using restricted symbolic and institutional resources/ 
channels that are largely invisible, inaccessible and unaccountable by/to the vast majority of people. 
The processes of monetary creation are undertaken largely in a ‘black box’ whereby people 
understand how to use money and interact with the interfaces of the banking and financial system, 
without actually understanding any of its internal mechanics.  The generation of money itself largely 
depends upon the issuance of credit to those who lack it and are willing (or desperate enough) to 
go into debt to access it. Private control of the generation and legitimation of monetary signifiers is 
therefore one of the most fundamental but under-debated sources of power in capitalist society. 
Once basic institutional and infrastructural preconditions are satisfied, the credit system of banking 
routinely creates monetary forms out of thin air. Fractional reserve banking systems require a 
lending bank to retain a cash reserve as a ratio of the quantum of money that they issue as credit 
equal to the rate at which depositors will demand their money back. As Hoyle & Whitehead 
summarise: 
 
‘Suppose a customer deposits £100 in cash (of which he [sic] is only likely to request 
£5 back); this £100 is 5 per cent of £2000. The bank could therefore in theory create 
£1900 in credit, by making advances to borrowers of that amount. This £1900 would be 
paid out by borrowers using cheques, and these cheques would return as deposits to 
the banking system by the traders who received them. Since these traders will only 
have a 5 per cent cash ratio, they are unlikely to ask for more than 5 percent of £1900 
= £95, which is precisely the amount of cash available. ‘ (Hoyle & Whitehead, 1982, 
p.92). 
 
Thus when a bank electronically credits a deposit into a borrowers’ account, it is quite literally 
creating money out of nothing except the symbolic performativity of its own institutional 
mechanisms. Thus a mortgage loan confers upon a borrower the abstract purchasing power to buy 
a house, and on transmitting the requisite quantum from symbols in the borrower’s account to the 
vendor’s account, the payment is performed and legal ownership of the house is transferred to the 
buyer. Thus the implicit/ performative reflexivity of the underlying codifications are a prerequisite of 
deployment of monetary symbols that constitutively enact changes of ownership or changes in 
value (the explicit or transactional form of reflexivity). When the mortgagee spends the credited 
money in the purchasing of a house, it passes to the vendor who usually deposits the cash in their 
own bank account. There are two important processes to note here. Firstly, the semiotic 
commensuration between one unit of money registered in an electronic account and any other 
means the monetary signifiers are entirely interchangeable. The same abstract purchasing power is 
attributed to all monetary symbols designated in the same unit of account. Electronic dollars issued 
through bank credit have the same abstract purchasing power as dollar bills in one’s pocket.  The 
bank has no institutional ‘memory’ of creating those specific monetary units. Consequently, when 
the money flows back to the original bank that issued the credit, it is received as a new deposit and 
counts as additional capital to be loaned out. However, the second process most definitely does 
involve the bank’s institutional memory. The issuance of credit to a borrower is a capital investment 
by the issuing bank and it is premised not only on the borrower’s repayment of the quantum of 
money borrowed but on the payment of interest on the loan. Assuming that the borrower is able to 
maintain payments, then the principal will eventually be paid off, and the credit/debt relationship will 
be negated on payment of the final instalment. However, the negation of the debt-relation does not 
negate the continued existence of the quantum of money created by the initial issue of credit; this 
continues to circulate in the economy.   
 
Banks are theoretically limited in the extent to which they can go on creating money through the 
issuance of credit, partly by cash reserve requirements and partly through fiscal prudence in 
ensuring that borrowers can repay (since defaults on debt repayments by counterparties reduce the 
value of the bank’s assets, as compellingly demonstrated by the sub-prime fiasco that ironically 
stemmed the very CDO instruments intended to manage such risks). In practice, however, the 
de/reregulation of banking during the 1980s largely removed any legal requirement for a minimum 
fractional reserve. Rowbotham (1998) notes that the required cash reserve in the UK is just 0.5% 
(so Hoyle and Whitehead’s [1982] example of £100 in cash reserves becoming the basis for £2000, 
would need to be multiplied tenfold to £20,000). Meanwhile, state treasuries normally supply cash 
(M0) to banks on demand, so there is no practical limit to the private expansion of the money supply 
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other than official cash rates and the potential for defaults on bank loans to risky borrowers. To 
underline the arbitrariness of the financial power such arrangements confer on the private banking 
system, Rowbotham quotes Josiah Stamp, (the well-known economist and director of the Bank of 
England at the time of the Wall Street crash and the ensuing depression): 
 
‘The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is 
perhaps the most astounding piece of slight of hand that was ever invented. Banking 
was conceived in iniquity and born in sin. Bankers own the earth; take it away from 
them but leave them with the power to create credit, and with the stroke of a pen they 
will create enough money to buy it back again […] If you want to be slaves of the 
bankers and pay the costs of your own slavery, then let the bankers create money’ 
(Stamp, quoted in Rowbotham, 1998, p.36). 
 
Although the debts incurred by borrowers when the loans are issued do not directly create money 
that the issuing bank can use for its own purposes, it nevertheless gains significant financial 
benefits.  An indirect benefit is that the loan means there is more money circulating in the market, 
some of which will get deposited back with the issuing bank to be used as the cash reserve for 
future loans. More importantly though, the issuing bank gains a revenue stream from periodic 
repayment of the interest and principal of the loan. Although these repayments gradually reduce the 
quantum of debt, the money flowing back to the bank from the borrower also counts as a new 
deposit. This means that the debt can be securitised (usually through pooling with thousands of 
other loans to evenly spread the risk of default and to allow statistically reliable calculations of the 
risk and returns). Securitised debt in the form of transferable rights to the revenue streams of 
borrower repayments can be sold as financial assets to third parties, which was the basis of the 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) implicated in the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
subsequent credit crunch97. Furthermore, the creation of financial assets premised on the future 
reliability of on an on-going revenue stream over a designated period also has an impact on 
borrowing, since securitised debt/ bonds constitute financial assets which constitute collateral 
against which further loans can be leveraged (on the basis that the creditor’s risk is limited if the 
borrower has other assets that could be liquidated in the event of a default). These basic monetary 
processes are deeply implicated in the generation of fictitious values and the financial system’s 
endogenous predisposition to crisis.  
 
As noted previously, the performative inscribing of as-yet-unrealised value into instruments denoted 
values in a present frames of reference is one of the core symbolic processes in the generation of 
fictitious capital forms, and indeed, money itself and is therefore central to the functioning of 
financial markets. Marx’s accumulation circuits (M-C-M’ and M-M’) both depend upon the 
transformation of a given quantity of money into a larger quantity. The nature of the basic 
contradictions of capital accumulation that Marx identifies (1859/1973, 1867, 1885, 1894) are now 
rendered explicit: They arise precisely because of the quantitative incommensuration between M 
and M’: $10 is not equal to $11. If the money supply represents the labour value in the commodities 
produced then it cannot simultaneously be used to realise the full exchange value of commodities 
and be retained as surplus value. However, the fictitious, interest-bearing capital of which Marx was 
so suspicious offers a symbolic solution to the accumulation contradiction, because it semiotically 
inscribed future monetary value (abstract purchasing power) into present frames of reference. 
Although debt repayments do extend over time, it is important to recognise that the process through 
which money and fictitious debt securities are manifested in the present involves performative 
symbolism within the specific intersubjective codifications of banking and financial institutions. By 
rectifying the monetary shortfall of the M-C-M’ and M-M’ circuits, symbolic accumulation fixes can 
                                                 
97
 The transferability of the pooled mortgage debt meant that the banks were able to create financial assets by 
issuing loans to high risk borrowers and then use complex financial math to create ‘tranched’ assets that could 
gain investment-grade ratings. Ironically, had the banks merely off-loaded these dubious securities to hedge 
funds willing to take on risky securities and washed their hands of them, the impact of the credit crunch would 
not have been so severe. However, the banking sector appeared to be convinced of the external validity of the 
risk calculations implied by the ratings systems that the CDO issuers had factored into the design of their 
instruments. These securities were therefore bought up in large quantities by the very banks which knew the 
loans were based on mortgages issued to borrowers at high risk of default.  
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be manifested, although their ongoing stability and sustainability depend on the coordination of the 
intersubjective codifications among market agents, since these underpin the shared meanings and 
value of the symbolic forms in circulation. 
 
The issuance of debt as a financial asset conferring the rights to a regular revenue stream is by no 
means an uncommon practice, however. In fact it is the basis upon which governments (and 
corporations) routinely raise capital through the issuance of bonds (government bonds are often 
called T-bills in the US and Gilts in the UK). The bond is sold at a discount to its face value on a 
future maturity date when the payment becomes due. (The difference in issuing price and value at 
maturity is calculated as an interest rate on a loan, and bonds are often referred to as interest-rate 
assets). Importantly, when banks purchase bonds issued by a state treasury, the state is effectively 
allowing the bank to create money with itself as the debtor. The government has the money 
credited into its account which it can then spend on the provision of goods and services. But this is 
money which needs to be repaid (with interest) by the state through taxation revenue being paid 
into the private banking sector. Heavy borrowing by government usually increases the market 
perception that there is risk of a default on repayments and results in a demand for higher interest 
rates from creditors and a reduction in the national currency’s trading value on the money markets. 
Of course, limiting government borrowing and public spending this is one of the primary pressures 
imposed by the macroeconomic paradigm shift to monetarism. As Kunczik (2002) and Soederberg 
(2002) have noted, the pressure on governments to maintain currency stability and the continuing 
capacity to borrow money at low rates means their sovereign debt must be evaluated by agencies 
such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, whose ratings are widely incorporated into operational 
schemata of banks and investment institutions. Investment banks and pension funds often operate 
portfolios with minimum rating requirements, and may be obliged to avoid bonds which fall below 
their required threshold of investment-grade98 and sell off any holdings (driving their market value 
down). Downgrades in the credit-rating of a government’s debt are financially significant because 
Increased levels of indebtedness increase the perceived likelihood of default (incurring higher 
interest rates) and potentially trigger sell-offs. Where defaults on debt do occur, any associated 
bonds are automatically downgraded to junk status, incurring significant restrictions and penalties 
on any future borrowing (something that also affected CDOs in the sub-prime crisis). As Soederberg 
(2002) points out, these pressures have sometime led governments to modify their economic 
policies in negotiation with the ratings agencies in order to satisfy their criteria for a required credit 
rating. Indeed, the incorporation of credit ratings as a measure of credit risk within the 
intersubjective codifications underpinning institutional investors’ trading decisions means that the 
award of a rating performatively constitutes an implicitly reflexive change in market fundamentals 
(even though it is evident that ratings agencies sometimes misjudge financial risk or base ratings on 
models that do not take into account contextual specifics of the economies concerned). Rather like 
the appearance of digits constituting monetary credit in a bank account, the ratings agencies’ award 
of a credit-rating grade is therefore not merely representative, but constitutive of market reality. 
Thus the recognised price-sensitivity of a credit ratings announcement and the incorporation of this 
factor into institutional trading schemata performatively establishes ratings as a market 
fundamental.  
 
The ability of governments to raise money to provide public services, education, health and welfare 
is one of the most complex and fractious policy issues in contemporary society. The imperatives of 
capital interests and the norms of monetarist macroeconomics since the late 1970s have imposed 
significant constraints on the state in this regard. With the exception of the minting of cash (M0) and 
indirect control of national currency exchange rates through adjusting interest rates, the availability 
of money depends on the private banking system. The control of the money supply by private 
capital interests has far reaching implications for the balance of relations among state, capital and 
civil society. It also has important implications for the theoretical debate between political economic 
and cultural economic perspectives over the extend to which money is a form of structural power or 
an expression of human agency (see Dodd, 1994, 1995b; Gilbert, 2005). Such tensions are 
discernible in the differences between Marx (1867) and Simmel (1907/1990) and also several 
                                                 
98
 Investment grades usually means BBB or higher on the Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s scales. However, 
this is determined by the investing institution. Low risk funds may have a higher threshold, while some hedge 
funds will often buy junk bonds if their relative risk-return ratio is attractive.  
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debates concerning the nature of money in the journal Economy and Society, notably in the 
exchanges between Fine & Lapavitsas (2000), Zelizer (2000) and Ingham (2001). For Marx (1867) 
money facilitates the extraction of surplus value through exchange on the accumulation circuits and 
is therefore inseparable from the structural power-relations of the class system. Simmel 
(1907/1990) also recognised the depersonalising aspects of monetary exchange but in contrast to 
Marx, he also regarded money as conferring social power. In that regard money is coterminous with 
individual agency (see Dodd, 1995b). An analogous structure-agency tension emerges between 
Fine & Lapavitsas’ (2000) neo-Marxist critique of cultural approaches to money and Zelizer’s (1994) 
insistence that money’s forms and functions are shaped by agencies in specific cultural contexts. 
Although  Fine & Lapavitsas usefully develop the notion of generalised purchasing power as the 
source of monetary power and accept that not all markets are homogenous, they emphasise that 
any account of money and markets needs to be placed in a framework of commodity production 
(and hence class relations). Thus they account for variations in the socio-cultural forms of markets 
in terms of different commodity forms, thereby locating monetary/economic power within a general 
Marxist framework. Zelizer (2000) rejects Fine & Lapavitsas’ attempt to explain socio-cultural 
variations in money and markets on the basis of commodity relations. She argues that their attempt 
to explain monetary heterogeneity with a Marxist framework misconstrues the theoretical basis of 
her emphasis on how cultural norms and market agencies become inscribed on monetary forms in 
specific contexts, earmarking it for particular uses with particular meanings. Zelizer instead 
suggests that monetary forms always have a dual function, on general economic circuits and in 
localised form of exchange;  
 
‘Seen from the top, economic transactions connect with broad national symbolic 
meanings and institutions. Seen from the bottom, however, economic transactions are 
highly differentiated, personalised, and local, meaningful to particular relations. No 
contradiction therefore exists between uniformity and diversity: they are simply two 
different aspects of the same transaction’ (2000, p.386).  
 
From that statement, Zelizer’s perspective would seem consistent with the argument that the 
industrial accumulation circuit‘s pursuit of exchange value (M-C-M’) can operate as a complement 
to the pursuit of use-value within the lifeworld, through which labour is exchanged for the money 
needed to buy commodities (C-M-C). However, in capitalist society, such lifeworld activity is 
subordinated to the broad imperatives of accumulation; it is not the investment of labour in 
production of commodities according to the producers’ own needs. Indeed, insofar as the culture 
industry is able to fetishise the value of the goods capital sees fit to produce (through advertising 
and consumerist discourses), the money thus earned is arguably used to satisfy artificially-
stimulated demands. Moreover, as neoliberal/ monetarist policies drive down real wages and 
pressure governments to reduce spending on public services, the consumption of commodities in 
line with use values increasingly relies on credit from the banking system.  However, Zelizer’s 
subsequent comments indicate a more fundamental departure from such political-economic 
limitations. She explicitly opposes Fine and Lapavitsas’ (2000) suggestion that the generalised 
properties of money are what allow market variations to arise within the broader parameters of 
commodity production, arguing that, ‘Except for common properties that are true by definition, 
markets vary systematically in the way they set prices, in the relations among producers, and in the 
kinds of transactions that connect producers and consumers’ (Zelizer, 2000, p. 386).  
 
Zelizer then proceeds to explain how her (1994) analyses of monetary usage and earmarking within 
households or welfare economies was intended to demonstrate that the ostensibly corrosive effect 
of money and market forces on the lifeworld was not apparent even in the most vulnerable 
environments and that socially vigorous relations were evident. This invokes the classic stand-off 
between political economy and cultural studies, whereby the agencies emerging in social 
microcosm are set against the determinism of macro-structures (e.g. see the terse exchange 
between Grossberg, 1995 and Garnham, 1995). Unfortunately, this undermines Zelizer’s claim to 
account for both systemic macro-uniformity and micro-diversity. Structural claims regarding the 
economic corrosion of lifeworld relations are not refuted by evidence of vibrant social complexities 
in the way poor families use their money. Indeed, such creative agency may well be necessitated by 
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the adverse economic conditions that stem precisely from the gearing of society to the imperatives 
of accumulation99.  
 
Zelizer (1994, 2000) is nevertheless correct to argue that there are many different forms of 
monetary practices in different social contexts. As Ingham (2001) points out, Zelizer does not base 
her analysis on a definitive account of what money is or how it comes into being (which makes 
sense if one assumes that its forms and functions are always shaped in local context). The issue 
here is not that Zelizer’s insistence on monetary heterogeneity is intrinsically flawed; the problem is 
that Zelizer’s emphasis on how variations in monetary practices become inscribed by local cultural 
inflections and familial earmarking does not clearly differentiate between the kinds of variations that 
are possible within the codifications of capitalist economies and those that are possible outside of 
capitalism. Applied to local credit systems that devise their own credit tokens, religious communes 
that eschew money, online bartering and file-sharing, and communities which are not (yet) 
integrated into capitalist markets, there are manifold variations in economic practices and in the 
form and function of monetary forms that would never be possible within capitalism. In other words, 
the intersubjective codifications which define what counts as money, who gets it and what can be 
done with it can be distinct from capitalist relations and (at least partly) independent of global 
macro-economic conditions100.  
 
As Rowbotham (1998) points out, there is a ‘double demand’ for money, firstly as a requisite 
medium for acquiring goods and services, and secondly, as a means of servicing the debts through 
which the vast majority of money was introduced into the economy. Thus even when money 
circulates according to lifeworld codifications involving purposes other than accumulation, the 
overall trajectory of monetary flows within the economic system is vectored such that money must 
flow back to the credit-issuing institutions from which they originated, fulfilling the logic of the M-M’ 
circuit. Douglas (1924) and Rowbotham (1998) liken this dependency on debt-money to peonage 
(enslavement through unpayable debt): The entire economic system depends on the availability of 
money created through the issuance of private debt (to mortgagees, consumers and governments 
as well as corporations and financial institutions themselves) that must be repaid with interest. On a 
systemic level, this prevents any aggregate flows of money towards purposes that preclude 
reaccumulation and repayment (if money was borrowed and donated to charity, the obligation to 
service the debt would remain). This suggests that regardless of lifeworld diversions, the credit/debt 
origins of money inscribe it with an earmark that ultimately requires and repayment reaccumulation. 
 
As Marx himself observed, money loaned as interest-bearing credit ‘shall return to its point of 
departure after a definite time interval, and […] it shall return as realised capital- a capital having 
realised its use-value, its power of creating surplus-value’ (1894, p.354). Capitalist money might be 
momentarily diverted to serve other purposes, but these are counter-currents within the prevailing 
flow of an asymmetrical monetary tide; the codifications of capitalist credit money eventually 
demand that it be rendered unto Caesar. Although Dodd’s (1994) analysis of money differs from 
Marx, he acknowledges money’s role in the formation of exploitative social relations: ‘It is 
                                                 
99
 For example, a NZ Department of Labour report (2006) noted that, among lower socio-economic groups, 
long hours of work correlated with declining incomes, suggesting that the poor are working harder and longer 
for less reward. Such trends have significant implications for the time available to spend pursuing lifeworld 
goals at home with one’s family (see also Beder, 2001; AFLCIO, 2005; Business Week, 3 October, 2005). 
Meanwhile, ‘necessity entrepreneurship’ (i.e. efforts to find new ways of making money in order to survive: see 
Frederick, 2004) may well be socially vibrant and creative in Zelizer’s terms, but it is also most prevalent in 
developing countries where abject poverty and economic desperation is otherwise inescapable.  
 
100
 Within capitalist societies, however, monetary practices on the micro-cultural level may well exhibit many 
different codifications. For example, a network of neighbours in a poor socioeconomic area might devise an 
informal mutual support system for extending micro-credit to each other or enabling the proverbial cup of sugar 
to be borrowed if someone runs short. Superficially, this might be construed as a subversion of the capitalist 
accumulation circuits, deploying agency embedded in lifeworld relations to recode M-C-M’ and M-M’ into C-M-
C and reprioritise use-values. But it is important to emphasise that such practices remain subordinate to the 
primary economic and codifications stemming primarily from the activities of major corporate, financial and 
political institutions. The terms upon which money is made available through employment opportunities, 
welfare or borrowing and the availability of goods and services are often not negotiable.  
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undeniably the case that money has been bound up with the unequal distribution of wealth and 
property whenever and wherever it is used […] Money has been chronically implicated in the 
economic, cultural and political processes which have ensured that social inequality is not merely 
sustained but institutionalised’ (1994, p.159). 
 
There is also a third demand for money in addition to the two Rowbotham 1998) identifies. In 
addition to the monetary demands of people, governments and businesses seeking to set up or 
expand production. As Henwood (1998) and Lowenstein (2000) point out, borrowing has also 
become a key element in financial speculation (Henwood, 1998; Lowenstein, 2000). For example, 
when investment funds seek to exploit marginal differences in the prices of securities, they routinely 
borrow money to ‘leverage’ their investment, thereby amplifying potential profits (and losses). The 
recent global credit crunch arose partly because banks stopped lending money to each other, 
restricting the overall liquidity in the financial system. At the same time, financial de/reregulation has 
allowed a much wider range of  financial institutions (such as pension funds) to issue credit both to 
consumers and each other, effectively creating a ‘shadow-banking’ system with fewer controls than 
regular banks (such as fractional reserve requirements). As Geithner (2008) observes, the shadow 
banking system is now worth trillions of dollars and in some areas of credit is larger than the regular 
banking sector (notably in the forms of debt-based securities implicated in the credit crunch). Credit-
money is integral to a capitalist economy, and the key institutions of capital are themselves 
dependent on credit systems. Indeed, the central role of credit expansion in the (dys)functioning of 
financial markets was recognised by Minsky (1977, 1982, 1992), whose analysis of financial 
markets recognised an endogenous propensity for crisis stemming from credit cycles (see Chapter 
6).  
 
The analysis of the socio-cultural dimensions of monetary systems certainly reveals complexities in 
the way that money is deployed in particular contexts and underlines the need to understand the 
particular agencies that underpin monetary assets. Monetary forms always exist within networks of 
specific agencies (the electronic symbols on bank computer screens only constitute money in the 
context of appropriate institutional codifications). However, recognising the symbolic of money is not 
an alternative to a political-economic analysis of capitalism but a necessary component of it. 
Recognising how monetary forms themselves come into being through credit, and in turn how the 
future interest payment on the debt is coded into forms of financial security to which fictitious value 
is ascribed in the present is a necessary precursor to analysing the processes through which 
financial markets operate. The symbolic ontology of financial values helps explain how capitalism 
may be periodically able to overcome its internal contradictions through a symbolic fix on the M-M’ 
circuit, and also how such processes have intensified financial markets’ predilection for crisis and 
implosions of value.  
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Chapter 8: Reflexivity, fictitious values,  symbolic fixes 
and crisis  
 
 
Informational efficiency and symmetry 
 
Babe (1994, 1995, 1996) has suggested that the communicative processes which underpin (and 
constitute) economic activity have in several important respects been the ‘blindspot’ of neoclassical 
economics. Although the importance of information is certainly recognised in formal economics (e.g. 
see Hayek, 1945; Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1974; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980), it tends to 
assume the mechanistic transmission of unambiguous data about an objective, external market 
reality, the fundamental facts about which are readily discernible and communicable. Neoclassical 
analyses regard market actors as rational and consistent in the way they respond to information 
(Carey, 1994; Shleifer, 2000) such that, through the mechanism of the invisible hand, prices are 
driven to their ‘correct’ equilibrium point.  The efficient markets hypothesis  (or EMH; see Fama, 
1970, Shleifer, 2000; Ross, Westefield & Jaffe, 2002) assumes all available market information is 
automatically incorporated into the prices of goods/ securities, precluding the possibility of 
generating abnormal returns (higher than the market average) by trading on asymmetrically 
distributed information101. The neoclassical notion of communication therefore entails an implicit, 
positivist assumption that information is representative of objective market conditions.   
  
As Carey (1995) notes, electronic communications have largely eliminated opportunities for simple 
arbitrage. Because market news and changes in price data appear on everyone’s Bloomberg and 
Thomson-Reuters terminals simultaneously, prices for most globally traded assets and commodities 
have converged. This suggests that, despite the scale and sophistication of financial 
communication systems,  no trading advantage can be derived from generally available market 
information102. Transparency regimes requiring timely public disclosure of price-sensitive 
information such as the Basel accords do not completely preclude insider trading, However, the 
opportunities for informational asymmetry among investment institutions are generally very limited.  
 
Paradoxically though, were it not for asymmetrical distributions of information and/or 
interpretations/motivations, markets would cease to function: The reason sellers sell and buyers buy 
is precisely because information, meanings, and/or motives vary between them. If all market actors 
knew that a particular commodity or security was going to increase/decrease in price and attached 
exactly the same value to owning it, then none of those in a position to sell/buy it would have any 
incentive to do so, and there would be an evaporation of liquidity (see Golding, 2003). Although 
such situations are exceptional, market crises and bubbles are both characterised by symmetries of 
information, semantics and agency which polarise activity and precipitate a collective mania or 
panic of price-insensitive buying or selling (Kindleberger, 1996; Dunbar, 2000). Similarly, the recent 
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 Ross et al. point out that there are different interpretations of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH). The 
strong version holds that all relevant market information is always publicly available to all market actors and 
that this means the information will instantly become incorporated into prices (assuming that insider trading is 
prohibited). The semi-strong version is similar but allows for the fact that insider trading may occur. This still 
predicts a ‘random walk’ in investing, meaning neither technical data (historical price patterns) nor fundamental 
data (core data about the consistency of company earnings in ratio to share price, credit risk assessment, and 
other factors reliably known to be price-sensitive) can confer an advantage. The weak version holds that 
abnormal returns cannot be generated on the basis of any information that is already public, including patterns 
of past price movements. However, this version does not preclude the possibility of information being subject 
to asymmetrical lags or (in principle) the discovery of information about market fundamentals before other 
investors.  
 
102
 Although this symmetry of market data and prices does not preclude significant disadvantage if a trader 
suffers lags in information flow. Nevertheless, arbitrage is not entirely ruled out by symmetries of information 
and pricing, because sometimes price discrepancies can emerge between different assets whose 
fundamentals suggest identical value. One strategy used to generate profits from marginal spreads is to trade 
in very large volumes (using borrowed and money and derivatives to ‘leverage’ the trade) thereby amplifying 
the profits (and potential losses).  
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credit crunch stemmed partly from a wide range of banking institutions all deciding that the risk of 
lending to each other in an environment where the stability of the banking sector itself was 
uncertain would not be prudent.  
 
The apparent paradox of informationally symmetrical markets being able to function can 
nevertheless be resolved. The fact that investors share the same fundamental codifications does 
not preclude significant variations of meanings/ interpretations/ motivations within those parameters 
across different institutional contexts. Informational asymmetry refers to the uneven distribution of 
market information contingent/game information (e.g. one trader having access to a Bloomberg 
terminal while another makes do with yesterday’s Financial Times). Semantic asymmetry would 
arise from different market actors having symmetrical access to information but ascribing different 
meanings to it (e.g. deciding whether or not an analyst’s buy/sell recommendations are reliable). 
Agency asymmetry, meanwhile, refers to variations in institutional decision-making schemata, 
different tolerances for risk, and particular portfolio compositions, leading to different meanings 
being attributed to the same information (e.g. the news that an asset/security has been awarded a 
BBB rating will result in different meanings and responses depending on whether or one holds that 
asset/security and whether the rating meets the institution’s risk threshold). 
 
The symmetry issue can be clarified further using the different forms of reflexivity mentioned earlier: 
By differentiating between implicit/performative information concerning basic market schemata, 
explicit/ transactional information constituted by actual financial trading, and contingent /game 
information about other variables, events and actors regarded as price-sensitive (including market 
news announcements), it is possible to assert that symmetry would be high in the first and the 
second categories, but that symmetry of the third type would be subject to variation.  
 
In regard to the implicit/performative form of reflexive information, market actors’ trading schemata 
may not be identical, but these codifications have to broadly agree on a fundamental level in order 
to allow mutual recognition of legitimate money forms and asset types as well as the channels and 
modes of market action. For example, in his study of narrative forms in the Bank of Canada, Smart 
(1999) noted the institutional importance of the Quarterly Projection Model in providing the set of 
references through which a shared sense of market reality could be formed; ‘As a shared 
representation of the economy and a common analytic framework, QPM contributes in an important 
way to the intersubjectivity- the ground of shared understandings- that makes possible the 
intellectual collaboration of the bank’s economists.’ (1999, p.256). The performative dimension of 
such codifications can be seen in the way that the external validity and predictive accuracy of 
investment models can vary according to how extensively they are incorporated into trading 
schemata. Henwood points out that the development of theoretically abstract models that posit 
relations between financial variables that are themselves abstract constructs can potentially lead to 
self-referentiality; ‘In the hermetic world of conventional analysis, prices are explained with regard to 
other prices, output with regard to other outputs and so on- a circular, almost onanistic process of 
analysis.’ (1998, p. 142-3). As Lewis suggests, models may be adopted not because of any 
confidence in their representational validity, but simply because of their intersubjective recognition 
by other investors: 
 
‘[T]he speculators […] had an amazing array of irrational systems to help them win 
money  [but] there was one good reason for using the charts; everyone else did. If 
you believed that large sums of money were about to be invested on the basis of a 
chart, then, as dumb as it made you feel, it made sense to look at that chart; 
perhaps it would enable you to place your bet first, and get in front of the coming 
wave.’ (1989, p.191-192).  
 
The Bank of International Settlements found that the development of mathematically complex 
investment instruments was partly driven by the need to increase the correspondence between 
portfolio structures and investment models (Henwood, 1998). In other words, financial reality was 
being reshaped to correspond to the theory. Indeed, the utility of theories such as the Miller-
Modigliani capital structure theorem and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has varied in line 
with market confidence in their validity. Mackenzie & Millo (2003) and MacKenzie, (2004) identify a 
similar variation in the external validity of the Black-Scholes equation for pricing options. Although 
investors need to be familiar with any new trading model that might provide an advantage, 
 115 
symmetrical availability of a model erodes the advantage it confers. However, developing new 
models that reflexively anticipate current investment practices may performatively alter current 
market behaviours. Indeed, as Henwood (1998) observes, many market analyst forecasts use 
technical models based on past price movements and pay close attention to the forecasts of other 
analysts. Along with the aforementioned institutional pressures on analysts, this often renders 
market forecasts unreliable. As the graph below illustrates, analysts’ S&P500 forecasts have tended 
to track historical price movements, meaning that they are, in effect, predicting the past.  
 
 
Fig. 5 
 
Reproduced with permission of SG Equity Research (2008; sourced from Montier, 2008) 
 
The explicit/transactional form of reflexive information will generally be symmetrical insofar as price 
movements due to trading activity are publicly accessible and non-contestable (because the unit of 
account is fixed in the implicit/performative codifications). Given that most institutional investors 
have access to real-time wire services, the current ask-bid levels are normally discernible even 
when no recent transactions have taken place. The intersubjectively coherent valuation of assets is 
underpinned trading screens, public displays in exchanges and institutional records of transactions 
(see Abolafia, 1998103, Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger, 2002b). Transactional reflexivity involves the 
crystallization of the current price of a security through buying/selling. In the absence of any 
transaction to performatively manifest the current selling price, trading screens usually display the 
level of public ask-bid spreads, indicating that a market agent is willing to buy or sell a given 
quantity of a security at a particular price. However, the actual depth of that liquidity is not always 
discernible, and if the ask/bid spread is large, then trading can potentially seize up. As noted earlier, 
a change in the current trading price though trading a particular quantum of securities 
metonymically extends to all the other securities, even though these were not traded. When liquidity 
is limited, there is potential for a relatively small volume of trading to exert a disproportionate effect 
on the price (and fictitious value) of the entire holdings of a security. As Golding observes, ‘Share 
prices are made at the margin. It takes little buying or selling- in relation to the number of shares 
outstanding- to move a share price’ (2003, p.72). Two examples illustrate the process through 
which explicit/transactional reflexivity amplifies fictitious values. In May 2006, a leaked NZ 
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 Abolafia’s (1998) ethnographic analyses of financial exchanges leads him to distinguish between the 
‘regulative’ rules of practice (e.g. formal codes of practice about the sequencing of customer orders by brokers) 
and ‘constitutive’ rules which concern emergent scripts and norms of practice (such as expectations about 
what counts as fair trading) that underpin trader identity and agency. This conception of constitutive rules 
overlaps with but is not identical to the conception of implicit/ performative reflexivity and the constitutive 
aspects of communicative action being developed in the current discussion.  
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government report revealed plans to ‘unbundle’ the ‘local loop’ and led to a minor panic on the NZX 
exchange, wiping NZ$2.2 billion dollars off the value of Telecom NZ. This implosion of fictitious 
capital was generated by just NZ$60m in actual trading of Telecom stocks (Good Returns, 11 May 
2006).  More significantly, the crude oil price rises that saw the price of a barrel pushed to an record 
US$100 in January 2008 were attributed to the actions of a single transaction by one trader BBC 
News (3 January 2008). The New York Mercantile Exchange reported that a single trade involving 
the purchase of a futures contract for 1000 barrels (the minimum quantum) pushed the price of 
crude to an unprecedented US$100, only to be followed an immediate resale of the barrels for 
US$99.40, making a US$600 loss (the trade was intended to claim ‘bragging rights’ over setting a 
record price). However, this underlines the point that a notional US$100,000 transaction involving a 
futures contract for a mere 1000 barrels performatively generated a change in  the current 
exchange value of crude oil across the entire market. Although these fictitious prices are often 
transitory and merely indicate the potential to liquidate the assets at the denoted price, the notional 
increase in capital can be calculated as a return on investment. Through this mechanism, it 
becomes possible to expand returns out of proportion to actual revenue or the volume/velocity of 
money deployed in trading. This is the core mechanism of the ‘symbolic fix’ for capital accumulation, 
but as will become apparent, it is also a mechanism that predisposes the financial system towards 
periodic crisis.  
 
The game/contingent form of reflexive information is potentially less symmetrical than the implicit or 
explicit forms. For example, information about price movements will be symmetrically distributed, 
but the extent to which that is significant to an investor’s trading schemata will depend on whether 
they focus on technical data or follow price momentum. Similarly, a market analyst’s 
recommendations can be symmetrical in distribution, but their significance may depend not of the 
ostensible accuracy of their predictions but on whether other investors pay attention to them. For 
example, George Soros’ speculation against UK sterling in 1992 or the news of heavy short-selling 
by currency speculators prior to the SE Asian currency crisis in 1997-8 suggest a potential for self-
fulfilling market expectations. Indeed, what such cases illustrate is not so much a problem with 
objectivity or accuracy but a problem with symmetry. If information about the fundamentals is 
available to all market actors in real time, then it is likely to confer no trading advantage. However, 
this does not simply confirm the ‘random walk’ predicted by the EMH. Rather, it means that to gain 
any trading edge, investors must seek out other forms of information which may include self-
referential monitoring of other market agents’ opinions and trading behaviour. The contingent/game 
aspect stems from the indeterminacy of the variables that can potentially influence trading 
decisions. It seems clear that the financial media play a key role in shaping such perceptions (e.g. 
see Sant & Zaman, 1996; Davis, 2005), but just what kind of role is precisely what the empirical 
study seeks to ascertain.  
 
Fictitious value and Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
The work of Hyman Minsky (1977, 1982, 1992; also see Bellofiore & Ferri, 2001) emphasises the 
centrality of money/credit system and endogenous feedback loops in the generation of financial 
bubbles/ crises. Minksy’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) was marginalised by mainstream 
economic theory, partly because it rejected a core premise of the dominant neoliberal/monetarist 
paradigm, namely the assumption that market instability and inefficiency stemmed primarily from 
exogenous attempts to interfere with market processes (such as government regulation). The 
applicability of his theories to the recent sub-prime mortgage and ‘credit crunch’ crises has led to a 
posthumous interest in his work, however. The fact that his work has often gone unacknowledged in 
media discourses, policy thinking and mainstream economics textbooks does not seem to have 
prevented its recognition in investment circles104. This suggests that Parsons’ (1989) argument 
concerning the proliferation of financial discourses through the media may need to distinguish 
between public media and specialist financial media.  
 
                                                 
104
 Minsky’s ideas have long been recognised within elite investment circles, as evidenced by 
repeated references in top analyst newsletters and online forums (e.g. John Mauldin’s Outside the 
Box and Thoughts from the Frontline newsletters and blog). 
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Minsky’s work is often characterised as neo-Keynesian, but as Keen (2001) and Pineault (2001) 
both observe, his recognition of the intrinsic instability of financial accumulation means there is 
potential to transcode the FIH  into a neo-Marxist account of accumulation crises. Minsky (1977) 
differentiated between two systems of pricing in the economy, which appear analogous to the 
Marxist M-C-M’ and M-M’ circuits. Minsky recognises the potential for disjuncture between the 
respective factors that determine prices in commodity production and financial exchange:  
 
‘The money wage rate is a dominant determinant of the supply price of investment 
output [i.e. commodity production]. The price of a capital asset is a determinant of the 
demand price of a comparable investment good. Given that the price level of capital 
assets [i.e. M-M’] and investment output [i.e. M-C-M’] are based upon quite different 
principles, it is not surprising that, at times, they can and do get out of ‘alignment’. This 
is especially so when […] positions in capital assets as well as the investment output in 
the process of being produced are debt financed, so that changing in financing terms 
affect both the supply price of investment outputs with significant gestation periods as 
well as the market value of capital assets.’ (Minksy, 1977, p.142). 
 
As Hummel (2002) explains, Minsky’s analysis recognises that returns on investment come to 
depend not only on consumption of commodities (M-C-M’) but on constant expansion of revenue 
streams from financial investment (M-M’). In line with the temporal fix based on credit (see Chapter 
6), when the available money is insufficient to buy all the available commodities/securities, then 
increasing the level of overall capital investment can help ensure there is sufficient money in the 
system (both quantity and velocity) to allow surplus exchange value to be realised. However, this 
depends on the availability of credit and the expectations of future returns (which determine both 
current asset prices and the assessment of financial risk; see Golding, 2003). Those expectations of 
returns and perceptions of risk are influenced by endogenous cycles and self-referential (and self-
reinforcing) feedback loops within the financial circuit of accumulation. Although Minsky does not 
examine the communicative aspects of these processes in any detail, there is an implicit recognition 
that investor psychology is reflexively influenced by endogenous signals generated by their own 
trading activities. 
 
Minsky’s (1977, 1982) Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) points out that periods of  financial 
market stability generate the conditions for future instability. A perceived investment opportunity 
(such as the development of new financial instruments promising attractive returns) generates 
demand for credit from the investment sector. The ensuing investment fuels market activity and an 
expansion of financial market values. This growth encourages market optimism and minimises risk 
perception both among investors and lenders. In turn, there is an expansion of low-interest credit 
due to increased confidence in borrowers’ ability to repay debt from future returns. This allows a 
positive feedback loop to form, whereby financial market growth engenders euphoria among 
investors and banks, generating further cheap credit expansion on the expectation that further 
market growth will continue and ensure debts are repaid. In effect, the current returns constitute a 
signal confirming the validity of investor expectations of future growth. Thus the risk of future 
defaults on loans is (mis)calculated on the basis of currently optimistic perceptions of future 
increases in value, inductively inferred from recent market trends. Minksy (1977, 1982, 1992) 
suggests that this entails two transitions in the structural quality of the credit-debt relations 
underpinning investment.  Initially, ‘hedge finance’105 allows borrowers to fulfil all their payment 
obligations from current cash flows, so if the investments made with the borrowed capital did not 
generate the expected returns, the debts could still be repaid. However, as credit levels expand, the 
continued expansion of market values becomes underpinned by ‘speculative finance’. This means 
that the interest on the debt used to fund investments can still be covered by current cash flows, but 
repayment of the principal debt must be deferred, pending as-yet-unrealised increases in 
investment earnings. Although this means that increases in interest rates or reductions in earnings 
may place the investor in a default scenario, the continuation of the positive feedback loop may lead 
                                                 
105
 Hedge finance in this context has nothing specific to do with hedge funds, except that it suggests 
risks/liabilities are evenly balanced by other investments/ revenue streams, i.e. current interest obligations. 
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to investment becoming underpinned by ‘Ponzi finance106‘. This means that the repayment 
requirements on the borrowed capital can only be serviced if the investor can liquidate the assets in 
which they have invested the loan, or by borrowing even more money either to cover short-term 
interest obligations or invest in the hope of making quick returns (none of which are probable in a 
cycle of declining expectations, credit and liquidity). In other words, the symbolic creation of 
fictitious value ends up depending on a pyramid scheme of credit. Crucially, the points of inflection 
from hedge to speculative to Ponzi finance are not discernible during the expansionary phase of the 
credit cycle because continuing returns/ market price increases appear to confirm the validity of 
continued optimism and low risk estimates.  
 
As Perelman (1987) points out, the expansion of fictitious financial values is erroneously interpreted 
as an indicator of a robust economy. However, the increasing structural fragility of the underlying 
debt-finance eventually leads to crisis when, returns on some investments fail to meet market 
expectations. Because asset prices already factor in price expectations and risk calculations, this 
triggers downward revisions of asset values which reduces the collateral holdings of borrowers. 
This leads the banking system to re-assess the risk of maintaining their loans to investors. Interest 
rates increase and creditors may demand that assets be liquidated to increase borrowers’ collateral 
‘margin’. This can shift hedge-financed investments into speculative or Ponzi forms. As Minsky 
(1977, 1982, 1992) suggests, the positive feedback cycle that generated the boom is now primed to 
reverse and turn negative. A shock to market expectations such as a debt-default, a ratings 
downgrade, an interest rate hike, or weak returns in a growth sector107 leads to securities being 
sold, driving down their market values (see later discussion of pricing mechanisms), amplified by 
the panic of investors who find that their Ponzi-type exposure means debts can only be serviced if 
securities are sold off. However, the required returns cannot be realised in a market panic where 
everyone is trying to sell. Defaults on loans accumulate, which not only reduce the expected returns 
and market value of the creditor institutions, but also implode the value of any assets based on the 
securitization of the debts (i.e. future revenue streams) they have created. As Dodd (1994) 
observes, ‘Economic expectations are formed on the basis of perceptions of stability and instability 
[…] In this sense, expectations can on aggregate resemble something of a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
which the rational assessment of information plays an integral and constitutive role.’ (1994, p.132).  
 
Kindleberger (1996) points out that although financial crises can be manifested in different ways 
and their proximate triggers can vary, Minsky’s account of how market stability can lead to instability 
explains a wide range of financial phenomena. His framework is directly applicable to the recent 
credit crunch (see Whalen, 2007), the dot-com bubble, and the SE Asian currency crises (see 
Saqib, 2001).  Moreover, its emphasis on endogenously-generated market signals also offers a way 
of extending Marxist’s recognition of capitalism’s tendency towards accumulation crisis to 
contemporary financial markets. Although Minsky’s framework recognises that credit cycles and 
crises depend on institutional-level market perceptions and (mis)interpretations of key indicators, it 
does not explain the symbolic processes involved or the precise role financial media might play in 
such phenomena. This is precisely where a communication-oriented framework is helpful, not only 
in extending Minksy, but also in transcoding his analysis onto a (revised) Marxist framework that 
can take account of the informational reflexivity and the symbolic dimension of capital on the M-M’ 
circuit.  
 
These processes are central to both the ‘symbolic fix’ to the contradictions of accumulation and the 
development of financial crises and bubbles. Moreover, this points to an important connection 
between crises, the financial system’s autopoietic tendency and endogenous feedback loops 
                                                 
106
 Ponzi finance refers to a kind of pyramid scheme notoriously pioneered by Charles Ponzi in 1920. This 
involves investment in a fund whose earnings depend on cash-flows generated by selling more and more 
shares in the scheme. The South Sea bubble involved an early example of this kind of scam. More recently in 
2008, former NASDAQ chairman Bernie Madoff was found to have operated the largest Ponzi scheme in 
history, scamming $65 billion from duped investors. However, as Minksy demonstrates, there are far larger 
Ponzi systems operated routinely in the financial markets.  
 
107
 The FIH holds that the structural instability of financial markets is endogenously generated. However, the 
trigger of a crisis can be endogenous or exogenous (for example, wars, natural disasters, new government 
regulations, or negative reports about the health of the economy in the media).. 
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involving reflexive communication processes. Where the intersubjective codifications specific to a 
system define processes/activities within that system as significant then the system will become 
sensitised to endogenous signals generated by its own operation. Of course, it would be unusual for 
any system not to monitor and respond to its own activities. If the system codifications become 
strongly self-referential and attach no significance to the impact of its processes/activities on 
exogenous systems, then autopoiesis may be manifested. However, a more complete account of 
reflexive processes in financial markets requires a closer examination of how the financial agents 
responsible for capital investment decisions actually make use of media and information.  
 
Communicative reflexivity and trading frames  
 
In neoclassical models, prices are determined by objective fundamentals and rational market actors 
supplied with accurate market information will drive prices to their correct equilibrium point in line 
with those fundamentals. The preceding discussion of communicative/ informational reflexivity in 
financial markets underlines why this account is not sustainable. Implicit/ performative reflexivity 
means that the concepts, models and schemata used by investors to understand market 
phenomena shape their trading activity and thus help constitute the object of their own codifications. 
Thus price movements can be driven by investor responses to price movements, especially in 
securities where ‘momentum’ or ‘noise’ traders try to predict fluctuations based on investor 
psychology. 
 
The search of a trading edge in a environment where virtually all the core market information is 
symmetrically distributed in real-time motivates the identification of new models/ frames to take 
advantage of other information. Investors must work out what factors are currently shaping the 
trading decisions of other market actors. This may give rise to herding behaviour, either through 
trading on price momentum or through following consensus opinion, analyst recommendations, or 
just the latest rumour circulating online.  There are certainly empirical examples that suggest the 
objectivity of financial news may sometimes be irrelevant if investors can anticipate that the 
aggregate trading patterns will still move prices in response to it.  For example, a report in Business 
Week (24 April, 2000) identified a concern about increasing investor reliance on often inaccurate or 
misleading information distributed via the internet from dubious sources. In one case, a Californian 
tree pruner was prosecuted by the SEC for distributing dubious stock recommendations under the 
name ‘Independent Financial Reports’. His advice was picked up by a on-line subscription financial 
news service, Business Wire, and was even cited on Bloomberg. If market analyses from amateurs 
or vested interests are as potentially influential as professional experts, then it seems curious that 
investment institutions pay significant sums for analyst reports. Henwood duly offers an explanation: 
‘Why would people pay $100,000 a year for such bad journalism?…Because it moves markets 
when it spreads beyond the circle of subscribers; if you hear it first, you can make money on it 
whether it's true or not.’ (1998 p.104).  In other words, the truth value of financial information may 
depend not on correspondence with any objective economic conditions, but on investors’ inter-
subjective confidence that other actors will take notice of the information and act upon it as if it were 
true. 
 
Despite the evidence that financial media can trigger price movements, these are not simple causal 
effects, and involve quite complex institutional and cognitive processes  (see Sant & Zaman, 1996; 
Vickers & Weiss, 2000; Busse & Green 2002;  Davis, 2005, 2006a; Frieder & Zittrain, 2006). 
Information is interpreted in the context of prevailing market expectations of future price movements 
which feed back into current valuations and form the basis of current market prices. As well-known 
financial speculator, George Soros (1994, p.29) observes, ‘Nowhere is the role of expectations 
more clearly visible than in financial markets. Buy and sell decisions are based on expectations 
about future prices, and future prices, in turn, are contingent on present buy and sell decisions.’ 
Kurtz (2000) and Golding (2003) likewise note the importance of expectations shaping the market 
response to news. Although analyst predictions are publicly reported in the financial media unofficial 
‘whisper numbers’ also circulate through the market grapevine and provide institutional traders with 
an indication of the price/earning estimates set the institutional thresholds around which prices will 
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actually move108: This raises an important issue about the interplay between public news media and 
private channels. Given that the significance of financial media reports depends on their 
interpretation in respect to prevailing expectations, and that the institutional biases of public analyst 
statements are well recognised by institutional investors, then explaining financial market behaviour 
needs to explore the other financial networks/channels/information sources through which those 
expectations are formed. Even if financial news media can trigger trading, other media/sources may 
play a more fundamental role in helping institutional investors develop an informed view of other 
market actors positions and predispositions.  
 
Financial markets are evidently sensitive to signals about financial epiphenomena that their own 
processes endogenously generate. However, not all these signals will be communicated through 
news media.  As Wark (1994) suggests, the emergence of a media-saturated space of economic 
flows means it has become problematic to discern what is information and what is noise. It might be 
contended that this depends less on the external reference to market conditions and more on the 
variables currently being incorporated into trading models/ schemata. Contingent or game reflexivity 
suggests that any number of currently-peripheral variables can become salient to investment 
decisions at different times. Rumours about the activities of other investment institutions and 
predictions of market commentators in the media are all routinely monitored and analysed for their 
implications. Analysts specialising in various markets are employed to collate, filter, condense, 
prioritise and interpret all this contingent information into a form readily intelligible to investors. The 
relevance and significance of different types of information may vary depending on the type of 
institution and market sector.   
 
The implication here is that the trading schemata of investors evolves and that a variety of variables 
could become price-sensitive if they become incorporated into those schemata (see Clark et al., 
2005; Knorr-Cetina, 2005). As Beunza & Stark (2003, 2004) point out, despite the quantity of 
information available through various financial media, its symmetrical distribution across the market 
means that any trading advantage must come from identifying, prioritising and interpreting the 
information that is most likely to move the market; ‘the challenge for traders is not to be faster, 
higher, stronger- as if the problem of the volume of data could be solved by gathering yet more- but 
in selecting what counts and making sense of the selection’ (2004, p.369). Arnoldi (2006) concurs, 
pointing out that in information-saturated trading rooms, ‘What is lacking is indeed, not information, 
what is lacking is a frame by which some information can be singled out as discrete and tangible 
information, leaving the rest behind as mere background and noise’ (p.390). In other words, despite 
(or perhaps because of) the real-time information flows on the trading screens, traders need meta-
information to tell them what kind of data needs to be monitored in order to anticipate price 
movements. This would indicate that trading frames evolve and that their validity depends on their 
correspondence with the prevailing intersubjective codifications demarcating which variables are 
currently salient. As George Soros (1994) acknowledges, the evidence that investors respond to 
perceptions/expectations of other investors’ aggregate market behaviour means that the 
neoclassical assumption that financial market prices have a natural equilibrium based on objective 
fundamentals cannot be sustained; ‘Instead of a determinate result, we have an interplay in which 
both the situation and the participants’ views are dependent variables so that an initial change 
precipitates further changes both in the situation and in the participants’ views. I call this interaction 
“reflexivity”.’ (1994, p.42 109).  
                                                 
108
 As Kurtz remarks: ‘Everything revolved around expectations; the good news was already built into the stock 
price. Analysts always set the next target, and there was intense pressure to ‘make the number’, regardless of 
how high the bar had been raised. If the company fell short, Wall Street devalued the stock.’ (2000, p.70). And 
furthermore; ‘The brokerage houses would buy up a company’s stock, publish lowball estimates for the next 
quarterly earnings and everyone would act pleasantly surprised when the company ‘beat the Street’ by a 
penny or two, looking for all the world like it was on a roll. And the media played along with the game, 
relentlessly reporting the artificially low estimates and then breathlessly touting the better-than-expected 
results.’ (2000, p.227-228).  
 
109
 More specifically, Soros argues that the financial markets exhibit a reflexive process whereby prices are 
determined by two factors, ‘prevailing bias’ and ‘underlying trend’ (1994, p.50). The former refers to observable 
patterns of aggregate market perceptions manifested  in the common reference point of shifting prices. The 
latter refers, rather nebulously, to unobserved/ subliminal factors which shape market actors’ perceptions of 
market events. Both are, in turn, shaped by price movements, and Soros uses these concepts to develop a 
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Soros goes on to explain that:   
 
‘Stock market valuations have a direct way of influencing underlying values: 
through the issue and repurchase of shares and options and through corporate 
transactions of all kinds- mergers, acquisitions, going public, going private, and so 
on. There are also more subtle ways in which stock prices may influence the 
standing of a company: credit rating, consumer acceptance, management 
credibility, etc. […] I contend that market valuations are always distorted; moreover- 
and this is the crucial departure from equilibrium theory- the distortions can affect 
underlying values. Stock prices are not merely passive reflections; they are active 
ingredients in a process in which both stock prices and the fortunes of companies 
whose stock are traded are determined.’ (1994, p.48-49).   
 
The relationship between the producers/ distributors of economic information and those who use it 
to make trading/ investment decisions is a complex one, often involving contradictory imperatives. 
For both analysts and traders, markets are embodied and mediated through a variety of channels 
and electronic screen displays (see Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2001, 2002a). These may include, in 
varying priority, public news from mass media, financial wire-services and real-time market updates, 
reports from specialist market analysts (especially ratings agencies), advice and tips from 
colleagues and insider sources, and, of course, the monitoring of other investors' market activity 
(Henwood, 1998; Rothkopf, 1999). Smart (1999) points out that a key role of financial analysts is to 
render market data intelligible by articulating narratives that are meaningful in terms of their 
institution’s operational schemata, thereby  providing a frame to help orientate trading decisions. 
These translations of data into meaningful discourses is extends beyond passive de-coding. There 
is an active, performative aspect through which the codifications become intersubjective. This is 
significant not only within the institution but also on a broader market level when analysts comment 
publicly in the media. Even if analysts’ opinions are not accepted uncritically, they may act as 
primary definers in imposing a frame of reference around which the perceptions of other market 
actors will tend to crystallise. The role of analysts extends beyond basic buy/hold/sell 
recommendations. Media coverage is often desired by analysts because of the visibility and 
credibility this confers upon their account or ‘story’ of how and why market events occurred. 
Particularly where markets conditions are complex or uncertain, analyst frames may be contested. 
Having the market pay attention to an institution’s preferred frame/story can therefore be an 
important factor in ensuring the aggregate reaction is not unfavourable to its interests.  
 
Beunza & Stark’s (2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b) detailed analyses of social relations and technologies 
deployed in financial institutions emphasise the trading-floor as the principal  node of financial 
agency.  Although exchanges remain an important point of interaction and reference point in terms 
of prices and indexes it is through the agency manifested on the actual trading-floor that the 
trajectory of global capital flows are largely determined, particularly since electronic brokerage 
systems largely replaced pit trading and reterritorialised investment through interlinked but spatially 
remote terminals (see also Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002a, 2002b). Of particular interest to 
Beunza and Stark is the way in which traders across different financial sub-markets (bonds, stocks, 
currencies etc.) engage with each other in ‘heterarchical’ formations to share knowledge and 
actively construct the models and schemata and decision-making frames that will confer a trading 
advantage (see also Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger’s [2002] conception of financial ‘conversations’). 
Beunza & Stark (2004, 2005a) point out that calculative frame-making is key role of analysts in 
investment institutions. This is particularly important where securities need to be valued in volatile 
market contexts where ambiguity/ uncertainty is high, because the calculative frames shape what 
kinds of information are coded as significant and what data is excluded as noise (see Tversky & 
                                                                                                                                                     
model of boom-bust cycles reflecting their mutual interference and amplification over time. The utility of Soros’ 
theory is somewhat impaired by his use of terminology which begs further explanation. Specifically, his 
arguments about the reflexive relations between price movements and ‘biases’ or ‘trends’ do not explain how 
the latter phenomena come about. Thus while his enormous success as a trader is indicative of the validity of 
Soros’ insights into the internal processes of financial markets, his epistemology is vague. A focus on the 
informational and communicative processes in financial markets provide a clearer basis for a deeper 
understanding into these reflexive processes.    
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Kahneman, 1981; Arnoldi, 2006). Beunza & Stark (2004) pay particular attention to contemporary 
arbitrage practices. Although informational symmetries render traditional arbitrage well-night 
impossible, returns can still be generated from exploiting spreads between asset prices that 
valuation models suggest will converge. This involves identification of potential price correlations 
between securities that the market has not yet identified, otherwise trading will close the spreads 
before a profitable position can be taken (i.e. buying the underpriced asset and short-selling the 
overpriced one). Such strategies depends in part on the anticipation that the market will in due 
course become sensitised to the trading frame or ‘story’110 and trade accordingly converging the 
prices and locking in a profit for the arbitrageur. The constant refinement of the models is facilitated 
partly through the heterarchical cross-referencing of the different schemata used in different trading 
desks/ different trading strategies. What this suggests is an evolving tension between the prevailing 
intersubjective codifications among investors and the reflexive incorporation of those codifications 
into new models/schemata which confers the innovating institution an advantage..  
 
Although Beunza and Stark (2004, 2005b) emphasise these processes on an institutional level, 
they also help explain contingent/ game reflexivity on a broader level; the aggregation of efforts to 
ensure  investment models/schemata do not become outmoded requires on-going monitoring of the 
validity of one’s own models and schemata as well as indications of shifts in the models/variables 
influencing other investors’ trading strategies. The constructed ontology of market fundamentals 
becomes apparent here; if market models evolve so as to collectively incorporate a particular 
variable into the prevailing trading schemata, it can become implicit the intersubjective codifications 
underpinning financial trading. Beunza & Stark suggest that the use of calculative frames 
performatively reify abstract market phenomena and enable interaction with these objects through 
trading screens as if they were ontologically distinct from the codifications upon which they are 
derived;  
 
‘To see opportunities, traders use the mathematics and the machines of market 
instruments. We can think of traders as putting on the financial equivalent of infrared 
goggles that provide them with the trader’s equivalent of night-vision. The traders’ 
reliance on such specialised instruments, however, entails a serious risk. In bringing 
some information into sharp attention, the software and the graphic representations on 
their screens also obscure. In order to be devices that magnify and focus, they are also 
blinders. […] An even more serious risk for the traders is that distributing calculation 
across their instruments amounts to inscribing their sensors with their own beliefs […] 
the fact that the tool has been shaped by his theories means that his sharpened 
perceptions can sometimes be highly magnified misconceptions, perhaps disastrously 
so […] a faulty model can lead to massive losses. There is however, no option not to 
model: no tools no trade. […] the reality out there is a social construct consisting of 
other traders and other interconnected instruments continuously reshaping, in feverish 
innovation, the properties of that recursive world. In this coproduction, in which the 
products of their interventions become a part of the phenomena they are monitoring, 
such reflexivity is an invaluable component of the their tools of the trade’ (Beunza & 
Stark, 2005b, p.94-95) 
 
Beunza & Stark (2004) point out that trading screen data cannot be understood as representative of 
an external market reality (see also Arnoldi, 2006) and suggest that ‘electronic markets constitute 
an on-screen reality that lacks an off-screen counterpart’ (Beunza & Stark, 2004 p.370).  Knorr-
Cetina & Bruegger (2002b), Knorr-Cetina (2005) and Knorr-Cetina & Preda (2007) have suggested 
                                                 
110
 Beunza & Stark (2005a) note an example of how variance in calculative framing led to analyst 
discrepancies in valuations and trading recommendations on Amazon.com. As the dot-com boom was still 
developing in the late 1990s, there were no generally agreed models and schemata to enable consistent 
evaluation of online companies. Analysts therefore modelled the dot-coms on the basis of analogies with other 
securities. Beunza & Stark note that two high-profile analysts, Henry Blodget and Jonathan Cohen interpreted 
the information on Amazon very differently: Cohen framed its weak earnings as a fundamental weakness 
because he compared it with other retail book companies and concluded its current shareprice could not be 
justified. In contrast, Blodget framed the weak earnings as a consequence of Amazon’s investment in future 
expansion in a new market sector, which, justified expectations of future profitability and its high shareprice.  
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that trading screen data should be conceptualised through the phenomenological notion of 
‘appresentation’, in the sense that the screen data constitutes the market environment through 
which financial activity is immanently conducted. As Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger observe, ‘By using 
the term ‘appresentation’ […] we also mean to emphasise that the screens do not, in their core 
elements, represent a reality ‘out there’, but are constitutive of it.’ (2002b, p.166, original emphasis). 
 
Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger’s (2001, 2002a, 2002b) ethnographic studies of trading floor practices 
emphasise the central role of electronic mediation and trading screens in creating deterritorialised 
global financial microcultures. In pre-electronic pit trading, traders were co-located in the same 
space and interacted face-to-face. There was therefore considerable noise (physical and 
informational) that meant checking current prices and ask/bid prices was prone to lags and errors. 
Now that financial trading is conducted primarily through electronic screens, interaction is not limited 
by spatial proximity, and multi-layered arrays of data provide market prices and ask-bid spreads 
(and their responses to trading) in real time. This brings about a shift in the nature of finance culture 
toward post-social relationships defined through interactions with/through the screens111. As 
Abolafia’s (1998) analysis of the constitutive codes of trading practice on different exchanges 
suggests, variations may arise between traders in different types of security (e.g. currencies, stocks, 
bonds and derivatives) and between traders who focus on fundamental data (e.g. price/earnings 
ratios) versus technical data (historical price cycles). Different traders will therefore organise their 
screens differently according to their market area, institutional obligations and trading style.  Knorr-
Cetina & Bruegger (2002a, 2002b) and Knorr-Cetina & Preda (2007) distinguish three key layers or 
streams of information: a) current market prices, b) ask-bid spreads and any interaction/ 
conversation related to the execution of potential trades and c) any other market data or news-
feeds deemed relevant to the securities being traded. The screens also sequence orders and 
provide a ‘scoping system’ through which traders monitor and reproduce the market. The screen 
presentations therefore serve to assemble the frames, focusing traders not only on particular data, 
but also particular modalities and channels of trading activity. The interaction of traders through the 
co-ordinating reference of the financial objects immanently constituted on the screens. This 
financial universe is partly constituted through traders’ reflexive awareness of each other’s 
monitoring of those screens; ‘Market reality itself is knowledge generated, that is, has no existence 
independent from the informational presentation of the market on screen that is provided by the 
news agencies, analysts, and traders themselves ‘ (2002, p.915) The appresentation of this reality 
is therefore constantly in the process of being reproduced, and is therefore ontologically distinct 
from material/spatial market reality. As Knorr-Cetina and Preda suggest:  
 
‘The screen reality discussed is inherently in flux and has none of this [material] 
durability. Traders perform their activities in a moving field constituted by changing 
dealing prices, shifting trading interests (the indicative prices), scrolling records of the 
immediate past that are continually updated, incoming conversational requests, newly 
projected market trends, and emerging and disappearing headline news, 
commentaries and economic analyses. They perform their activities in a streaming 
temporal world; as the information scrolls down the screens and is replaced by new 
information, a new market continually projects itself. […] it is this ontological fluidity of 
market reality that we want to capture with the notion of flow. The screen reality, in 
these markets, is like a carpet of which small sections are woven and at the same time 
rolled out in front of us.’ (2007, p.130). 
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 The disembedding and deterritorialization of financial activity through electronic screens gives rise to ‘post-
social relations’. However, Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger emphasise that this does not imply that there is no socio-
cultural dimension to financial trading. On the contrary, they identify some quite intricate norms of interaction 
and reciprocal relations among traders, particularly in regard to the provision of liquidity and agreement to buy 
securities even when this entails risk or loss to the purchasing party. This would seem to contradict the 
conception of the financial trader as a totally rational and ruthless agent seeking nothing but optimal 
advantage. The global microcultures of finance certainly cannot be reduced to economic algorithms. However, 
it should also be noted that the cultivation of social capital (see Putnam, 2000)  with other traders at the cost of 
optimising short-term returns is entirely rational if it ensures that liquidity from counterparties can be found 
when it is urgently needed. This is entirely consistent with  long-term maximisation of returns.  
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The analyses of Beunza & Stark, Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger and Knorr-Cetina & Preda transcode 
well into the intersubjective codifications framework and the conceptions of informational reflexivity 
in finance. Importantly, they identify processes through which financial information systems, analyst 
frames and monitoring of other market agents feed back into each other give rise to self-referential 
and self-constituting relations. These analyses also indicate processes through which the 
contingent information about markets potentially becomes incorporated into the implicit knowledge 
assumed in trading frames and how transactions based on those frames immediately generate on-
screen feedback. Three emergent issues/tension need further clarification, however. First, the 
recognition of constant innovation in framing suggest a tendency towards heterogeneity that 
understates the potential for homogeneity and symmetries of information, meaning and/or agency 
implicated in bubbles and crises. In contrast, the behavioural finance studies of market reactions to 
news (e.g. Sant & Zaman, 2006; Busse & Green, 2002) and the potential for financial media and 
information flows to predispose markets to herd behaviour (e.g. Davis’ [2005] ‘consensus indicator’ 
and ‘panopticon’ effects) do not dovetail neatly with these analyses112.  
 
Second, somewhat different conceptions of how the trading screens themselves become market 
reality through constitutive appresentation of data can be discerned. In places, Knorr-Cetina & 
Bruegger (2002b) Knorr-Cetina & Preda (2005, 2007) and Beunza & Stark (2004) come close to 
denying the existence of an external referent market object beyond its immanent manifestation on 
the screen. There may be potential for this kind of ‘radical’ reflexivity (see Lynch, 2000) to arise 
periodically in bubbles and crises where symmetries of market agency lead investors to respond to 
financial epiphenomena such as price momentum and herd behaviour rather than fundamental 
information about securities derived from the industrial economy. However, the notion that markets 
have transcended all spatial-temporal constraints and become a self-constituting hyperreality (see 
McGoun, 2005) must be viewed cautiously (Hope, 2002). Although Beunza & Stark (2004) 
emphasise the constitutive dimension of the screens and traders’ primary engagement with the 
markets through this medium, they also note that traders engage in conversations and negotiations 
to facilitate deals. Likewise, while Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger (2002b) are right to note that screen-
mediated ‘post-social’ interaction is very different from pit trading, the screen itself remains the 
medium not the counterparty of transactions. In this regard, the ask-bid displays remain 
representative of the prevailing intersubjective codifications of various market agents.  This still 
allows for the possibility for reflexive informational exchanges between investors to become 
disconnected from external referents in the industrial economy,  but the content of the screens still 
relates to the positions and actions of those market agents. Thus the entirety of the market is not 
simply subsumed by the displays, and not all the data on the screens is hermeneutically 
appresented (particularly in regard to news about the industrial economy, including matters such as 
the availability of commodities or company earnings, there remains an element of external 
representation, albeit subject to interpretation and perception).  
 
This leads to a third point: The heterogeneous and contingent nature of the frames and the constant 
flux of the market as appresented on the screen is suggestive of an evolving complexity that resists 
the development of any definitive model of financial market behaviour. This is partly an outcome of 
the efforts of financial analysts to identify the currently-salient price sensitive variables and 
incorporate them into models/trading frames to provide an edge over other investors. The reflexive 
nature of trader responses to information underlines the contingent and constructed nature of what 
counts as a fundamental and the potential for these to be performatively remodelled over time. 
Nevertheless, this does not imply the impossibility of intersubjective coherence among the 
codifications deployed by investors and analysts. The fact that markets can behave seemingly 
randomly at any particular moment does not mean that those consistencies and coherences cannot 
be modelled with sufficient validity to be of practical value to investors over periods of time. 
                                                 
112
 This may reflect the respective theoretical/ methodological approaches employed: Beunza & Stark’s and 
Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger’s studies are micro-ethnographic whereas the media ‘effects’ evidence is based more 
on correlations between news announcements and price movements or aggregated institutional evidence. 
There may also be a tension or dynamic between the implicit/performative reflexivity which maintains the 
intersubjective coherence of market models/schemata/frames and the need to be cognizant of 
contingent/game reflexivity whereby new variables not incorporated into the prevailing models become price-
sensitive.   
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Consistencies in overall market responsiveness to core fundamentals such as interest rates or 
changes in supply and demand will therefore still be influential113, even if such fundamentals are 
understood as constructs liable to be subordinated to other transitory market moods and trends.   
 
Although the schemata and frames used to make investment decisions can be subject to constant 
revision, there are also many enduring reference points and parameters that shape and constrain 
trading behaviour. Professional traders typically work within a set of institutional arrangements 
which structure their roles by specifying targets, risk thresholds, preferred instruments/ investment 
categories and other decision-making criteria which shape operational schemata (MacKenzie & 
Millo, 2003). For example, many large funds, particularly those which passively114 track a securities 
index (such as the S&P500) have to maintain a ratio of assets in proportion to the value of the 
overall index. Thus price movements of any security within that index oblige funds to increase their 
holdings as it gains value or sell as it loses value (Henwood, 1998, Golding, 2003), and any IPO115 
obliges the fund buy a proportional quantity (regardless of whether the price is attractive). When 
many large funds follow indexes in this manner (often using computer algorithms to perform the 
constant adjustments) it can result in amplification of price movements, increasing market volatility. 
This in turn provides opportunities for other investors to profit from short-term price movements (see 
Kyrolainen, 2008). Thus the institutional obligations and priorities that shape and constrain trading 
decisions generate can themselves be the source of price movements. In that regard, the demand 
for real-time information and instant trading responses in response to volatility is self-generating.  
 
Other important factors shaping trading decision include the common metrics of  ‘value-at-risk’ 
(VaR) and ‘mark-to-market’ (see Henwood, 1998, Dunbar, 2000, Lowenstein, 2000). VaR is a 
calculation of the potential losses an investor’s portfolio holdings could potentially incur under 
current conditions of market volatility over a particular period. VaR is related to the mark-to-market 
system of current portfolio valuation. This entails calculating the value of a portfolio on the basis of 
the current market price of the securities that compose it. It is contrasted with mark-to-model 
calculations where values are calculated on the basis of a formula based on fundamentals. These 
can give quite different results and can be significant insofar as current mark-to-market prices can 
be inflated during a bubble and collapse during a crisis. The institutional requirement to sell to 
reduce risk exposure or to provide liquid assets for margin calls can arise irrespective of whether 
traders consider the assets worth retaining and expect their value to increase in the future on the 
basis of their fundamentals. Indeed, VaR and mark-to-market systems have been implicated in 
crises, including the implosion of the trillion dollar LTCM hedge-fund portfolio in 1998 and the on-set 
of the credit crunch following the sub-prime mortgage crisis (see short case studies in Appendix 1). 
 
This account of the intersubjective codifications and the informational reflexivity in financial trading 
activity dovetails with the earlier review of the literature concerning the role financial media play in 
shaping market behaviour and the complex inter-relationship among traders, analysts and 
reporters. Coupled with the analyses of the communication processes underpinning money/credit, 
fictitious value and financial crises, the link between the financial system’s internal mechanisms and 
the earlier arguments concerning autopoiesis and the potential for the financial system to disrupt 
other social systems can now be discerned more clearly, However, important questions remain 
about the nature of the intersubjective codifications underpinning financial trading and the reflexive 
aspects of financial information, particularly in regard to the tension between trading on standard 
economic models versus the need to develop new frames and schemata and monitor the variables 
being emphasised by other traders.  The following sections of this thesis concern the empirical part 
of the thesis and will further explore the questions concerning informational reflexivity related to 
institutional investor media usage.  
                                                 
113
 This is why behavioural financial theory typically assumes that basic economic models have an 
approximately validity but that prices are subject to ‘distortion’ through collective investor psychology, although 
as Keynes famously noted, market sometimes remain irrational longer than investors can remain solvent.  
 
114
 As opposed to actively managing a portfolio where a fund manager analyses its composition and tries to 
pick high-growth securities to buy while selling poor performers.  
 
115
 Initial Public Offering; the inaugural launch of a security such as a company’s stocks on a public exchange.  
 
 126 
Chapter 9:  Methodology and Data Collection   
 
Scope and Focus: 
 
Discussion of the first research question concerning communication processes in financial markets 
and the reconfiguration of relations among state, capital and civil society has been largely covered 
in the preceding chapters, although will again be emphasised in the subsequent discussion 
concerning the fifth question. However, the final analysis of the autopoietic tendency of financial 
markets and the implications for democracy will be informed by the empirical component and 
therefore requires research questions 2, 3 and 4 to be addressed. From the preceding chapters, an 
overview of the key literature and theoretical issues concerning communication processes and 
global financial activity has been provided. The theoretical utility of understanding financial 
processes using a communicative framework that emphasises intersubjective codifications and the 
channels and modalities of meaningful financial activity has been explained. However, there remain 
significant questions about the precise ways in which institutional investors engage with the 
different forms of financial media and information.   
 
As noted earlier, the key research questions that are being addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
 
1. How have communication-related changes in these markets since the 1970s contributed to a 
reconfiguration of the wider social relations between state, capital and civil society? 
2. How do institutional finance professionals in New Zealand prioritise different types of media and 
information to inform their investment decisions? 
3. What are the implications of the empirical data on media usage and perceptions of media and 
information importance/ objectivity for the theories of informational reflexivity in financial market 
processes? 
4. Are there convergences and divergences in perceptions of media importance and objectivity 
across different financial market-types?  
5. To what extent are the findings generally consistent with claims that financial markets have 
become more or less democratic/ publicly accessible and  accountable. 
 
The focus on investors’ usage of financial media/sources and information will address these 
empirical and theoretical issues. Although it is evident that some forms of financial media/sources 
and information are important in trading (e.g. electronic wire services such as Thomson-Reuters, 
analyst announcements, up-to-date price-movements, ratings agency downgrades and so forth) the 
significance of other types of media/sources and information is not easily discerned. The 
exploratory aspect of the empirical study will provide an indication of the perceived importance and 
perceived objectivity of a wide range of media/information sources and types of information in 
investment. It will also provide data on variations in media/information usage across different market 
sectors (stocks, bonds, currencies and derivatives). The focus on investor media usage will help to 
reveal patterns of consensus and dissensus on media usage and help to further explain the 
apparent tension between the simultaneous tendency toward homogeneity/symmetry and 
heterogeneity/asymmetry in financial information flows. The analysis will also provide indications of 
the ways in which investor usage of financial media may be implicated in the reflexivity/self-
referentiality of financial information. Evidence of the presence or absence of such reflexivity/ self-
referentiality will then be used to inform arguments about the financial system’s potential for 
autopoiesis and the implications of such a tendency for the stability of the relations between state, 
capital and civil society.  
 
There are several issues that need clarification before discussing the specific methodological 
processes. Given the broader theoretical focus on global financial markets and capital flows, the 
focus on a small, and arguably peripheral financial centre such as New Zealand needs explanation. 
The primary rationale is a practical one, namely access and opportunity. Access to financial 
investment institutions is usually very limited for academic researchers unless they are engaged in 
financial studies of direct relevance to investment practice or have professional connections to a 
particular institution. For example, Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger’s (2002a, 2002b) ethnographic studies 
of traders’ engagement with screens were enabled by the fact that Urs Bruegger had himself 
worked for an investment bank and was able to gain access for an extended study. Another factor 
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here is that the nature of financial investment means that trading practices and the strategies/ 
knowledge that inform them are, if not secretive, then private and insulated. It is therefore far from 
straight forward for a critical academic from outside the discipline of finance to negotiate access to 
such institutions. Indeed, as preliminary enquiries revealed, many major financial institutions either 
ignore research enquires altogether or issue a statement of policy indicating that no cooperation 
with external researchers will be considered. Nevertheless, enquiries through informal networks 
enabled the author to make contact with several former and current finance professionals based in 
New Zealand, and through following up prospective contacts, the author was able to negotiate 
access to Deutsche Bank, ANZ and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (including the trading floors 
of these institutions). The assistance of INFINZ, the local professional institute for finance 
professionals was also enlisted and it was largely through their cooperation that access to the 
online survey link was distributed (through their newsletter).  
 
Despite its small size, New Zealand is far from irrelevant as a focus for a study of financial market 
practices. Although the NZX exchange has a capitalization far lower than Tokyo, London and New 
York, it is also the most easterly financial market of any developed economy. This means that when 
markets open in New Zealand subsequent to the close of trading in the US, it may precursor the 
market activity likely to be seen when markets in Sydney, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Shanghai open. 
The small size of the local stock market also means that many local financial institutions engage in 
internationally traded securities such as currencies and bonds. At the same time, the small size of 
the NZ market makes it susceptible to global market trends, and the fluctuating value of the Kiwi 
dollar is often unrelated to domestic economic conditions. For example the IMF (2007) notes that 
the Kiwi’s exchange rate his record highs despite a significant current account deficit, suggesting 
that by offshore currency speculation and hedging had a significant influence on its value. 
Moreover, the neoliberal reforms New Zealand underwent from the 1980s onwards make it an 
interesting indicator of how markets function under conditions approximating textbook models, 
whether global financial market trends are also apparent in a smaller market.  
 
Epistemological assumptions 
 
Essentially, the data required to answer the empirical research questions (2-4 above) requires the 
study of the codifications underpinning financial agent’s activities, particularly in regard to the 
prioritisation of media/information sources and the different types of information considered 
important, and the way in which these might support investment decisions. The theoretical 
framework upon which the thesis is based assumes a constructivist ontology in its account of how 
intersubjective codifications shape the form and meaning of transactions and the coherence of 
financial market values. The object of study is therefore the cognitive phenomena  in the minds of 
financial actors that underpin and help constitute financial reality. Obviously, the immaterial nature 
of such phenomena means they are not directly observable or measurable. However, a 
methodology such as survey (including questionnaires and interviews) can systematically gauge 
self-reported cognitive processes within individuals and, through aggregation, reveal patterns in 
attitudes and explanations for behavioural practices (see Stacks & Hocking, 1999; Babbie, 2007). 
The study here encompassed both a descriptive and an analytic/explanatory dimension (see 
Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). The descriptive element is also exploratory, insofar as it is not known 
precisely which media and information forms investors consider most important or objective in their 
trading decisions or how these might vary across different investment sectors. The study also 
entails an analytic dimension insofar as the patterns of investor media/information usage will 
indicate potential relations between different media/sources and information types and help inform 
the arguments concerning informational reflexivity and, on the broader level, the potential for 
financial autopoiesis.  
 
The survey approach is consistent with the theoretical framework foregrounding intersubjective 
codification. To recap, this holds that financial phenomena are constituted through symbolic 
interactions rendered meaningful and embodied through channels of action implicitly coded into the 
schemata, frames and scripts of each market agent. As discussed, earlier, by emphasising that the 
codifications are manifested immanently though the minds of market agents and performatively 
reproduced through mutually intelligible interactions, this formulation avoids the need to posit 
ontological structures of an immaterial and metaphysical nature that cannot be empirically studied.  
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The empirical focus of the study therefore involved gauging individual agents’ knowledge and 
perceptions concerning media and information usage in investment decisions. As the actors directly 
involved in the processing of financial information and taking investment decisions in response to it, 
traders and analysts have the most direct and valid experience of how markets work and have been 
the target population in other financial studies (for example, see Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger, 2002b). 
Although it is possible that respondents would not be consciously aware of all the cognitive 
processes through which they process information and make investment decisions, investment is a 
deliberative endeavour and finance professionals need to analyse their performance in order to 
succeed in their careers. It is important to note that the proposed study does not extend to 
measuring and analysing the actual investment decision processes themselves, but the significance 
of various media/sources and information to those decisions. Traders and analysts would certainly 
be aware of the types of media/sources and information they use and be capable of discerning 
those most important to their professional work as well as which they consider objective/credible. It 
is also probable that finance professionals would have insights into some of the potential 
reflexive/constitutive aspects of financial information and how markets respond to media and 
information flows, even if their understanding of such phenomena was not based directly on the 
theories being deployed in this thesis. Where an individual does not understand or recognise such 
processes in a manner that lends itself to coherent articulation, patterns/trends in the data emerging 
from the collation/aggregation of the individual responses can still help reveal the latent 
intersubjective codifications and provide indications of reflexive tendencies.  
 
Within the aforementioned geographical and institutional constraints, it was not possible to pre-
define a determinate sample of respondents within the target population. The aim was to solicit 
responses to interviews and/or questionnaires from institutional investors involved in some form 
decision-making linked to capital flows, namely analysts and traders themselves. Contact with 
financial institutions initially proceeded by cold-calling telephone or e-mail to every financial 
institution involved listed as trading participant on the NZX exchange (see NZX website link, no 
date). However, it soon became apparent that many financial organisations were not amenable to 
engagement with external academic researchers. Informal networks of contacts including 
colleagues with financial backgrounds facilitated more productive outcomes: INFINZ, the main 
professional association for financial investors in NZ, agreed to distribute a link to the online 
survey116 and three banking institutions (Deutsche Bank, ANZ, and the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand) allowed on-site observation on the trading floors117 and interviews with a range of traders 
and analysts. Nevertheless, the difficulty of soliciting questionnaire respondents from a relatively 
private, inaccessible and extremely busy target population was inevitably going to be a potential 
limitation.  Moreover, the questionnaire (see Appendix 3) was very detailed, containing 66 scale 
items (with parallel response boxes for 4 market sectors) plus 17 structured, open-ended questions 
(see below). The length and detail of the survey evidently inhibited some responses, as evidenced 
by numerous recorded visits to the online questionnaire form that did not generate a response. 
Eventually, 65 responses to the questionnaire were generated (although this provided 132 parallel 
responses across market subsectors). Further qualitative data was collected through 39 semi-
structured interviews with institutional investors (and an additional two unstructured interviews with 
financial journalists). Although it is unclear how many financial investors actually received and 
noticed the survey link, if one assumed that the 600+ membership of INFINZ represented the 
majority of institutional investors in New Zealand then the most optimistic estimate of the ratio of 
responses to population would be around 11%. Realistically, however, it is likely that the actual ratio 
is somewhat lower.  The potential for sample error and a compromising of external validity, that is, 
                                                 
116
 The link, along with background information about the survey, was distributed to INFINZ’s membership 
(around 600 investment professionals) through their newsletter. After initial responses were slow, the 
researcher offered cinema tickets to provide an incentive to respond, and  this was again distributed in the 
newsletter, with slightly better results. There was no reason to believe that the offer of cinema tickets would 
generate responses that were motivated in a manner likely to affect the validity of the data.  
 
117
 Much to the researcher’s pleasant surprise and commensurate gratitude. Initially, the researcher spent a 
whole day at Deutsche Bank in Auckland with two half-day follow-up visits, and two half days at each of ANZ 
and RBNZ in Wellington. Several other institutions permitted brief visits for the purpose of individual interviews. 
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the applicability of the findings outside the actual sample group (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2003) therefore needs consideration.  
 
The nature of the target population coupled with the fact that the researcher was an external 
academic meant  it was not possible to predetermine the number or identity of the respondents. 
After initial contact was made with an institution, the researcher provided information indicating the 
nature of the research and the desired respondent group (see information sheet and consent form 
in Appendix 3). In this sense, the selection of the respondent sample was not random, because it 
was bounded by the specification of participants being institutional investors. This is consistent with 
‘purposive’ or ‘judgemental’ sampling (Babbie, 2007) where the respondents are determined by 
prior designation of a specifically relevant population or key persons within it. However, within that 
population the participant group effectively self-selected. Particularly during the initial period of 
soliciting potential respondents, new contacts were gained through connections with previous 
respondents. This might be characterised as network sampling or ‘snowball sampling’ (Babbie 
2007). This approach requires a certain epistemological caution because it is not possible to be 
certain of the extent to which the respondent group will be statistically representative of the target 
population. As Wimmer & Dominick (2003) and Hill & Lewicki (2007) point out, it is problematic to 
calculate the degree of error for non-probability samples (i.e. respondent groups that are not known 
to be representative of their population). However, as the review of the literature and theoretical 
framework indicated, the population of finance professionals are engaged in activities that 
presuppose that the basic codifications underpinning global trading practices are shared regardless 
of demographic and institutional variation. Initial consultations with three finance professionals (all 
of whom had experience of investment in the US or UK) suggested that local financial investment 
practices were not significantly different from those in other markets. Moreover, a high proportion of 
responses stemmed from investors and analysts working in local offices of international financial 
institutions which (as the study duly confirmed) were closely interlinked with the systems and 
operations of the other offices around the world. In conjunction with the detail provided in the 
questionnaires and interviews, this increases confidence in the representative validity of the 
sample, despite its limited size118. Thus the limitations of the sampling are arguably off-set by the 
specialist nature of the respondent sample.  
 
Three modes of data collection are involved in eliciting this information from the target population. 
These include: 
1.  A self-administered questionnaire (on-line and hard copy) in two parts:  
a)  A set of semantic differential scale questions on perceptions of financial media/sources  
and data/information.    
b) A set of structured, open-ended questions related to financial media usage. 
2. Semi-structured open-ended interviews with institutional investment professionals (with some 
in-depth, depending upon respondent availability) 
3. Non-participant observation on the trading floors of amenable financial investment institutions. 
 
 
Questionnaire development 
 
In order to enable the analysis of institutional investor’s use of financial media and information, 
there are two key considerations:  a) the range of media and information types to be studied, and b) 
the aspects of their usage that might shape investment decisions. Apart from the key wire 
services/trading platforms (such as Thomson-Reuters), information relating to market fundamentals 
(such as company earnings) and technical data (historical price movements) it is far from self-
evident what other media or types of information are used in investment decisions. Many different 
sources and types of data might confer a trading advantage. These could potentially include a 
range of print, broadcast and electronic/online media  as well as informal contact with other 
investors or specialist reports outside the domain of  normal public access. Developing a typology of 
                                                 
118
 By way of comparison, Schwarzkopf’s (2007) study of US investor media usage was based on 235 
responses to a narrower questionnaire, while Davis’ (2005) study of media influences on UK fund managers in 
the City of London was based on 34 personal interviews. Given the much larger numbers of institutional 
investors in the US and UK markets, the ratio of the respondent sample to the overall target population in this 
study does not appear unfavourable.  
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media/information categories organically from open responses entails the risk of overlooking 
media/sources or forms of information that might be important but not identified as a discrete form. 
For example, a respondent may not consider their own professional analysis or hunches/intuitions 
as a legitimate source of information, even though these might influence their decisions in important 
ways. Moreover, allowing the typology to develop from the collation of unprompted responses 
would also preclude direct comparison of the media/information prioritised by different investors 
(e.g. one respondent might say newspapers in general were insignificant while another identifies a 
particular column in the finance section of one particular publication as important).  
 
As the studies of investor media usage by Schwarzkopf (2007) and Wood et al. (2007) indicate, 
both the range of financial media/ information forms and the level of analysis can vary significantly. 
The challenge, then, is to examine a comprehensive range of media/information forms without 
exhaustive detail119. The review of literature and the discussion of financial information and 
reflexivity pointed to numerous potentially significant influences on trading activity stemming from a 
range of media/information sources ranging from company earnings announcements and 
professional analyst recommendations to rumours on television programmes and financial ‘spam’. 
The literature also suggested that while there is a broad set of common financial information 
sources and implicit agreement about the importance of certain sorts of data (such as official credit 
ratings) the symmetrical real-time distribution of most financial information incentivises efforts to 
identify novel types of information from which some trading advantage might be derived. The 
arguments concerning contingent or game reflexivity suggest that investors’ monitoring of their own 
behaviour and anticipation of price movements in response to factors not incorporated into standard 
models/ trading schemata. This suggests that the evidence for such reflexive tendencies will be 
found in gauging a range of different media/information forms rather than focusing solely on the 
primary sources which are likely to be symmetrically distributed. This required examining a wider 
range of media rather than focusing on a few key financial media in close detail.  The typology of 
media/sources and information forms included in the survey (discussed below) were developed 
partly through including types indicated as significant in the literature, and partly through preliminary 
consultations with three finance professionals (a former investment banker, a broker and an 
analyst120) who affirmed the salience and adequacy of the range. Because of the difficulty in eliciting 
responses from institutional investors, eliciting responses for a full pilot study was liable to preclude 
subsequent requests to complete the final version revised survey. This concern was entirely 
validated because eliciting responses in any quantity duly proved to be a challenge. The experience 
of the three preliminary consultants was therefore essential in ensuring that the questionnaire would 
be intelligible and unambiguous. Although this was not ideal, the questionnaire instrument included 
options to suggest other forms of media/ information which had not been included, and the eventual 
response gave no indication that any category had been overlooked.  
 
The final typology consisted of 24 categories of media/ information source and 15 categories of 
information. A 25th category was left open for respondents to specify if they felt a medium had been 
overlooked but none of the responses indicated that this was the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119
 Sowray (1998), for example, examined the informational architecture of trading screens (from an IT 
perspective) but this level of detail would make it impossible to review a range media/ information sources. 
 
120
 Interview respondents #3, #,4 and #5. There was a broad degree of agreement among the consultants that 
the range of media covered was sufficient not to have left any obvious gaps, although the wording was 
modified where necessary to minimise ambiguity. One category of media/information source that was not 
included but which, in hindsight, may have been interesting was financial ‘spam’,(see  Frieder & Zittrain, 2006; 
Bohme & Holz, 2006). However, it seems  unlikely that institutional investors would have considered this a 
relevant source, given the range of far more reliable, expert  sources at their disposal.   
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Types of media/Information sources:  
 
1. General interest newspapers 
2. Finance/ business newspapers 
3. General interest magazines 
4. Finance/business magazines 
5. Specialist academic journals 
6. General interest broadcasting news (TV/radio) 
7. Finance/ business broadcasting news (TV/radio) 
8. Specialist finance/business channels (CNBC/CNNfn) 
9. General Internet sites (including on-line versions of other general media) 
10. Financial/business internet sites (including online versions of other financial news media) 
11. Subscriber finance/business Internet sites/ on-line market information services 
12. Specialist financial information/wire services (Reuters/Bloomberg, etc.) 
13. Specialist Industry reports (official stock market/ central bank/ratings agencies reports) 
14. Company reports/accounts/publications/announcements 
15. General (informal) discussion with own colleagues 
16. Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with own colleagues 
17. Specific (work-related) instructions/advice from one’s own institution 
18. General (informal) discussion with external contacts in financial markets 
19. Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with external contacts in financial markets 
20. Public investment advice/ recommendations from market analysts 
21. Private (purchased) advice/ recommendations from external market analysts 
22. Information derived from specialist systems/algorithms used in own institution 
23. Information derived from one’s own professional analysis 
24. Information derived from personal intuition/ feelings/ hunches 
 
There are several distinctions worth noting here. Firstly, media of general interest are differentiated 
from those that have a specialist financial/business focus, and subscription media are differentiated 
from those that are available free of charge. This is intended to enable comparisons between these 
types of media among institutional investors and also assess whether the media likely to be 
available to non-institutional investors has any investment value. The typology also distinguishes 
between internal and external channels of information among financial market actors themselves, 
and includes the investor as a source of their own information on two levels (analytic and intuitive). 
These are made to help draw out variations or patterns that might indicate some form of self-
referentiality.  
 
In order to develop a survey capable of generating data that would both allow a basic description of 
finance professionals’ media usage and provide a basis for discerning the potential for informational 
reflexivity, two aspects of institutional investors’ media usage were distinguished; perceived 
importance and perceived objectivity. Perceived importance in relation to trading decisions is largely 
self-explanatory, and it was gauged on a seven point semantic differential scale with ‘essential’  
‘irrelevant’ at the extremes. The scale was semantically symmetrical, with a central point (4) being 
labelled ‘somewhat important’121 (see survey in Appendix 3). The notion of perceived objectivity 
requires further explanation however. As a theoretical concept, it clearly does not fit easily into a 
framework emphasising reflexivity or social constructivist notions of news (see Tuchman, 1978) that 
rejects positivist notions of representation.  However, this need not preclude assessing the extent to 
which financial actors perceive the media/sources they rely on in making investment decisions to be 
objective. The use of the concept of perceived objectivity here should therefore not be taken to 
imply a theoretical acceptance of a positivist conception of financial information/representation, but 
rather a focus for gauging the extent to which financial traders and analysts perceive such a quality 
to obtain in relation to different media/sources. 
                                                 
121
 One might contend that the inclusion of the term ‘moderately important’ is not neutral in the sense that it 
invites a more positive skew towards one side of the scale compared with ‘moderately unimportant’, which 
would be its semantic mirror. However, having a neutral point labelled ‘neither important nor unimportant’ 
seemed to suggest ‘no opinion’ rather than neutrality, and explaining the neutral point in more detail might 
have caused more confusion.  
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Interestingly, Schwarzkopf (2007) examined investor perceptions of source ‘credibility’122 which he 
defines in Beaulieu’s (2001) terms of the extent to which a source inspires belief in its 
representations. This is related to the conception of  ‘objectivity’, here, but it is also connotes trust 
and confidence, which arguably overlapped also with the general notion of importance. A more 
pragmatic reason for focusing on objectivity is that this is a concept emphasised in the institutional 
codes of practice for INFINZ, the main professional association for financial investors in New 
Zealand, which suggested that the concept was already familiar to the target population. The 
finance professionals consulted in the development of the questionnaire did not consider 
‘objectivity’ to be problematic.  
 
In the questionnaire, perceived objectivity was rated on a 7-point semantic scale ranging from 
‘totally subjective ‘ to ‘to totally objective’, with a central value of ‘partly objective’. ‘Objective’ was 
defined in terms of whether a source was perceived to be an accurate and impartial indicator of 
market conditions, whereas ‘subjective’ was defined in terms of whether a source was considered to 
reflect opinions, perceptions and interpretations that are not impartial or accurate. Again, the scale 
was semantically symmetrical with the central point labelled ‘partly objective’. One reason for 
differentiating between two separate variables, perceived importance and perceived objectivity, is to 
enable the relation between the two perceptions to be correlated.  
 
Besides examining investor perceptions of media/ information source importance and objectivity in 
tandem, 15 categories of information were developed, again with reference to the review of 
literature and through the preliminary consultations with the three finance professionals who had 
assisted in the development of the media typology. A 16th category was left open for respondents to 
specify if they felt an information type had been overlooked (no responses added an additional 
category).  
 
Types of data/ information: 
 
1. General market/industry data- fundamental 
2. General market/industry data- technical/econometric 
3. Specific industry sector data- fundamental 
4. Specific industry sector data- technical/econometric 
5. Individual company data- fundamental 
6. individual company data-technical/econometric 
7. General market news, investment trends/moods/opinions (e.g. bullish/bearish) 
8. Opinions/intentions/positions of rival investment institutions (banks, brokerage firms, etc.) 
9. Opinions/intentions/positions of other financial institutions (central banks, ratings agencies, etc.) 
10. Historical market/price data 
11. Current market/price data 
12. Projections of future market/price data 
13. Non-market news/information (politics, culture, sport, etc.) 
14. Correlations of data/opinions/intentions from different sources. 
15. Information about the media/information sources themselves.  
 
The categories here were kept relatively broad. The development of more specific categories was 
problematic because even with the advice of the preliminary consultants, the level of useful detail 
was unclear. For example, within the category of individual company data (fundamental) one might 
distinguish between company earnings announcements, dividend announcements, earnings 
estimates, annual reports, changes in management, statements about changes in business 
strategy, investment in new ventures, mergers, new share issues, and so forth. Likewise, it would 
have been possible to break down a category such as opinions of other financial institutions into 
separate subcategories for central banks, ratings agencies and other financial institutions whose 
actions/ statements are liable to influence trading (for instance, should central bank official cash 
rate announcements be considered separately from other statements, or should ratings agency 
                                                 
122
 This publication was not available at the time the survey was being developed.  
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warnings of a potential revision to a rating count as separate from an actual downgrade?) 
Restricting the typology to broad categories inevitably entailed some ambiguity, but the more they 
were broken down, the greater the risk of proliferating irrelevant categories, overlooking significant 
ones, and rendering any survey instrument unwieldy. It was decided to differentiate between 
different levels of market data (market as a whole, specific sector/ industry and individual 
companies123) as well as between fundamental data and technical data. A distinction is also made 
between forms of financial data that neoclassical models consider core to investment practice (such 
as market fundamentals and prices) and other forms which these models would consider 
extraneous (such as monitoring other market actors,  correlations of opinion and overall market 
sentiment or information not related to markets).  
 
Hypothetical Propositions 
 
Although the study of media usage is more exploratory than experimental, there are several 
theoretical reasons for assessing the perceived importance/objectivity of these variables among 
institutional investors. Generally speaking, positive correlations between the perceived importance 
of a medium /information source and the perceived importance of various information types may 
help to indicate the reasons why a particular medium is (or is not) considered important124. Other 
angles of exploration can be noted, although these are themes of interest rather than formal 
hypotheses. However, they can be loosely expressed as hypothetical propositions related to 
potential findings:  
 
If the neoclassical/positivistic conception of markets responding rationally and efficiently to 
information about external/objective market conditions is valid, one would expect that: 
 
• Positive correlations would be found between the perceived importance and perceived 
objectivity of various media/information sources. 
• Information about factors such as market fundamentals and prices would be rated as important 
while non-fundamental factors such as the opinions of other investors, market mood, and non-
market information would be rated as unimportant.  
• Positive correlations would be found between the media/source types perceived to be most 
important and the importance ratings of factors such as market fundamentals and prices.  
 
These propositions can serve as rough null hypotheses, since the expectation is that the data 
collected on the perceived importance and perceived objectivity of media/sources and information 
types will not correspond to their expectations. Conversely, if markets are intersubjectively 
constructed and subject to reflexive informational processes one would expect that: 
 
• An absence of (or even negative) correlations would be found between the perceived 
importance and perceived objectivity of various media/information sources. 
• Information about non-fundamental factors such as the opinions of other investors, market 
mood, and non-market information are rated as more important than or equally important as 
fundamental factors such as market fundamentals and prices.   
                                                 
123
 In hindsight, it may have been helpful to differentiate between companies and countries, especially in 
regard to bond markets. 
 
124
 Note, however, that just because there is a correlation between, say, the perceived importance of the 
financial press and the perceived importance of market fundamentals this does not on its own demonstrate that 
market fundamentals are sought directly from the financial press.  Such a pattern of data might arise from the 
fact that the financial press is regarded as important because it is a source of some other form of information 
deemed important, while market fundamentals are themselves derived from another source (such as company 
reports). Tests for statistical significance (see later) can assist with the elimination of correlations that occur by 
chance (type 2 errors), but will not entirely remove them.  In contrast, an absence of any significant correlation 
between the perceived importance of the financial press and market fundamentals, would suggest there was 
no meaningful relation between the two (although the possibility of type 1 errors, i.e. false negatives, needs to 
be considered). Nevertheless, the absence of a relationship where one would reasonably expect to find one 
can be just as meaningful as confirming cases where significant relations do exist. 
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• An absence of (or even negative) correlations would be found between the media/source types 
perceived to be most important and the importance ratings of market fundamentals and prices. 
• Positive correlations would be found between the media/source types perceived to be most 
important and the importance ratings of non-fundamental factors such as the opinions of other 
investors, market mood, and non-market information. 
 
The empirical study is more exploratory rather than experimental, so these hypothetical propositions 
are intended to be indicative rather than definitive. It seemed entirely plausible that the data would 
not unambiguously confirm one position while refuting the other. More nuanced analyses would 
then need to be developed with the use of rich data from the questionnaires and interviews.  
 
In order to enable the collation and comparison of institutional investor perceptions of media/ source 
importance and objectivity and information/data importance, a semantic differential scale125 (see 
Collis & Hussey, 2003; Babbie, 2007) was devised, differentiated on seven points. This is very 
similar to the methodology deployed in other surveys of investor perceptions of media sources and 
information types and several other studies have used seven point scales (Shiller, 2000; 
Schwartzkopf, 2007; Hong & Ki, 2007, see also Tippett, 2000) although nine and eleven point 
scales are also evident (see Wood et al, 2007; Schwarzkopf, 2007). There is debate about the 
relative merits of using different semantic scales (see Miller, 1956, Chang, 1994, Cohen & Manion 
1994; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Obviously, a binary scale with only the option to indicate 
agreement/disagreement or importance/unimportance would be too limited. Even-numbered scales 
negate the respondents’ option to indicate a neutral opinion. Odd-numbered scales may carry a risk 
of uncertain (or uninterested) respondents opting for the central value, which likewise compromises 
the validity of the instrument. More extensive scales (>7 points) allow a wider range of responses 
and arguably allow for more nuanced perceptions to be gauged (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). 
However, unless there are discrete semantic values attached to the scale that can be readily 
differentiated, validity and reliability can be again compromised because respondents may be 
unable to be sufficiently precise about their own perceptions.   
 
Seven point scales were developed for the study because this allows for the response range to 
remain semantically coherent (i.e. on scales of essential to irrelevant and totally objective to totally 
subjective) while allowing for a range of responses and including a central point but with less 
potential for central tendency bias than a narrower scale. It is nevertheless important to recognise 
than even where each scale value is semantically distinct, it remains ordinal in nature: Although a 
scale involves numerical values indicating a mathematical relation of relative magnitude/ intensity (7 
> 6 and 1 < 2, etc.) it cannot be assumed to measure particular perceptions or attitudes such that 
two respondents who assign the same scale response to a given question/object of evaluation can 
be assumed to be expressing a directly comparable meaning/disposition. Thus two respondents 
who indicated that, say, financial newspapers are ‘moderately important’ (scoring 4 on a 7-point 
scale from essential to irrelevant) might have different reasons for that assessment and understand 
‘moderately important’ in different ways. Likewise, a scale rating of 4 cannot be assumed to indicate 
twice the level of perceived importance as a rating of 2: The former number certainly indicates 
higher perceived importance than the latter but the mathematical ratio is not continuous.  
 
Issues arise here in regard to both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. On a descriptive 
level, the difference between one ranked response and another may not be consistent, and mean 
values of responses on an ordinal scale may be semantically ambiguous. However, as Wimmer & 
Dominick (2003) indicate, statistical analysis uses the numeric values generated by the scales, not 
their semantic coding. Consequently, ordinal data based on attitude/perception scales might be 
treated as parametric interval data. Stacks & Hocking (1999) likewise suggest that Likert/semantic 
differential scale data can be treated as either categorical or continuous. This suggests that it is not 
meaningless to generate mean scores to which meanings can be ascribed in line with the labels126. 
                                                 
125
 Semantic differential/rating scales are very similar to Likert scales in function except that the latter 
technically gauge responses to a specific statement in terms of agreement or disagreement.  
 
126
 For example, studies by Shiller (2000)  and Hong & Ki (2007)  both calculated  means based on scale 
ratings of investor perceptions of importance.) As long as the scale is semantically coherent and the overall 
patterns of distribution/ deviation are taken into consideration, generating the means of ordinal scales is a 
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Wimmer & Dominick (2003) and Hill & Lewicki (2007) point out that it can be problematic to use 
parametric tests with ordinal scale data because the ranked values do not plot continuously onto 
normal distribution curve like ratio/interval data.  Using ordinal scale data based on a relatively small 
sample to make inferences about the wider population therefore needs a robust threshold for 
testing statistical significance of correlations or variations in order to minimise errors (see below).  
 
Semantic differential scales are nevertheless useful because they allow qualitative cognitive 
meanings  to be expressed in quantified form and rendered amenable to basic statistical analysis 
within non-parametric limitations. Neither the rich data from interviews nor the understandings 
developed from ethnographic/ participant observation studies lend themselves so readily to succinct 
summary and comparability. Differences in responses on the scales are meaningful for the 
individual respondent and systematic variations and statistical consistencies between scale-ratings 
of different question items that emerge across a sample are more easily summarised and 
interpreted than, say, thematic analysis of rich data. However, quantification itself does not impart 
superior validity or eliminate the need for interpretation. The generation of statistics concerning the 
relative perceptions of the importance and objectivity of various types of media and information can 
provide indications of their patterns of overall usage by institutional investors and potentially reveal 
variations across different financial market sectors. But this may not be sufficient to explain why 
particular patterns arise from the data.  
 
An additional section of 17 structured but open-ended questions was therefore included in order to 
elicit a level of rich-data that could be cross-referenced with the statistical data. These questions 
were developed in relation to theoretical issues arising from the literature and were intended to elicit 
indications of how media/information usage would change under different circumstances as well as 
how far this might indicate some form of informational reflexivity. They therefore included questions 
concerning the verification of market information (linked to implicit reflexivity) , the kinds of trading 
activities and market signals that might move markets (explicit/transactional reflexivity) and the 
extent to which the monitoring of other market actors and informational (a)symmetry is a 
consideration in trading decisions (contingent/game reflexivity).  
 
Again, preliminary consultations with the three finance professionals who assisted with the 
development of the media/information typologies were undertaken to check the wording and focus 
for comprehensibility and salience. The researcher raised the question of whether respondents 
might have any motive to be disingenuous in their responses and also expressed caution about 
being direct in the solicitation of information about the processes of reflexivity, lest this serve either 
to prime respondents to provide responses that might not otherwise have been forthcoming or 
perhaps inhibit responses that suggested that the respondents’ behaviour was in some way 
inconsistent or untoward. The advice received was that professional investors would simply not 
answer any question they regarded as personally or professionally compromising and would most 
likely be forthright in expressing their views regardless of whether this appeared to confirm or reject 
the propositions suggested in the questionnaire. (This was duly borne out by the responses both to 
the open-ended section of the questionnaire and the interviews127). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
legitimate way of simplifying condensing patterns of quantitative data to render them amenable to interpretation 
and generalisation.   
 
 
127
 For example, two respondents directly challenged the assumption in question 15 that any such quantity 
might be specified and suggested it was the wrong question to ask; one pointed out that it depended on 
context the other pointed out the need to consider liquidity in the securities in question. Other interview 
participants were not slow to correct the researcher’s assumptions where they detected ignorance, and in 
cases where potentially sensitive data such as the value of transactions was requested, several simply pointed 
out that they considered it inappropriate to comment (in which case the researcher did not press for a 
response).  
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The 17 open-ended questions are listed below: 
 
1. How would your use of various media types/ information sources change during times of 
market volatility/ crisis?  
2. How would your use of various types of information/data change during times of market 
volatility/crisis? 
3. How far does the volume/scale (i.e. $$$ value) of investment transaction affect your use of 
various media types/ information sources?  
4. Under what circumstances might you second-guess/ double-check an information source 
you normally consider reliable? (Or trust a source you normally consider unreliable?) 
5. If your trading involves either managing funds for third parties or investing in funds 
managed by third parties, how does this affect your use of media types/ information 
sources? 
6. Briefly comment on how your trading/ analysis activities have been affected by the 
emergence of new information technologies (e.g. computers cellphones, internet, etc.) 
7. Briefly comment on how the financial markets as a whole  have been affected by the 
emergence of new information technologies (e.g. computers, cellphones, internet, etc.) 
8. What types of media/ information sources do you most need to access in real time (i.e. zero 
time delay/ continuous monitoring) and why? 
9. What types of information/data updates do you most need to access in real-time (i.e. zero 
time-delay/ continuous monitoring), and why?  
10. How far does the importance you ascribe to a particular media type/ information source 
depend on the significance ascribed to it by other market actors (i.e. that other 
traders/analysts take notice of it) ? 
11. How far does the importance you ascribe to a particular type of information/data  depend on 
the significance ascribed to it by other market actors (i.e. that other traders/analysts act on 
it) ? 
12. If you were able to gain access to a currently unavailable type of media/source and/or a 
currently unavailable type of information/data, which would have the most impact on your 
ability to trade/ analyse successfully (and why)? 
13. There are often several competing media/ information sources of each type (e.g. Wall St. 
Journal & Financial Times; Reuters & Bloomberg, etc.). What factors determine whether 
you prefer one medium/source to another of the same type? 
14. What types of data/ information have the greatest potential to precipitate trends of trading 
activity and ‘move the market’ ? 
15. To what extent do high-volume ($$$ value) trading transactions have the potential to 
precipitate trends of trading activity and ‘move the market’? (And how large would they 
have to be?) 
16. In trading/analysis activity, how important is it to have access to information/data not 
currently available to other market actors, compared with having access to the 
information/data which is available to other market actors?   
17. When making recommendations or decisions about buying/ selling/ rating various 
securities, is it important that your rationale/criteria be shared by other market actors, or is it 
important that your rationale/ criteria diverge from others (i.e. a ‘contrarian’ approach)?     
 
The wording and sequencing of questions given to respondents was a potentially important 
consideration in the construction of the questionnaire.  The length of the instrument was recognised 
as having the potential to inhibit completion of the entire questionnaire. Given that interviews were 
also planned, it was decided to place the open-ended section at the end The quantitative scales 
indicating the perceived importance and objectivity of the various media/information sources were 
considered to be of primary importance, so these were located first. Note that the sequence invited 
respondents to complete scale responses to the perceived importance of the various media before 
completing the section on perceived objectivity. The reason for this was to maintain a distinction in 
the cognitive frames used by respondents and also to commit them to rating importance without 
direct comparisons with objectivity128. The listing of media/sources and information types to be rated 
                                                 
128
 In practice, it would have been possible for respondents to go back and check their initial responses, but 
there was no evidence from the hard copy responses that  ratings were subsequently altered.  
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was also loosely sequenced in order to help encourage respondents to frame their responses in the 
context of roughly comparable media (e.g. the subcategories of print media and online media were 
juxtaposed on the form, as were different forms of discussion with market contacts). This was 
intended to help ensure that any differentiation in perceived importance or objectivity were explicitly 
recognised. For example, the juxtaposition of general interest newspapers and financial/business 
newspapers would cue the respondent into a response contextualised by their ratings for other 
similar media129. Interestingly, the missing cases in the quantitative data set stemmed primarily from 
the section on information types. Because this followed the two ratings of media importance and 
objectivity, it is likely that this reflected respondent fatigue rather than confusion or a lack of 
access/relevance.  
 
Questionnaire Implementation 
 
The implementation of the questionnaire involved four basic processes;  
 
1. The creation of an online version of the survey (using SurveyPro130), the link to which was 
distributed through the newsletter of INFINZ, the main professional association for financial 
investors. This link was sent out twice, the second time with an accompanying offer of cinema 
tickets for participants to incentivise more responses. The online questionnaire (which included 
an electronic information sheet and consent form which had to be completed before responses 
could be recorded) was divided into two sections, one with the semantic differential scale 
questions and the other with the set of open-ended questions. 41 responses were generated 
through the online questionnaire, of which 20 included responses to the section containing 
structured open-ended questions. Access to the data was password-protected and restricted to 
the researcher.  
 
2. Direct contact with financial investment institutions through telephone with a request for access 
to traders and analysts who might be willing to participate. Those who agreed were either sent 
a hard copy of the survey (including information and consent forms) by post with a return post-
paid envelope or an e-mail link to the website. 9 further postal responses were generated in this 
fashion. The hard copy data was entered into the SurveyPro database by the researcher and 
subsequently transferred to SPSS for analysis. Hard copy responses were retained by the 
researcher but kept securely in a locked cabinet.  
 
3. During the course of the data collection, three institutions (Deutsche Bank, ANZ and The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand) permitted several periods of direct access to their trading floors 
to interview traders and analysts. These participants were also asked to fill out the quantitative 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
129
 It might be contended that mixing up the sequence of media types would have removed this framing 
influence and helped ensure that responses were not shaped in the context of other responses. However, in 
contrast to the distinction between importance/ objectivity, this form of cognitive framing or anchoring stemming 
from the contextual cues of prior responses to similar questions was considered useful in ensuring greater 
consistency in responses.  
 
130
 Three faculty research assistants and the IT department at the author’s place of work assisted with the 
technical aspects of implementing the online software (see acknowledgements). The design/format of the 
questionnaire instrument and the analysis of the collected data remained entirely the author’s work, of course. 
The sequence and display of the online questionnaire followed the format of the hard copy. The respondents 
had to manually input a figure in the relevant media type/ market sector in exactly the same way as the hard 
copy version. One difference is worth mentioning however. Although respondents were advised that the survey 
would require up to 30 minutes, the progression through the survey was not signalled by the SurveyPro 
programme. In order to try and minimise the likelihood of respondent frustration, the sequencing of response 
screens in the on-line version provided an opportunity to exit the questionnaire before completing the 
structured/open ended section, and half the online respondents took that opportunity. Otherwise, apart from 
the uncontrollable potential for typological error, there is no reason to assume that the online version created 
any variation in responses from the hard copy version. As it transpired, although SurveyPro was user-friendly 
from the respondents’ perspective, it was found to be rather cumbersome in terms of data collation. Once the 
survey period had expired, the data had to be manually extracted and inputted into SPSS to enable analysis.  
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section of the hard copy questionnaire. These were either completed at the time or 
subsequently posted back in the envelope provided. 15 further questionnaire responses were 
elicited through this approach was and the data was entered into the SurveyPro database by 
the researcher.   
 
4. The qualitative data from the open-ended questions was collated and stored for compilation and 
with the interview data (see later).  
 
The questionnaires were administered concurrently with the interviews between May 2004 and  
September 2005. The total number of completed responses numbered 65. However, the structure 
of the questionnaire requested parallel responses for each of the four financial market areas 
identified (stocks/equities, bonds/interest rates, currencies/forex and derivatives). Of these 
respondents, 31 provided more than one parallel response, indicating that they were involved in 
trading or analysing securities in more than one financial sector. Although in several cases these 
parallel responses were identical131, in the majority of cases some variation was evident. This 
indicated that the respondents had different perceptions of the importance or objectivity of some 
media/sources and/or types of data/information in respect to different financial market sectors. 
Importantly, this also allowed the parallel responses to be treated as separate in the analysis of the 
data, and increased the number of valid responses to 132 in total. By market sector, these were 
comprised of 47 responses on stocks/equities, 32 on bonds/interest rates, 30 on currencies/forex 
and 23 on derivatives, which provided a reasonable distribution of responses across the four 
sectors. It is worth noting that derivatives trading can be highly varied and can involve securities 
based on any of the other sectors. Accordingly, the majority of responses related to derivatives 
came from respondents who also filled out a parallel response for another market area. The 
majority of respondents were traders and analysts from investment banks or other financial firms 
trading their own capital, with a much more limited response from major institutional funds deploying 
other investor’s money. This may therefore mean the responses have an institutional bias towards 
the investment banking sector, whereas other studies (notably Davis, 2005) emphasised 
institutional fund managers.  
 
The quantitative data was entered into an SPSS-14 database which was used to conduct several 
forms of calculation pertaining to the research questions. These included: 
 
a) Generation of basic frequencies, means, and standard deviations with break-downs for each 
market sector to provide basic descriptive data about the overall patterns of perceptions in 
relation to perceived importance and objectivity for each media/source and information type.  
 
b) Generation of a correlations matrix to examine the strength of bivariate relations among the 
entire set of variables, using Spearman’s Rho132 to test for statistical significance among ordinal 
                                                 
131
 The fact that the responses were identical does not invalidate the response or suggest that the respondent 
was not taking due care with the answers. The majority of the respondents who completed parallel questions 
for more than one sector had some involvement with derivatives which is likely to be linked to their other areas 
of trade (thus currency trading may well involve forex forwards, swaps and futures/options).  
 
132
 Statistical significance testing allows the researcher to gauge the level of confidence with which the 
statistical patterns in the sample data can be extrapolated to the general population and thus extend 
descriptive statistics into inferential statistics. The basic principle here involves comparing the actual patterns 
of data distribution between two variables with the possible distributions one could expect to occur in a 
completely random distribution (given the number of categories and the maximum/minimum range of possible 
responses). The degree of correlation is gauged between +1.0 (perfect positive) and -1.0 (perfect negative), 
either of which would indicate a directly proportional co-variance between the two variables (a moderate 
correlation of 0.5 would indicate that one variable accounts for 25% of the variance in the other variable). 
However, correlations may arise through chance distributions of data. A test of the statistical significance of a 
correlation between two variables is therefore needed. Significance tests are essentially intended to refute the 
‘null hypothesis’ that there is no relation between the variables and thereby rule out the probability that the 
correlation arose solely by chance. The usual threshold for accepting a correlation as significant is a 5%  (a p-
value of 0.05 or less) likelihood that the distribution of data occurred by random chance (Stacks & Hocking, 
1999; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003; Hill & Lewicki, 2007). If the data is parametric and follows a normal 
(symmetrical) curve of distribution around the mean, the significance of a correlation is generally tested using 
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data correlations. The primary intention here was to examine the relationship between the 
perceived importance and perceived objectivity of various media/sources and also the relation 
between different media/sources and the various forms of information. However, the inclusion 
of all the variables in the correlations matrix was an exploratory strategy to uncover any 
unanticipated relationships between variables that might help inform the analysis of 
informational reflexivity. 
 
c) The use of ANOVA (one way) to test whether variances133 in the responses differ significantly 
across the four market sectors (using a post-hoc Tukey test to identify the points of difference).  
 
d) Identification of correlated clusters of variables using factor analysis to identify ways of 
condensing the variables into fewer discrete scales. The reliability of the scales was then tested 
and assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha134. After modifying the factors to include or exclude 
variables the enhance reliability and semantic coherence, a further correlation matrix between 
                                                                                                                                                     
the Pearson r coefficient. With nonparametric data where it is not known whether the distribution of values 
follows  the normal distribution curve  and/or where the values represent ordinal scales rather than intervals or 
ratios, it is more usual to use the Spearman (R)  test for calculating significance (although Stacks & Hocking 
[1999] suggest the semantic differential scales can lend themselves to parametric analysis using Pearson r ). 
The Spearman function is similar in some respects to Pearson in that it calculates significance by comparing 
the actual distribution of values with a random distribution based on discrete ranks according to the sample 
size and the range of possible values for each variable (Hill & Lewicki, 2007).  
 
133
 ‘Variance’ here refers to calculation of differences between groups based on totalling the squared deviation 
from the overall mean in each group (the sum of squares) and dividing this by the total number of responses 
less one. The relation being explored here concerns whether market categories (stocks, bonds, currencies, 
derivatives) act as an independent variable in explaining variations in the perceived levels of media/source 
importance and objectivity. ANOVA calculates the F-ratio by dividing the variance between categories by the 
variance within the categories; if the former is larger than the latter then the F- ratio will be high and variation 
between the groups is regarded as significant, suggesting the categories produce the difference as an 
independent variable. Where there is significant variation related to the subcategories, the Tukey post-hoc test 
is used to identify where the key difference arises between the subcategories. As Hill & Lewicki (2007) point 
out, this is considered more valid than conducting T-tests for differences between each pair because Tukey 
takes simultaneous account of the variance across all the subcategories, not just the two selected ones.  
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 Clusters of inter-correlating variables which exhibit a level of variance proportional to each other can be 
identified using factor analysis. If it can be determined that the values of several separate variable measures 
tend to move together, this may indicate that they can be understood as measuring aspects of a common 
underlying variable that can be described as composite scale, allowing analysis as if it were a discrete 
constructed variable. Principal Component Analysis identifies the range of components that can comprise a 
composite variable/scale. This was ‘exploratory’ factor analysis (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 2000) since the 
researcher had no specific preconception of how the variables might cluster (although there was an 
expectation that similar types of media might well be rated similarly on the importance/ objectivity scales.  As 
Hill & Lewicki (2007) suggest, factor analysis can be understood as a process of developing an n-dimensional 
scatterplot, indicating the points where variable scores would cross-reference on a graph with multiple axes, 
and then rotating the axes (SPSS Varimax function) to identify a line (or, rather, an n-dimensional plane) which 
best intersects those points, indicating the optimum extent to which an underlying construct explains the 
variances among the constituent components. The Kaiser normalisation principle eliminates components if 
they do not account for variance at least as well as any other single component (eigenvalue <1.0).  
Subsequent to the initial Principal Component Analysis, the scales were adjusted (adding or removing 
components) to render them discrete and more relevant in terms of the logical relations among the variables. 
For example, the initial analysis indicated two clusters of variables related to perceived media importance and 
suggested a distinction between media/sources that would be publicly accessible and those restricted to 
institutional investors. To make these more analytically coherent, other variables were added or deleted from 
the respective sets (e.g. academic journals were rather ambiguous here). As Stacks & Hocking (1999) 
suggest, there is a need to ensure the reliability of any scale, rather like checking for inter-coder reliability in 
content analysis. If a new variable is added to the scale, it must checked to ensure the construct remains 
consistent as a measure. Each adjustment was tested using Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (a scale reliability of 
0.7 or higher is usually considered acceptable, particularly for the initial development of scales; Stacks & 
Hocking, 1999). If adding or deleting a component reduced the Cronbach Alpha level below this level, the 
change was rejected. The scales are discussed further in the findings and analysis section.  
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the scale variables was generated, testing for significance using Pearson’s r (because the scale 
values do not conform to discrete ranks).  
Interview Design and Implementation 
The quantitative data and the accompanying qualitative responses from the questionnaire provide 
descriptive data on how various types of media/sources and information are perceived and 
prioritised. The qualitative data from the structured, open-ended questions would also provide 
additional indications of how respondents made use of different forms of  media and information in 
trading decisions. However, the structured nature and limited response space of the open-ended 
questions on the questionnaire can only elicit relatively cursory responses. Self-administered 
structured questionnaires allow no opportunity for the researcher to clarify the intended meanings of 
statements or to pursue an emerging theme with additional questions. However, semi-structured 
open-ended interviews with the agents directly involved in financial trading and analysis provide 
precisely such opportunities. The ability to check and clarify the respondent’s meanings significantly 
also increases the validity of the analysis because the researcher can be more confident in 
interpreting rich data statements. Given that institutional investors’ professional knowledge of 
financial media and information usage is the primary object of investigation, the use of interviews 
can be regarded as a vector through which respondents’ articulations of their own decision-making 
agency can be rendered accessible to the researcher. When collated, this provides an index of the 
intersubjective codifications underpinning financial market activity. The main limitation of this 
method of data collection is that, as additional questions and themes are developed, the data 
becomes increasingly dissimilar from those of other respondents, reducing the potential for 
thematisation and systematic comparison.  
The interview data, along with the data from the open-ended section of the questionnaire, was 
intended to provide a basis for triangulation with the quantitative questionnaire data. Triangulation 
can be regarded as a process that helps increase the validity of analysis by cross-referencing the 
findings from two different sets of data. Although the statistical findings can be meaningful in their 
own right in the context of the theoretical framework, explaining why certain statistical patterns 
emerge (or are conspicuous by their absence) involves a level of interpretation whereby the 
intentions, norms or behaviour of the respondents must be inferred. Rich data derived from 
interviews may provide more substantive validation where this allows empirical (dis)confirmation of 
the explanations developed to explain the patterns of media usage. In Babbie’s (2007) terms, this 
might be regarded as developing a nomothetic explanation by collating and cross-referencing the 
idiographic. For the purposes of this study, this entailed analysing the interview data for ‘key 
enunciations135‘ that provide a direct account of the respondent’s agency in relation to the issues 
being examined and offer the interpreting researcher an ‘emic’ angle of understanding (see 
Trocchia & Janda, 2000; Babbie, 2007). Although the researcher must avoid selective emphasis on 
enunciations that match the preferred theoretical suppositions, this approach does not ignore 
manifest patterns of responses across multiple respondents and the consistencies or contradictions 
that emerge from this. All utterances salient to the issues in question need to be taken into account. 
However, analytic priority is afforded to respondents’ explicit accounts of their own agency over 
formal explanations based on themes not identified by the respondents themselves. The idea of 
‘key enunciations’ draws on Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock (1999) who point to the need to 
be sensitive to several forms of utterance when interpreting rich data from interviews. Citing 
Anderson & Jack’s (1991) work on interview methodology, Deacon et al. distinguish between 
                                                 
135
 This is the researcher’s term for the use of specifically meaningful utterances derived from interviews with 
key actors to triangulate evidence from public documents in political-economic analyses of media policy. 
Although not elaborated as a distinct method, see for example, Thompson’s (2005, 2007) analyses of 
broadcasting politics in New Zealand. The key challenge in dealing with interviews with persons representing 
institutions with vested interests in the issues being explored is to judge where data from public 
documents/records and the theories being applied indicate that the interview responses may not be valid or 
even deliberately disingenuous/misleading. This was not regarded as a significant difficulty in the study of 
financial investors’ use of media/information, because the information being provided had little bearing on the 
normative evaluation of the respondents’ performances.  
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normative utterances (which may reveal a respondent’s sense of how their opinions/actions related 
to expected behaviours/standards), logical utterances (which reveal the internal consistency or 
inconsistency of the respondents’ opinions/reported behaviour) and meta-statements (which 
indicate respondent awareness of tensions between comments and actions or normative ideals).  
The development of the  semi-structured interview schedule was based on the open-ended section 
of the questionnaire. However, for convenience, questions 1 and 2  and questions 9 and 10 were 
condensed into a single question regarding media/ information usage136. Question 4, concerning 
management of third party capital was not used in practice because none of the respondents were 
actually fund managers.  Meanwhile, two questions were added to the schedule. Question 1 invited 
the respondent to briefly describe their daily routine media usage. Question 16, citing the example 
of a non-expert whose investment website became temporarily influential was also introduced as a 
prompt to elicit comments about the potential for unreliable information to move markets. The 
schedule of interview questions is listed below. In practice, time constraints and the different length 
of responses different respondents provided to questions (along with the researcher’s 
supplementary questions for clarification) meant that not all the questions could be fully answered 
by all respondents. Where time was evidently  limited, the sequence of the questions was changed 
to ensure that a range of questions were covered, not just the initial sequence. In a few instances, 
where respondent answers were becoming very technical, the researcher would politely interrupt, 
admit that his own limited knowledge was failing to keep up with the response and either request an 
explanation or move on to another question.   
Base open-ended question schedule for semi-structured interviews: 
1. Please can you describe your routine media usage when you come in and set up for 
trading/analysis every day? 
2. How would your use of various media/ sources and/or information types change during times of 
market volatility/ crisis?  
3. How far does the volume/scale (i.e. $$$ value) of investment transaction affect your use of 
various media types/ information sources?  
4. Under what circumstances might you second-guess/ double-check an information source you 
normally consider reliable? (Or trust a source you normally consider unreliable?) 
5. Briefly comment on how your trading/ analysis activities have been affected by the emergence 
of new information technologies (e.g. computers cellphones, internet, etc.) 
6. Briefly comment on how the financial markets as a whole  have been affected by the 
emergence of new information technologies (e.g. computers, cellphones, internet, etc.) 
7. What types of media/ information sources do you most need to access in real time (i.e. zero 
time delay/ continuous monitoring) and why? 
8. What types of information/data updates do you most need to access in real-time (i.e. zero time-
delay/ continuous monitoring), and why?  
9. How far does the importance you ascribe to a particular medium/source or information type 
depend on the significance ascribed to it by other market actors (i.e. that other traders/analysts 
take notice of it) ? 
10. If you were able to gain access to a currently unavailable type of media/source and/or a 
currently unavailable type of information/data, which would have the most impact on your ability 
to trade/ analyse successfully (and why)? 
11. There are often several competing media/ information sources of each type (e.g. Wall St. 
Journal & Financial Times; Reuters & Bloomberg, etc.). What factors determine whether you 
prefer one medium/source to another of the same type? 
12. What types of data/ information have the greatest potential to precipitate trends of trading 
activity and ‘move the market’ ? 
                                                 
136
 Questionnaire responses indicated that minimal differentiation was made by respondents here. Most of the 
20 respondents who completed the open-ended questions either completed one question or else repeated the 
information. This may suggest that the respondents made no distinction between media /source type and 
information type, but it is equally likely that haste in questionnaire completion precluded checking how the 
questionnaire had categorised the respective typologies.  
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13. To what extent do high-volume ($$$ value) trading transactions have the potential to precipitate 
trends of trading activity and ‘move the market’? (And how large would they have to be?) 
14. In trading/analysis activity, how important is it to have access to information/data not currently 
available to other market actors, compared with having access to the information/data which is 
available to other market actors?   
15. When making recommendations or decisions about buying/ selling/ rating various securities, is 
it important that your rationale/criteria be shared by other market actors, or is it important that 
your rationale/ criteria diverge from others (i.e. a ‘contrarian’ approach)?    
16. There was a story in Business Week about a case in the US where a tree pruner who fancied 
himself as an investment expert set himself up as a financial expert on the internet. He was 
eventually closed down by the SEC, but not before he’d been quoted by a top analyst’s 
newsletter and started to be cited on Bloomberg. Could you comment on how this kind of thing 
might occur and what it suggests about the way information can affect markets? 
Semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with 30 finance professionals with eight 
participants being interviewed twice (and one senior individual three times), for a total of 39 
interviews137. These additional interviews followed on from the initial semi-structured interviews and 
were not themselves structured138. Four of the interviewees were not currently working in financial 
investment, although their experience was recent and salient (interview participants #3, #4 and #5 
139), while the other (participant #12) was a former stockbroker in the UK prior to the introduction of 
electronic trading platforms (whose experience was solicited for a point of contrast). The overall 
break-down of the interviewees was as follows: 14 were investment bank traders/dealers, 7 were 
investment bank analysts/economists, 1 was an analyst at another investment firm, and 8 had 
financial investment roles at other institutions. Out of the 30 participants, 18 had senior positions, 
including three institutional heads of trading/investment, one chief economist, and three who were 
the senior managers of their respective investment firms. All except one of the interview participants 
were male, which was entirely consistent with the overall gender composition of the investment 
institutions visited. With the exception of five interviews (#3, #4, #5, #12 and #13) all were 
conducted on site at the investment institution in question. These were all conducted between May 
2004 and September 2005, concurrently with the implementation of the questionnaire140.   
                                                 
137
 A further two unstructured interviews were also conducted with local financial journalists with experience in 
reporting with Reuters and the Financial Times.  
138
 In the case of the two follow-up visits to Deutsche Bank, the timing was negotiated to coincide with the 
Reserve Bank’s six-weekly official cash rate (OCR) announcement, which would have a direct influence on the 
value of the Kiwi dollar and any related interest rate securities. This was the primary focus of the related 
interviews. 
 
139
 Participants #3, #4 and #5 assisted with the development of the questionnaire, although only #5 
subsequently completed it.  
 
140
 It was originally intended that the interviews would be a follow up the questionnaire part of the study. This 
would have allowed some preliminary analysis of the data and permitted more focused interview questions to 
be developed. However, the slow response rate to the online questionnaire precluded this and the visits to the 
investment institutions to conduct interviews provided a vital opportunity to solicit additional responses to the 
quantitative part of the questionnaire.  The interviews were all pre-arranged in consultation with a senior 
representative of the respective institution. In the cases of the visits to Deutsche Bank, ANZ and RBNZ, where 
access to the trading floor was permitted, these included a schedule of interviews with participants who had 
already indicated a willingness to participate, although several unscheduled opportunities presented 
themselves during those visits. In each case, the participant was provided with the information sheet and 
consent form in advance, and the researcher provided a brief verbal explanation of the nature of the study, 
emphasising the voluntary and nature of the exercise and the undertaking to maintain anonymity/ 
confidentiality if requested. Participants were given the option of requesting both personal and institutional 
anonymity and were permitted to opt out of the recording (which three participants opted for). Because of the 
mixed nature of the requests for anonymity (two thirds requested not to be personally identified) and the 
potential for inadvertent identification if colleagues were named, it was decided to refer to all the participants by 
number and include a list of acknowledgements (which meant that no individual comment could be traced to 
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Methodological caveats over interviewer-interviewee dynamics and the propensity for respondent 
acquiescence, leading questions, or non-verbal cues (see Cohen & Manion, 1994; Schumann & 
Presser, 1999) were not considered to be a significant concern. The researcher’s academic 
background was largely irrelevant to the respondents, and the mode of engagement between 
interviewer and interviewee was that of the non-expert outsider seeking the knowledge of the expert 
insider. Not surprisingly, respondents were both highly educated and self-confident in their own 
expertise. In cases where the researcher asked a question or suggested an interpretation of market 
processes inconsistent with the respondents own understanding, there was no hesitation in 
correcting the researcher. Although the researcher was treated politely as a guest, and his lack of 
expert knowledge was accepted with patience, the power-relations in the context of the interviews 
clearly placed him in a subordinate position. In some respects, this was advantageous because it 
allowed the researcher to raise questions about market information and media usage in the 
confidence of not influencing responses. The disadvantage was that it sometimes limited the 
interviewer’s ability to control the direction of interview, particularly where respondents became 
enthused about explaining technicalities peripheral to the research question. Given that the 
researcher did not have the specialist knowledge of in-house systems and the detailed knowledge 
of markets that the respondents would often refer to, regular clarifications had to be requested. 
Consequently, around half of the interview material comprised either of technical explanations and 
contextualisation to enable the respondent to engage in comprehensible dialogue with the 
researcher, rather the question-specific responses.  
The collated data was read through and notes were taken on the more general themes emerging. 
However, the primary analysis of data followed close reading of the transcribed material and 
identification of key enunciations which had salience for the specific questions and/or the patterns 
of quantitative questionnaire data which had been collected concurrently but analysed first. As each 
transcript was scrutinised, indications of the basic responses to the key questions were noted (and 
it is at this level that the data was thematised to indicate broad areas of consensus/ dissensus), 
while the key enunciations that were most salient to particular theoretical points were recorded141 
and then cross-referenced with other findings emerging from the quantitative data 
Non-Participant Observation 
The third mode of data collection deployed was more limited in scope but nevertheless invaluable. 
Through negotiations and the cooperation of participant institutions, the researcher was afforded 
the opportunity to engage in extended visits to three banking institutions, Deutsche Bank 
                                                                                                                                                     
any individual140). In all cases, hand-written notes were taken during the interview. For consenting parties, the 
interviews were recorded using a portable analogue cassette recorder. Recordings were stored securely in a 
locked cabinet. Partly to ensure correct transcription and partly as a time-saving measure, a professional 
transcriber was employed (with a confidentiality agreement) to prepare the initial transcriptions of the 
interviews. The researcher then checked the transcriptions while listening to the recordings and amended the 
transcription where required. Particularly in the cases involving Deutsche Bank and ANZ, the busy trading 
room environment occasionally meant recording was either subject to interference from background noise 
(phones ringing, trading calls being made across desks) or interruption where market activity suddenly required 
the participant’s attention or called them to another desk in the trading room (which also precluded the use of a 
microphone physically attached to the respondent). On several occasions, the researcher was required to turn 
off the recorder because of sensitive conversations being conducted with counterparties or bank clients. As a 
result, some parts of the recordings were unclear, and in one case, a section of an interview was lost due to 
technical failure. Nevertheless, the interviews, which lasted between 20 minutes and one hour, generated 
approximately 150,000 words of data in total, not including the notes from interviews with respondents who 
declined to be recorded.   
 
141
 For example, in one case, a respondent made the observation that in some market sectors that were less 
prone to short-term fluctuations and did not need real-time information flows (long-term stock market 
investments), non-institutional investors could potentially invest on a reasonably well-informed basis. In 
another instance, a different respondent strongly suggested that non-institutional investors were disadvantaged 
by their lack of access to specialist information from top analysts whose reports were not easily accessed 
outside the networks of institutional investors. Partly because they both concern symmetries of access to 
information and partly because they do not agree with each other, these would be noted as key enunciations.  
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(Auckland), ANZ Bank (Wellington) and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. All three offered 
opportunities to interview a range of traders and analysts and observe the general activities on their 
trading floors (Deutsche Bank, 22 March 04, 9 June 05, and 28 July 05; ANZ 2 May 05 and 28 
September 05; RBNZ 3 May 05 and 28 September 05). The initial trip to Deutsche Bank was for a 
full day; the other visits were for half-days. In the two repeat visits to Deutsche Bank, the dates were 
arranged to coincide with the Reserve Bank’s official cash rate announcement to enable the 
researcher to observe the preparation and response of a major financial institution to an anticipated 
information event with the potential to generate significant trading activity. Together, RBNZ, DB and 
ANZ provided an interesting range of bank-based perspectives on financial markets142. The actual 
observation process was largely inseparable from the process of conducting on-site interviews. The 
researcher was not permitted to wander around the trading floor at random and of course, there 
was no way to actually participate in the investment activities. The researcher was introduced to 
respondents in turn and would sit adjacent to them at their respective trading desks to conduct the 
interviews. This allowed the researcher the opportunity to directly observe the screens and arrays of 
information and media channels used to conduct the trading activity and the respondents were able 
to identify features of these systems that would not have been practical to explain on a 
questionnaire. During busy periods of trading, the researcher would (literally) take a back seat so as 
not to interfere with proceedings. These periods might last for up to half an hour during which time 
there was an opportunity to write up notes from earlier interviews and generally observe the 
interactions among traders and analysts. In Wimmer & Dominick’s (2003) terms, this would be 
classed as overt, non-participant observation in a natural setting, and is more suited for descriptive 
types of data collection. Deacon et al. (1999) classify this kind of non-participant approach as 
simple/ overt observation, but, despite its obvious limitations, they emphasise that any kind of  
observation confers some empirical advantage on the researcher compared with remote surveys. 
Directly experiencing the behaviour of the target population in their natural environment may reveal 
events or patterns that are taken for granted and regarded as insignificant by the members of that 
population and therefore unlikely to be reported in a questionnaire.  
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 It is worth noting some basic characteristics of these institutions (based on the respective annual reports for 
DB, ANZ and RBNZ): Deutsche Bank is the local branch of one of the largest financial institutions in the world. 
DB is primarily an investment bank with approximately US$3 trillion in assets and almost 2000 branches 
around the world (roughly half in Germany). Its regional operations look after trade and analysis in local 
currencies, bonds and stocks, but are closely integrated with the banks’ global market activities. ANZ (New 
Zealand) is the local branch of the Australian-based banking institution with around US$430 billion in assets 
and branches in 32 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region as well as the US and UK. Its investment function is 
not as globally prominent as DB commercial (retail) services, and the NZ trading section is more autonomous 
from its other overseas operations than DB (although it has close links with the Australian offices). The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand is a different kind of institution insofar as its role is not primarily to maximise 
profits for private shareholders. Although technically a state organisation, RBNZ operates at arms-length from 
government,  but it plays a critical role in financial and monetary policy. Its objectives include ensuring stability 
in the New Zealand monetary system, promoting financial market efficiency, and ensuring that the currency 
needs of the domestic economy are met while economic inflation is controlled. Here, it plays a critical role in 
the financial markets by setting the Official Cash Rate (OCR) for the Kiwi dollar which sets the official inter-
bank lending rate and affects the value of both the currency and all interest rate (bond) securities thus 
denominated. The role on maintaining currency stability also requires the RBNZ to maintain significant forex 
portfolios and other financial assets and occasionally reserve banks will intervene in currency markets to 
stabilise the domestic currency (although as the SE Asian crisis demonstrates, this is not always successful). 
The actual composition of RBNZ forex reserves is therefore not publicly disclosed, although the institution’s 
assets are worth around US$17.5 billion, of which roughly 60% is currency-related (RBNZ forex reserves for 
intervention were substantially increased after 2007 because of the global instability of the credit crunch). Any 
public RBNZ statement or comment has the potential to influence market perceptions, particularly in regard to 
expected adjustments of the OCR (which indirectly affects the cost of credit and thus the quantity of money in 
the economy; see earlier chapter on money). Although not a major actor in terms of the scale of its operations 
or size of its investment portfolios, every nuance of RBNZ’s statements is subject to intense scrutiny by the 
financial community and it has to take special care to ensure that it does not inadvertently mislead market 
expectations and move prices. Coupled with the opportunity to observe trading floor responses to the OCR at 
DB, this provided scope to investigate a small-scale but nevertheless very interesting moment of action in the 
financial cycle. 
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However, the limitations entailed by simple/overt/non-participant observation need consideration. 
One possible disadvantage is the potential for what Babbie (2007) terms ‘reactivity’, where the 
researcher’s presence influences the activities of the population being observed. In practice, 
however, the need for concentration entailed by the investment activities and the non-expert status 
of the researcher meant there was negligible likelihood of this arising. Another issue is that. 
epistemologically speaking, observation of a subject of investigation can never be neutral; the 
observer must have some prior conception of which phenomena deserve attention and how to 
interpret and classify those observations. There is a therefore risk of forming subjective, etic 
impressions that do not correspond with the emic perceptions of the actors concerned (Babbie, 
2007). In ethnographic studies of trading, such as those conducted by Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 
(2002a, 2002b), extended periods of access and/or the prior professional experience of the 
researcher allow the development of an emic perspective. Longitudinal observation was not a 
possibility in the context of this study, and the etic limitation was readily apparent: Even direct 
observation of traders engaging in transactions, calling up screens of data, or making calls to 
colleagues in offices overseas could not be directly interpreted in terms of the research questions 
being explored. For example, in one instance, a trader explaining his media usage called up a 
Reuters screen displaying a complex array of ask-bid spreads and pointed to a single line of data to 
which he was paying close attention. The fact that the researcher could see the same screen did 
not confer the ability to discern what information was relevant to the trader or why. 
Nevertheless, in conjunction with interviews, the on-site observation offered a valuable additional 
source of data. Observation provided an opportunity to ask participants about on-going behaviours 
or events/actions that have just occurred with an immediacy not possible in questionnaires where 
reports of such actions are subject to memory and filtering (Deacon et al., 1999). For example, on 
several occasions, the researcher observed traders calling on their analyst colleagues to provide 
explanations for unexplained or unexpected market news or price movements. This helped 
crystallise the researcher’s understanding of the trader-analyst relation in a way that could not have 
been derived from the quantitative data from the questionnaire. The concurrent nature of the 
observation interspersed with interviews also allows the researcher to check the validity of 
observations in subsequent interviews. Another valuable aspect of the observational opportunities 
was that they made it easier for the researcher to relate the theory and the accumulating data to a 
context one has directly experienced and to derive a sense of the institutional climate in which 
investment activities take place. This also aided the researcher’s conceptualisation of processes 
explained in the literature that had heretofore been limited to theoretical abstractions or media 
imagery; as Deacon et al. (1999, p.261) suggest, observation helped ‘put the flesh on the bones’. 
The observational aspect of the study was therefore invaluable in terms of providing the researcher 
with first-hand experience of the environment in which the financial investment activities being 
investigated were conducted. However, where particular patterns of activity or behaviours/ 
interactions among the traders and analysts were deemed interesting or involved some form of key 
enunciation that revealed something specifically relevant to financial media and information usage, 
then these were noted down, either during the interim period between interviews, or at the earliest 
opportunity after the end of the visiting period. This helped ensure that the researcher’s memory of 
the observed phenomena was as recent as possible. Where relevant and possible subsequent 
interviews were used to check the researcher’s interpretation of the observed behaviour/event, and 
interviewees were invited to explain observed behaviour. 
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Chapter 10: Quantitative Findings and Discussion143 
 
The preceding methodological section identified the empirical research questions and the 
processes through which data would be collected and analysed. This chapter presents the findings 
of the quantitative survey and the qualitative findings of the open-ended survey questions and the 
semi-structured interviews. The first part will present several descriptive charts and tables providing 
an overview of the quantitative survey findings on perceptions of media/source importance and 
objectivity and the importance of different information types. Relevant quantitative data on each 
medium/ information source and information types and their variations across market sector types 
will also be presented, and the relevant sets of correlations with other variables will also be 
identified.  For the sake of space and reading efficiency, some discussion and analysis will be 
included in relation to each media/source and information type particularly where the data has 
specific theoretical significance. Where relevant, findings from the qualitative part of the empirical 
study will be introduced to help contextualise the quantitative data.  This sequencing is intended to 
help ‘narrate’ the findings rather than present large amounts of quantitative data ‘up front’ and then 
constantly refer the reader back to it.  
 
Chapter 11 will then present the main qualitative findings from the open-ended section in the 
questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews and discuss the theoretical significance of this 
data in the context  of the quantitative data. This section will also include some discussion of the 
financial communicative processes involved in preparation and response to the Official Cash Rate 
by the Reserve Bank as a mini-case study, drawing particularly on the interviews and observations 
at RBNZ and Deutsche Bank.  
 
The collated data from the quantitative survey generated 132 discrete responses on the perceived 
importance and objectivity of 24 media/ information sources and 15 types of information across four 
market sectors. The responses across market sectors included: 47 for stocks/equities; 32 for bonds/ 
interest rates; 30 for currencies/forex; and 23  for derivatives. The importance and objectivity ratings 
were all gauged on  7-point semantic differential scales as indicated below. 
 
Fig. 6a Scale for Rating Importance of Media/Sources and Information  
 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Essential Highly 
Important 
Important Moderately 
Important 
Unimportant Highly 
Unimportant 
Irrelevant 
 
 
Fig. 6b Scale for Rating Objectivity of Media/Sources  
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Totally 
Objective 
Highly 
Objective 
Mainly 
Objective 
Partly 
Objective 
Mainly 
Subjective 
Highly 
Subjective 
Totally 
Subjective 
 
 
The following bar charts compare the overall means for each media/source type and also include 
graphic comparisons of the differences between the means across market sectors. More detailed 
discussion will follow in the subsequent sections, but the charts will provide an initial impression of 
the overall pattern of the survey findings. Note that the media/source and information labels have 
been abbreviated in places to fit the diagrams.   
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 Following feedback from the examiners, the presentation of some of the quantitative and qualitative data 
has been abbreviated or deleted  to maintain the emphasis is on the most theoretically salient findings. 
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Fig. 7 
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Fig 8. Rankings of Media/ Source by Importance 
Importance Rating Media/ Information Sources 
 
Mean 
> 6 
 
Essential-  
Highly 
Important 
 
• Specialist financial information/wire services (Reuters/ Bloomberg, 
etc.);  
• Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with own colleagues;  
• Information derived from one’s own professional analysis 
 
 
Mean 
> 5 
 
 
Highly 
Important-
Important 
 
• Specialist Industry reports (official stock market/ central bank/ratings 
agencies reports);  
• General (informal) discussion/consultation with own colleagues;  
• Specific (work-related) instructions/advice from one’s own institution; 
• General (informal) discussion/consultation with external contacts in 
financial markets;  
• Specific (work-related) discussion/ consultation with external contacts 
in financial markets;  
• Information derived from specialist systems/algorithms used in own 
institution;  
• Information derived from personal intuition/ feelings/ hunches.  
 
Mean 
> 4 
 
 
Important- 
Moderately 
Important 
• Finance/ business newspapers;  
• Financial/business internet sites (including online versions of other 
financial news media);  
• Subscriber finance/business Internet sites/ on-line market information 
services;  
• Company reports/accounts/ publications/ announcements;  
• Public investment advice/ recommendations from market analysts; 
• Private (purchased) advice/ recommendations from external market 
analysts;  
 
Mean 
> 3 
 
Moderately 
Important- 
Unimportant 
 
• General interest newspapers;  
• Finance/business magazines;  
• Specialist academic journals;  
• Finance/ business broadcasting news;  
• Specialist finance/business channels;  
• General Internet sites (including on-line versions of other general 
media);  
Mean 
> 2 
Unimportant-
Highly 
unimportant 
• General interest magazines;  
• General interest broadcasting news 
 
 
Although these mean figures require further consideration in respect to variation across market 
sectors and the range of responses/ standard deviations, several patterns are readily evident: 
Firstly, the media/ information sources rated most important (mean ratings between ‘essential’ and 
‘very important’)   are the respondent’s own professional analysis of markets, the specialist financial 
wire services144 and specific work discussion, which, interestingly, are all media forms that would be 
restricted primarily to institutional investors. Following these, with means between ‘important’ and 
‘highly important’, are discussions with professional colleagues (both internal and external to the 
respondents’ own institution), the systems/algorithms of the respondents’ own institutions, specialist 
industry reports (such as central bank and ratings agency analyses) and, perhaps curiously, 
intuition/ feelings/hunches145.  
                                                 
144
 Note that the substantially higher rating for wire services compared with financial newspapers is not 
consistent with the 2000 MORI poll cited by Davis (2006a, 2006c) which found that UK fund managers 
regarded the financial press as more important. However, the sample composition here represents investment 
bank traders more than fund managers, so this may indicate a difference in institutional practices. 
 
145
 Obviously a non-institutional investor might have intuitions or hunches about trading decisions, but the 
assumption here is that the value of such a nebulous source would stem from subconscious pattern 
recognition and instincts derived from extended professional experience, rather than lucky guesses.  
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Next, there are several media/ sources rated between ‘important’ and ‘moderately important’ 
including company reports, public and private analyst advice,  internet-based financial sources and 
financial newspapers. Note that there appears to be  minimal distinction between subscription 
financial internet sources and free financial internet sources or between public analyst advice/ 
recommendations and private (purchased) analyst advice/recommendations. This suggests the 
relative advantage to be gained from paying for such sources is minimal.  The other media/sources 
are all rated below the level of ‘moderately important’: general internet sites, financial broadcasts 
(including specialist financial channels such as CNBC), academic journals, financial/business 
magazines and general interest newspapers are all rated between ‘moderately important’ and 
‘unimportant’, while the media/sources which are rated the least important (between ‘highly 
unimportant’ and ‘unimportant’) are general interest broadcasting and general interest magazines.  
 
From this overview of the data, it appears that the more specialised/ less accessible forms of 
media/information sources that would tend to be available only to the professional institutional 
investor are regarded as generally more important than other publicly-available media sources, 
even those that have a particular financial focus. Nevertheless, financially-oriented newspapers, 
magazines, television channels and internet-based resources are rated as more important overall 
than their general interest counterparts. This suggests that some generally-available media/ 
information sources do have some value to traders and analysts. The fact that no medium is rated 
as completely irrelevant would also support the notion that in a context where the vast majority of 
market-related information is symmetrically distributed,  investors are open to seeking other sources 
of information that could potentially provide a marginal, transitory advantage. 
 
The high importance ascribed to both informal and work-specific discussion with internal colleagues 
and external contacts may indicate that trading decisions are not shaped simply by rational 
responses to incoming news about external market conditions. Consistent with Babe’s (1995) 
critique of the positivist/transmission model of economic communication, the importance of 
networks of contacts with other investors would support the argument that access to an expert 
interpretative community is just as important as accessing raw data in a timely manner. The 
importance ascribed to discussion with networks of colleagues/contacts would also be consistent 
with the need of traders and analysts to monitor the validity of their own schemata/models and 
identify trends and changes in the variables that appear to be driving trading and price movements. 
Even if the near-universal use of the financial wire services within investment institutions provides a 
basis for symmetrical, real-time access to market information, the importance ascribed to networks 
of colleagues and contacts to investment decisions suggests multiple interpretative communities 
would give rise to asymmetries in semantics and agency.  
 
From the importance ratings and the preceding discussions, an initial summary could posit an 
interplay between symmetrical and non-symmetrical media/information sources. Real-time flows of 
financial news from the wire services provide traders with the basic data on the market, but 
networks of colleagues/contacts help shape the way trading models/frames/ schemata are being 
applied (including indications about any shifts in those codifications). Thus there is a need not only 
for sources of data market activity, but for meta-information about what data matters and how it 
needs to be interpreted. This would also be consistent with the tension that emerged in the 
literature review between accounts of financial media that emphasise their role in generating both 
homogeneity and heterogeneity within flows of information and the formation of market perceptions 
(e.g. see Clark et al., 2005; Davis, 2005, 2007). However, other empirical data needs to be 
considered in order to ascertain whether such an account is sustainable. 
 
The following table provides a break-down of the overall importance ratings by market types (top 
row) and indicates the standard deviation (SD) for each score (bottom row). Note that in cases 
where there is a relatively low SD the mean is more representative of the responses as a whole. 
Where SDis relatively high (notably for company reports and systems/algorithms) caution is needed 
in making direct comparisons. Space precludes detailed discussion of each variable, and 
subsequent variance and correlations analyses are not limited in their validity because of such 
considerations. However, to illustrate the difference between a distribution with high SD and low 
SD, three basic bar charts are displayed below: 
 
 150 
Fig. 9  Break-Down of Mean Importance for Media/Sources by Market Subsector 
 
Media/ Source 
IMPORTANCE 
Overall 
Mean/SD 
Stocks 
Mean/SD 
Bonds 
Mean/SD 
Currencies 
Mean/SD  
Derivatives 
Mean/SD  
3.55 4.45 3.31 2.97 2.78 General interest 
newspapers 1.545 1.316 1.355 1.326 1.678 
4.21 5.06 3.88 3.80 3.48 Finance/Business 
newspapers 1.558 1.292 1.497 1.349 1.702 
2.39 2.85 2.16 2.17 2.09 General interest 
magazines 1.209 0.932 1.194 1.162 1.443 
3.85 4.30 3.88 3.63 3.17 Finance/Business 
magazines 1.417 1.250 1.431 1.351 1.557 
3.76 3.88 3.97 3.52 3.57 Specialist academic 
journals 1.424 1.273 1.50 1.424 1.630 
2.78 2.87 2.88 2.73 2.52 General interest 
Broadcasting news  1.292 1.191 1.289 1.311 1.504 
3.54 3.70 3.59 3.53 3.17 Finance/Business 
Broadcasting news  1.266 1.227 1.188 1.279 1.435 
3.83 3.79 4.00 3.93 3.61 Specialist  finance/ 
business channels  1.247 0.976 1.309 1.385 1.469 
3.35 3.83 3.16 3.17 2.87 General Internet 
sites 1.316 1.305 1.186 1.053 1.576 
4.65 5.00 4.65 4.63 4.00 Financial/Business 
Internet sites 1.379 1.333 1.330 1.273 1.508 
4.77 5.02 4.79 4.64 4.41 Subscriber finance 
Internet sites 1.465 1.214 1.521 1.545 1.709 
6.22 5.73 6.29 6.66 6.52 Specialist financial 
wire services 1.129 1.250 1.101 0.769 0.994 
5.16 5.30 5.35 5.23 4.52 Specialist industry 
reports 1.488 1.245 1.404 1.455 1.488 
4.73 6.13 4.65 3.69 3.52 Company reports/ 
announcements 2.018 1.185 1.836 1.831 2.150 
5.28 5.17 5.32 5.30 5.39 Informal  work 
discussion 1.530 1.554 1.447 1.643 1.530 
6.08 6.91 6.29 6.00 6.22 Specific work 
discussion 1.183 1.395 0.902 1.287 0.902 
5.42 5.24 5.52 5.39 5.67 Specific work- 
instructions 1.510 1.665 1.430 1.524 1.317 
5.19 5.17 5.16 5.20 5.23 Informal external 
discussion 1.279 1.322 1.157 1.324 1.378 
5.80 5.93 5.81 5.63 5.73 Specific external 
discussion 1.217 1.129 1.167 1.245 1.453 
4.24 4.51 4.23 4.10 3.91 Public Analyst 
Advice 1.316 1.236 1.359 1.322 1.379 
4.26 4.36 4.41 4.11 4.05 Private Analyst 
Advice 1.486 1.581 1.376 1.397 1.627 
5.00 4.93 5.17 4.82 5.14 Systems/ 
Algorithms 1.878 1.730 1.821 2.127 1.982 
6.29 6.36 6.32 6.10 6.35 Own Professional 
Analysis 0.940 1.036 0.791 0.995 0.885 
5.72 5.51 5.84 5.80 5.87 Hunches/ feelings/ 
Intuitions 1.205 1.218 1.186 1.095 1.359 
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Figs 10 a-c: Examples of Frequency Distribution and Standard Deviation for Media 
Importance 
 
Overall Mean: 4.73 
Standard Deviation: 2.018 
Overall Mean: 4.21 
Standard Deviation: 1.558 
 
Overall Mean: 4.73 
Standard Deviation: 2.018 
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The moderate level of standard deviation for the importance ratings of financial newspapers is 
associated with a (relatively) normal distribution curve compared with those for company reports 
and specialist financial wires.  The lower SD for financial wire services  is reflected in the strong 
skewed towards the higher ratings, reflecting their importance to the majority of institutional 
investors in all market subsectors. The higher standard deviation of the responses for company 
reports manifests itself in the more uneven distribution of scores. One factor accounting for this is 
the (self explanatory) higher importance rating for company reports among respondents dealing in 
stocks/equities146.  
 
The following bar-chart comparing means across market categories graphically illustrates the 
variations in scores across different markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 As subsequent ANOVA and Tukey post-hoc tests indicate, the importance ratings for company 
reports among stocks/equities respondents vary significantly from other market subsectors. The 
distribution bar chart for stocks/equities responses alone (not displayed) resembles the overall high-
end skew seen in the responses for financial wire services, indicating that there are two different 
patterns of distribution represented in the results for company reports.  
Overall Mean: 6.22 
Standard Deviation: 1.129 
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Fig. 11  
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The bar chart displaying the comparison of mean importance ratings for media/ information sources 
broken down across market sectors provides an initial indication of how media usage might vary 
depending upon the types of securities being traded. The chart suggests a consistent overall 
response across many of the media/information types. However, there is a noticeable variation 
between stocks/equities trade/analysis (red bar) and the other subsectors in several cases. The 
importance ratings for stocks are higher for company reports (which is self explanatory) and also for 
publicly-available print, broadcast and online media. Respondents involved in stocks/equities 
trade/analysis also ascribe somewhat lower importance to specialist financial wires, and 
intuition/feelings/hunches than respondents in other market sectors.  
 
The reason for this variation is unclear. However, of all the financial securities, stocks/equities are 
arguably the most deeply embedded in the industrial economy. Insofar as revenue and profitability 
depend largely on production and consumer sales, the trading of the rights to a share of that 
revenue in the financial markets (M-M’ circuit) are closely linked to the company’s productivity and 
sales (M-C-M’ circuit). In that respect, an tentative argument might be made that news about 
everyday events reported in general media are more salient to the value of stocks/equities than 
other financial securities. The ratings from bond/interest rate market respondents are the closest in 
value to stocks/equities for both company reports and financial wire services as well as several 
generally-available media/sources where stock/equities have the highest overall rating. It is difficult 
to ascertain the significance of such a pattern, but bond/interest rate instruments include corporate 
debt-securities (the ratings of which depend on company performance), government bills and 
bonds, and securitised mortgages (including CDOs). In this respect, like stocks/equities, the value 
of bonds  is liable to be influenced by debt-defaults by businesses, mortgagees or states as well as 
by credit-cycles and ratings agency reports.  On that basis, it might be tentatively posited that the 
bond/interest rate subsector also exhibits slightly stronger embeddedness in the industrial economy 
than currencies and derivatives. 
 
Although the differences in the mean scores are potentially important, a statistical test was  needed 
to determine whether any of the variations in importance ratings can be confidently attributed to the 
market subsector categories. Variance in the ratings for media/sources across the market 
subsectors was therefore analysed using one-way ANOVA, followed by Tukey tests to identify the 
precise points of difference where  they are detected.  A table displaying the statistically significant 
variations ( 0.05 threshold) attributable to market subsector category are indicated below147. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 The ANOVA F-test is based on the ratio of variance between the groups/categories (attributable to the 
independent variable category itself) and the variance within the groups/categories (error not attributable to the 
independent variable category). F is calculated as a ratio of the former to the latter, and where this exceeds 1.0 
by a an extent unlikely to be explained by a chance distribution of data (0.005 threshold) the variance is 
considered significant (see Hill & Lewicki, 2007). Note that ANOVA and Tukey tests are preferred over T-tests 
between paired variables because these cannot take the overall distribution of data across multiple categories 
into account. There is a higher risk of error involved in examining the different market sector categories as a 
series of pairs. 
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Fig.12 Significant Variation in Media/Source Importance across Market Type 
Media/ Source Variance  
by Market Subsectors 
Mean 
Square 
ANOVA 
F-value 
Sig. 
Between Groups 21.119 10.840 .000 General Newspaper 
Within Groups 1.948   
Between Groups 18.404 8.962 .000 Finance Newspaper 
Within Groups 2.053   
Between Groups 5.115 3.717 .013  General Magazine 
Within Groups 1.376   
Between Groups 7.123 3.774 .012 Finance Magazine 
Within Groups 1.888   
Between Groups 5.948 3.646 .015 General Internet 
Within Groups 1.632   
Between Groups 5.120 2.804 .043 Finance Internet 
Within Groups 1.826   
Between Groups 6.132 5.300 .002 Specialist Finance Wire 
Within Groups 1.157   
Between Groups 54.108 18.768 .000 Company Report 
Within Groups 2.883   
 
Of the 8 variables for which variance across market category is significant, it is interesting to note 
that the first six are all non-specialist publicly-available media, while the mean importance ratings 
for the latter two (specialist finance wire and company report) have already been identified as 
varying in regard to stocks/equities. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests148 were then run to identify the 
market subsector categories where the variance was apparent: The columns on the right indicate 
the categories between which significant variance is evident.  
 
Figs. 13 (a-f). Tukey Tests for Variation of Media Importance by Market Type149 
 
General Newspapers: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 2.78  
Currencies 30 2.97  
Bonds/Interest 32 3.31  
Stocks/Equities 47  4.45 
 
Finance Newspapers: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 3.48  
Currencies 30 3.80  
Bonds/Interest 32 3.88  
Stocks/Equities 47  5.06 
                                                 
148
 Because the sample sizes between the market sector categories were unequal, the Tukey test assumed a 
harmonic mean sample size of 30.927. The test result notes that type 1 errors cannot be disregarded.  
 
149
 The author is indebted to Lyndon Walker and Donna Henson for collegial advice on Tukey tests. 
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The above Tukey tests indicate that the variation in the ratings for general interest newspapers and 
finance/business newspapers arises between stocks/equities and the other three market 
subsectors. This would confirm that the higher rating for these media among respondents involved 
in the trade/analysis of stocks/equities is indicative of newspapers being used differently from 
respondents in other market sectors.   
 
General Magazines: Tukey 
Market Type N 1 
Derivatives 23 2.09 
Bonds/Interest 32 2.16 
Currencies 30 2.17 
Stocks/Equities 47 2.85 
               * Although the ANOVA test suggested a significant variation in this variable according to  
               market sector, the Tukey test did not identify any distinct points of variation.  
 
 
Finance Magazines: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 3.17  
Currencies 30 3.63 3.63 
Bonds/Interest 32 3.88 3.88 
Stocks/Equities 47  4.30 
 
 
General Internet : Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 2.87  
Bonds/Interest 31 3.16 3.16 
Currencies 30 3.17 3.17 
Stocks/Equities 46  3.83 
 
  
Finance Internet : Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 4.00  
Currencies 30 4.63 4.63 
Bonds/Interest 31 4.65 4.65 
Stocks/Equities 46  5.00 
 
The preceding three Tukey tests for variance in the importance ratings for financial magazines and 
general internet and financial internet all indicate the same points of distinction between two 
groupings of market subsectors; derivatives/currencies/bonds and currencies/bonds/stocks. These  
nevertheless suggests that the primary contrast arises between derivatives and stocks which 
respectively account for the highest and lowest ratings in each case. The statistical significance of 
the higher rating for these publicly-accessible media/sources among stocks/equities respondents 
lends further support to the proposition that these securities are potentially influenced by a range of 
variables reflecting news on a broader range of events.  
 
 
 
 157 
 
Specialist Finance Wire: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Stocks/Equities 45 5.73  
Bonds/Interest 31 6.29 6.29 
Derivatives 23  6.52 
Currencies 29  6.66 
 
The Tukey test for importance ratings on specialist financial wire services indicates that the 
variance arises between two groupings; stocks/bonds and bonds/derivatives/currencies. The major 
point of contrast arises between stocks and currencies/derivatives. Given that one key feature of 
the financial wire services is their ability to provide real-time updates of financial news and price 
changes, this variance may reflect different time-frames influencing trading in these markets. As 
noted in the introductory chapter, the volume of turnover in currencies and derivatives securities is 
generally higher than in stocks/bonds. Although prices for bonds and stocks can still fluctuate in 
real-time, their ‘fundamentals’ would include periodic cash rate announcements (every six weeks in 
NZ) and quarterly earnings reports, so some investors’ trading horizons may reflect these cycles 
and tend not to respond to short-term price fluctuations unless these are indicative of a crisis.  
 
Company Reports: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 3.52  
Currencies 30 3.60  
Bonds/Interest 31 4.65  
Stocks/Equities 46  6.13 
 
In regard to company reports/announcements, the Tukey test confirms the significance of the higher 
rating for stocks/equities. Given that this media/source would provide critical information on the 
fundamentals influencing stocks/equities, the variance here needs no further explanation. 
 
 
 
The following bar chart presents the overall data on the ratings for objectivity for the same set of 
media/information sources. 
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Fig. 14 
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The overall objectivity ratings for media/ information courses indicated in the bar chart above 
indicate a narrower range of responses, with no mean rating above 6 (highly objective) or below 3 
(mainly subjective). These mean scores may reflect more complex patterns of responses (indicated 
by high standard deviation)  but some general observations can be made at this point. The fact that 
no medium was rated as ‘highly objective’ or higher suggests that no source is regarded uncritically 
as an accurate and impartial indicator of market conditions and that the potential for any 
medium/source to be influenced by subjective opinions, perceptions and interpretations is well 
recognised. 
 
The five highest rated media (between ‘mainly objective’ and ‘highly objective’) are specialist 
financial wire services, specialist industry reports, academic journals,  institutional systems/ 
algorithms, and (perhaps most interestingly) respondents’ own professional analyses. The 
media/sources rated lowest for objectivity (between ‘mainly subjective’ and ‘partly objective’) are 
general interest newspapers, general interest magazines, general interest broadcasts, general 
interest internet sites, informal discussion with external contacts, and intuition/feelings/hunches.  
 
Fig. 15  Rankings of Media/ Source by Objectivity 
Objectivity Rating Media/ Information Sources 
 
 
Mean 
> 5 
 
 
Highly 
Objective- 
Mainly 
Objective 
 
• Specialist financial information/wire services (Reuters/ Bloomberg, 
etc.); 
• Specialist Industry reports (official stock market/ central bank/ratings 
agencies reports); 
• Specialist academic journals; 
• Information derived from specialist systems/algorithms used in own 
institution; 
• Information derived from one’s own professional analysis; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
> 4 
 
 
 
 
Mainly 
Objective- 
Partly 
Objective 
• Finance/ business newspapers;  
• Finance/business magazines; 
• Finance/ business broadcasting news;  
• Specialist finance/business channels;  
• Financial/business internet sites (including online versions of other 
financial news media);  
• Subscriber finance/business Internet sites/ on-line market information 
services;  
• Company reports/accounts/ publications/ announcements;  
• Public investment advice/ recommendations from market analysts; 
• Private (purchased) advice/ recommendations from external market 
analysts;  
• General (informal) discussion/consultation with own colleagues; 
• Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with own colleagues; 
• Specific (work-related) instructions/advice from one’s own institution;; 
• Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with external contacts 
in financial markets;  
 
 
Mean 
> 3 
 
 
 
Partly 
Objective- 
Mainly 
Subjective 
• General interest newspapers;  
• General Internet sites (including on-line versions of other general 
media);  
• General interest magazines;  
• General interest broadcasting news;. 
• General (informal) discussion/consultation with external contacts in 
financial markets 
• Information derived from personal intuition/ feelings/ hunches. 
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At the higher end, the specialist financial wire services, specialist industry reports are both rated as 
mainly/highly objective. Given that these media/sources are likely to convey information such as 
prices/ask-bid spreads, credit ratings and interest rate announcements, the relatively high objectivity 
rating may stems from their presentation of information that is likely to move the market or directly 
constitute a shift in market conditions (explicit/transactional reflexivity). Although the reflexivity 
arguments presume that the ontology of markets is constructed, in an environment where market 
agents’ intersubjective codifications are sufficiently coherent to ascribe meaning consistently to data 
such as prices, interest rates and credit-ratings,  changes in such data can be externally verified 
and reported ‘objectively’.  
 
The relatively high objectivity rating ascribed to institutional systems/algorithms is understandable, 
since where trading is based on computer models or close reading of technical charts, there is little 
scope for interpretation or extraneous influence by vested interests. Indeed, as interview 
respondent #15 pointed out, the use of specific systems of calculation to determine investment 
decisions can help eliminate subjective emotions and idiosyncratic perceptions from the decision 
process. Meanwhile, the higher objectivity rating for respondents’ own professional analysis may 
seem unusual, insofar as this could be regarded as entirely subjective. The rating may reflect the 
self-confidence needed to work as an institutional investor but it will also reflect the perception that, 
like systems/algorithms, one’s own analysis of the markets is regarded as independent of 
extraneous influence/ motivation to distort information/interpretations.  
 
The mean objectivity ratings indicate that general interest media are regarded the least reliable 
sources of information about financial markets, along with informal discussion with contacts external 
to one’s own institution and personal intuition. This is not particularly surprising, since non-specialist 
media are less likely to employ dedicated financial reporters or have the extensive network of expert 
contacts. These relatively low objectivity ratings for general news media may reflect  their 
dependence on the definitions of primary financial definers. These are likely to be market analysts 
whose own work may at times be subject to institutional bias. Interestingly, advice/ 
recommendations from both public and private analysts are rated as more objective than general 
interest media, despite the well-recognised tendency for analysts to ‘talk their book’. The lower 
objectivity rating of hunches/feelings intuitions is perhaps self-explanatory, but it is interesting to 
note its relatively high importance rating and also the contrast with the higher objectivity rating of 
respondents’ own professional analyses (which are also individual and potentially idiosyncratic, but 
perhaps regarded as based on intersubjectively validated practices of calculation and thus rationally 
explicable to peers).  
 
 
The table below provides a break-down of the overall Objectivity ratings by market types (top row) 
and indicates the standard deviation for each score (bottom row).  
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Fig. 16 Break-Down of Mean Importance for Media/Sources by Market Subsector 
 
 Media/ Source 
OBJECTIVITY 
Overall 
Mean/SD 
Stocks 
Mean/SD 
Bonds 
Mean/SD 
Currencies 
Mean/SD  
Derivatives 
Mean/SD  
3.79 4.03 3.66 3.74 3.57 General interest 
newspapers 1.312 1.000 1.396 1.430 1.568 
4.52 4.50 4.52 4.54 4.52 Finance/Business 
newspapers 0.949 0.679 1.022 0.999 1.250 
3.39 3.64 3.28 3.12 3.45 General interest 
magazines 1.399 0.968 1.437 1.532 1.820 
4.32 4.33 4.24 4.30 4.45 Finance/Business 
magazines 0.983 0.764 1.023 1.068 1.234 
5.16 5.32 5.19 5.08 4.90 Specialist academic 
journals 1.185 1.029 1.075 1.100 1.651 
3.46 3.56 3.38 3.38 3.45 General interest 
Broadcasting news  1.351 1.071 1.399 1.416 1.731 
4.18 4.18 4.14 4.23 4.19 Finance/Business 
Broadcasting news  1.031 0.756 1.060 1.142 1.327 
4.56 4.39 4.48 4.69 4.81 Specialist  finance/ 
business channels  0.932 0.790 1.022 0.928 1.030 
3.44 3.43 3.43 3.62 3.29 General Internet 
sites 1.149 1.152 1.136 1.098 1.271 
4.32 4.26 4.38 4.44 4.20 Financial/Business 
Internet sites 1.013 0.910 1.115 1.013 1.015 
4.68 4.47 4.82 4.81 4.57 Subscriber finance 
Internet sites 1.298 1.320 1.389 1.272 1.207 
5.61 5.84 5.69 5.58 5.48 Specialist financial 
wire services 0.865 0.932 0.850 0.758 0.928 
5.56 5.54 5.76 5.77 5.60 Specialist industry 
reports 0.976 0.913 0.830 0.863 1.353 
4.70 4.87 4.81 4.48 4.44 Company reports/ 
announcements 1.309 0.951 1.272 1.358 1.886 
4.15 3.82 4.41 4.38 4.10 Informal  work 
discussion 1.216 1.233 1.240 1.203 1.091 
4.53 4.38 4.66 4.74 4.38 Specific work 
discussion 1.219 1.248 1.203 1.163 1.284 
4.86 4.75 4.82 5.05 4.90 Specific work 
instructions 1.210 1.180 1.188 1.224 1.334 
3.81 3.70 3.86 3.96 3.76 Informal external 
discussion 1.008 1.114 0.953 1.018 0.889 
4.30 4.15 4.41 4.37 4.33 Specific external 
discussion 1.217 1.226 1.268 1.245 1.155 
4.10 4.06 4.25 4.16 3.90 Public Analyst 
Advice 1.262 1.068 1.236 1.344 1.553 
4.31 4.12 4.50 4.38 4.30 Private Analyst 
Advice 1.344 1.493 1.304 1.173 1.380 
5.56 5.37 5.64 5.71 5.60 Systems/ 
Algorithms 1.260 1.416 1.254 0.908 1.392 
5.22 5.23 4.41 5.11 5.10 Own Professional 
Analysis 1.153 1.330 1.053 1.013 1.136 
3.40 3.40 3.45 3.44 3.25 Hunches/ feelings/ 
Intuitions 1.593 1.598 1.572 1.601 1.713 
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Fig.17 
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When the mean objectivity ratings for media/information sources are broken down across market 
sectors, the discernible variations are, on the whole, less pronounced than in the break-down of 
importance ratings. Standard deviations are likewise fairly consistent and the overall levels are 
lower than for the importance ratings of the same media/sources, reflecting the narrower range of 
responses. Also in contrast to the importance ratings, the statistical tests for variation across market 
sectors (using one-way ANOVA) found no statistically significant variation across stocks, bonds, 
currencies and derivatives for any of the objectivity ratings of different media/sources. It is 
nevertheless interesting that respondents involved in analysis/trade in stocks/equities ascribed 
marginally higher objectivity ratings to general interest media as well as academic journals, 
company reports, specialist financial wire services.  
 
Correlations between media/source importance and objectivity 
 
As mentioned in the methodology, one of the reasons for gauging perceptions of both importance 
and objectivity was to ascertain whether there was any evident relationship between the use of  
media/sources in trading decisions and the perception that they provided an impartial and accurate 
guide to market conditions. If the neoclassical model of market efficiency and informational 
representation is correct, then one would expect to identify correlations between the two. In 
contrast, an absence of correlations would suggest that the importance of a media/sources to 
trading decisions was unrelated to the perception that they provide an impartial and accurate guide 
to market conditions, lending support to the arguments concerning informational reflexivity.  
 
The table below indicates the relationships between these two variables. The correlations were 
calculated using SPSS, using Spearman’s rho to indicate the significance of any relationship. A 
perfect linear correlation would be indicated by +1.00 or -1.00 (although this would be highly 
unusual except in cases of direct causality between the two variables). Generally speaking, 
correlations of less than 0.3 are generally regarded as weak (and may be insufficient to draw any 
confident conclusion about the nature of the relationship even if they are statistically significant) 
while correlations of 0.8 are considered strong150. Scores in between can be classified in different 
ways, but statistically significant correlations over 0.3 usually indicate that the relationship is worth 
investigating151. The significance threshold in social science is usually assumed to be a Pearson or 
Spearman r-score of 0.05 or lower (Stacks & Hocking, 1999; Babbie, 2007). The rho (r)  figure is an 
indication of the probability that the distribution of data indicating the correlation would occur 
naturally through a random distribution of scores without any relation between the variables. An r-
score of 0.05 indicates that there is a 5% chance of the data being attributable to chance (that is, 
out of 100 random distributions of data, the correlation indication would occur five times152).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 The square of the correlation coefficient indicated the extent to which one variable explains the variation in 
the other; thus  a correlation of 0.8 would indicate that 0.64 (64%) was explained, while a correlation of 0.4 
would indicate that 0.16 (16%) of the variation was explained (see Stacks & Hocking, 1999; Babbie, 2007) 
 
151
 Although this may occur because of factors other than a direct relationship between the two variables; 
correlation is not cause, hence there if one identified a positive correlation between, say, age and accumulated 
wealth, it is clear that ageing alone does not generate wealth.  
 
152
 However, given the 63 quantitative ratings (24 each on the importance and objectivity of media/sources and 
15 on the importance of  information types) and the four market sector categories, the basic correlations matrix 
involved calculation of 3,906 bivariate correlations for each of the four sectors.  The sheer volume of variables 
suggested that with a Spearman’s r- threshold of 0.05, one would still expect 195 significant correlations to 
emerge by chance distributions of data. Although the calculations examined relations at the standard 0.05 
significance threshold, discussion in the main section will concentrate primarily on correlations with p-scores of 
0.001. However, for the sake of the examination of the relation between perceived importance and objectivity 
in relation to the media/information sources, all significant results will be noted.  
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Fig 18. Means and Correlations between Media/Source Importance and Objectivity 
(for all media/information source types and indicating correlations and significance levels  at 0.05 or 
lower; *Asterisked correlations indicate cases accompanied by a stronger correlation within a single 
market sector subcategory).  
Medium/ Information Source 
( n refers to number of valid responses in  
both importance and objectivity categories) 
Mean 
Import- 
ance 
Mean 
Object-
ivity 
Corre-
lation 
Signif 
 
General interest newspapers (n= 117) 
 
3.55 3.79 nil - 
Finance/Business newspapers  (n=118) 
 
4.21 4.52 .200* .030 
General interest magazines (n= 114) 
 
2.39 3.39 .236 .011 
Finance/Business magazines (n= 116) 
 
3.85 4.32 .198 .033 
Specialist academic journals (n=106) 
 
3.76 5.16 .222* .022 
General interest broadcasting news (TV/Radio)  
(n= 114) 
2.78 3.46 nil - 
Finance/Business broadcasting news  
(TV/Radio)  (n=114) 
3.54 4.18 nil - 
Specialist  finance/ business channels (e.g. CNBC, 
CNNfn) (n= 108)  
3.83 4.56 nil - 
General Internet sites (including on-line versions of 
other general media) (n= 115) 
3.35 3.44 .286* .002 
Financial/Business Internet sites (including on-line 
versions of other financial news media) (n= 115) 
4.65 4.32 .264 .004 
Subscriber finance/ business Internet sites/ on-line 
market information services (n= 107) 
4.77 4.66 .263* .006 
Specialist financial information/wire services 
(Reuters/ Bloomberg etc.)  (n= 115)  
6.22 5.61 nil - 
Specialist industry reports (official stock market/ 
central bank/ ratings agencies reports) (n= 114) 
5.16 5.66 .220 .018 
Company reports/ accounts /publications/ 
announcements (n= 109 ) 
4.73 4.70 nil * - 
General (informal)  discussion/consultation with 
own colleagues  (n= 115 ) 
5.28 4.15 nil - 
Specific (work-related) discussion/ consultation 
with own colleagues (n= 116 ) 
6.08 4.53 .234 .011 
Specific (work-related) instructions/advice from 
one’s own institution (n= 110 ) 
5.42 4.86 .338* .000 
General (informal) discussion/consultation with 
external contacts  in financial markets  (n= 116 ) 
5.19 3.81 .215 .022 
Specific (work-related) discussion/ consult’n with 
external contacts  in financial markets (n= 114 ) 
5.80 4.30 nil - 
Public investment advice / recommendations from 
external market analysts  (n= 108) 
4.24 4.10 nil - 
Private (purchased) investment advice/ recomm-
endations from external market analysts (n= 104) 
4.26 4.31 .277* .004 
Information derived from specialist systems/ 
algorithms used in own institution (n= 105 ) 
5.00 5.56 .341* .000 
Information derived from one’s own professional 
analysis (n= 116 ) 
6.29 5.22 nil - 
Information derived from personal intuition/ 
feelings/ hunches  (n=  115) 
5.72 3.40 nil - 
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Note that the correlations here are not merely the relationship between the overall mean ratings, but the co-
variance emerging from the overall distributions of the two scores across the entire response sample. The 
correlation between importance and objectivity is presented here as a rough approximation of a null 
hypothesis reflecting the neoclassical model; a more liberal interpretation of the Spearman’s rho 
score here is therefore intended to avoid bias in favour of the reflexivity theories. 
 
For the sake of simplicity,  in the ensuing discussion references to correlations will use the following 
terminology:    < 0.4 = weak; < 0.6 = moderate; < 0.8 = strong; >0.8 = very strong, while references 
to significance will be referred to thus: >0.05 insignificant; < 0.05 =marginally significant; <0.01 = 
significant;  < 0.001 = highly significant.  
 
The overall pattern of correlations between importance and objectivity ratings for media/information 
types indicates a weak positive relationship between these perceived qualities in just over 50% (13 
of the 24) categories. However, none of these correlations is consistently present across all market 
subsectors (stocks, bonds, currencies, derivatives), suggesting that the weak positive relationship 
emerges out of the overall distribution of the data rather than something that is consistently present 
throughout the sample. In 8 cases, there is a correlation between importance and objectivity ratings 
within a single market subsector that is not present in any of the other three sectors. In these 
instances, they are actually stronger correlations than those for the overall sample, suggesting that 
the responses within that market subsector are responsible for the broader trend. These are 
indicated in the table below. 
 
Fig. 19 Means and Correlations between Media/Source Importance and Objectivity 
within Single Market Subsector 
 
Medium/ Information Source 
(n= number of valid responses within subsector) 
Overall 
Correl-
ation 
Market 
Sub- 
sector 
Sub- 
sector 
Correl-
ation 
Sub-
sector 
signif   
Finance/Business newspapers (n= 28 ) 
 
.200 Currencies .388 .041 
Specialist academic journals (n= 36) 
 
.222 Stocks .363 .010 
General Internet sites (including on-line versions of 
other general media) (n= ) 
.286 Stocks .460 .003 
Subscriber finance/ business Internet sites/ on-
line market info services (n= 27 ) 
.263 Bonds .390 .044 
Company reports/ accounts /publications/ 
announcements (n= 39 ) 
nil Stocks .358 .025 
Specific (work-related) instructions/ advice from 
one’s own institution (n= 36  ) 
.338 Stocks .420 .011 
Private (purchased) investment advice/ recomm-
endations from external market analysts (n= 24 ) 
.277 Currencies .435 .034 
Information derived from specialist systems/ 
algorithms used in own institution (n= 28) 
.341 Bonds .398 .036 
 
The overall set of correlations provides only limited and inconsistent support for the proposition that 
the importance ascribed to various media/information sources is related to their perceived 
objectivity. Even though the correlations are signalled as statistically significant (at a threshold of 
0.05), the strength of the relationship is weak ( <.30 in all except two cases) and given the range of 
bivariate correlations examined, the possibility that these are chance occurrences cannot be 
discounted, especially given the fact that these relationships are not consistently represented 
across more than one market subsector.  Of the three media/sources rated most important (6+), 
only specific discussion with colleagues correlates with the objectivity rating (suggesting trust in the 
expertise within one’s own institution). The absence of a correlation between perceived importance 
and objectivity for one’s own professional analysis may well reflect recognition of personal 
subjectivity. However, the finding that there is no relation between perceived importance and 
objectivity for specialist financial wire services is highly anomalous, because these systems provide 
the real-time market news and trading interfaces for institutional traders across the globe and the 
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data they appresent provides the basis for significant investment decisions. It is important to note 
that objectivity rating for the wire services is still high (5.61; second only to specialist industry 
reports). The absence of a correlation does not mean the wire services are not perceived to be 
objective. However, their very high perceived importance (6.22) is not explained by their perceived 
objectivity. This indicates that some other factors must be influencing the rating153.  
 
Among the other media/sources rated as ‘important’ or higher (5+), perceived importance and 
objectivity are only weakly correlated. These include the cases of specialist industry reports, specific 
work discussion with one’s own colleagues, and informal discussion with external market contacts, 
with slightly stronger correlations (>.30) in the case of specific work  instructions/advice from one’s 
own institution and specialist systems/algorithms. A tentative argument could be made here that 
among respondents who regard institutional/network sources as important, there is a tendency to 
perceive those sources as providing information impartially.  
  
In regard to the market sector specific correlations between importance and objectivity ratings, all 
exhibit a stronger relation than the overall rating, although the sector-specific sample sizes mean 
the significance levels vary. The higher importance and objectivity ratings for company reports 
among respondents involved in stocks/equities evidently reflects the fact that company reports and 
earning announcements will always influence share value, even when these are often driven by IR 
strategy and creative accounting (see Golding, 2003; Davis, 2007). Likewise, the correlation 
emerging in stocks/equities between the importance and objectivity of general internet sites 
supports the contention that company share-prices may be influenced by a wider range of factors 
reflecting the closer connection to the M-C-M’ circuit  However, this correlation is not replicated for 
other general interest news media. The other market sector-specific correlations are interesting, but 
there is no obvious explanation beyond the descriptive relation suggested (or chance anomaly).  
 
The overall data suggests that the importance of financial media/information sources to investment 
decisions cannot be adequately explained by their capacity to provide impartial and accurate 
information about markets. Indeed, it is noteworthy that two of the media/sources with the highest 
mean importance ratings, specialist financial wire services and respondents’ own professional 
analysis exhibit no correlation between importance and objectivity. Although in the former case, the 
idiosyncratic aspect may explain the absence of such a relation, the latter case is rather surprising, 
given the role of financial wire services in providing real-time financial data and the platforms 
through which financial transactions are conducted 
.  
This initial overview of importance and objectivity ratings for the various media forms does not 
provide any convincing support for the neoclassical conception of markets. At best, there is only a 
weak and inconsistent relation between importance and objectivity. This indicates that the provision 
of accurate/impartial information about markets cannot be the only factor determining the 
importance of and medium/source to investment decisions.  However, this is not sufficient on its 
own to demonstrate the superior validity of the arguments concerning informational reflexivity and 
the proposition that financial markets are self-referential systems with an autopoietic tendency.  
 
The next set of data to be considered is the survey responses concerning the perceived importance 
of different types of information.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153
 One potential explanation would be that the information flows provided through key wire services such as 
Thomson-Reuters and Bloomberg are regarded as secondary to their provision of the actual trading interface 
with markets. An alternative explanation could be that these high-end services provide such a wide range of 
content from different sources that it is difficult to assess them as a discrete, singular media form. A further 
possibility is that the reasons wire services are important to respondents are tangential to the provision of an 
accurate/impartial account of market conditions. As the subsequent interview data suggests, these platforms 
are important both for providing up-to-date market data but also for providing a network through which 
information, news and rumours are shared and cross-referenced with other market actors.    
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Fig 20 
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From the table above, it is apparent that none of the information types are regarded as irrelevant. 
The lowest mean rating is assigned to non-market news and information about media/sources 
themselves both of which rank between  ‘unimportant’ to ‘moderately important’ . The highest rating 
(between ‘highly important’ and ‘essential’) is ascribed to current market prices, with historical prices 
and future projections of prices rated slightly lower. This might seem curious given that knowledge 
of future prices would logically allow risk-free investment decisions, but of course, these are 
impossible to verify in advance. Projections/forecasts/expectations are factored into current prices 
and may have future denotations of value performatively inscribed  into present frames through 
derivatives instruments.  
 
Fig. 21 Rankings of Information Type by Importance  
Importance Rating Information Types 
Mean 
> 6 
Essential-  
Highly 
Important 
• Current market/price data 
 
 
Mean 
> 5 
 
Highly 
Important-
Important 
• General market/industry data- fundamentals;  
• General market/industry data- technical/econometric; 
• Specific industry sector data- fundamentals; 
• Opinions/intentions/positions of other financial institutions (central 
banks, ratings agencies, etc.)  
• Historical market/price data 
• Projections of future market/price data 
 
 
Mean 
> 4 
 
 
Important- 
Moderately 
Important 
• Specific industry sector data- technical/econometric; 
• Individual company data- fundamental; 
• Individual company data-technical/econometric; 
• General market news, investment trends/moods/opinions (e.g. 
bullish/bearish)  
• Opinions/intentions/positions of rival investment institutions 
(banks, brokerage firms, etc.) 
• Correlations of data/opinions/intentions from different sources. 
 
Mean 
> 3 
Moderately 
Important- 
Unimportant 
 
• Information about the media/information sources themselves;  
• Non-market news/information (politics, culture, sport, etc.) 
 
 
 
The importance ascribed to other types of information shows that fundamental market data for the 
overall market and specific industries/market sectors is highly relevant to trading decisions, as is 
technical data. The slightly lower rating for company-specific fundamentals and technicals is a 
reflection of its relevance to the stocks/equities sector (as indicated in the subsequent bar chart 
showing ratings by sector). Subsequent analyses nevertheless showed that the importance ratings 
of fundamental data and technical data (on all levels) were significantly correlated, and interviews 
confirmed that technical and fundamental data were routinely used together154. Along with the 
relatively high importance ascribed to price information, these findings might be regarded as 
broadly consistent with the neoclassical model of prices being driven by market conditions. 
However, the nature of current and future price information means they cannot be understood in 
simple positivistic terms. It is also important to note that, alongside the fundamental/technical/price 
data, other types of information are also considered important. The opinions/intentions/positions of 
                                                 
154
 In a few instances, (e.g. interviewee respondents #15 and #26), basing trading decisions on technical 
analysis was specifically preferred to fundamental analysis  Others, (#16 and #17) regarded technical trading 
with some scepticism and tended to ignore this data. However, most respondents accepted that both kinds of 
data were useful, particularly in estimating the optimum timing of substantial transactions/changes in position 
within the market cycle.  
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other investment institutions such as banks and ratings agencies are, unsurprisingly, rated 
alongside market fundamentals and pricing, reflecting the fact that these are affected by their 
statements and actions (most notably interest rate hikes and credit rating changes). Meanwhile, the 
opinions/ intentions/ positions of rival investment institutions, general market trends/moods (i.e. 
bullish/bearish sentiment) and correlations of data/opinions/intentions from different sources are all 
rated as ‘moderately important’ to ‘important’. These are perhaps rather more nebulous concepts 
than fundamental, technical and price data, but they are rated sufficiently highly to support the 
contention that there is potential for the continent/game form of informational reflexivity to influence 
trading decisions. The pattern of information usage that emerges here suggests that decisions are 
informed by both the standard variables assumed in neoclassical models and factors indicative of 
some level of reflexive response to other market actors and market moods. This conjecture will be 
explored further as the analysis of findings progresses.  
 
The table below provides a break-down of the overall importance ratings for information types (top 
row) and indicates the standard deviation for each score (bottom row). A bar chart follows to 
illustrate the variations more graphically 
 
Fig. 22 Break-Down of Mean Importance for Information Types by Market Subsector 
 
Mean Ratings for Importance of Information Types  
Across all Market Sectors 
Information 
Type 
Overall 
Mean/SD 
Stocks 
Mean/SD 
Bonds 
Mean/SD 
Currencies 
Mean/SD  
Derivatives 
Mean/SD  
5.26 5.39 5.15 5.28 5.17 General Market 
Fundamental data 1.502 1.171 1.617 1.542 1.886 
5.40 5.15 5.58 5.44 5.53 General Market 
Technical data 1.158 1.064 1.270 1.083 1.264 
5.22 5.82 5.04 4.76 5.00 Specific Industry 
fundamental data 1.325 0.950 1.341 1.422 1.455 
4.90 5.36 4.81 4.44 4.84 Specific Industry 
Technical data 1.445 1.055 1.357 1.609 1.772 
4.85 6.21 4.62 3.76 4.22 Company 
Fundamental data 1.782 1,083 1.675 1.665 1.665 
4.26 5.18 4.19 3.48 3.79 Company Technical 
data 1.501 1.211 1.497 1.327 1.437 
4.95 4.82 4.96 4.96 5.16 General Market 
Mood/Trends 1.224 1.044 1.311 1.241 1.425 
4.79 4.70 4.65 4.88 5.00 Opinions/ Positions 
of Rival Institutions 1.063 0.883 1.129 1.092 1.247 
5.31 4.88 5.58 5.64 5.26 Opinions/Positions 
of Other Institutions 1.120 0.820 0.987 1.036 1.593 
5.32 4.79 5.50 5.36 5.95 Historical Market 
Price data 1.300 1.293 1.241 1.287 1.129 
6.04 5.82 6.08 6.04 6.37 Current Market 
Price data 1.102 1.103 0.935 1.060 1.342 
5.64 5.67 5.73 5.40 5.78 Future Market Price 
Projections 1.060 1.190 0.919 1.041 1.060 
3.08 3.30 2.92 3.16 2.79 Non-Market News 
1.326 0.984 1.230 1.519 1.686 
4.65 4.63 4.69 4.64 4.63 Correlations of 
data/ opinions 1.520 1.338 1.619 1.497 1.802 
3.22 3.66 3.27 3.00 2.68 Information on 
Media/ Sources 1.633 1.450 1.710 1.633 1.734 
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Again, some caution is required when comparing mean scores where standard deviations are 
relatively high. As the subsequent ANOVA and Tukey tests suggest, there was significant variance 
between market subsector responses for the latter variable, indicating that (unsurprisingly), the 
distribution of data for company fundamentals involved a different set of ratings from respondents 
involved in stocks/equities trading.  
 
Figs. 23 (a/b): Examples of Frequency Distribution and Standard Deviation for 
Information Importance 
 
 
Overall Mean: 6.04 
Standard deviation: 1.102 
Overall Mean: 4.85 
Standard deviation: 1.782 
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Fig. 24 
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The preceding chart highlights several instances of variation across the responses for different 
market sectors. Higher importance ratings are indicated for company-specific fundamental and 
technical data and industry-specific fundamental and technical data among respondents involved in 
the trade/analysis of stocks/equities. This variation is fairly self-explanatory. However, there are also 
somewhat higher ratings for non-market news and information on media/sources among those 
involved in stocks/equities. This is consistent with the earlier proposition that stocks/equities trading 
could be influenced by a wider range of factors than other securities. In other market sector areas, it 
is interesting that the importance ratings for historical, current and future prices  are highest among 
respondents dealing in derivatives. This is explicable by the fact that the value of derivatives 
contracts is directly affected by price changes in their underlying securities (although the slightly 
higher rating for general market mood/trends is less easily accounted for). It is also interesting to 
note that the importance rating for other institutions’ opinions/positions is highest for currencies and 
bonds, which perhaps indicates the extent to which these securities are directly influenced by 
central bank policy and credit ratings agencies.  
 
The variance in the distribution of importance ratings for information types across the market 
subsectors was also analysed using one-way ANOVA, with post-hoc Tukey tests to identify the 
precise points of difference. 
Fig. 25 Significant Variation in Information Type Importance across Market Type 
 
Information Type Importance 
 Variance by Market Subsectors 
Mean 
Square 
ANOVA 
F-value 
Sig. 
Between Groups 6.275 3.881 .011 Specific Industry Fundamentals 
Within Groups 1.617   
Between Groups 33.151 14.678 .000 Company Fundamentals 
Within Groups 2.259   
Between Groups 15.859 8.610 .000 Company Technicals 
Within Groups 1.842   
Between Groups 3.584 3.025 .033 Other Institution Opinion 
Within Groups 1.185   
Between Groups 5.902 3.776 .013 Historical Market Price 
Within Groups 1.563   
 
Tukey tests were used to identify the particular points of variance among the market subsector 
categories (alpha = 0.05 or lower, but type 1 errors are not discounted because of unequal sample 
size).   
 
Figs. 26 (a-e). Tukey Tests for Variation of Information Importance by Market Type 
 
Specific Industry Fundamentals: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Currencies 25 4.76  
Derivatives 18 5.00 5.00 
Bonds/Interest 26 5.04 5.04 
Stocks/Equities 33  5.82 
 
The variation here arises between two groupings; currencies/derivatives/bonds, and derivatives/ 
bonds/ stocks. The major contrast is between currencies and stocks. The higher importance of 
industry-specific information on market fundamentals to stocks is not surprising. The lower rating 
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ascribed to this information type by respondents involved with trade/analysis of currencies is not 
obvious, but time-frames may well be a factor.  
 
Company Fundamentals: Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Currencies 25 3.76  
Derivatives 18 4.22  
Bonds/Interest 26 4.62  
Stocks/Equities 33  6.21 
 
Company Technicals:  Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Currencies 25 3.48  
Derivatives 19 3.79  
Bonds/Interest 26 4.19 4.19 
Stocks/Equities 33  5.18 
 
There is no surprise that the variations for company fundamentals and technicals again involve a 
contrast between stocks and other market subsectors. In the latter case, however,  the distinction is 
between bonds/stocks and currencies/bonds/stocks, perhaps reflecting the fact that some 
bond/interest rate securities are derived from corporate debt.  
 
Other Institutions’ Opinions:  Tukey  
Market Type N 1 
Stocks/Equities 33 4.88 
Derivatives 19 5.26 
Bonds/Interest 26 5.58 
Currencies 25 5.64 
 
Although the ANOVA test suggested a significant variation in this variable across market sectors, 
the Tukey test did not identify any distinct points of variation. ‘Other institutions’ here does include 
central banks and ratings agencies, so it is possible that the lower rating from respondents involved 
in trading stocks stems from the tendency for official cash rates and credit ratings to have the most 
direct influence on currencies and bonds/interest-rate securities.  
 
Historical Market Price:  Tukey  
Market Type N 1 2 
Stocks/Equities 33 4.79  
Currencies 25 5.36 5.36 
Bonds/Interest 26 5.50 5.50 
Derivatives 19  5.95 
 
The point of variance for historical market price arises between the groups of stocks/ currencies 
/bonds and currencies/ bonds/ derivatives. The major contrast is between stocks and derivatives. 
There is no obvious explanation for the relatively low importance of this data among those involved 
in trade/analysis of stocks, but price data is particularly relevant to derivatives trading because the 
value of the securities is shaped by the prices movements of underlying securities.  
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Correlations between media/source importance and information type importance 
 
The next step in the analysis concerns the identification of statistical relationships between the 
importance ratings of various media and the importance rating of different information types. SPSS 
was used to generate a bivariate correlations matrix to identify relationships between all the 
quantitative variables and assess their statistical significance (using Spearman’s Rho). The 
identification of a positive correlation does not, of course, permit the inference that the information 
type is the factor determining the perceived importance. Given the number of variables subject to 
bivariate comparison and the finite range of scale responses, the possibility of false positives (type 
1 error) being identified by chance cannot be disregarded. For example, traders might rely on 
financial wires for, say, current price data and private analyst advice for information on a specific 
industry sector. If all are rated similarly, then financial wires might well correlate with specific 
industry information while private analyst advice might correlate with current price data.  
Conversely, if a moderately-important information type is still routinely monitored (e.g. market 
positions of a rival investor) but only be available through a single channel (e.g. specific work 
discussion with external market contacts), the importance ascribed to the source might be much 
higher than the information content. Although systematic co-variance in the overall responses could 
still allow the identification of a correlation, the possibility of type-2 errors (false negatives) cannot 
be entirely ruled out.  
 
 
Furthermore, given the preceding discussion of how new financial information technologies have 
created symmetries of information, closed price spreads, and intensified the need to identify new 
sources of information and any emergent variable with the potential to influence prices, two other 
points need to be considered: a) any new media source that appears to be attracting investor 
attention or starts to be cited by market opinion leaders will need to be monitored, if only to ensure 
that one’s market rivals do not gain some advantage from an informational asymmetry, and b) the 
information in that medium may become salient because the medium is regarded as influential 
rather than the medium being regarded as important because it contains salient information (as the 
earlier example of the tree-pruner whose amateur investment advice ended up being cited in 
exclusive analyst reports suggests). The directionality of the correlations here are therefore not 
assumed to be unilinear155, but likely to be mutually influential in line with the evolving 
frames/schemata of investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155
 Note also that regression tests on bivariate correlations do not necessarily reveal the directionality of such 
relationships, if indeed the correlations do indicate meaningful connections.  
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Fig. 27  Table indicating correlations between overall ratings for media/source 
importance and information type importance. (Correlations >.300 and significant at the 
0.001 level are in bold. Single Asterisk denotes that the overall correlation is accompanied by a 
single higher correlation in a single market subsector. Double asterisk indicates that there are 
multiple correlations within market subsectors in addition to the overall correlation).  
 
 
Importance of   
Medium/ Source  
Importance of Information Type 
(n= valid responses in both categories) 
Corre-
lation 
Signif 
 
Company fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .441 .000 
Company technicals ( n=  103) .459 .000 
 
General interest  
newspapers 
 
Non-market news ( n= 103 ) .416** .000 
Specific industry fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .337 .001 
Specific industry technicals ( n= 103 ) .337* .001 
Company fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .319 .001 
Company technicals ( n= 103 ) .346 .001 
 
Finance/Business  
newspapers 
 
Non-market news ( n= 103 ) .390** .001 
Specific industry fundamentals ( n=102) .212 .032 
Specific industry technicals ( n=103) .293 .003 
Company fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .314 .001 
Company technicals ( n=  103) .412** .000 
 
General interest  
magazines 
 
Non-market news ( n= 103 ) .448** .000 
Company fundamentals (n=  102) .286 .004 
Company technicals ( n=  103) .324 .001 
Non-market news ( n= 103  ) .347 .000 
Finance/Business 
magazines 
 
Information on media/sources ( n=  102 ) .346** .000 
Company technicals ( n= 101 ) .286* .004 
Historical market prices ( n= 101 ) .286** .004 
Specialist Academic 
Journals 
 Non-market news ( n= 101  ) .279* .005 
General market fundamentals ( n= 102  ) .387** .000 General Interest 
 Broadcast news Non-market news ( n=  103) .347* .000 
General  market fundamentals  ( n= 101 ) .282* .002 
Specific industry fundamentals ( n=  101) .270 .006 
Company fundamentals ( n= 101 ) .238 .016 
Company technicals ( n= 102) .261 .008 
Current market prices  (n=  102) .206 .038 
Future market prices (negative) ( n= 101 ) -.259 .009 
Non-market news ( n= 102 ) .293 .003 
 
 
Finance/Business 
Broadcast news 
Correlations of data/opinions ( n= 101  ) .287* .004 
Current market prices ( n= 94 ) .425** .000 
Future market prices (negative) ( n=93  ) -.427** .000 
Specialist  finance/  
business channels  
 Non-market news ( n= 94 ) .331* .001 
General market fundamentals ( n= 93 ) .341 .000 
Specific industry fundamentals ( n=  93) .528** .000 
Specific industry technicals ( n= 94 ) .414** .000 
Company fundamentals ( n=  93) .530 .000 
Company technicals ( n=  94) .438* .000 
 
 
General Internet  
sites  
 
 Non-market news ( n= 94  ) .311 .001 
Company fundamentals ( n= 102) .287 .003 
Specific industry fundamentals (n= 102) .241 .015 
Financial/Business  
Internet sites 
Correlations of data/opinions ( n= 102  ) .316* .001 
General Market fundamentals (negative)  
( n= 99 ) 
-.300 .003 
Correlation of data/ opinions ( n= 99 ) .466** .000 
 
Subscriber finance/  
business Internet sites 
 Information on media/sources ( n= 99 ) .343* .001 
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Specific industry fundamentals  
(negative) ( n= 100  ) 
-.277 .005 
Company fundamentals (negative)  
( n= 100 ) 
-.427 .000 
Company technicals (negative) ( n= 101 ) -.322* .001 
 
Specialist financial 
information/wire  
 
Other institutions’ opinions/ positions   
( n= 101  ) 
.280 .005 
Company fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .323** .001 
Company technicals ( n=  103) .309* .001 
Other institutions’ opinions/positions  
 ( n=  103) 
.235 .017 
Non-market news ( n= 103  ) .388* .000 
 
 
Specialist industry  
reports 
  
 Correlation of data/ opinions ( n= 102  ) .215 .030 
Specific industry fundamentals ( n= 102 ) .437** .000 
Specific industry technicals ( n=  103) .373** .000 
Company fundamentals ( n=102  ) .732** .000 
Company technicals ( n=  103) .638** .000 
 
Company reports/ 
announcements 
 
Information of media/ sources ( n= 102 ) .408* .000 
General market fundamentals ( n=102  ) .348* .000 
General market mood/trends  ( n= 103 ) .340* .000 
Rival Investor opinions/positions  
( n= 103 ) 
.371** .000 
Current market prices ( n=  103) .287** .003 
Non-market news ( n=  103)  .422** .000 
 
 
Informal work  
discussion  
 
 
 Correlations of data/ opinions ( n= 102 ) .279 .005 
General market mood/trends ( n= 102 ) .364* .000 
Rival investor opinions/ positions  
( n= 102  ) 
.409** .000 
Non-market news ( n=  102 ) .378** .000 
 
Specific  work  
discussion 
 
Correlations of  data/ opinions ( n= 101 ) .398* .000 
General market mood/trends ( n= 98 ) .324* .000 Specific work instructions 
Information on media/sources ( n= 97 ) .481** .000 
General market mood/ trends  (n=  102) .373* .000 Informal discussion with 
external contacts   Non-market news ( n= 102 )  .310* .002 
General market mood/ trends ( n= 100 ) .205* .041 
Current market prices  ( n= 100  ) .240* .016 
Non-market news ( n= 100 ) .260* .009 
 
Specific work discussion 
with external contacts   
Information on media/sources ( n= 99 ) .290* .004 
Company fundamentals ( n=  101) .298 .003 
Company technicals ( n= 102 ) .291** .003 
Non-market news ( n= 102 ) .320* .001 
 
Public Analyst investment  
advice / recommendations  
 
 
Information on media/sources ( n= 101 ) .340** .000 
Company fundamentals ( n= 95  ) .280 .006 
Company technicals ( n=  96) .231** .024 
Correlations of data/opinions  ( n= 95 ) .241 .019 
 
Private Analyst investment  
advice/ recommendations  
 Information on media/sources  ( n= 95 ) .286 .005 
General market mood/ trends ( n= 99 ) .335* .000 
Rival investor opinion/position ( n=99  ) .356** .001 
Historical market prices ( n= 99 ) .212 .035 
Current market prices  ( n= 99  ) .288** .004 
 
Specialist systems/ 
algorithms  
 
Future market prices  ( n= 99  ) .305** .002 
Own Professional analysis Information on media/sources ( n=  101) 
 
.364* .000 
Personal intuition/  
feelings/ hunches 
Correlation of data/ opinions (negative) 
 ( n=  101) 
-.341** .000 
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The above table presents the overall correlations between importance ratings for media/sources 
and importance ratings for information types: The correlations matrix retained a default significance 
threshold of 0.05 (Spearman’s r), but the primary focus will be on the stronger and most significant 
correlations  (> 0.3 and significance 0.001 or lower, in bold). .The double asterisked correlations 
indicate that there are multiple correlations across different market subsectors, suggesting that the 
relation between the variables is consistent throughout the sample, not an emergent characteristic 
or a product of a single correlation within one subsector (single asterisk). 
 
There is no simple way to summarise all the data in the table, so the discussion will focus initially on 
identifying correlations between some of the media/sources and information types where both 
variables are rated as important or higher (rating >5), while working in commentary on related 
media/source and information forms where this aids narration. In some places, interview findings 
will be introduced where it is helpful in explaining the patterns of data. Again, for the sake of 
simplicity,  in the ensuing discussion references to correlations will use the following terminology:    
< 0.4 = weak; < 0.6 = moderate; < 0.8 = strong; >0.8 = very strong. References to significance will 
be referred to thus: >0.05 insignificant; < 0.05 =marginally significant; <0.01 = significant;           < 
0.001 = highly significant.  
 
Current market price data 
 
Current market price data was the information type ranked most important. It is therefore interesting 
that relatively few importance ratings for media/sources correlate with current market price data. 
There is a weak (and only marginally significant) positive correlation with finance/business 
broadcast news, a moderate (highly significant) positive correlation with specialist financial business 
channels (such as CNBC156) and weak (although significant) correlations with informal discussion 
both with colleagues and specific work discussion with external contacts in the market. Surprisingly, 
there is no correlation at all with specialist financial wire services (such as Thomson-Reuters/ 
Bloomberg). This seems anomalous because it is evident both from the literature and the periods of 
trading room observation/on-site interviews that real-time ask-bid spreads and price-changes are 
closely monitored on these electronic platforms157. Indeed, if the required price information was 
readily available through the regular business news broadcasts or specialist channels, the need for 
the expensive, high-end screen arrays would be much reduced. The fact that there are multiple 
weak correlations between current price data and several different may indicate that this information 
is accessed through multiple sources. Another explanation might be that the availability of price 
data is ubiquitous and taken-for granted, so the importance rating of the wire services has to do 
with other specialist functions that they offer158.  
 
The importance ratings for specialist financial wire services also exhibit several intriguing 
correlations. These include a weak (but significant) positive correlation with other institutions’ 
opinions/ positions (e.g. ratings agencies, central banks) and three negative correlations: One of 
these is a weakly negative (but significant) relation with specific industry fundamentals,  one is a 
                                                 
156
 It should be noted that during the period of data collection, CNBC was not being carried by the major 
subscription provider, Sky, although it had been previously and the service is now available again. 
 
157
 This was double-checked by excluding stocks/equities (the ratings for which varied in relation to other 
subsectors) and breaking down the analysis in other market subsectors. This still identified no correlation 
between wire services and current market price. Correlations were also checked excluding any responses 
rating the importance of  financial wire services < 6, to check if those who rated this medium as most important 
also rated current price data as important. Again, no correlation was found.  
 
158
 Other interviews suggested that one of the key functions of the wire-service platforms was the ability to 
send and receive messages (both private and publicly-visible) to/from other market agents in order to share 
news, check rumours, and maintain a ‘finger on the pulse’ of the market, so to speak. Bloomberg in particular 
was often cited as providing useful instant messaging updates. This is consistent with the notion that the 
significance of the data on trading screens stems in part from the need for constant validation of trading 
frames/schemata (Beunza & Stark, 2005b; Beunza & Garud, 2005). This may suggest that media/source 
variable of specialist financial wire services is too broad to encapsulate all its functions.  
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weak (highly significant) relation with company technicals, and one is a moderately negative (highly 
significant) relation with company fundamentals. These negative correlations arise in relation to 
information types that are most important to stocks/equities markets. Coupled with aforementioned 
absence of any significant relation with price data, it counter-intuitive that the media/source rated 
most important to investment decisions is negatively correlated with data that would be normally 
considered core to financial market activity. The explanation that best fits the data requires a 
modification of the conception of trading screen data as reflexively constituting or ‘appresenting’ 
market reality. As noted earlier, Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger (2002a, 2002b) and Knorr-Cetina & Preda 
(2007) differentiate between three dimensions of screen data: current market prices: ask-bid 
spreads (along with any interaction/ conversation related to the execution of trades) and other 
market data or news-feeds deemed relevant to the securities being traded. Trading screens 
certainly display constant updates of prices as the transactions which crystallize those changes are 
registered through exchanges or trading systems and constantly update ask-bid spreads (see 
example of a Reuters Kobra screen for bond markets and currency futures below, courtesy of 
Deutsche Bank159). 
 
Fig. 28 Reuters Kobra Screen 
 
 
In several of the extended interviews, the researcher asked respondents to comment on the notion 
that the screen displays actually constituted the market reality with which they engaged when 
making decisions. Although several replies focused on technical details of the screen displays, two 
respondents (interviews #19 and #28) recognised the theoretical issue but explicitly disagreed with 
the proposition. Both pointed out that the prices and ask-bid spreads on the screen were regarded 
as indexical of potential trades with counterparties, emphasising that, while the data showed the 
presence of external market agencies with the inclination to deal, confirmation of prices and 
                                                 
159
 The screen display includes a range of ask-bid spreads and quantities for various bonds (top row), Kiwi 
dollar futures and Aussie dollar futures are highlighted in the red boxes and other international currencies in 
the green box 
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transaction volume (particularly for higher volume trades) often still required interaction with the 
counterparty, either through an electronic medium or (in some instances) through a brokerage 
agent. Interviewee #28 explained that although the trading screens would indicate price levels, 
these were often indicative of the mid-point between ask-bid spreads, and so the actual transaction 
price remained contingent until a trade itself was conducted. This is consistent with the explicit/ 
transactional form of informational reflexivity, although it also suggests that the contingent/game 
form of reflexivity (i.e. monitoring of other actors’ dispositions) plays a role here too. The discovery 
of current market prices therefore involves more than the appresentation of discrete values on 
screens. Institutional investors engage with each other through these electronic interfaces, but they 
are aware that the displays are not ontologically independent of positions of other agents whose 
positions they represent.  
 
Specific work-related discussion  
 
Overall importance ratings for specific work-related discussion were among the highest (>6) but as 
with financial wire services, this exhibits no correlation with the importance ratings for the most 
important information types. There are however, weak (but highly significant) positive correlations 
with market mood/trends, non-market news, and correlations of data/opinions, and also a moderate 
(highly significant) positive correlation with rival investor opinions/positions. These information types 
relate more to the context of market events and their underlying causes (such as political 
developments, bullish/bearish market sentiment, or particular strategies of other investors). The 
importance ratings for informal work discussion also exhibit several correlations with market 
mood/trends (weak/ highly significant), rival investor opinions/positions (weak/highly significant), 
non-market news (moderate/ highly significant) and correlations of data/opinions (very 
weak/significant). This suggests there is minimal distinction between informal and specific/work-
related discussion with colleagues. However, the ratings for informal discussion are positively 
correlated with general market fundamentals (weak/highly significant), and current market prices 
(weak/significant). From the researcher’s on-site observation of the trading floors at Deutsche Bank 
and ANZ, numerous instances arose where colleagues consulted each other in response to a piece 
of news or unexplained price movement. The resident analysts appeared to play a significant role 
here, and in two observed cases, they were called over by trading desk colleagues in response to a 
particular instance of market activity where price movements were either unexpected or anomalous 
to provide contextual commentary to help rationalise the events in terms of market events and 
provide a frame for a trading response. Consistent with Smart’s (1999) emphasis on the narrative 
process underpinning financial practices, the analyst’s function appeared to be the articulation of an 
unfamiliar phenomenon in such a way as to render it intelligible/meaningful within a frame/schema 
that made sense in relation to the traders’ intersubjective codifications. Indeed, two of  the analysts 
interviewed (interviewees #5 and #10), identified the importance of ‘selling a story’ to help 
rationalise investment decisions, either in the trading room or in regard to guiding external clients. 
As one commented, ‘What you’ve got to try and do is, from all the information that’s available, try 
and create a story […] We try to distill ideas, so the information that’s available on the electronic 
networks is really a primary source- it’s your raw material that you’ve got to deal with. You know, 
after that, you’re still at work with the data.’ (interviewee #10). This reinforces the contention that in 
a financial market environment characterised by informational abundance and real-time symmetry, 
the trading advantage will often derive from meta-information, including the recognition of what data 
is significant and which frames need to be employed to render it meaningful and salient to trading 
decisions. However, insofar as these processes need to take into account factors such as market 
psychology and the consensus views of market opinion leaders, they cannot be based solely on a 
mechanical response to fundamentals. Interestingly, the importance of specific work-related 
instructions and specialist systems/algorithms (both rated >5) also exhibit correlations that tend to 
support this differentiation. The former is correlated with market moods/trends (weak/highly 
significant) and information on media/sources themselves (moderate/highly significant). Specialist 
systems/ algorithms, meanwhile, are correlated with historical, current and future price data (all 
weak but significant correlations), general market mood/trends (weak/ highly significant) and rival 
investor opinion/position (weak/highly significant). The correlation with rival investor opinions may 
be indicative of the process Beunza & Garud (2005) point to, whereby the validity of investor’s own 
frames/schemata is regularly checked for correspondence with those of others (which is logical 
given that the institution’s own systems/algorithms are unlikely to reveal this data).   
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Informal and specific work-related discussion with external contacts  
 
Informal discussion with external contacts exhibits a weak (significant) correlation with non-market 
news and weak (highly significant) correlation with general market mood/trends, which is perhaps 
indicative of the way even general conversation with external colleagues may still constitute a 
source of salient information or sensitise traders/analysts to particular themes/ issues in the news. 
Importance ratings for specific work-related discussion with external contacts also correlates with 
several information types: There is a weak (marginally significant) relation to general market 
mood/trends and a weak (significant) relation with non-market news. Furthermore, work-related 
discussion with external contacts has a weak (significant) correlation with information on 
media/sources. This could suggest that this information is sourced from external contacts, but a 
more compelling interpretation would be that respondents who regard external contacts as 
important also value information about which sources/contacts are reliable.  
 
It is worth noting that the discussion of media/source and information type correlations so far has 
covered many of the institutional network-related media/sources to which access would primarily be 
limited to professional institutional investors. Interestingly, with the exception of some forms of price 
data, many of the informational correlations exhibited involve factors related to market psychology, 
opinions/positions of rival investors or other key institutions, correlations of data, information on 
media/sources and even non-market news. The absence of any broad pattern of correlations 
between these institutional/ network sources and information about market fundamentals, technical 
data and prices (and in some instances, negative correlations with these information types) is 
indicative that their importance stems from providing other forms of significant information. This 
would be consistent with the contention that markets are susceptible to influence from reflexive 
communication/ information processes, including investors’ need for meta-information concerning 
what kind of data is driving other investors’ decisions and the validation of prevailing trading frames 
/schemata. Nevertheless, as the data presented earlier indicated, information about market 
fundamentals, technicals and prices still remains important, and these exhibit correlations with 
ratings for several other media/source types. 
 
Specialist industry reports 
 
Specialist industry reports from central banks, ratings agencies and other influential financial 
institutions exhibit weak (highly significant) correlations with fundamentals and technical data 
related to companies, but not on an industry or general market level. This could be explained by 
ratings agency reports examining company credit ratings, (although interestingly, the main 
subsector correlations here arose in relation to derivatives and currencies, and some caution in 
needed in this interpretation). Interestingly, specialist industry reports are correlated with non-
market news (weak/highly significant), other institutions’ opinions/positions (weak/marginal 
significance) and correlations of data/opinions (weak/marginal significance).  The relation to non-
market news could be explained by the way financial publications of this nature analyse financial 
markets in the context of broader geopolitical/ strategic/ historical trends, although this cannot be 
definitively verified from the data here. Otherwise, the relations to other institutions’ opinions 
includes the specification of stock exchanges, central banks and ratings agencies (on the survey 
form) and thus mirrors the media/source variable. Thus the relation to correlations of opinions/data 
is a logical extension of this. It is perhaps surprising that these latter correlations are not stronger, 
because official reports by these institutions are potentially market-moving, but this may be a result 
of using a relatively generic variable category.  
 
Public and private analyst advice 
 
Given the evidence presented in the review of literature that financial analyst recommendations and 
comments can trigger bouts of trading activity, it was interesting that both public and private analyst 
advice were rated as only moderately important (> 4) and partly objective (> 4), and that there was 
minimal difference between their ratings. This may reflect the recognition of the potential for vested 
interests to influence recommendations (notably among sell-side bank analysts working with client 
companies; see Golding, 2003). Another consideration here, though, is that most traders working 
for large financial institutions will have access to their own in-house analysts, and sometimes even 
a global network of such experts in the case of the largest institutions. The ratings for public and 
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private analyst sources are both correlated with information on media sources (weak/significant for 
private; weak/highly significant for public) which, again, is probably indicative that respondents who 
make use of analysts as sources also seek information about their reliability/independence. Public 
analyst advice is also positively correlated with non-market news (weak/ highly significant), possibly 
suggesting that public analysts are helpful in placing financial events in the context of other events 
and drawing attention to new frames (see earlier point regarding the narrative/ story-telling function 
of analysts). Private analyst advice, meanwhile, is correlated with correlations of data/sources 
(weak/highly significant) which would suggest that paid-for analyst advice is helpful in confirming the 
perceptions of market opinion leaders (even if one places more confidence in the advice of in-house 
analysts).  
 
Print news media  
 
General interest newspapers show a moderate (highly significant) positive correlation with non-
market news (self-explanatory) and also company technical and fundamentals. The same positive 
correlations (weak/highly significant) also appear in the case of financial/business newspapers, but 
in the latter case there are also weak (highly significant) correlations with specific industry 
fundamentals and technicals. Insofar as these correlations are indicative of the types of information 
that might be sought from them, this would suggest a wider range of information is sought from the 
more specialised financial press (which have a higher overall rating than general newspapers). 
Interestingly, despite general interest magazine having the lowest overall importance rating (< 3 ), 
they exhibit an almost identical set of correlations to financial newspapers, although the relation to 
specific industry fundamentals and technicals is weaker. Financial magazines, meanwhile, have 
very similar correlations to general interest newspapers (with a weaker relation to company 
fundamentals) but also have a weak (highly significant) relation to information on media/sources 
(which may reflect the need to be discerning about the authors of feature articles and analyst 
commentaries).  
 
Although newspapers would include news about companies and different industries which could 
include fundamental data concerning supply, demand, earnings and so forth, the nature of technical 
data is more problematic here. The kind of detail and flexibility of technical data presentation made 
possible by high-end screen-based platforms extends well beyond the utility of any set of charts in a 
magazine or newspaper The analysis of price fluctuations within particular markets over either 
longitudinal/historical periods or short-term intra-day trends can involve sophisticated programmes 
and several traders interviewed (#15, #26 and #27) identified the flexibility of high-end platforms 
such as Reuters in providing facilities for bespoke analysis of technical data, including comparisons 
of different securities over different periods. 
 
Traders may use technical data in different ways. Some respondents emphasised using technical 
charts on the basis that price cycles reflected a deep structure in financial markets and helped 
eliminate idiosyncratic interpretations of fundamentals, guesses about market sentiment or personal 
emotions (interviewees #26, #27). One respondent (interviewee #15) pointed out that technical 
charts could be used as ‘momentum indicators’ to anticipate where price movements would de-
couple from the values predicted by fundamentals, and where surges/declines not in line with 
fundamentals would ‘run out of steam’. Others suggested that technical charts helped gauge market 
trends but were useful primarily in assisting the timing of entry/exist from major positions 
(interviewees #27, #14). The Omega Research/ProSuite screen image below shows a set of 
technical charts for currency movements over different time-frames (courtesy of RBNZ). The green 
circled section of the top right graph indicated a sequence of price movements colloquially known 
as a ‘head and shoulders’ pattern, with smaller peaks occurring either side of a larger central peak, 
which often precede the onset of a more pronounced shift in price movement (interviewee #27).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
 
Fig. 29  Omega Technical Charts 
 
 
Although print media may sometimes present selected, static graphs and time-lines of interest to 
investors, such information is unlikely to be used as technical data to support institutional trading 
decisions on a routine basis. The correlations between newspapers/magazines and technical data 
might be explained as an anomaly stemming from the consistent moderate-to-strong correlations 
between fundamental and technical data for general markets, industry sectors and companies (see 
later correlations matrices and factor analysis). One print medium worth mentioning is academic 
journals, which, despite being considered mostly objective (> 5), have a relatively low importance 
rating (< 4). The rating for journal importance correlates with that for company technicals historical 
market prices, and non-market news (all weak/significant). Historical data on market behaviour and 
price movements (e.g. analyses of previous crises and bubbles) could be sourced from journals.  
 
Broadcast media 
 
General interest broadcast news ratings are positively correlated with non-market news and general 
market fundamentals (both weak/ highly significant) which would be consistent with the information 
provided by other general media. Financial/business broadcast news exhibits a far wider range of 
weak/significant correlations with non-market news, correlations of data/opinions general market 
fundamentals, specific industry fundamentals, company fundamentals (marginal significance), 
company technicals, current market price data (marginal significance), and, somewhat curiously, a 
negative correlation (weak/significant) with future market price data.  Assuming that the link with 
company technical data is explained as a product of the stronger correlation with company 
fundamental data, the other relations seem plausible. Financial news often features analyst 
commentaries and this could account for the connection with correlations of data/opinions. Ratings 
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for specialist finance/business channels160 meanwhile, exhibit a weak (highly significant) positive 
correlation with non-market news, a moderate (highly significant) positive correlation with current 
market prices data (see earlier discussion) and again, a moderate (highly significant) negative 
correlation with future market price data. The positive correlations with current market price may be 
indicative of the way financial channels such as CNBC maintain a real-time update of various 
market indexes (although these are also provided by wire services).   
 
Online media  
 
Importance ratings for general internet sites exhibited several positive correlations with those for 
information types. These included  weak (highly significant) correlations with non-market news and 
general market fundamentals, and moderate (highly significant) correlations with specific industry 
fundamentals and technicals and also company fundamentals and technicals. Interestingly, with the 
exception of the (self explanatory) strong correlations between company reports and company 
fundamentals/technicals, the correlations between general internet sites and fundamental data for 
companies and specific industries were the strongest between any medium/source and information 
type (> .500, significance .000). However, general internet sites are not regarded as very important 
overall (< 4), so it is problematic to suppose that a non-specialist public medium rated as 
unimportant would be the primary source for this kind of market data (rated moderately-highly 
important). In the context of these findings, the correlations between financial/business internet 
sites and subscriber financial internet sites are also interesting. The former shows a weak 
(marginally significant) correlation with specific industry fundamentals, a weak (significant) 
correlation with  company fundamentals and a weak (highly significant ) correlation with correlations 
of data/opinion. It is certainly plausible that these types of information would be sought from 
financial/business internet sites, particularly in regard to cross-referencing opinions and checking 
the accuracy of data.  However, it seems counter-intuitive for a more specific financial/business 
medium to exhibit weaker correlations with fundamental and technical data than its more general 
counterpart. Meanwhile, subscriber financial internet sites actually exhibit a negative correlation 
(weak/ significant) with general market fundamentals. This could be explained by respondents who 
using this source to seek more specialised/detailed data about markets. However, the other two 
correlations apparent here are a moderate (highly significant) relation to correlations of 
data/opinions and a weak (highly significant) relation to information on media/sources. The former 
could be again interpreted in terms of the cross-referencing of opinions and checking the accuracy 
of other data with a expert whose views are considered worth paying for. The latter, however, may 
indicate that knowing the reliability/credibility of the source is a prerequisite for making use of such 
sites.  
 
Other correlation sets of interest 
 
Apart from the correlations between media/source importance and objectivity ratings and  between 
the ratings for media/source importance and information type importance, there were numerous 
other statistically significant relationships indicated in the SPSS correlations matrices. An 
exhaustive discussion of all these findings would require additional space disproportionate to any 
likely additional clarity. However, scrutiny of the matrices indicated that there were several clusters 
of significant non-negligible bivariate correlations suggestive of more fundamental patterns in the 
data. These included relations among several of the publicly-available media/sources (such as 
newspapers, magazines, broadcasting and the internet) and among several of the media/sources 
involving institutional networks of professional contacts (such as informal and work-specific 
discussion with colleagues and external; market contacts). Parallel to these were roughly 
commensurate clusters of correlations involving objectivity ratings, and also two other sets of 
roughly discernible clusters involving importance ratings for information types, one including various 
levels of fundamental and technical data, the other including variables such as market mood, 
opinions/positions of rival investors/other market institutions and correlations of data/sources.  
                                                 
160
 CNBC was not being carried on Sky at the time the empirical data was collected, although it was previously 
and subsequently available, and interviewees were certainly familiar with this and other financial television 
channels. Of course, CNBC and CNNfn (whose broadcast service was discontinued in 2004) also have an 
internet presence and it cannot be ruled out that the responses here were based partly on the online versions. 
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The overall correlations matrix is too large to present here, but some relevant sets of correlations 
are presented here separately to illustrate the clusters identified. Again, a single asterisk denotes 
an overall correlation accompanied by a single stronger correlation within a single market 
subsector. A double asterisk indicates that the overall correlation is reflected in multiple market 
subsectors, suggesting it is not merely an emergent trend but a relationship consistent throughout 
the sample.  
 
Fig 30 
Table indicating overall correlations among  
publicly available media/source importance ratings  (Spearman r) 
Media/ 
Source 
Importance 
 
1  
Genrl 
news 
paper 
2  
Finan 
news 
paper 
3  
Genrl 
maga 
zine 
4  
Finan 
maga 
zine 
5  
Genrl 
broad 
cast 
6  
Finan 
broad 
cast 
7  
Genrl 
inter 
net 
8  
Finan 
inter 
net 
Corr 
- .832** .676** .649** .506** .433** .457** .455** 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1)  
General 
Newspaper 
n 
- 132 132 132 132 131 130 130 
Corr 
.832** - .666** .637** .511** .483** .465** .486** 
Sig 
.000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2)  
Finance 
Newspaper 
n 132 - 132 132 132 131 130 130 
Corr 
.676** .666** - .630** .446** .442** .445** .352 
Sig 
.000 .000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3)  
General 
Magazine 
n 132 132 - 132 132 131 130 130 
Corr 
.649** .637** .630** - .391** .424** .272* .348** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 - .000 .000 .002 .000 
4)  
Finance 
Magazine 
n 132 132 132 - 132 131 130 130 
Corr 
.506** .511** .446** .391** - .564** .426** .292** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000 .001 
 5)  
General 
Broadcast 
n 132 132 132 132 - 131 130 130 
Corr 
.433** .483** .442** .424** .564** - .415** .524** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000 
6) 
Finance 
Broadcast 
n 131 131 131 131 131 - 129 129 
Corr 
.457** .465** .445** .272* .426** .415** - .470** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 - .000 
7)  
General 
Internet 
n 130 130 130 130 130 129 - 130 
Corr 
.455** .486** .352 .348** .292** .524** .470** - 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 - 
8)  
Finance 
Internet 
n 130 130 130 130 130 129 130 - 
 
The table here indicates a cluster of moderate highly significant positive correlations among these 
publicly-accessible news media (both general interest and more specific financial/business types). It 
is also noteworthy that the majority of these correlations are exhibited among multiple market 
subsectors, increasing the confidence that the relations indicated are not merely an emergent 
anomaly. These statistical relations indicate that is possible that respondents have implicitly 
categorised rated these sources in a comparable manner, suggesting that there may be some 
common perceived characteristic or quality underlying the responses.  
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Fig. 31 
 
 
 
 
This matrix indicates another set of highly significant weak-moderate correlations among several 
media/sources available primarily only through institutional networks/ professional relationships with 
other investors. Again, several correlations are consistent within multiple market subsectors, 
increasing the confidence that they are not anomalous. Although the importance ratings for these 
media/sources differed, this could again suggest that respondents have, by an large, categorised 
and rated them according to some common perceived quality/ characteristic. The subsequent factor 
analysis explores this possibility further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table indicating overall correlations among institutional  
network media/source importance ratings (Spearman r) 
Media/ 
Source 
Importance 
 
1  
Infml 
work 
disc 
2 
Spec. 
work 
disc 
3 
Spec. 
Instr-
uction 
4 
Infml 
extnl 
disc 
5 
Spec. 
extnl 
disc 
6 
Systm 
/Algo 
Corr 
- .650** .402** .476** .396** .264 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 
1)  
Informal 
Work 
Discussion  n 
- 129 120 129 127 119 
Corr 
.650** - .483** .340** .455** .539** 
Sig 
.000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 
2)  
Specific 
Work 
Discussion n 129 - 120 128 126 119 
Corr 
.402** .483** - .445** .324** .429** 
Sig 
.000 .000 - .000 .000 .000 
3)  
Specific 
Instructions 
n 120 120 - 120 118 112 
Corr 
.476** .340** .445** - .706** .239 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 - .000 .009 
4)  
Informal 
External 
Discussion  n 129 128 120 - 127 118 
Corr 
.396** .455** .324** .706** - .388** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 
5)  
Specific 
External 
Discussion n 127 126 118 127 - 117 
Corr 
.264 .539** .429** .239 .388** - 
Sig 
.004 .000 .000 .009 .000 - 
6)  
Systems/ 
Algorithms 
n 119 119 112 118 117 - 
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Fig. 32 
Table indicating overall correlations among publicly- 
 available media/source objectivity ratings  (Spearman r) 
Media/ 
Source 
Objectivity 
 
1 
Genrl 
news 
paper 
2  
Finan 
news 
paper 
3  
Genrl 
maga 
zine 
4  
Finan 
maga 
zine 
5  
Gen 
broad 
cast 
6  
Finan 
broad 
cast 
7  
Genrl 
inter 
net 
8  
Finan 
inter 
net 
Corr 
- .545** .787** .493** .780** .566** .754** .408** 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
1)  
General 
Newspaper 
n 
- 117 114 116 114 115 115 115 
Corr 
.545** - .409** .591** .517** .698** .393** .437** 
Sig 
.000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2)  
Finance 
Newspaper 
n 117 - 114 116 114 115 115 115 
Corr 
.787** .409** - .587** .798** .573** .620** .315* 
Sig 
.000 .000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
3)  
General 
Magazine 
n 114 114 - 114 114 114 112 113 
Corr 
.493** .591** .587** - .603** .553** .327* .305** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 - .000 .000 .000 .001 
4)  
Finance 
Magazine 
n 116 116 114 - 114 114 114 115 
Corr 
.780** .517** .798** .603** - .808** .585** .297* 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000 .001 
 5)  
General 
Broadcast 
n 114 114 114 114 - 114 112 113 
Corr 
.566** .698** .573** .553** .808** - .384** .280* 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 .003 
6) 
 Finance 
Broadcast 
n 115 115 114 114 114 - 113 113 
Corr 
.754** .393** .620** .327* .585** .384** - .585** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 - .000 
7)  
General 
Internet 
n 115 115 112 114 112 113 - 113 
Corr 
.408** .437** .315* .305** .297* .280* .585** - 
Sig 
.000 .000 .001 .001 .001 .003 .000 - 
8)  
Finance 
Internet 
n 115 115 113 115 113 113 113 - 
 
This matrix indicates a further cluster of correlations among the objectivity ratings for publicly-
accessible news media, the majority of them moderate-to strong and highly significant. This 
evidence further reinforces the contention that respondents may have categorised and rated these 
media/sources according to come common perceived underlying quality/ characteristic.  
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Fig. 33 
Table indicating overall correlations among institutional  
network media/source objectivity ratings (Spearman r) 
Media/ 
Source 
Objectivity 
 
1  
Infml 
work 
disc 
2  
Spec. 
work 
disc 
3 
Spec. 
Instr-
uction 
4 
Infml 
extnl 
disc 
5 
Spec. 
extnl 
disc 
Corr 
- .820** .580** .603** .476** 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .000 .000 
1)  
Informal Work 
Discussion  
n 
- 114 109 115 114 
Corr 
.820** - .712** .641** .683** 
Sig 
.000 - .000 .000 .000 
2)  
Specific Work 
Discussion 
n 114 - 111 116 115 
Corr 
.580** .712** - .449** .516** 
Sig 
.000 .000 - .000 .000 
3)  
Specific 
Instructions 
n 109 111 - 111 110 
Corr 
.603** .641** .449** - .722** 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 - .000 
4)  
Informal 
External 
Discussion  n 115 116 111 - 116 
Corr 
.476** .683** .516** .722** - 
Sig 
.000 .000 .000 .000 - 
5)  
Specific 
External 
Discussion n 114 115 110 116 - 
 
This matrix also indicates a cluster of correlations among the objectivity ratings for institutional 
network sources, the majority of them moderate-to strong and highly significant. Likewise, this too 
reinforces the contention that respondents may have categorised and rated these media/sources 
according to come common perceived underlying quality/ characteristic.  
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Fig. 34 
  
Table indicating overall correlations among Fundamental/ Technical 
information type importance ratings (Spearman r) 
Information 
Type 
Importance 
 
1  
Gen. 
market 
funda-
mental 
2  
Gen. 
market 
tech-
nicals 
3  
Spec 
industry 
funda-
mental 
4  
Spec  
industry 
tech- 
nicals 
5 
Compny 
funda-
mental 
6 
Compny 
tech-  
nicals 
Corr 
- .570** .354** .299** .061 .027 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .002 .543 .784 
1) 
General 
Market 
Fundamentals n 
- 102 101 102 101 102 
Corr 
.570** - .259* .533** -.164 -.071 
Sig 
.000 - .009 .000 .101 .479 
2) 
General 
Market 
Technicals n 102 - 102 103 102 103 
Corr 
.354** .259* - .720** .576** .488** 
Sig 
.000 .009 - .000 .000 .000 
3)  
Specific 
Industry 
Fundamentals n 101 102 - 102 102 102 
Corr 
.299** .533** .720** - .356* .433** 
Sig 
.002 .000 .000 - .000 .000 
4)  
Specific 
Industry 
Technicals n 102 103 102 - 102 103 
Corr 
.061 -.164 .576** .356* - .743** 
Sig 
.543 .101 .000 .000 - .000 
5)  
Company 
Fundamentals 
n 101 102 102 102 - 102 
Corr 
.027 -.071 .488** .433** .743** - 
Sig 
.784 .479 .000 .000 .000 - 
6)  
Company 
Technicals 
n 102 103 102 103 102 - 
 
 
This matrix of correlations again points to a cluster of correlations among various forms of 
fundamental and technical data. Although general market data is not significantly correlated with 
company data, both correlate with specific industry data for both fundamental and technical data, 
with the relationships ranging from weak/significant to strong/highly significant.  
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Fig. 35 
 
Table indicating overall correlations among  
Meta-information type importance ratings (Spearman r) 
Information 
Type 
Importance 
 
1  
Gen 
market 
mood 
2  
Rival 
invest. 
opinion 
3  
Other 
instit’n 
opinion 
4  
Non-
market 
news 
5  
Corr 
data/ 
source 
6  
Info on 
media 
Corr 
- .590** .498** .197 .332** .163 
Sig 
- .000 .000 .047 .001 .101 
1)  
General 
Market 
Trend/Mood n 
- 103 103 103 102 102 
Corr 
.590** - .620** .199 .572** .098 
Sig 
.000 - .000 .043 .000 .325 
2)  
Rival Investor 
Opinion 
n 103 - 103 103 102 102 
Corr 
.498** .620** - .098 .502** .019 
Sig 
.000 .000 - .326 .000 .846 
3)  
Other 
Institution 
Opinion n 103 103 - 103 102 102 
Corr 
.197 .199 .098 - .167 .296 
Sig 
.047 .043 .326 - .093 .003 
4)  
Non-Market 
News 
n 103 103 103 - 102 102 
Corr 
.332** .572** .502** .167 - .212 
Sig 
.001 .000 .000 .093 - .032 
5)  
Correlation 
Data Sources 
n 102 102 102 102 - 102 
Corr 
.163 .098 .019 .296 .212 - 
Sig 
.101 .325 .846 .003 .032 - 
6) 
Information 
on Media 
n 102 102 102 102 102 - 
 
Another cluster of correlations was noted among importance ratings for several information types 
that might be associated with meta-information and reflexive cross-referencing of data/opinions. 
The pattern of correlations is not entirely consistent across all these categories; information on the 
media only exhibits weak correlations with two other variables, and two of the three correlations 
exhibited by non-market news are very weak and marginally significant.  
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Factor analysis and development of scales  
 
The initial sets of ratings for media/source importance and objectivity and information type 
importance were not completely consistent with either the neoclassical/positivist or radical reflexive 
account of how market information and market activity/price movements might be related. 
Correlations between the importance and objectivity ratings for different media are either weak or 
absent. Both market fundamentals/technicals and forms of meta-information concerning market 
psychology and the cross-referencing of data with other actors’ opinions appear to be relevant to 
trading decisions/analysis. There is a complex pattern of correlations between the importance 
ratings of various information and media types. More generalised conclusions about these clusters 
of relationships may be derived from condensing the number of variables under consideration. As 
the preceding matrices suggests, there are several sets of correlation clusters which potentially 
indicate correspondence with a common underlying element. Factor analysis can be helpful in 
identifying composite variable components that are inter-correlated. Any component factors 
identified may then assist with the development of  scale variables, (although these may require 
further refinement to ensure semantic coherence, discreteness, comprehensiveness and reliability). 
 
One reason that 24 media/information source categories and 15 information type categories were 
included in the questionnaire was to enable any differences in institutional investor perceptions to 
be discerned. Nevertheless, if there are a smaller number of common factors that can account 
reasonably well for the variation in responses, then this may not only help eliminate any redundant 
categories but also enable a useful level of generalisation of findings. To this end, factor analysis 
was used to identify groups of variables that constitute components of more generic variables. As 
Darlington (2003) and Garson (2007) point out , there is a difference between using factor analysis 
to identify ‘absolute’ or ‘confirmatory’ relations between a set of (pre-determined) variables in order 
to establish the validity of an existing theoretical construct/ scale, and using it as an heuristic or 
exploratory tool to identify potential subsets of related variables from a larger sample and inform the 
development of scales/models. The preceding examination of several correlation clusters suggests 
that several factors may emerge from the data, but the precise composition of those factors is 
uncertain at this stage of the analysis and it would be premature to move directly to proposing 
composite scales and testing a predetermined range of variables.  
 
The overall data sets relating to; a) media/source importance ratings; b) media/source objectivity 
ratings; and c) information type importance ratings were all analysed separately161. A further 
analysis of the entire set of data was also conducted, to explore any interesting combinations of 
variables across these categories. However, this largely confirmed the components identified in the 
separate procedures. The findings are displayed below. Each column represents a potential factor/ 
component accounting for variance across the respective data set. The correlation figures in the 
box indicate the strength of the relationship of each variable constituting each factor/component. 
The initial component analysis matrix is presented for reference, but the second matrix presenting 
the component factors extracted after Varimax rotation is the main focus because these indicate 
more discrete factors with fewer overlapping/shared variables. The smaller tables presented after 
each varimax matrix indicate the level of variance each factor/component accounts for within the 
overall set of data for both the initial component analysis and the varimax rotation.  
                                                 
161
 The SPSS factor analysis used Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalisation. The basic factor analysis 
identifies a basic set of components/factors which account for as much of the overall variance in the data as 
possible. Variance maximisation entails the mathematical modelling of an n-dimensional scatterplot through 
which an axis line (or, rather, plane) could be drawn so as to minimise the overall distance of each point from 
the ‘line’ while maximising the variance explained by any emergent new underlying variable factor represented 
by the line (Hill & Lewicki, 2007). As Garson (2007) points out, Varimax rotation has an advantage over basic 
component analysis because it differentiates factors more discretely and helps avoid ‘loading’ the same 
variable onto two factors. If two factors contain the same components, this may mean they are correlated and 
not indicative of distinct underlying variables (see Darlington, 2003). Garson (2007) explains that this occurs 
because in cases where multiple components are identified, the initial ‘line’ will usually fall between two factors 
and hence not be discrete. Varimax therefore optimises the association of each variable with a single factor 
(although some duplication can still occur). Kaiser normalisation, meanwhile, simply applies the principle that 
the amount of total variance explained by a variable (eigenvalue) cannot be less than the variance explained 
represented by any single variable comprising the factor (Darlington draws the analogy of writing a summary of 
a book which is longer than the book itself).  
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Fig. 36 
Basic Component Matrix  for importance of media/ information source type 
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
General Newspaper .775 -.317             
Finance Newspaper .762 -.362             
General Magazine .697 -.321             
Finance Magazine .696 -.391             
Finance Broadcast .688     -.415         
Company Report .641       -.412       
General Internet .583 -.388       -.397     
Public Analyst Advice .559     .529         
Finance Internet .541   -.459     -.357     
Informal Work Discussion .533 .496 .345 -.367         
General Broadcast .513   .439       -.381   
Private Analyst Advice .498   -.453     .432     
System/ Algorithms   .658             
Specific External Discussion .417 .658           -.432 
Informal External Discussion .323 .598       -.304   -.532 
Specific Work Discussion .460 .581           .384 
Specialist Finance Wire   .525     .498       
Specific Instruction .427 .483             
Academic Journal .347   .673           
Subscriber Finance Internet .493   -.643       .302   
Specialist Finance Channel .543     -.567   .352     
Intuition/ Hunches   .401   .415 .591       
Own Analysis   .393   .436 .469       
Specialist Industry Report .511   -.304       -.546   
 
Fig. 37 
 Vmax Rotated Component Matrix for importance of media/ information source type 
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Finance Magazine .842               
General Newspaper .827               
General Magazine .821               
Finance Newspaper .785               
 Academic Journal .529 .431   -.309         
Public Analyst Advice .509     .388   .306 .333   
Specific Work Discussion   .786             
Informal Work Discussion   .751     .413 .360     
Specific Instruction   .713             
Finance Internet     .833           
Subscriber Finance Internet     .816           
General Internet .321   .498   .464     .358 
Private Analyst Advice       .804         
System/ Algorithms   .508   .638         
Specialist Industry Report       .619 .377     .386 
General Broadcast .437       .781       
Finance Broadcast     .544   .609       
Specialist Finance Channel   .343   .360 .518     -.418 
Informal External Discussion           .912     
Specific External Discussion       .321   .798     
Intuition/ Hunches             .836   
Own Analysis             .782   
Specialist Finance Wire               -.744 
Company Report .380     .358       .620 
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Fig. 38  
Media 
Impor-
tance 
Initial Eigenvalues & 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Comp-
onent 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
% 
Vari-
ance 
Cumul-
ative 
% 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
% 
Vari-
ance 
Cumu-
lative 
% 
1 6.485 27.020 27.020 4.023 16.765 16.765 
2 3.667 15.278 42.298 2.610 10.876 27.641 
3 2.017 8.406 50.704 2.433 10.136 37.777 
4 1.616 6.735 57.439 2.291 9.548 47.325 
5 1.443 6.011 63.451 2.023 8.428 55.752 
6 1.228 5.116 68.567 1.890 7.874 63.626 
7 1.139 4.747 73.314 1.681 7.004 70.630 
8 1.014 4.226 77.539 1.658 6.910 77.539 
• Note that Kaiser normalisation excludes components with an eigenvalue < 1.00. (Higher eigenvalues 
indicate that the component accounts for a greater level of variance, while cumulative values give some 
indication of how much of the variation in the data sets remains unexplained by the various components).   
• % Variance figures relate to the level of variation across the data set explained by the component/factor.  
 
The factor analysis for media/ information sources confirms that component #1 is comprised of 
several variables approximately corresponding to a cluster of inter-correlated public news sources. 
The main difference here is that public analyst advice and company reports are included in this 
component, whereas financial/business broadcast news and financial/business internet sites are 
not included. Interestingly, academic journals are also included, although this variable is common to 
both components #1 and #2. The second component, meanwhile, corresponds partially to the set of 
variables related to institutional networks, including informal and work-related discussion with 
colleagues, specific work-related discussion and systems/algorithms. However, this excludes both 
informal and work-related external discussion . The third component includes all three on-line media 
variables along with financial broadcasts, while the fourth included public and private analyst 
reports, systems/algorithms, specialist industry reports and company reports, finance channels 
work-related external discussion, and a negative element relating to academic journals. The others 
indicate various alternative component compositions, but these first four components indicate an 
approximate distinction emerging between component 1 (involving publicly accessible news media) 
and other potential components (primarily comprised of combinations of institutional/network-related 
media with some other publicly-accessible media/sources). Although one must be cautious about 
over-simplifying interpretations to match theoretical assumptions, the aim at this stage remains 
heuristic, and any subsequent scales developed will need to be checked for their reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 193 
Fig. 39   
Basic Component Matrix  for  Objectivity of Media/ Source type 
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Finance Internet .776      
Specific Work Discussion .747 -.491     
Specific Instructions .721     .468 
Finance Newspaper .705 .451  -.308   
Specialist Finance Channel .703   -.502   
Private Analyst Advice .700 -.386 .335    
Subscriber Finance Internet .696 -.457     
General Internet .691  -.327    
Informal Work Discussion .685 -.419 -.318    
Finance Broadcast .675 .515     
Specific External Discussion .673 -.517     
Finance Magazine .666 .481     
Academic Journal .601    -.465  
General Magazine .595 .585     
Intuition/ Hunches .581 -.452  -.330   
Public Analyst Advice .516  .339 .421   
General Newspaper .485 .684 -.305    
General Broadcast .634 .643     
Own Analysis .553 -.611     
Informal External Discussion .524 -.568     
Systems/Algorithms   .608  .427  
Company Report .391  .509   .453 
Specialist Finance Wire .351  .301 -.626  .433 
Specialist Industry Report .333  .529  -.618  
 
Fig. 40 
Vmax Rotated Component Matrix  for  Objectivity of Media/ Source  
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Specific Work Discussion .908           
Informal Work Discussion .848           
Informal External Discussion .837           
Specific External Discussion .818           
Own Analysis .746           
Subscriber Finance Internet .739         .411 
Intuition/ Hunches .732       .307   
Finance Internet .663 .428         
Private Analyst Advice .657     .392   .434 
Specific Instructions .606 .461     .313 -.335 
General Newspaper   .909         
General Broadcast   .901         
General Magazine   .874         
General Internet .372 .770         
Finance Broadcast   .763         
Finance Newspaper   .704     .374   
Finance Magazine   .684       .456 
Specialist Industry Report     .892       
Academic Journal   .405 .601     .337 
Company Report     .557 .530     
Systems/Algorithms       .768     
Public Analyst Advice   .336   .650     
Specialist Finance Wire         .892   
Specialist Finance Channel .335 .458     .456 .540 
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Fig. 41 
 
Media 
Object-
ivity 
Initial Eigenvalues & 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Comp-
onent 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
% 
Vari-
ance 
Cumul-
ative 
% 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
% 
Vari-
ance 
Cumu-
lative 
% 
1 8.893 37.055 37.055 6.217 25.905 25.905 
2 4.101 17.086 54.141 5.627 23.446 49.351 
3 2.026 8.442 62.583 1.949 8.121 57.472 
4 1.481 6.171 68.754 1.863 7.764 65.237 
5 1.255 5.230 73.984 1.669 6.953 72.189 
6 1.076 4.484 78.468 1.507 6.279 78.468 
 
The factor analysis for media/source objectivity indicates six potential components, but the first two 
are of primary interest here. There is a clear distinction between these components, the first being 
comprised primarily of media/sources linked to institutional networks, the latter being comprised 
largely of publicly-accessible media. Three components are shared here; general and financial 
internet sites and also specialist finance channels.  
 
Fig. 42 
 
Basic Component Matrix  for  Importance of Information Type 
 
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 
General Market Trend/Mood .744 -.304       
Rival Investor Opinion .712 -.351 -.435     
Current Market Price .668       -.363 
Specific Industry Fundamentals .645 .541       
Correlation Data Sources .601   -.430     
Specific Industry Technicals .558 .521 .403     
Historical Market Price .498 -.329   .402 -.384 
Company Technicals .357 .804       
Company Fundamentals .377 .726 -.319     
Other Institution Opinion .564 -.570       
General Market Technicals .422   .739     
General Market Fundamentals .485   .594 -.340   
Non-Market News       -.735   
Future Market Price       .663 .497 
Information on Media         .663 
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Fig. 43 
Varimax Rotated Component Matrix  for   
Importance of Information Type 
 
Components: 1 2 3 4 5 
Rival Investor Opinion .909         
Other Institution Opinion .748         
General Market Trend/Mood .722   .338     
Current Market Price .666         
Correlation Data Sources .641       .498 
Historical Market Price .570     -.550   
Company Technicals   .889       
Company Fundamentals   .856       
Specific Industry Fundamentals   .772 .314     
Specific Industry Technicals   .664 .539     
General Market Technicals     .880     
General Market Fundamentals     .764     
Non-Market News       .788   
Future Market Price       -.467 .727 
Information on Media       .312 .668 
Fig. 44 
Import-
ance 
Info 
Type 
Initial Eigenvalues & 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Comp-
onent 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
%  
Vari-
ance 
Cumul
-ative 
% 
Total 
Eigen-
Value 
%  
Vari-
ance 
Cumu-
lative 
% 
1 4.021 26.808 26.808 3.249 21.661 21.661 
2 2.572 17.146 43.954 2.814 18.763 40.424 
3 1.655 11.036 54.990 2.036 13.574 53.998 
4 1.463 9.755 64.744 1.475 9.831 63.829 
5 1.272 8.483 73.228 1.410 9.398 73.228 
6 4.021 26.808 26.808 3.249 21.661 21.661 
 
The factor analysis for information types indicates three main components. The first generally 
corresponds to meta-information and the cross-referencing of data with other actor’s opinions while 
the second concerns fundamental and technical data for both companies and specific industries. 
The third also includes fundamental and technical data for general markets and specific industries 
(overlapping with component one) and also general market moods/trends. Pricing data does not 
form into a discrete category, although current and historical price data is included in component 
one. This would again seem to be roughly consistent with the earlier proposition that fundamental 
and technical information about markets are distinct from other forms of meta-information. 
 
Development of scales and reliability tests 162 
 
As noted earlier, the analysis of potential factors was primarily an heuristic exercise intended to 
identify clusters of related variables indexical of more generic underlying factors. From the matrices 
presented above, it appeared that several factors could be identified in each set of data relating to 
media/source importance, media/source objectivity and information type importance. However, not 
every component identified in the factor analysis necessarily pointed to a coherent underlying 
                                                 
162
 The author is indebted to Deepa Marat for collegial advice on factor analysis and scale development. 
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construct that could be usefully theorised. As Babbie (2007) points out, factor analysis cannot take 
account of the theoretical-semantic implications of combining the variables in the components 
identified. The development of coherent scale factors therefore entails a process of incorporating/ 
excluding variables on the basis of the statistical patterns emerging from the factor analysis and 
incorporating/excluding variables based on semantic/theoretical salience. Although it is possible to 
develop scales comprising of multiple variables based on a priori theorisation (Hill & Lewicki, 2007), 
this does not mean that scales can simply be assembled on the basis of correspondence with 
theoretical expectation/expediency, even when they are derived from components suggested by 
factor analysis. The reliability of the scale composition in terms of the confidence with which it can 
be assumed to be measuring an underlying variable can be tested using Cronbach’s Alpha163. An 
Alpha coefficient of 0.7 or higher is generally considered the minimum threshold of acceptable 
reliability, although refinement of existing scales may demand higher values.  
 
The rationale for the factor analysis and the development of scales was to identify ways of 
coherently simplifying/condensing the overall patterns of data emerging from the quantitative 
survey. The theoretical focus on whether ratings of media/source importance and objectivity and/or 
information type importance would provide evidence for the processes of informational reflexivity 
remained the primary concern. The initial exploration of bivariate correlations already suggested 
that there may be some commonality underpinning media/source variables linked to institutional 
networks and  those linked to publicly-available news media (both in terms of importance and 
objectivity) and also between basic forms of fundamental and technical information on different 
market levels, and forms of meta-information involved in the reflexive cross-referencing/ correlation 
of data and opinions. These distinctions were broadly confirmed by the factor analyses of the 
respective data sets, but this also indicated several components which did not correspond neatly to 
the emergent hypothetical distinctions.  
 
One option here would have been to develop a secondary set of scale variables based very closely 
on the components emerging from the factor analysis. However, despite the Varimax rotation, some 
variables were distributed across components and this would mean the scales were not discrete. 
Moreover, in some cases, the components emerging from the factor analysis did not correspond to 
the hypothetical distinctions being proposed between publicly-available and  institutional  
media/sources, or between market fundamental/technical data and reflexive/meta-information. 
Adopting scales to maximise the correspondence with the components emerging from the factor 
analysis would arguably maximise the validity of the scales as a descriptive account of the data set. 
However, this could impede the investigation of the (separate) theoretical questions concerning 
communicative/informational reflexivity (which would work best with discrete scales).  
 
Therefore, where the factor analysis identified components that not neatly correspond to the 
hypothetical distinctions being investigated, it was therefore decided to prioritise the development of 
discrete scales that would allow the testing of the theoretical propositions. This preference for 
semantic/theoretical coherence in no way obviated the need to ensure that the scales were also 
statistically reliable and that the constituent variables were indeed correlated to an underlying 
factor. To this end, several permutations of variable combinations were explored using Cronbach’s 
Alpha to test their reliability.  
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 Scale/Item reliability tests using Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient involves a comparison of the variance of the 
total value of the scale (the sum-scale) and the sum of the variance of each component variable. If the 
variance of the sum-scale is lower than the aggregate variance of its constituent variables, then the scale is 
judged to be reliably measuring some underlying element (Hill & Lewicki, 2007). As noted earlier, variance is 
calculated as the sum of squares, i.e. the deviations from the overall mean for each response is squared, 
totalled, and then divided by the total number of responses minus one.  Garson (2007) points out that scales 
with a high Alpha coefficients cannot automatically be assumed to be measuring a discrete, objective variable, 
although high Alphas would indicate that there is a good degree of correlation among the scale’s constituent 
variables. For example, one might in theory measure the changing physical coordinates of a flock of birds or a 
shoal of fish and find that they all move together. The flock/shoal is obviously comprised of multiple separate 
birds/fish although it is not meaningless to analyse their overall shape/ movement as a discrete form.  
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The approach was intended to identify at least two scale variables for each set of data which, 
would: 
 
a) Be discrete in relation to each other (no shared variables) 
b) Be theoretically coherent in terms of differentiating between i) publicly accessible media and 
media associated with professional/ institutional networks and ii) information types related to 
market fundamental/ technical data and reflexive/meta-information.  
c) Maintain a rough approximation to the component distinctions from the (varimax) factor analysis 
where possible. 
d) Exhibit a Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient higher than the respective components from the 
corresponding (varimax) factor analysis where possible, or, where this was not possible, satisfy 
the  minimum   > 0.7 threshold. 
 
The scale variables that were eventually selected satisfied a) and d) below. In some instances, 
satisfying b) and c) involved a trade-off between theoretical distinctiveness and adherence to the 
original scale implied by the factor analysis: 
 
 
Fig. 45 Scale Variable for Public Media/Source Importance 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Std. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Public Media 
Importance Scale 
 
37.05 92.832 9.635 .874 * 
Valid number: 128 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
General Newspaper 
 
33.66 69.989 .816 .842 
Finance Newspaper 
 
32.87 70.966 .771 .846 
General Magazine 
 
34.66 75.692 .734 .852 
Finance Magazine 
 
33.19 74.972 .693 .854 
General Broadcast 
 
34.32 79.038 .538 .866 
Finance Broadcast 
 
33.45 79.902 .522 .867 
General Internet 
 
33.65 77.364 .644 .858 
Finance Internet 
 
32.33 80.017 .447 .872 
Company Report 
 
32.41 72.292 .492 .877 
Public Analyst 
Advice 32.89 82.271 .396 .875 
* Cronbach’s Alpha for Component 1 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .829 
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Fig. 46 Scale Variable for Institutional Media/ Source Importance 
 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Std. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Institutional Media 
Importance Scale 
 
69.66 89.479 9.459 .813* 
Valid number: 100 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Specialist Finance 
Channel 65.53 78.878 .458 .801 
Subscriber Finance 
Internet 64.98 80.323 .249 .820 
Specialist Finance 
Wire 63.42 83.216 .257 .814 
Specialist Industry 
Report 64.62 75.410 .467 .800 
Informal Work 
Discussion 64.47 73.545 .551 .792 
Specific Work 
Discussion 63.58 75.640 .655 .787 
Specific Instruction 
 
64.09 74.608 .533 .794 
Informal External 
Discussion 64.39 77.675 .492 .798 
Specific External 
Discussion 63.84 74.924 .642 .787 
Private Analyst 
Advice 65.37 74.842 .496 .797 
System/ Algorithms 
 
64.55 70.573 .553 .792 
Own Analysis 
 
63.29 82.753 .342 .809 
Intuition/ Hunches 
 
63.79 84.188 .203 .818 
 
*Cronbach’s Alpha for Components 2 and 4 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .750 and .743 
respectively 
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Fig. 47 Scale Variable for Public Media/ Source Objectivity 
 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Strd. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Public Media 
Objectivity Scale 
 
60.73 40.97 8.42 .884* 
Valid number: 104 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
General Newspaper 
 
37.05 54.920 .744 .862 
Finance Newspaper 
 
36.36 58.814 .708 .867 
General Magazine 
 
37.39 52.746 .760 .861 
Finance Magazine 
 
36.57 58.578 .693 .868 
General Broadcast 
 
37.34 52.458 .838 .854 
Finance Broadcast 
 
36.69 57.613 .744 .864 
General Internet 
 
37.43 58.597 .636 .871 
Finance Internet 
 
36.65 63.005 .430 .884 
Company Report 
 
36.34 59.954 .453 .885 
Public Analyst 
Advice 36.92 65.043 .218 .900 
 
* Cronbach’s Alpha for Component 2 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .902. Note that both 
objectivity scales for public media and institutional media were modified to ensure their constituent 
variables corresponded directly with the respective importance scales. This was done in order to 
permit meaningful correlations between scale-level importance and objectivity ratings. 
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Fig. 48 Scale Variable for Institutional Media/ Source Objectivity 
 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Strd. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Institutional Media 
Objectivity Scale 
 
60.73 101.438 10.072 .889* 
Valid number:  93 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Specialist Finance 
Channel 56.04 91.237 .495 .885 
Subscriber Finance 
Internet 56.25 83.275 .706 .874 
Specialist Finance 
Wire 55.16 94.506 .343 .891 
Specialist Industry 
Report 55.06 94.626 .281 .894 
Informal Work 
Discussion 56.66 86.163 .651 .878 
Specific Work 
Discussion 56.23 82.046 .802 .869 
Specific Instruction 
 
55.94 85.691 .615 .879 
Informal External 
Discussion 56.91 90.775 .521 .884 
Specific External 
Discussion 56.47 83.600 .770 .872 
Private Analyst 
Advice 56.42 81.246 .743 .872 
System/ Algorithms 
 
55.03 95.597 .231 .896 
Own Analysis 
 
55.49 85.383 .703 .875 
Intuition/ Hunches 
 
57.11 79.836 .651 .879 
 
* Cronbach’s Alpha for Component 1 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .850 
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Fig. 49 Scale Variable for Market Information Importance 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Strd. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Market 
Information 
Importance Scale 
 
29.88 32.59 5.709 .730* 
Valid number:  105 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
General Market 
Fundamentals 24.59 26.148 .305 .736 
General Market 
Technicals 24.58 28.938 .169 .761 
Specific Industry 
Fundamentals 24.61 21.933 .707 .624 
Specific Industry 
Technicals 25.09 21.656 .648 .635 
Company 
Fundamentals 24.93 21.928 .447 .704 
Company 
Technicals 25.58 22.534 .560 .663 
 
*Cronbach’s Alpha for Components 2 and 3 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .831 and .732 
respectively (NB: these two components overlapped on industry fundamentals/technicals). Although 
this comprises the least reliable scale, it exceeds the minimum reliability threshold and provides a 
more generic scale variable for the purpose of contrasting with the reflexive component. 
 
Fig. 50 Scale Variable for Reflexive Information Importance 
 
Sum-Scale 
Mean 
Sum-scale 
Variance 
Sum-scale 
Strd. Dev. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 
Reflexive 
Information 
Importance Scale 
 
22.84 20.155 4.489 .752* 
Valid number:  106 
Components 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
General Market 
Trend/Mood 17.91 13.439 .590 .682 
Rival Investor 
Opinion 18.00 13.276 .735 .641 
Other Institution 
Opinion 17.51 13.852 .606 .680 
Non-Market  
News 19.82 16.110 .222 .810 
Correlation Data/ 
Sources 18.12 11.823 .546 .704 
 
*Cronbach’s Alpha for Component 1 in the (varimax) factor analysis = .816.  
 
One reason for the alpha score being lower than the original scale factor was the removal of the 
current price data variable. Although price data might be regarded as a market fundamental. Only 
historical price data can be externally verified; current and future prices have a reflexive ontology. 
Consequently, it was considered problematic to assign price data to either the market information or 
reflexive information categories. Historical /current/ future price data was explored as a separate 
scale variable, but it was not possible to identify a discrete scale based on pricing.  
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Analysis of scale-variable data 
 
The development of the six scale variables discussed above allowed further investigation of the 
respective importance and objectivity of ‘public media’ and ‘institutional media’ and the importance 
of ‘market information’ and ‘reflexive information’. Firstly, because the scales were comprised of 
unequal numbers of constituent variables, their sum-values were recoded to reflect the proportional 
mean scores and allow more meaningful comparisons in line with the original 7-point values. 
Secondly, a correlations matrix was generated to investigate the relationships among the 6 scale 
factors.  
 
From the initial ratings data and sets of correlations, it might be expected that the media/sources 
included in the ‘public media’ scale would tend to be regarded as less important than the 
media/sources included in the ‘institutional media’ scale, but that the overall relationship between 
importance rating and objectivity rating would be marginal for both public media and  institutional 
media. The initial sets of ratings for information type importance, meanwhile, suggested that the 
importance ratings for ‘market information’ and ‘reflexive information’ scales would not be markedly 
dissimilar, with perhaps a slightly higher rating for the former. The correlations between the 
media/source scales and the information-type scales are the most important point interest here, 
however. Insofar as the scales are discrete and have been shown to be at least minimally reliable, 
the correlations here will help provide a basis for drawing some more generalised conclusions 
about the nature of the relationship between the respective functions of public and institutional 
media and different forms of information.  
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Fig 51 
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Fig. 52 
 
Scale Variable 
Mean Ratings 
Overall 
Mean/SD 
Stocks 
Mean/SD 
Bonds 
Mean/SD 
Currencies 
Mean/SD  
Derivatives 
Mean/SD  
3.70 4.27 3.62 3.39 3.14 Importance of  
Public Media 0.96 0.75 0.87 0.79 1.12 
5.36 5.21 5.49 5.37 5.39 Importance of 
Institutional Media 0.73 .077 0.72 0,72 0.69 
4.09 4.10 4.11 4.11 4.05 Objectivity of  
Public Media 0.84 0.55 0.87 0.93 1.17 
4.67 4.53 4.79 4.74 4.65 Objectivity of 
Institutional Media 0.77 0.87 0.73 0.74 0.76 
4.57 4.45 4.59 4.68 4.60 Importance of 
Reflexive Information 0.89 0.74 0.88 0.86 1.20 
4.98 5.48 4.90 4.54 4.79 Importance of  
Market Information 0.95 0.78 0.99 0.88 0.96 
 
 
As anticipated, the overall importance rating for public media (unimportant to moderately important)   
is somewhat lower than the rating for institutional media (important/ highly important). Their 
respective objectivity ratings are more similar (both partly objective/ mostly objective), but the rating 
for institutional media is marginally higher than that for public media. In regard to the information 
scales, the importance ratings for market information were slightly higher than those for reflexive 
information  (although both fall between moderately important to important). Standard deviations 
are relatively low for all variables, which reflects the central tendency that stems from generating a 
scale-level rating from mean of all the individual constituent variables. Otherwise, ratings for all 
variables are fairly consistent across market subsectors, with two exceptions: There is a higher 
importance rating for both public media and for market information among respondents involved in 
trading stocks/equities. These findings reinforce the earlier indication that although the channels 
available to institutional investors through high-end services and professional networks are 
considered primary, publicly-available general news media are certainly not irrelevant. The 
importance ratings of market information and reflexive information serve to underline the point that 
trading decisions cannot be considered to be either a mechanical rational response to market 
fundamentals or a process based entirely on self-referential perceptions of investors’ own opinions. 
The nature of the interplay among these variables still needs clarification, however.  
 
One-way ANOVA tests for variance among the scale variables across market subsectors identified 
significant variation in regard to the importance ratings of Public Media and  Market Information. 
 
Fig. 53 
 
Scale Variance  
by Market Subsectors 
Mean 
Square 
ANOVA 
F-value 
Sig. 
Between Groups 8.229 10.948 .000 Importance Public 
Media Scale Within Groups .752   
Between Groups 4.703 5.934 .001 Importance Market 
Information Scale Within Groups .792   
 
Tukey HSD tests indicated the following points of variation. (Again, because the sample sizes 
across market sectors were unequal, a harmonic mean was assumed and type-1 errors cannot be 
discounted).  
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Fig. 54 (a/b) 
 
Importance of Public Media: Tukey 
Market Type N 1 2 
Derivatives 23 3.1391  
Currencies 30 3.3933  
Bonds/Interest 31 3.6194  
Stocks/Equities 44  4.2727 
 
 
Importance of Market Information: Tukey 
Market Type N 1 2 
Currencies 26 4.5449  
Derivatives 18 4.7870  
Bonds/Interest 27 4.9012 4.9012 
Stocks/Equities 34  5.4755 
 
 
These tests are consistent with the earlier analyses. In regard to public media, the higher rating 
among stocks/equities would be consistent with the proposition that these securities are influenced 
by factors to which investors in other securities may be less sensitive. As suggested earlier, the fact 
that companies are directly involved in the industrial economy and are affected by consumer 
behaviour/lifeworld activities may indicate that news about non-financial events is more salient to 
this subsector. Meanwhile, the point of differentiation for market information arises between 
currencies/derivatives/bonds and bonds/stocks (although the fact that company fundamentals and 
technicals were included in this scale variable suggests that the difference in the case of stocks is 
unsurprising). The distinction in the case of bonds may reflect that fact that some traded interest 
rate instruments are securitised debt based on mortgages or corporate paper, again suggesting a 
vector through which bonds may be influenced by news about events in the industrial economy and 
lifeworld. In that regard, this finding is also consistent with the arguments concerning the higher 
level of embeddedness of stocks/equities markets (and to a lesser degree, bonds markets) with 
other social subsystems.  
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Correlating scale variables 
 
The correlations matrix below indicates all the bivariate relationships found between the scale 
variables. Significant correlations (Pearson’s r = 0.05 or lower) are in bolder type. Note that the 
Pearson’s test for significance was preferred here because the scale variable scores no longer 
corresponded to ordinal integers (although the means are still equivalent on the 7-point semantic 
scale). *A single asterisk indicates an overall correlation accompanied by a stronger correlation 
within one market subsector. **Double asterisk correlations are reflected across multiple market 
subsectors. Note that the varying numbers of valid responses stem from the increased exclusion 
ratio of missing cases when multiple variables are incorporated into either of the correlated scales.  
 
Fig. 55 
Overall Correlations of Scale Variables (Pearson’s r) 
Scale 
Variables 
 Import 
Public 
Media 
Import 
Institu-
tional 
Media 
Object 
Public 
Media 
Object 
Institu-
tional 
Media 
Import 
Reflexive 
Inform-
ation 
Import 
Market 
Inform-
ation 
Corr 
- .305** .020 .263 .178 .539** 
Sig - .002 .844 .011 .070 .000 
Importance of 
Public Media 
n 
- 100 102 93 104 103 
Corr 
.305** - .046 .253* .469** .137 
Sig 
.002 - .671 .017 .000 .213 
Importance of 
Institutional 
Media 
n 100 - 86 89 84 84 
Corr 
.020 .046 - .447** .022 -.047 
Sig 
.844 .671 - .000 .835 .649 
Objectivity of 
Public Media 
n 102 86 - 86 95 95 
Corr 
.263 .253* .447** - .124 .015 
Sig 
.011 .017 .000 - .261 .895 
Objectivity of 
Institutional 
Media 
n 93 89 86 - 84 84 
Corr 
.178 .469** .022 .124 - .246* 
Sig 
.070 .000 .835 .261 - .012 
Importance of 
Reflexive 
Information 
 n 104 84 95 84 - 104 
Corr 
.539* .137 -.047 .015 .246* - 
Sig 
.000 .213 .649 .895 .012 - 
Importance of 
Market 
Information 
n 103 84 95 84 104 - 
 
 
 
A further correlations matrix (below) indicates all the significant bivariate relationships found (using 
Pearson’s r) between the scale variables broken down by market subsector. Significant correlations 
(0.05 or lower) are in bolder type. 
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Fig. 56 
 
Scale Variable Correlations Across Market Subsectors 
Correlation 
Variable-
Variable 
 Overall Stocks/ Equities 
Bonds/ 
Interest 
Curren-
cies/ 
Forex 
Deriva-
tives 
Corr .539 .249 .481 .534 .553 
Sig .000 .170 .011 .005 .017 
Importance of 
Public Media 
with  
Importance of 
Market 
Information n 103 32 27 26 18 
Corr .253 .015 .439 .323 .306 
Sig .017 .941 .032 .153 .203 
Importance of 
Institutional 
Media 
With 
Objectivity of 
Institutional 
Media n 
89 25 24 21 19 
Corr .469 .448 .455 .541 .503 
Sig .000 .037 .029 .011 .033 
Importance of 
Institutional 
Media with  
Importance of 
Reflexive 
Information n 84 22 23 21 18 
Corr .246 -.081 .526 .327 .446 
Sig .012 .654 .005 .103 .063 
Importance of 
Reflexive 
Information 
with 
Importance of 
Market 
Information n 
104 33 27 26 18 
Corr .305 .500 .287 .299 .488* 
Sig .002 .005 .156 .155 .029 
Importance of 
Public Media 
with 
Importance of 
Institutional 
Media n 100 30 26 24 20 
Corr .447 .419 .396 .468 .590* 
Sig .000 .030 .068 .037 .013 
Objectivity of 
Public Media 
with 
Objectivity of 
Institutional 
Media n 86 27 22 20 17 
 
 
The overall correlations matrix for the scale variables reveals several interesting relationships. 
Firstly, there is no correlation between the importance and objectivity ratings for public media, and 
only a weak/marginally significant correlation between the importance and objectivity ratings for 
institutional media (which also appears as a moderate/marginally significant correlation in the bonds 
subsector, although there is no obvious reason why the relationship is stronger here). This provides 
a more general confirmation of the earlier proposition that the perceived importance of financial 
media to investment decisions has little to do with whether they are perceived to provide the 
trader/analyst with impartial/ accurate accounts of market conditions.  
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The most theoretically important findings here are the respective correlations between the 
importance ratings of public media and market information, and between the importance ratings of 
institutional media and reflexive information, both of which are moderate/highly significant. Given 
the complex range of the earlier bivariate correlations, it was expected that there might be 
correlations between each media/source scale and both types of information scales. The discrete 
correlations between public media/market information and institutional media/reflexive information 
are therefore very interesting164. The correlation between reflexive information and institutional 
media is consistent across all the market subsectors. This applies also to the correlation between 
public media and market information, with the exception of the stocks/equities subsector. This 
consistency across subsectors increases the confidence that the relationships indicated are more 
than just emergent statistical anomalies.  
 
At first glance, these correlations might be interpreted as an indication that information about 
market fundamentals/technicals are derived primarily from public media forms, while meta-
information about the opinions of other market actors and correlations of data are derived from 
institutional media forms. Assuming mutual exclusivity here could be potentially misleading, 
however. Apart from the generic caveat concerning the inference of real relationships on the basis 
of correlations, these statistical relationships do not demonstrate that the respective types of market 
information are derived solely from one type of media/source. For example, both the literature and 
the interviews/observations suggest that information concerning market fundamentals and 
technicals is derived from financial wire services which are included in the institutional media 
category. A more nuanced interpretation would be that the correlations are indicative of the 
media/source importance being premised on their provision not just of a particular type of 
information, but a particular form of informational advantage more effectively than other media (i.e. 
public media providing some kind of decision-making utility based on market information better than 
institutional sources, while institutional media provide some kinds of decision-making utility based 
on reflexive information better than public media). 
 
The distinction between public media and institutional media that emerged through the factor 
analysis and development of scales underlines the contrast between two accounts of financial 
communication systems/processes: a) those which afford greater analytical primacy to the role of 
external/public news media (both general interest and specialist business/finance types) in driving 
financial market activity (e.g. Sant & Zaman, 1996; Busse & Green, 2002; Thrift, 2001; Clark, Thrift 
& Tickell, 2005; Davis, 2005); and b) those which ascribe higher priority to the way 
internal/institutional media and sources help constitute the informational environments through 
which investors reflexively define market reality and engage in transactions (e.g. Smart, 1999; 
Stalder, 2001; Beunza & Garud, 2005; Knorr-Cetina & Preda, 2007; Davis, 2007). These 
perspectives are not necessarily incompatible, but reconciling them demands a more careful 
differentiation of the financial functions supported/ facilitated by different media forms. The low level 
of importance ascribed to public media does not support Clark, Thrift & Tickell’s (2005) assertion 
that investors are ‘highly susceptible’ to news media, or indeed, the 2000 MORI poll indication that 
the financial press was regarded as more important than the financial wire services (cited in Davis, 
2006a). Indeed, Davis’ (2005) identification of ‘consensus indicator’,  ‘anticipatory’, and ‘panopticon’ 
media ‘effects’ would seem to be more closely related to the types of information comprising the 
reflexive information scale (correlated with institutional media, and not public media). However, the 
fact that the more important media/source scale (institutional media) is correlated with the less 
important information scale (reflexive information) while the less important media/source scale 
(public media) is correlated with the more important information scale (market information) means 
that none of these scale variables can be considered irrelevant.  
 
A more nuanced interpretation of these correlations therefore needs to be posited: Many 
respondents, being institutional finance professionals, may well have taken their multi-channel 
information-rich institutional environments for granted in the survey responses. In line with Stalder’s 
                                                 
164
 Indeed, common sense might suggest the reverse relationship would be more plausible. If high-end wire 
services are needed for real-time market news and public media circulate informal market rumours then 
correlations between institutional media and market information and between public media and reflexive 
information would be anticipated. 
 
 209 
(1997b) notion of the financial system’s self-constituting ‘constant presence’, and Knorr-Cetina & 
Preda’s (2007) conception of screen flows and ‘appresentation’, in the informational context of the 
financial market virtually all of the basic market information is always-already-available through a 
variety of sources/channels. This would be consistent with the notion that respondents have 
considered how particular media confer some distinct trading advantage in evaluating their 
importance ratings. Thus the function of institutional media forms in providing core market 
information is less distinctive than their function in providing confirmation of meta-information. This 
would include indications of consensus on the variables driving current trends, provision of 
epistemological guarantees needed to coordinate/validate prevailing frames/schemata, and real-
time market updates from networks of contacts through the on-screen message-boards.  
 
Even though these kinds of reflexive information might be somewhat less central to trading 
decisions than core market information about fundamentals and technicals under normal 
circumstances, they are available principally through institutional media channels. If symmetrical 
distributions of core market information through public media channels is assumed as a default, the 
accessing of reflexive information through institutional media is what accounts for semantic 
symmetries within the institutional investor networks. In contrast, the lower level of importance 
ascribed to public media is probably attributable to their symmetry (i.e. lack of exclusivity), relative 
simplicity (journalistic simplification/ brevity in public news media) or time-delays (lack of real-time 
updates). However, where market information that is already available through real-time wire 
services needs to be confirmed or put in a context of reference, then information about the recent 
performance of companies, industry developments or general market events would be available 
through public media. This account would be consistent with both the relative importance ratings 
and the correlations between the media and information scale variables and also help explain why 
key financial media such as the wire services were not correlated with market fundamentals/ 
technicals or price data when the literature and empirical observation show that real-time updates 
on such information are a key reason for wire services’ ubiquity in trading rooms.  
 
The relationship between Public Media Importance and Institutional Media Importance with 
historical price data, current price data and future price data was also investigated (using Pearson’s 
r for the significance test). This found no overall correlation between public media and any of the 
price data variables. However, a positive weak/significant correlation (0.333, sig.= .002) was 
identified between institutional media and current price data (n= 85). This correlation was not 
present in the case of stocks/equities, but it was evident in the case of bonds/interest rates (.439, 
sig.= 036), currencies (.553, sig.= .009) and derivatives (.704, sig.= .001). This appears to confirm  
the earlier argument concerning the reflexive/contingent nature of current market prices and the 
difficulty of verifying price levels outside of the institutional networks of investors, even with the 
assistance of real-time screen updates.  
 
Key points arising from the quantitative data 
 
From the findings generated by the quantitative component of the survey, several important 
patterns emerge in respect to media usage by institutional investors.  
 
1. Firstly, the absence of any substantial correlation between perceived importance and perceived 
objectivity reinforces the argument that the neoclassical/positivist conception of how prices are 
efficiently driven to their natural equilibrium by information about market conditions is 
problematic. The finding that both market information and reflexive information is important to 
trading decisions nevertheless suggests it would be premature to assert a radical degree of 
communicative reflexivity and reject entirely the supposition that financial markets are 
responsive to conditions in the industrial economy.    The interplay between the media and 
information scale variables needs further investigation, but the findings thus far would suggest 
core market information is symmetrically distributed through a plurality of media forms. 
However, advantages in trading/analysis would be derived from the asymmetrical distribution of 
reflexive/meta-information accessed primarily through institutional networks. Differentiating 
between the functions of public and institutional media is evidently important, but this will be 
explored further through triangulation with the qualitative data. 
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2. The findings support the contention that reflexive communication processes (anticipation of/ 
responses to price momentum and monitoring other market actors’ opinions/positions/ 
behaviour) are an important source of trading advantage in an informationally symmetrical 
market. Reflexive/meta-information (such as the knowledge of which frames/schemata are 
currently driving the market) is primarily available through institutional, not public media 
channels. This would suggest a significant impediment to the ostensible ‘democratisation’ of 
finance and the capacity of non-institutional investors to engage in trading without 
disadvantage. 
 
3. The dual significance of market information and reflexive information precludes the conclusion 
that financial markets are driven solely by the self-referential flows of rumours and herd 
reactions to price momentum. Nevertheless, the findings indicate that trading decisions are at 
least partly driven by signals generated by the interactions of traders and analysts themselves. 
The correlation between institutional media and reflexive information suggests a basis for 
understanding how financial volatility and crisis might arise where financial markets become 
decoupled from external referents in other social subsystems.  
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Chapter 11:  Qualitative Findings and Discussion165  
 
As discussed in the methodology, the quantitative part of the questionnaire was accompanied by a 
structured, open-ended series of questions intended to elicit further qualitative responses on media 
and information usage in financial trading/analysis decisions. A similar series of questions was 
included in the semi-structured open-ended interviews conducted on-site with various analysts and 
traders (see chapter 9). These provided rich data that permitted greater validity in the interpretation 
of the survey responses. The two sets of qualitative data (approximately 20 survey responses and 
39 interviews involving 31 institutional traders and analysts, plus two interviews with financial 
journalists) will be discussed in conjunction166.  Where relevant,  themes from the survey responses 
will be presented first, followed by more in-depth discussion of the interview data167). Several 
questions were closely related, and where the themes in the responses overlapped, these have 
been condensed into a single section to avoid repetition. The question numbers noted alongside the 
themes refer to the relevant questions from the semi-structured interview schedule (see 
methodology chapter 9).  
 
The analysis of the qualitative data was not based on a detailed thematic analysis of the entire set 
of responses. Rather, the survey responses and interview transcripts were collated and roughly 
coded in respect to the theoretical salience of the responses. The sections of the responses 
involving technical explanations or discussion of issues peripheral to the research themes have 
therefore been filtered. The coding process involved the identification of key enunciations that 
indicated the agency of the respondent as an institutional investor and render the emic aspect of 
the intersubjective codifications explicit. Following Deacon et al. (1999), one particular focus here 
was on meta-statements particularly regarding comments through which respondents acknowledge 
a normative or theoretical tension between actual financial practices and the rational calculation of 
market values based on fundamentals. After the initial coding of responses salient to the research 
questions, these were recollated and the process was repeated to identify emerging themes in 
more detail. This helped draw out convergences and contrasts in the responses relating to the 
communicative/ information reflexivity. Triangulated with the quantitative findings, this enabled more 
robust conclusions to be drawn about media and information usage by institutional investors and 
the implications of these processes for understanding how financial market functions in relation to 
communication and information processed.  
 
 
                                                 
165
 Following feedback from the examiners, the presentation of some of the quantitative and qualitative data 
has been abbreviated or deleted  to maintain the emphasis is on the most theoretically salient findings. 
 
166
 Note that, where there is no risk of altering the intended meaning or conveying a misleading mood/level of 
certainty, quotations that exhibit minor typological errors in the written responses and minor grammatical 
slippages or linguistic fillers (such as “ums/ errs” or stutters/ misphrasings) have been corrected or filtered. This 
‘cleaning up’ of quotations is intended to increase clarity and intelligibility for the reader and also to allow the 
inclusion of more interview material to demonstrate the link between the empirical evidence and the theoretical 
points being discussed. This should not be confused with selective editing or alteration of verbal quotations 
intended to bias the interpretation towards a preferred conclusion. On the contrary, in several cases the 
process has enabled points of tension in respondent views to be illustrated more clearly, and allows the 
findings to ‘speak for themselves’. Where editing linguistic features might influence the meaning of a 
statement, they are retained. Where otherwise intelligible sections are omitted for the sake of brevity or 
relevance,  three dots in square parentheses are used to indicate elisions in the quoted text […]. Note also that 
in several cases, interviewees refer to non-specific market actors using male pronouns. Given the 
overwhelmingly male composition of financial institutions, these have not been ‘corrected’ as inappropriately 
gendered language.  
 
167As noted earlier, because of the varying levels of respondent consent regarding personal or institutional 
anonymity, a conservative approach to citation is adopted here: all citations/ quotations are referred to by 
number, not name. References to institutions that were visited was approved, and where some individuals may 
be identifiable through context or position, care has been taken to ensure that this does not violate consent for 
identification. Interviewee numbers are not assigned in chronological or institutional order, and respondents 
interviewed on more than one occasion are referred to by the same number.  
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Routine media usage and issues of which media/sources are preferred or confer an 
advantage (Qs 1, 10, 11)  
 
As with the quantitative survey, interview responses identified a range of media and sources as 
significant, although the focus overall was quite heavily oriented toward specialist financial media 
(particularly wire services and online sources) and various institutional channels/sources. The 
evidence from the interviews and observation periods suggested that the use of public media, even 
those with a financial orientation, was probably more marginal than the quantitative survey had 
indicated168. 
 
Survey responses regarding the prioritisation of different media/sources and media/ information 
indicated several distinct themes. Real-time provision of key data such as prices was a key factor, 
with nine respondents citing the wire services as the medium of preference. Interestingly, this 
function was not revealed by the quantitative data. The quality/accuracy of information, including 
analytic depth and originality were also mentioned by several respondents. In terms of accessing 
currently unavailable media/information, six respondents mentioned the desirability of accessing 
other institutions’ analyst reports, while a further two suggested knowing the liquidity/depth of other 
market actors’ positions. These responses align reasonably well with the quantitative findings that 
both market information and reflexive information are significant in trading/analysis decisions. 
 
The interview respondents were asked similar questions but in the context of describing their 
routine media usage. Responses varied in detail, but there were  some common elements from the 
traders and analysts at Deutsche Bank and ANZ as well as the respondents from other institutions.  
Several interviewees noted that New Zealand’s time-zone meant checking overnight price 
movements on the wire services was a priority in the morning routine. Morning meetings prior to the 
open of trading included briefings from resident analysts to provide a market overview for the 
traders and prepare them for any anticipated market events (such as OCR or GDP 
announcements). Respondents from Deutsche Bank (hereafter DB) also engaged with other 
branches as the global trading account (the ‘book’) was picked up from operations in earlier time-
zones (and in turn linked through to the Sydney office as the Australian market opened two hours 
later169). Being a global investment institution, the routine links to other colleagues among DB 
respondents were primarily internal, although interviewees #14, #17 and #18 pointed out that 
subscriptions to private analyst reports (such as Bridgewater) and specialist financial services170 
(such as Medley and Datastream) were important. As one interviewee (#14) pointed out, there is a 
competitive advantage in being able to ‘use the strength of the global network in your local market’. 
Although ANZ’s Wellington trading floor was similar in scale to DB’s, it operates on a less global 
scale, with the local branch having its main links to its Australian parent. Consequently, there 
appeared to be somewhat higher prioritisation of external analyst contacts and research. The 
interviews underlined the importance of institutional networks of contacts as a source of contextual 
knowledge.  
 
Virtually all the traders and analysts interviewed made use of Reuters (which also supplied Dow 
Jones and Telerate feeds) and/or Bloomberg. Real-time price data and headline updates was 
evidently a key factor here, but it was not the sole factor. Each trader had at least three screens of 
data on display simultaneously. The quality of Reuters’ high-end analytical systems and the 
bespoke options for analysing and displaying data was noted as particularly advantageous 
                                                 
168
 This may reflect the institutional composition of the interviewee sample, most of whom were involved in 
investment banking either as analysts or traders. 
 
169
 Some transactions from the Auckland branch were actually conducted through the Sydney operation). 
 
170
 These are not services that non-institutional traders could typically afford. The indication was that these 
types of specialist report cost around NZ$50 to 60,000  per year each. It also appeared that a Reuters trading 
platform cost upwards of NZ$50,000 per annum. Bloomberg was more expensive, and many respondents 
grumbled about its cost. The high-end financial information and brokerage systems are therefore unlikely to be 
affordable to non-professional investors. 
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(Interviewees, #13, #14, #31). However, Bloomberg was also considered useful, partly because of 
its user-friendly architecture and navigation, and partly because of its real-time messaging system 
(interviewees #8, #15, #17) allowed communication with any other traders with a Bloomberg 
terminal. Both ANZ and DB employed direct electronic trading platforms. In addition to Reuters, 
ANZ used the Murex and Infinity systems. DB, meanwhile operated its own in-house electronic 
forex brokerage system, Autobahn. However, both trading floors still made some use of ‘voice-
broker’ links comprised of a desk-based microphone and speaker with a direct line to brokers 
operating on exchanges who match asks and bids and execute trades. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ) had a smaller trading room and its major portfolios were primarily concerned with 
forex. The same screen-based information and trading systems were evident however, with Reuters 
and EBS being used as the key brokerage platforms. 
 
The interviews confirmed the earlier proposition that networks of contacts with traders or brokers 
are often essential to the discovery of actual prices for some securities (interviewees #8, #14, #19, 
#20, #28). The real-time data on a brokerage screen is therefore indexical of a market counterparty 
willing to transact. Consequently, trading screen displays of prices are not hermetic, self-constituting 
appresentations of market reality. As Interviewees #14, #19, #21, and #28 emphasised, the ask-bid 
spreads were understood as indicators of external counterparties willing to transact, and there was 
a need to differentiate between ask-bid displays indexical of current market agency and price 
indicators simply displayed as updates on recent transactions. As #28 explained: 
 
‘Trading systems or electronic brokers and voice brokers confirm where the price is. 
Because there’s a price in the machine, there is a willing buyer and seller, so you know 
that’s where the real price is. Now that’s different from the generic Bloomberg, Reuters, 
Telerate indication rates. It doesn’t necessarily mean that’s where the price is, but 
anything that has been assigned to a brokerage-type screen where there is a fixed 
price, then you know that’s where you can sit […] There’s a component of Reuters 
called the Reuters Direct Dealer, which has a pricing mechanism where you can deal 
and transact at the price it’s showing. What you also get is the Reuters information 
page types, where banks will put in their indicative rates of roughly where the currency 
is. And in some cases, Reuters will use a mid-rate from that brokering system to 
highlight this is where the exchange rate is. But if you had to call up a bank to ask for a 
price, you may not get necessarily what’s on that screen, ‘cause the dealer is able to 
quote you what he or she sees fit.’ (Interviewee #28).  
 
This underlines the point that the trading screen signifiers do have external referents, and in 
practice, prices may not always correspond perfectly with the screens. These electronic displays 
are better understood as the mechanism coordinating the intersubjective codifications of the market 
agents. Insofar as the data displays are constitutive, they become intersubjectively real through the 
semantic matrices that constantly evolve as market agents interpret and respond to the data 
displayed.   
 
Two Reuters 3000 screens are displayed below. These print-outs were provided by a bond/interest 
rate trader, so most of the data relates to these securities. The boxes in colour have been 
highlighted to illustrate key data. For the top screen, the red box (top left) indicates ask-bid prices 
and the size (quantity) of securities currently available at those prices. The dates on the left are the 
maturity date of the bonds. The green box (top centre) displays current exchange rates for world 
currencies in ratio to the US dollar. The blue box (bottom left) is the real-time headline update. Links 
can be clicked on for further detail There is a combination of news here, including economically-
relevant political news (Australian government budget meeting and North Korean missile launch) as 
well as financial market events (Standard & Poor’s B+ credit rating for NZ investment firm, Geneva 
Finance and the South Korean 3-year treasury bond issue). In the bottom screen, the red box (top 
left) displays a single ask-bid price, with a column for the mid-price which is not visible on the print-
out. The green box (centre) provides data on key equities indexes including the Dow, NASDAQ, the 
S&P500 and the (local) NZX40 (prices not displayed). The blue box (bottom) shows a different 
configuration of the news headline updates, split into ‘All news’ and ‘NZ news’.  
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Fig 57- 58 Reuters 3000 Screens courtesy of ANZ 
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External chat-box links to other traders and analysts were routinely displayed on screens, 
particularly for Bloomberg. Interviewee #14 explained how these provide useful information about 
the agency of other market actors and the factors driving current transactions: 
 
‘This is a chat-box for […] a bunch of guys in my proprietary group around the world, 
so we can all communicate with each other. Foreign exchange is the product- 7 people 
on that one, 393 people logged in here […] Now this is a private chat line which I’ve 
just opened up with a guy who trades over in Sydney. He keeps me up to date: We’ve 
just been given 100 million Euros by [client A name]. I know you’re long Aussie- I’ve 
just picked up 50 to buy here for [client B name] […] So knowing that there’s an 
exporter underneath the market, to buy 50 million Kiwi, per se, doesn’t influence me 
one way or the other. What it does say to me is, that’s interesting from the point of view 
[that] he must have reasonable demand. It might also tell me that he doesn’t just deal 
with us, he deals all over the place. So maybe there’s other bids around the market. If 
we actually go down there [price] and he gets them very easily, that tells me the 
currency’s a bit weak- why is it weak? Are we seeing any selling on the other side? So 
every bit of information helps.’ (interviewee #14). 
 
Although much information was derived from the ubiquitous wire services, the apparent symmetries 
of informational availability do not translate directly into homogenous media usage. Indeed, even 
within the same trading floor of the same institution, traders working on the same securities desk 
exhibited variation in their media/ information usage. For example, discussion with several 
interviewees at both DB and ANZ suggested, (#15 #16, #17 #26 ), there were different views about 
the extent to which technical charts were valid even among traders in similar market sectors 
(although professional respect was mutual). There was also evidence of routine use of networks of 
financial contacts through which emerging trends and other market actors’ positions are discerned 
are identified. This is consistent with the quantitative data indicating that both market information 
and reflexive information is important.   
 
Influence of new communication technologies in markets and changes in 
media/source and information usage (Qs 5, 6) 
 
The significance of the internet and online information sources, including electronic wire services 
was acknowledged by nearly all survey respondents. Ten respondents mentioned the importance of 
24-hour real-time information flows. Real-time media also facilitate round-the clock trading and 
increase the interconnections between New Zealand investors to global financial networks. The 
internet and online information sources were noted as a key change in the informational 
environment of the markets, notably in regard to symmetrical access to data in real-time. As 
interviewee #2 noted; ‘[The]internet absolutely streamlined everything […] We don’t need to wait for 
all releases to come through- we just download it instantaneously […] We’re well in tune with what 
everybody else’s thought are: The market has become very efficient in terms of how it’s transmitting 
information around the global and the internet is largely responsible for that.’ However, such 
developments were not regarded as unambiguously beneficial. Interviewee #11 cited cases where 
expensive new financial information technologies were adopted just because they were regarded as 
necessary to keep up with everyone else and in practice these often conferred minimal additional 
advantage. Six survey respondents noted that NCTs had broadened the range of sources, but three 
suggested quality/accuracy had declined171. Two noted the increased need for filtering because of 
the increased volumes of information. Interviewee #31 acknowledged the issue: ‘The fact that there 
is so much information sometimes makes it very difficult […] There’s so much information out there 
and if you miss a few crucial things, that can make a big difference.’  
                                                 
171
 Interestingly, Journalist #A suggested that up to the 1990s, there had been a relatively clear ‘class structure’ 
among the financial media, with the wire services at the top followed by the elite financial press, then other 
news media. However, new media technologies, notably the internet and cable TV, had blurred this hierarchy 
and the distinction between the elite financial media and general news media. Although this allowed greater 
levels of access to much more financial information, it also allowed the proliferation of unsubstantiated rumours 
and ‘wildfire stuff’ from ‘completely ignorant’ people, suggesting that ‘the more information there is out there, 
the less it means’.  
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Importantly, the ostensible increases in transparency, pricing efficiency and symmetrical distribution 
of information was also linked to the increased difficulty of trading on the basis of informational 
advantage and also the increased emphasis on computer models and real-time responses to 
information. Two observations highlight this: One survey respondent commented that, ‘More people 
looking at markets makes it more difficult to take advantage of trading opportunities when they 
present themselves.’ Another explained that, ‘Trades must be deployed much more rapidly, within 
seconds, or other traders will push the price first. My trading has developed from outright to spread-
based. Spread trading captures the differential speed at which information hits two or more different 
markets/securities.’  
 
Interviewee #28 pointed out that NCTs and online brokerage systems made it easier to identify 
prices and source liquidity (willing buyers/sellers) which in turn had integrated smaller markets into 
the global financial sector;  ‘In my opinion, you get a globalisation of your currency- because what 
tends to happen is everybody sees the machine, they’ll all see the price, 24 hours a day anyone 
can trade it […] You don’t need to call up a New Zealand bank to trade, suddenly you’ve got New 
Zealand dollars trading between two American banks, or British and American banks- or you’ve got 
no interest in new Zealand at all, they just happen to want the exposures, whether that’s for 
diversification, correlations, interest rates, whatever.’  Interviewees #11 and #12 pointed to the role 
of NCTs in the development of bespoke securities instruments and portfolio structures.  #11 noted 
that increased volatility in financial markets and the potential for spreads in emerging financial 
markets as they integrated into the global financial system opened up opportunities for arbitrage. 
Similarly, #12 noted that computer systems were a critical factor in facilitating the creation of NFIs 
and trading strategies in order to circumvent regulations; ‘every time they put another barrier in the 
way of what I would term easy money, the mathematicians find a way around it.’   
 
The interview responses broadly confirmed that increased symmetry and transparency and 
informational efficiency have implications for investment practices underline the role of NCTs in 
contemporary financial markets. Interviewee #14 explained that even during the 1990s, the key wire 
services like Reuters might suffer delays in reporting on some markets: ‘News tended to arrive via 
Reuters [so] you could have an example of [the] Japanese Jiji news service having a relevant story 
thirty minutes before any other news services got it, which is an age in our market. Now, you know, 
if you manage to find a 30 second- one minute edge [because] you’d found it on the FT website 
which you just happened to click on when it came out […] you’d be thrilled to bits! The edges are 
smaller and you’ve got to be quick.’ The indications that traders have to cope with increasingly tight 
windows of opportunity to take advantage of any information in real-time and need to identify price 
spreads across different markets and securities has three significant implications: 
 
a) Financial traders (and analysts), particularly those whose investment strategy involves short-
term horizons, do not have much time to analyse and reflect on the implications of the news 
and information appearing on their trading screens. Trading schemata/frames therefore need to 
filter out a lot of information and trading responses need to be premised on a relatively narrow 
range of variables that allow the trader to make the semantic distinction between buying and 
selling. (This helps explain the use of computerised algo systems which can respond to 
incoming data in a pre-programmed manner faster than any human trader). 
 
b) The closing of price spreads/ arbitrage opportunities within the same markets/ instruments and 
refocusing on spreads across different markets/securities helps confirm the role of NCTs, NFIs 
and computerised models of financial calculation in performatively producing commensuration 
between different forms of capital (see Bryan & Rafferty, 2006).  
 
c) Insofar as informational symmetries have decreased the opportunities to trade on the basis of 
accessing news about fundamentals and price movements (market information) ahead of one’s 
competitors, trading advantages must be derived from other types of information. Consistent 
with the quantitative findings, although this does not reduce the need for core market 
information, it helps explain why institutional networks of contacts that can provide indications 
and correlations of other market actors’ opinions and motives or shifts in mood/ consensus 
(reflexive information) become more important in conferring a marginal advantage.  
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Interviewee #8 noted that the wire services and the internet had transformed the informational 
context of the markets, both in terms of news flows and in terms of maintaining networks with other 
market actors: ‘I don’t think you can be a trader where you sit there and not have the information 
come to you. You don’t really have to go and seek it. […] I think part of being successful in trading 
is having free and open communication- Not only with the media as in Reuters and Bloomberg, but 
also with each other.’ This is an interesting remark in the light of the earlier findings concerning the 
absence of any correlation between the importance of wire services and the importance of price 
data and other market information, because it supports the notion that within financial institutions 
most of the core market data is ubiquitous, symmetrical and always-already-available. The wire 
services are important in providing price data, but in terms of conferring a trading advantage to 
institutional investors, this is derived from analytic functions and the provision of meta-information.   
 
Media/ Source and information usage in periods of volatility/ crisis (Q2) 
 
Several survey responses specifically mentioned increasing their use of networks and media in 
order to double-check or correlate their information during volatile periods. Nine responses 
emphasised a general increase in their monitoring of media, and five specifically mentioned the 
need for real-time updates. The wire services were frequently mentioned here but, two respondents 
identified the usefulness of public broadcast news services like CNN or CNBC. Interviewees (#13, 
#14, #25) pointed out that information/news generated within the financial markets would typically 
circulate through institutional networks and be picked up by the real-time wire services before other 
public news media would pick up the story. As Interviewee #13, commented, ‘By the time that news 
hits the general media, we’ve probably heard it anyway’. One survey response noted that real-time 
updates are vital to assess the ‘impact, direction and momentum’ of a crisis. On that point, several 
respondents suggested keeping track of actual price levels would necessitate increased monitoring 
of networks of contracts rather than relying on  screen prices. Interviewee #28 pointed out that price 
discovery and liquidity in volatile periods could become problematic, and that arbitrage opportunities 
could arise from different brokers or electronic systems quoting different prices, making contacts 
and relationships more important; ‘The prices will get misaligned in volatile times, that’s for sure. 
[…] One of the things with these machines is you don’t know the liquidity. If things were volatile and 
there were no prices in the machine, what are you going to do? Are you going to rely on other 
relationship banks quoting to you?’ (Interviewee #28). 
 
Two survey respondents noted that paying greater attention to networks and cross-referencing 
opinions would reduce the attention paid to other media and one respondent pointed to the need to 
sacrifice analytical depth and focus instead on cross-referencing the real-time headlines across the 
main wire services. Other responses indicated a potentially very different response to market 
volatility. Seven respondents suggested that volatility would encourage greater reliance on 
fundamental market data, with two also indicating lower reliance on market opinions and more on 
hard data. Time-frames appear to be relevant here, with two respondents mentioning that their 
fundamental approach did not require responses to short-term volatility172. Interestingly, three 
survey responses indicated the importance of identifying the variables driving the volatility, 
suggesting that the challenge for investors in periods of crisis/volatility is determining whether 
prevailing fundamentals are actually  still salient. One survey respondent noted the need to ‘quantify 
the element causing the market uncertainty […] then assess if the underlying element is 
worsening/stable/improving, and differentiate this from how the participants’ reaction is changing.’  
 
This suggests a need to validate trading frames and incorporate new variables regarded as 
changing prices. Crucially, though, the validation of trading schemata and the identification of which 
factors are driving (or perceived to be driving) trading decisions and price movements become 
problematic precisely during transition phases of market cycles or in crisis scenarios. This is 
because the intersubjective codifications which underpinned the preceding period of stability 
become subject to contestation and renegotiation. As Interviewee #8 observed, having contextual 
awareness of broad market conditions is important when dealing with volatile situations:  ‘If things 
are happening quite quickly, […] then you have the underlying fundamentals […] and then when 
                                                 
172
 Both responses indicated an interest in company data, which is consistent with the earlier findings that 
stocks/equities traders/analysts rated real-time media like the wire services as less important than respondents 
in other market subsectors, while company fundamentals were rated highly.  
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things come across the news wire, you’re a lot faster. And you have to basically take that 
information in […] and the fundamental model may change. You’ve always got to be open to new 
information- you can’t be a stick in the mud!’  The notion that fundamentals are recognised both as 
significant reference points and as something prone to change in a crisis is important. The credit 
crunch involved the implosion of value of CDO securities after the official credit ratings that 
underpinned their value lost their intersubjective validity. Consequently, risk calculations and 
financial signifiers of value were rendered meaningless. This suggests a potential hazard for 
investors whose response to a crisis is to revert to monitoring standard fundamentals. As 
Interviewee #27 suggested, turmoil in the money markets (even before the credit crunch) had 
intensified the need to monitor short-term factors;  
 
 ‘The currency markets have had enormous volatility, so it indicates there’s more going 
on in the short-term. So it’s [about] positioning, trying to find out from the people we 
talk to about flows. So our primary information source for the short term [is] discussions 
with all the banks that we talk to.[…] And to talk to the banks, one of the tools I use a 
lot is Bloomberg Chat- so I’m just going to pull up a screen- this is one of the guys I talk 
to every day. So he’ll pick that [message] up and he’ll start giving me a run down. And I 
can do that to basically anybody that’s got Bloomberg in the world. […] So I’ll be talking 
to different banks in London, ask them what’s going on. So I guess, at the coalface, 
that’s really the primary means of getting information- the whispers in the market, 
what’s going on.’ (Interviewee #27). 
 
These findings reinforce the distinction between real-time updates on exogenous, publicly-
accessible world events tangential to the financial markets (where public media are significant) and 
news generated by/derived endogenously within the financial markets themselves (where 
institutional media are significant). A contrast might be drawn between investors who respond to 
volatility with an increased focus on fundamentals versus those who intensify  consensus checking 
through institutional networks. This contrast between market information and reflexive information 
may not imply mutual exclusivity. As both the quantitative findings and other interview responses 
indicate, institutional media/sources may be required to identify which fundamentals are currently 
driving the market. Different traders may respond to crises in different ways, but when market 
confidence in the validity of key financial indicators is destabilised, there is an intensification of the 
need to monitor other market actors to check that one’s information and trading schemata/frames 
are still intersubjectively valid.  
 
Extent to which volume/scale of trading influences media/source or information 
usage  and extent to which trading in volume can move the market (explicit/ 
transactional reflexivity) (Qs 3, 13). 
 
Two thirds of the 18 survey responses to the question on media/information usage suggested that 
the scale of transaction made little or no difference to their media or information usage, although six 
respondents indicated that the greater the value of the trade, the more the available information 
would be double-checked or cross referenced against other sources173. On the question of the 
potential for high volume data to move market prices, no specific quantity could be specified but the 
depth of liquidity was repeatedly identified as the factor determining the volumes of trade possible 
without necessitating an increase/decrease in the current ask/bid range. The manner in which 
prices are crystallized through explicit/transactional reflexivity has already been discussed, but there 
is another implication here concerning contingent/game reflexivity: Price-moving transactions signal 
changes in the valuation of securities by other market agents. Interviewee #5 pointed out that there 
were two aspects to high-volume trading moving the market price; the first is through exceeding 
current liquidity. The second is through recognition that the a major market actor is taking a position 
which might encourage other investors to follow suit and add to the momentum:  
                                                 
173
 The interview data was somewhat sparse on this question, partly because some respondents declined to 
discuss the size of their positions and trades on the grounds of commercial sensitivity. However, those who did 
comment (including interviewees #13, #14, #15, #19, #20) indicated that the range of routine  transactions fell 
between NZ$1m and NZ$5m, although a few traders noted that derivatives transactions might involve notional 
values in excess of NZ$100m, occasionally going into the low billions. 
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‘It’s kind of who’s doing the trade and what is the volume- it’s both factors. So if [major 
bank name] puts in a big order for government stock, they could be playing a game to 
excite the market so that they can off-load. Because let’s say they’re the number one 
player […] If you think they’re taking a position, then you follow it- ‘cause everyone else 
will follow it. And then, if you’re the number one, you have the ability to move the 
market.’  
 
Four respondents identified the need to ascertain what factors were behind trading volumes. A 
sudden price change might indicate the start of a more sustained trend, but it was noted that these 
can arise inadvertently through the offshore funds transacting in volume174. As interviewees #13, 
#14 and #20 confirmed, the relatively small size of the NZ market means such phenomena do arise 
periodically. Several other survey respondents also noted the potential of large offshore funds to 
inadvertently affect the price of local securities. As several interviewees noted (#14, #19, #29), 
securities based on the Kiwi dollar were prone to price movements because of trade on the global 
forex market, particularly since the high interest rates (in 2005) were attractive relative to the US 
dollar. One survey respondent similarly noted the problem of large trades by US funds with holdings 
in NZX-listed securities causing unexpected price movements and panicking local investors. 
Several interviewees (#14, #20, #26) confirmed that hedge funds occasionally engaged in high-
volume trading to generate momentum and  move the market, in order to profit from short-term 
volatility might be a hedge fund strategy, although this would not be typical practice for the 
investment banks or pension funds. However, #20 suggested such activities were sometimes 
detectable: ‘If you see a group of funds […] acting in one particular direction and then you hear 24 
hours later that they’re doing the opposite and there’s been a wide price swing, it’s probably clear 
what’s going on.’  
 
These findings generally confirm the arguments concerning transactional/explicit reflexivity in the 
crystallization of prices though buying and selling, but they also indicate the importance of the price 
movements as an index of the forms of investor agency operating in the market. Indeed, other 
interview data suggested that the monitoring of high trading volumes or ‘flows’ was a critical source 
of reflexive information precisely because it allowed anticipation of short-term price movements.  
 
Real time access to media/source and information and issues of informational 
efficiency (Qs 7, 8) 
 
In the survey data, by far the most commonly mentioned factor (cited 16 times) related to the need 
for real-time media and/or information was price data175. This was closely associated with the need 
for real-time wire services such as Reuters or Bloomberg. These responses confirm the link 
between wire services and real-time pricing information. As suggested earlier, the absence of any 
correlation between the importance ratings of wire services and price data can be explained by the 
omnipresence of such information in institutional dealing rooms. The advantage conferred by these 
systems, and the reason for their high importance stems from other functions. One respondent 
commented that the reason for needing price information in real-time was to allow comparison with 
fundamental valuation models in order to detect any discrepancy that could provide an opportunity 
for a profitable trade, while other interview data pointed to the importance of price movement as an 
index of trading flows coming through the market. 
 
 
                                                 
 
175
 Otherwise, six respondents mentioned the need for real-time updates from stock exchanges and company 
announcements. Four other respondents (at least two of whom indicated involvement in equities markets) 
suggested that their longer-term trading horizons made real-time media and information flows a non-essential 
luxury. Five other respondents mentioned the importance of accessing other market actors to confirm prices, 
the depth of liquidity, consensus opinion, and/or check which factors were driving price movements. 
Interestingly, no respondents identified real-time information as vital but also problematic in terms of conferring 
minimal advantage when everyone else had the same information (confirming the earlier points about 
information symmetry and closure of spreads). 
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It is important here to differentiate between different forms of communicative symmetries. Although 
basic market news, price movements and ask/bid spreads  can be displayed in real-time on trading 
screens, the meta-information traders and analysts use to prioritise and filter the enormous volumes 
available data may not be symmetrically distributed. As Interviewee #13 noted, all the high-end wire 
services provided the same information, so ‘the advantage I think comes from your interpretation of 
the data, rather than the information itself’ (this view was reinforced by Interviewees #10, #18, #25 
and #30). Thus there is a need to differentiate between symmetries of market information and 
reflexive information, and also between information itself and symmetries of semantics and agency. 
This was reinforced by interviewees commenting on the different roles of traders and analysts. 
Interviewee #2 observed that; 
 
 ‘We need speed- information is king- both in terms of us getting information in but also 
us turning around our information and going back the other side. […] As a release 
comes out, I’ll be asked my opinion within ten seconds [about] what is happening, and 
I’ll have to give my opinion. So this is that I think- you know, gut feeling […] I will have 
a note that goes out to the dealing room- which will be a formal thing- which will hit the 
dealers here within ten minutes. […] That should hit the clients by the time it gets 
processed- within 45 minutes. If it’s not happening within 45 minutes I start to get a 
little bit grumpy!’  
 
Interviewee #5  likewise pointed out that there was an important difference between short-term 
reactions to incoming information and strategic responses to analyst advice; ‘[There are] two types 
of information- there’s the kind of quick-hit information where you’d get it from the source and you’d 
want your top clients to access it quite quickly. But it wouldn’t be as robust as the more thorough 
analysis, which we would never be in a hurry to do.’ Interviewee #10 confirmed this, pointing out 
that speed was critical ’If you get a major change in a fundamental- a good example of that was 
[company name]. Came out yesterday- their quarterly number was essentially better than expected. 
So it’s great to have an analyst on the ground who knows that and can quickly give you an 
analysis.’ He also emphasised that just having the basic information was not sufficient. Even 
fundamental data had to be evaluated and put in a context (such as knowing whether the figures 
were in line with consensus expectations). Meanwhile, Interviewee #25 observed that there was a 
difference between research for long-term economic forecasts and the kind of short-term 
information processing required when analysts advised the trading floor; 
 
 ‘The half-life of information is very short. You have to see the information, you have to 
get your interpretation, and you have to deliver it to decision-makers [traders]. So the 
trick here is, you can’t be passive about it. […] You have to form your view about it, 
form your expectations from all the frameworks and models that you have in place […] 
So all the work is about preparation, and you should be able to deliver to the [trading] 
room that information within a few minutes.’ (Interviewee #25).  
 
He went on to explain when communicating with dealers, he could use ‘coded words that have a lot 
of embedded meaning’ which professionals would understand (but which would need plain English, 
and crucially, more time, to explain to clients and non-expert audiences). Traders would respond 
tactically more or less immediately to market news, but the role of the analysts was to place that 
information in context and work out its strategic implications as quickly as possible.  
 
Interviewee #25 acknowledged that real-time symmetrical distribution of market information was a 
key factor driving markets to respond instantly to news. Consistent with the studies of market 
reactions to analyst comments in public news media (Sant & Zaman, 1996; Vickers & Weiss, 2000; 
Busse & Green, 2002) he also noted that markets often over-reacted to headline news and then 
reverted once the information triggering the move was digested and contextualised:  
 
‘Everyone in the market sees pretty much the same news pretty much at the same 
time. And all are trying to do pretty much the same thing-so speed is of the essence. 
[…] Markets can and often do over-react. They’ll react to a headline number. […] That 
headline number could well and truly be misleading. So you’ll know, and you’ll see the 
market start to evolve back. So sometimes you can get big adjustments […] it’ll then, at 
some point, reverse itself as people start to evolve their thinking on what’s really just 
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happened.[…] If a headline number comes up really surprising, everyone will already 
know that- you don’t need to be a sophisticated economist to realise that number 
wasn’t what’s been predicted. But it might take more sophisticated training to 
understand that that number has been generated by an unusual configuration of the 
components of that report. That this is a statistical aberration […] that will be reversed 
over the next quarter or six months. And at that point, the reaction that’s happened is a 
false one. And if you can pick that up a minute before the rest of the market realises it, 
it presents an opportunity. And that’s an edge.’ (Interviewee #25) 
 
This confirms the important distinction between informational and semantic symmetry and 
underlines the role of the analyst in providing traders with an edge through contextualisation and 
meta-information. Interviewee #25 went on to explain how news evolved over a short period of time 
following an announcement by a key market actor, and gave an example of a statement issued by 
ANZ, revising its views on the Reserve Bank’s likely disposition towards the Official Cash Rate and 
suggesting it was becoming more hawkish (inclined to increase rates). The media statement was 
distributed to multiple media outlets including Bloomberg, which immediately registered the 
headline in real time, and then, over the next half hour added increasingly detailed updates. The 
screen displaying the updates is displayed below: 
 
Fig. 59: Bloomberg News Screen 
 
Bloomberg News headline screen courtesy of ANZ. (The yellow highlighted lines have been added to indicate 
where Bloomberg picks up and follows up the ANZ announcement. The red markers indicate the initial 
announcement and the full story.  
 
Interviewee #25 duly explained the sequence of news on the screen:  
 
‘This is a Bloomberg screen. I’m going to go to something we did today: So, at 12.28 
[pm] we made a statement that we thought interest rates were going to change. It 
comes out as a headline only- initial reaction about the interpretation and what it 
means. […] At 12.33- you’re talking literally five minutes- you’ll get a story, but it’s quite 
a limited story with a quote […] But all he’s saying is, “this guy said this”- so, number 
and some initial interpretation. […] So 12.33 there’s this first story. And then you’ll find 
the update at 12.54. So now you’ve got considerable time-lag and the journalist may 
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do more in-depth analysis and he may go to other sources to say “does this really 
make sense?”[…] So there’s typically on the wire services three layers of information: 
Headline, simple story- both of those are very time-critical […] But your more in-depth 
story- the journalist might have an hour window, depending how important the story is. 
[…] The 12.28 is the initial price-mover- the 12.33 is only the back-up to that headline. 
[…] The 12.54 might carry a story saying why these guys are wrong (this wasn’t in this 
instance). […] So you can get price movement from 12.28 and you might get some 
reversal out of 12.54- if it proves that what was said is not complete.’ 
 
This example follows the same sequence identified by other interviewees in regard to the need for 
traders to respond almost immediately to headlines, perhaps with on-the-spot input from analysts, 
who would then place the incoming information in a context and rapidly try to work out its strategic 
implications- hopefully conveying this to the trading floor before rival analysts in other institutions.  It 
also confirms that even in an environment of symmetrical real-time information flows, substantial 
efforts and resources are devoted to trying to gain an advantage from asymmetries in the timing 
and quality of analysis and response.  
 
Informational symmetry/ asymmetry (Qs 14-15) 
 
The survey respondents were virtually unanimous in emphasising the importance of accessing 
information faster than one’s rivals. As interviewee #14 observed, ‘No one gets an advantage from 
watching the telly because everyone’s got television’. However, several caveats modified this 
sentiment. Two respondents noted the hazard of becoming privy to insider information which would 
preclude trading (a point reinforced by interviewees #11 and #13), and indicated that longer 
investment time-horizons could make short-term informational asymmetries redundant. Five 
respondents pointed out that although asymmetrical access to information would be advantageous, 
this was virtually impossible, to legally obtain in the age of real-time news. Two pointed out that in 
order to ‘beat’ the market, one required not only the right information, but the ability to interpret that 
information and discern meanings that other market actors overlooked. Interviewee #30 drew a 
contrast between raw data and information and communication, suggesting that the data itself is 
useless until it is analysed and put into context: ‘[There’s a] very strong difference between 
information and data, and communication and dissemination. And the vast bulk of it is data that is 
being disseminated, not information which is being communicated.’ As Interviewee #21 observed, 
even if market data is symmetrically distributed, the interpretations of that data and its significance 
for future expectations and prices will be asymmetrical: 
 
‘I think fundamentals are the core of trading. It’s what the economy has its bare bones 
on, and everyone’s looking at that information and how you interpret that information: 
You can have the same information and can have a hundred people, and most 
definitely you won’t have a hundred people on one side […] I guarantee you’ll have 
multiple groups within that hundred people with the same information about what you 
think is going to happen tomorrow.’  
 
These comments reinforce the importance of differentiating between informational asymmetries and 
asymmetries of semantics/agency. Moreover, several survey respondents indicated that gaining 
access to information before one’s competitors was only advantageous insofar as one could reliably 
anticipate the market response to that information. One observed that, ‘It’s nice to have some 
information (e.g. profit forecasts) prior, but then the market needs the same information for me to 
benefit from the incorporation of that information [into prices].’ This is echoed in another comment; 
‘If I make a trade, I want people to come round to my way of thinking AFTER I have executed, to 
gain maximum impact. If I get in after everyone has come to the decision, the market is unlikely to 
move too far.’ Another respondent explained that, ‘Even if you have exclusive data, you need to be 
right in your timing. The data is of no benefit until the market gets it, then you are betting that you 
know how the market will weight the information. You may find it does not react, or it is outweighed 
by other information you don’t know.’ This view was further reinforced in this observation: ‘[What is] 
important is to have the view first, act on it, and then have the view widely accepted by other market 
participants. There’s no point having a contrary view if the market is going against you, i.e. standing 
in front of an express train.’   
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Again, these observations indicate why it is important not only to have timely information about 
market fundamentals but also be able to reflexively anticipate which fundamentals matter and how 
other market agents will interpret and respond to them. Meta-information of this nature might be 
shared on the institutional internet or distributed to clients, but as interviewees #17, 18  and #25 
indicated, this kind of knowledge would not normally be distributed publicly because its asymmetry 
is what  confers the trading advantage.  
 
Other data from the interviews tends to reinforce these arguments. The overall response pointed to 
a constant tension between having an abundance of information and having too much to cope with. 
Filtering the information efficiently requires meta-information concerning the sorts of data that are 
significant and need to be monitored and other data that can be disregarded. Interviewee #15 noted 
that a key challenge for him was information overload: ‘I get heaps. So I’m not really looking for 
more information. There’s just so much information […] You haven’t got enough time in the day […] 
So you’ve got to be selective.’  Another (#18) similarly observed that, ‘You could never sleep- and 
not even touch even a small portion of the research. So it’s [about] knowing what’s good and what’s 
not so good.’176 The advantage of maintaining extensive market contacts and direct access to 
expert analysis was also emphasised by interviewees #5, #10 and #13. All acknowledged that there 
were now many more sources of financial data available to non-institutional investors, (even 
including packages from real-time news and trading platform providers such as Reuters), but that 
this may not confer any significant advantage because of its symmetrical distribution. As 
interviewee #13 observed, ‘With the advances that have been made in information technology, 
[non-professional investors] have pretty much got access to the same data. What they probably 
don’t have is the same information that’s coming through from the global client base. We talk to 
masses more people than they talk to- and we’ve got masses of people talking to masses of 
people. So there’s a lot more theme coming through.’177 Interviewee #10, meanwhile, disputed the 
suggestion that most market information was distributed symmetrically. Like #5, #25 and #30, he 
differentiated between the availability of raw data and processed information salient to trading 
decisions, and also suggested that even basic fundamental data still needed analysis to be 
valuable;  
 
‘I would dispute that [all the information] is out there […] most of the stuff on the 
internet that’s available for free is out of date, and it’s pretty low quality. If something’s 
free, you know, generally that’s its value. […] There is some great information on the 
internet [but] there are four ways you can make an investment decision- four things 
that you need. The first one is fundamentals […] and you need a decent analyst to give 
you a view on that. Secondly, flows; there’s not much point buying a bond if every 
hedge fund in the world’s selling- so the market flows of market knowledge are 
important. Third one is technicals- you know, a picture paints a thousand words. You 
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 #18 went on to note that having access to other analysts was useful because they processed other sorts of 
news, information and research in more detail and could identify the key points that are significant or unusual.  
Having access to a global network of expertise also meant he could “see the global stuff coming” better than 
local economists. This was supported by Interviewee #31 who noted that ‘The people that are the keenest to 
talk with [local analysts] are actually the offshore players. I find they want to talk for longer. […] Also the 
domestic guys up here, they can bump into traders from other banks and so on the street and so on, whereas 
the offshore guys are a step removed, so I think for them it’s quite useful to talk to us.’  
 
177
 #13 also noted that processing too much information and too many opinions could be a disadvantage, and 
that even finding asymmetrical advantages can be problematic: ‘Not all information is good information. Not all 
information is helpful- it could be misleading, you can interpret it wrongly, it can cloud your view. […] I might be 
a technical trader rather than a fundamental trader, then I don’t care two hoots about what the latest rumour is. 
[…] Sometimes you don’t tell anyone what [or] why you’re doing something and you don’t necessarily want to 
hear what other people think- ‘cause you’re sure what you believe. […]Sometimes you can get the information 
ahead of time, so you can be the first to come up with an idea- But it’s no use to you until the rest of the 
market’s got that information, because they’re keeping on buying for other, completely different reason- and it 
might take them another week to realise what you’ve realised- and then the selling comes through. So you 
could sell too early, based on correct information, but be stopped out of your position before it’s actually had 
time to come through.”   
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need to know where the stocks has been historically […]. And probably the last one is 
luck. But I think when you’re sitting at home it’s quite difficult to get a good picture of 
the first two- flows and fundamentals.’   
 
Informational symmetry, deregulation and risk. 
 
Although NCTs have helped facilitate real-time symmetry in access to financial data, another 
important factor here is de/reregulation, particularly transparency and disclosure requirements (see 
Best, 2005). As Interviewees #14, #15 and #30 pointed out, the role of the reserve bank (RBNZ) 
has been influential in the New Zealand market. The shift from the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI 
178) to the Official Cash Rate system has narrowed spreads, while deregulation has increased the 
number of institutions looking to exploit them. As Interviewee #14 noted, ‘The whole game is a lot 
harder. So if you can find any little edge you take advantage of that- because it’s a very difficult 
edge to find. Just trying to stand still in the same place from year to year becomes harder. Every 
year you’ve got to run that bit much faster to stay in the same spot. It’s a difficult game.’  
Interviewee #16 also pointed out that transparency regimes and NCTs had closed spreads across 
the entire financial market. The development of NFIs such as derivatives have enabled more 
complex forms of trades involving the exploitation of marginal spreads (see Bryan & Rafferty, 2006). 
Interviewee #15 accordingly noted tighter margins in an informationally symmetrical environment 
and the increased reliance on derivatives to leverage profits from fractional spreads. Importantly, he 
also noted that while the RBNZ’s OCR policy decreased volatility (for NZ interest rates securities), it 
also had the effect of increasing the level of financial risk to which financial institutions expose 
themselves: ‘You’ve got to take a lot of risk to make money now. We take a lot more risk than we 
used to, seven or eight years ago when we had MCI. [Prices] used to move an average of 23 base 
points a day or something like that. And now the market moves about two- or less- [so] just to make 
the same amount of money, you take ten times the risk.’ (Interviewee #15).  This was reinforced by 
interviewee #10 who suggested that the closure of spreads led investors to move towards 
unhedged positions; ‘the ability to arbitrage markets has virtually disappeared. The markets are 
priced pretty efficiently, and you’re seeing, right now, a trend back to proprietary risk. […] Now the 
real potential to make great revenue- that’s to trade directionally, which means basically you’ve got 
to have a view on something, whether it’s overvalued, undervalued-and buy or sell accordingly.’ 
These are important points, particularly in the context of the credit crunch. In line with Beck’s 
arguments about risk society (Beck, 1992, 1999; Beck et al., 1994; Beck et al., 2003), Best’s (2005) 
critique of transparency regimes and Bryan & Rafferty’s (2006, 2007) arguments on the growth of 
derivatives and commodification of risk, these observations underline the point that the regulatory 
systems intended to minimise risk and volatility may inadvertently incentivise the adoption of trading 
strategies or NFIs (such as CDOs) to sustain profits which are then implicated in generating new 
hazards. 
 
Extent to which media/source and/or information usage is influenced by whether 
other market actors will have access to or pay attention to them (Qs 9, 14, 15) 
 
This section compiles responses to several questions concerning the prioritisation of media and 
information in relation to their availability and significance to other market actors. The underlying 
theoretical concern here was to attempt to gauge the extent to which aspects of contingent/game 
reflexivity inflected investors’ media/information usage. The responses also led to the development 
of two sub-themes concerning the evolution of trading schemata and the importance of monitoring 
market ‘flow’, which will be discussed in subsequent sections. Survey responses varied. Fourteen 
comments indicated that being aware that other market actors ascribed significance to a medium/ 
source or type of information  influenced their own usage. One theme emerging here was the 
potential for markets to move because the collective attention of investors or consensus opinion 
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 MCI required direct alignment between interest rates and currency value, leading to regular shifts in the Kiwi 
interest rate as the currency changed value, generating spreads between currency-related securities and 
opportunities for speculation. Under the Official Cash Rate (OCR) system, this requirement was dropped and 
RBNZ now reviews the standard interest rate eight times a year in accordance with monetary policy. 
Interviewee #30 pointed out that prior to the OCR regime introduced in 1999, MCI meant that it was ‘almost 
impossible to work out really what the [reserve] bank was driving out, and you’d get mixed messages.’ 
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was drawn to particular sources or data. Observations included: ’Markets are driven by mass 
psychology to a degree. If someone has noticed [a trend] chances are you should too’;  ‘It’s 
extremely important. Whatever is the sensitive topic of the week is what I need to be watching.’ ; 
‘This can be very important. If a large number of people follow some media then this can impact 
market prices’ [sic]; ‘A particular market can tend to accept a single information source as its 
standard thus causing other participants to also adopt this information source’ and, ‘This is critical 
[because] markets go in cycles and in each cycle there is a new key piece of data or type of 
information that holds the power to that particular market’s direction.’  This last observation is 
particularly interesting because it indicates that the fundamental variables that drive trading activity 
evolve over time. In turn, maintaining  sensitivity to such shifts requires precisely the sort of meta-
information that is likely to be derived from institutional networks, including the cross-referencing of 
models and schemata to ensure their continued validity (see Beunza & Stark, 2005b; Beunza & 
Garud, 2005; also Arnoldi, 2006). Coupled with the quantitative findings, this would confirm the 
significance of contingent/game reflexivity in trading activity.  
 
However, as noted earlier, it is too simplistic to conclude that financial market activity can be 
characterised entirely as self-referential herd-behaviour. Six other responses were more ambivalent 
on the issue of whether the importance of media/information depended on  the significance 
ascribed to them by other market actors. Several noted that awareness of such trends was useful 
but maintained that it was preferable not to follow the herd. Responses included these comments: 
‘There is a herd instinct but it’s better not to follow the crowd’ and ‘If others are watching a certain 
source then it’s important to have at least a passing knowledge so that one can comment in an 
informed fashion.’ Furthermore, thirteen responses indicated that such considerations made 
relatively little difference to their own practices, although few elaborated on their reasoning. Of 
those that did, the importance of paying attention to market fundamentals and key indicators and 
not being swayed by transitory market sentiment was emphasised. As one commented: ‘I’m more 
interested in fundamental content of information than others’ interpretations/reactions. If information 
is correct then the price [will] eventually reflect the information.’  An emergent tension might be 
discerned here between respondents who base their trading decisions on fundamentals and 
standard models of valuation and those who trade at least partly on the basis of shifts in market 
trends and/or the evolving attention others pay to different sources and variables. However, the 
quantitative findings suggested that market information and reflexive information are both significant 
in trading decisions. Three rather different ways of understanding this tension might therefore be 
proposed.  
 
a) The possibility that markets are comprised of a range of individual investment agents with 
idiosyncratic understandings of how markets operate. Different traders and analysts use 
different models and different media and any emergent patterns are coincidental. However, 
apart from challenging the validity of the intersubjective codifications framework, such a 
formulation would not easily account for either the market phenomena ontologically dependent 
on mutual cognition (such as abstract financial instruments, pricing models or the meaning of 
credit ratings), the consistency and significance of some of the correlations of investor 
perception emerging from the survey, or the evidence that many traders and analysts consider 
the cross-referencing and validation of opinions/data through institutional networks to be 
important.   
 
b) The possibility that, although individual investment agents have different market conceptions 
and trading strategies, their mutual engagement in various markets is coordinated through 
intersubjective codifications on a basic level through implicit/ performative reflexivity (i.e. 
symmetrical recognition of instruments, models, significance of core fundamentals such as 
price/earnings and risk indicators such as credit ratings). However, this does not preclude 
significant variation in trading strategy, prioritisation of media/sources or interpretation of 
variables. This account would be consistent with the findings that some traders/analysts pay 
more or less attention to public or institutional media and reflexive or market information, and 
also allow for variations in media/ information usage to arise on the level of game/contingent 
reflexivity. However, this would not explain the correlations between the importance ratings for 
public media and institutional media and for market information and reflexive information.  
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c) Developing point b) further, another possibility is that there is an interplay between traders’ 
respective emphases on market data and prevailing fundamentals versus institutional media 
and reflexive information. There are two processes here. Firstly, although some investors focus 
exclusively on models based on fundamentals and/or technicals while others invest solely on 
momentum and trends without regard for this data, the overall importance ratings for market 
information and reflexive information indicates their utilisation is not mutually exclusive. Traders 
may be ambivalent about monitoring a particular source or a variable based on its ostensible 
salience to others. However, where it becomes apparent to a substantial proportion of traders 
that following the trend/momentum could be profitable, this could produce periodic transitions 
from a primary focus on market information towards a stronger focus on reflexive information. 
Such an account would be broadly consistent with social/psychological accounts of how 
bubbles and crises are generated through positive/negative feedback signals that push market 
confidence and risk calculation out of alignment with fundamental indicators (see Minsky, 1977, 
1982; Kindleberger, 1996). Interestingly, the notion of periodic shifts in emphasis between 
calculative frameworks prioritising market information and/or reflexive information would also 
reinforces the utility of placing Minksy’s two-price mechanism in a communicative framework 
(Minsky, 1982; see also Keen, 2001). Specifically, the explicit/transactional reflexivity 
underpinning price crystallization constitutes a signal to the market of changing trends in 
valuations and expectations. While fictitious values expand, positive feedback loops confirm the 
validity of the prevailing trading schemata/models. However, when expectations fail to be 
confirmed, the reverse process triggers an implosion of fictitious values. 
 
As investors use their networks of institutional sources to identify the factors driving the change 
and discern whether prices will continue to increase or decline, this leads to the second 
process: Many investors maintain that, over the long term, market prices will roughly crystallise 
around core fundamentals. However, as the evidence of informational reflexivity suggests, this 
is not a simple relationship between independent and dependent variables (Soros, 1994). The 
factors driving market behaviour will often change across cycles. The contingent/game level of 
reflexivity involves the monitoring of other market actors’ opinions, positions and trading activity 
and the incorporation of anticipated trends into trading decisions. This monitoring also serves to 
check the continuing validity of the models/schemata/ frames underpinning those decisions 
(see Beunza & Stark, 2005b, Beunza & Garud, 2005). As market agents become aware of new 
variables consistently influencing prices, they may become incorporated into prevailing 
models/schemata. This performatively integrates them into the intersubjective codifications that 
coordinate meaningful investor interaction. In other words, game reflexivity may crystallise 
intersubjective recognition of which variables will count as fundamentals over the subsequent 
cycles.  
 
Evolution of market drivers and trading frames/schemata (Qs 4, 12, 14) 
 
Another theme which emerged from the interviews concerned information prioritisation and 
processing, particularly in relation to the arrays of screen data. As Interviewee #12 explained, ‘That 
guy in front of the screen is interested in one line of the screen only. One line. It might be the top 
right-hand corner which indicates the rate of interest, or whatever. That’s all they’re interested in, 
because they’ve got positions- and that’s what they’re looking at.’ This was confirmed by 
Interviewee #14 who, describing his Reuters screen, identified a range of ask-bid spreads for 
various forex securities and also a range  of oil-based commodities and futures. Of the latter, he 
identified one key commodity price (West Texas Crude) to which he was paying particular attention 
(partly because oil prices affected demand for the US dollar which in turn influenced the Kiwi dollar).  
He pointed out several other oil prices on the screen but pointed out that West Texas was regarded 
as a useful index for the others because it was a liquid security (hence prices would not be 
artificially driven up or down by a high volume trade). Asked to explain why this particular variable 
was considered the critical one to follow, Interviewee #14 replied; ‘Well, ah, to be honest, I don’t. I 
mean, I just ask questions about it. I know very little about oil […] Most people would be the same in 
our markets, but, ah, […] I just got told that. So that’s a kind of benchmark.’  
 
Several interviewees (#14, #17 and #21) noted the emergent significance of geo-political factors in 
trading frames/schemata, particularly since 9/11. As #14 observed; ‘You’re trading off the 
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fundamentals, the technical analysis, market position, geo-economics- this new phrase which has 
come to light in the last few years, which is geo-politics […] Certainly, since 9/11, and more so since 
they’ve gone to Iraq […] So that impacts on the fundamentals. [So] you’ve got to work out what the 
market’s trading off.’  Interviewee #14 went on to explain that even when one identified a new factor 
influencing trading, trying to take account of all the variables that could potentially move the market 
was like trying to create a coherent picture using pieces from multiple jigsaws. Meanwhile, 
Interviewee #17 also commented on the need to identify new factors and noted the recent 
significance of geopolitical factors and its influence on risk calculations: 
 
‘I suppose it’s just screening the information and picking out what you deem to be 
important […] There’s going to be new information coming out all the time, but how 
important is it? –is that going to drive the market or not? […] Obviously the trend in the 
last year or so has been the terrorist strikes- that sort of thing. […] The market’s 
already got a risk premium built into interest rates. Maybe US ten year interest rates 
are trading at, what, $4, $4.70, sort of thing. Maybe if there wasn’t a terrorist risk out 
there, they’d be trading 20 or 30 points higher.’ 
 
Interviewee #20, meanwhile, confirmed the importance of figuring out which factors to trade off:  
 
‘The art of trading is deciding what’s the flavour at the time, you know. What’s moving 
the market at the time? There’s certain data that moves the market, and certain data 
that doesn’t. It all depends what’s the flavour at the time. And that’s what happens, you 
know- Is it whether interest rates are moving currencies at the moment, or whether 
current account deficits are moving currencies? –It all depends. […] Years of 
experience do teach you what to look out for in the market place from time to time.’ 
 
Even within basic variable categories there can be evolving sub-frames which prioritise one 
particular factor over others. For example, the geopolitical focus was being drawn away from a 
previous interest in Iraqi hostage scenarios and more towards Saudi politics and concerns about oil 
prices (for which the variable in vogue, as noted above, was West Texas). Meanwhile, several 
interviewees (#13, #14, #17) noted that there had been increasing interest over several months in 
US payroll and unemployment figures. However, these had begun to stabilise and the market focus 
was now shifting towards US inflation/ CPI data. However, these would not be permanent and there 
was a constant need to cross-reference and revalidate the key price drivers. As Interviewee #13 
surmised; 
 
‘You have to know what the market driver is- it’s become comical now that the biggest 
mover in financial markets at the moment has become the non-farm payrolls number in 
the US. […] The analysts will try their best but it comes out in wild fluctuations. The 
reason the market’s looking at that is because the Federal Reserve came out and said 
“this is the number we’re targeting”. So suddenly it becomes a hot number. But the 
market consensus can be up, plus 100,000 as a number and it’ll come out minus 
50,000- so of course there’s a violent reaction ‘cause it’s so far away from 
expectations. And that seems to happen regularly. […] And it’s not just hot numbers, it 
can becomes themes- it can become the oil price, it can become the equity markets, it 
can become the Asian equity markets, it can become the Iraq war. It could become the 
current account. […] It’s just the fluidity of the markets. [Sometimes] they do eventually 
get bored with something, sometimes there’ll be something from Alan Greenspan 
saying, “well, this isn’t really an issue any more, because we think it’s been off-set by 
productivity, or whatever. But we’re now worried about the currency”- So the currency 
becomes the immediate focus in New Zealand […] It’s just talk on the street.’  
 
Disseminating one’s stories/trading themes/frames to ones contacts can be advantageous because 
if these get picked up and circulated through institutional networks, the rest of the market might 
begin to position itself in line with one’s own frames. As Interviewee #13 confirms, sometimes the 
stories/themes circulate to the point of becoming self-referential, but there are often competing 
counter-themes being pushed by rivals:  
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‘Part of my role is a sales role, so I can talk to all the major accounts in New Zealand. 
But I might wake up with a particular theme in my mind, and of course I’ll ring everyone 
and push that. […] If they like that idea, they’ll say “that’s a great idea”- So a rival bank 
will ring up and I’ll say, “Yeah, but what about this?” –as if it’s their idea! Then I’ll hear it 
coming back to me, and suddenly that might be the theme in the market. And it’s 
something I sort of woke up with in my head. […] But a rival bank might have a view on 
the markets that is distant from the herd, and they’ll say, “the reason we think this is, 
you know, the current account”, for example- and suddenly- “Oh yeah, they’ve 
probably got a point there…” And it becomes a worrisome thing no-one else has 
thought of.’  
 
Interviewees #5 and #10 both pointed out that sell-side analysts and brokers would always look at 
incoming news to try and spot new angles and ‘create stories’ to promote trading. In other words, 
the aim was to identify a trading frame or narrative which would highlight certain events or factors 
ostensibly moving the market and rationalise taking a particular position. For example, #10  (in line 
with the quantitative survey) pointed out the difference between focusing on the importance of 
picking the right individual security versus picking the right sector to trade in. Consistent with 
Tversky & Kahneman (1981), Smart (1999) and Kurtz (2000), the framing or narrative can shape 
how an investment decision is rationalised and which decision criteria are brought into focus. As 
interviewee #10 observed, there is a persuasive aspect to this: 
 
‘Your views are a portfolio- you might have a dozen views. Two will be outstanding, 
two will be dogs. And hopefully the other half dozen will carry the day. […] there are 
myriad styles for investors […] You’ve got macro-managers, micro-managers, you’ve 
got relative value, you’ve got long/short traders, you’ve got arbitrage- every which way 
but loose. So what you’ve got to try and do is, from all the information that’s available, 
try and [identify] a story- and then use that story to generate business.’ 
 
These findings indicate how the inclusion of different variables/indicators can become incorporated 
into a common trading frame/schema through cross-referencing with other market actors. They also 
show the importance of keeping up with transitions in these frames, even for major financial 
institutions which have extensive networks of market contacts. Again, the mass of data on the 
trading screens was evidently being filtered by an intersubjectively recognised code that would not 
be discernible to investors outside the institutional networks. These considerations underline the 
importance of distinguishing between public and institutional media and between market information 
and reflexive information: The correlation between institutional media and reflexive information is 
precisely the vector through which such intersubjective codifications are negotiated. Even if market 
information is, by and large, symmetrically distributed, reflexive/ meta-information indicating exactly 
which data is currently ‘hot’ is not, and therefore confers a trading edge upon investors who can 
discern these emergent trends. 
 
The findings on the need to validate trading frames/schemata are broadly consistent with the 
arguments of Smart (1999), Beunza & Stark (2004) , Beunza & Garud (2005), Knorr-Cetina & Preda 
(2005, 2007) and Arnoldi (2006). However, the quantitative evidence suggests that this kind of 
meta-information is accessed institutional networks. In contrast, the publicly accessible news media 
would be more useful in providing basic market data and information on world events liable to affect 
the market. This analysis suggests the financial news media have a more limited role in triggering 
trading activity along the lines suggested by Sant & Zaman (1996), Vickers & Weiss (2000), and 
Busse & Green (2002), at least among institutional investors. It would also suggest the rhetorical-
ideological influence of the media on collective investor perceptions suggested by Parsons (1989) 
and Thrift (2001) is more limited. This differentiation of the roles of public media versus institutional 
media and market information versus reflexive information also suggests a need to refine Clark, 
Thrift & Tickell’s (2005) contention that news media help cultivate new heterogeneous investment 
models/ frames and Davis’ (2005, 2006a) conception of consensus-indicator, anticipatory and 
panoptic effects.  
 
Nevertheless, there are two vectors along which public news about markets are still likely to exert 
influence on institutional investors. The first involves their potential impact on non-institutional 
investors/day-traders, and the exploitation of their tendency to over-react by more informed 
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investors. This would be consistent with Busse & Green’s study of the CBNC effect, and also Davis’ 
anticipatory effect, (although such phenomena are probably limited in the NZ context). The second 
is the influence of analysts afforded a media profile as opinion leaders. If, as interviewees #5, #10 
and #13 suggest (also see later), this enables then to promote an angle/story that sensitizes 
investor perceptions to particular price-drivers and/or securities, then there is the potential for the 
type of reflexive information normally accessed through institutional networks to be highlighted 
through public media channels. Top analyst statements may exert a potential ‘agenda setting’ 
influence either in drawing market attention toward particular securities179, and/or by sensitising 
investors to frames/stories and key variables that need to be monitored. This account would be 
consistent with (and reconcile) both the consensus-indicator ‘effect’ suggested by Davis and the 
notion that media drive the evolution of heterogeneous models/frames suggested by Clark et al. It 
also reinforces the argument that fundamentals are constructed relative to investors’ intersubjective 
codifications and evolve over time, and that the media play a role in this (particularly through the 
public statements of market opinion leaders). However, other findings indicate that analysts are not 
the sole source of this kind of meta-information.  
 
 
Financial Flows and the monitoring of other market actors’ positions (Qs 9, 14, 15, 
16) 
 
This section addresses an important theme that emerged from the interviews with institutional 
investors (including #8, #14, #17 and #20) concerning the significance of being able to detect 
market ‘flow’. Several interviewees pointed to the importance of ‘seeing more flow’ as a critical 
trading advantage. ‘Flow’ is a concept used in different ways to describe how networks and spaces 
are configured and interconnected through exchanges of information or capital (see Castells’ [1996] 
‘space of flows’ or Knorr Cetina’s [2005] ‘flow architecture’). In this context, however it refers partly 
to capital in the sense of the aggregate volume of financial transactions passing through a particular 
institutional node, partly to the ability to discern the composition and agency behind the transactions 
(i.e. who is trading what securities and in what quantity) and partly to the identification of the 
temporal sequences of transactions before they hit the market and cause a movement in prices. 
Large financial institutions tend to ‘see more flow’ because they act as brokers for third parties, 
execute financial transactions for clients or, in some cases, provide the actual exchange 
infrastructure. Interviewee #7 pointed out that Investment banks were particularly inclined to monitor 
media and the actions of other investors because they act as clearing houses for other major 
investment firms and see a lot of their trading flow:  
 
‘It is their business to know who is trading what and when.’ […] So when you go to 
investment banks you will find TV monitors- a fixation with screens- a myriad of 
salesmen and the quintessential flow trader: This flow trader is like an air traffic 
controller, assessing what salesmen say about their clients’ interests with the 
information on the screen: information, significance, positions- no doubt some people 
can react and interpret this better than others’ 
 
In DB’s case, the in-house currencies trading system, Autobahn, provides substantial liquidity (in 
multiple currencies) to the global market (i.e. they can guarantee the availability of currencies at the 
displayed ask/bid prices in substantial quantity) with the result that 12.5% of the entire global forex 
market goes through their system. This volume of flow means that a substantial proportion of the 
market becomes transparent to DB and they would be able to discern any significant changes in the 
pattern of transactions going through their system. This potentially reveals shifts in trends/cycles, or 
permits inferences to be made about the market agency behind the flow sequences. As one senior 
trader explained; 
 
                                                 
179
 Note that there is a parallel here with Bohme & Holz’s (2006) and Frieder & Zittrain’s (2006) studies of 
financial spam and also Barber & Odean’s (2008) study of day trader responses to financial media which 
suggested a kind of agenda-setting function whereby increased trading volumes were triggered by focusing 
investors’ attention on particular securities (regardless of whether the news about them was positive or 
negative).  
 
 230 
‘I get a good guide by looking at all our internal flow business, all our customer 
business- because we see such a large slice of the market […] and I see everybody 
piling into a new position, we’ve got good news on the Australian dollar. So the 
currency goes up and everybody buys it and buys it, and then we buy a lot more. But 
then it comes to a point where you look at it and think, “no, no, we’ve just bought 500 
[million] and it hasn’t gone anywhere I think we’ve reached exhaustion.” And you can 
see that, being a big bank, seeing a large slice of the market.’  (interviewee #14). 
 
Interviewee #14 also pointed out that although trading screens do not always reveal who is trading, 
information from contacts and stories about market activity and trading volumes can be analysed to 
work out the overall shape of market agency behind current trends:  
 
‘Let’s say we go and buy 50 million Kiwi and [other major bank] is the name for all 50. 
And the others say, “Oh, I wonder what he’s doing?” And if you’ve heard there’s some 
sort of flow going on the other way […] there might be a decent size M&A180 flow. And 
you know [other major bank] has done all the lending or arranging on it, or whatever, 
you might think “oh, I wonder if they’re doing that […] You want to have a reasonable 
guess at how you think the market’s positioned, because […] you get a lot of 
movements on the back of [it].’   
 
ANZ’s operation involved substantial forex activity and involved the provision of market liquidity on 
the Kiwi dollar. Interviewee #20 explained that because they had around 40% of the Kiwi market 
share, this increased the level of flow visible and enabled them to discern the positions of other 
market participants. He pointed out that this does not depend solely on the execution of actual 
transactions. In line with #14, he suggested that counterparties/ clients who ask for price quotes 
may reveal the scale and direction of transactions about to influence the market. Indeed, knowing 
another key actor’s positions and motives may allow a trader to profit from exploiting that 
knowledge; 
 
‘Sometimes you can make more by actually missing a parcel of business. […] A large 
customer might not necessarily go to one bank- he may spread the risk around, or he 
may ask two banks to quote on a market-moving amount. So if you miss that business, 
you know there’s actually an amount in the market place that could move the market, 
and if you’ve missed it on price, then you know someone else has won it, then you can 
start pushing the price against that person […] But you’ve got an idea of the market 
place- that there has been an amount dealt somewhere […] Then it’s up to you to 
decide whether you can make that person liquidate that position at a loss, or otherwise 
[…] But at least market intelligence has told you that there is something in the market 
place that could have market-moving impact.’ (Interviewee #20). 
 
Interviewees #21 and #28 corroborated this from another angle, pointing out that although 
discerning other investors’ positions in liquid securities that could easily be traded was not 
problematic, having rivals discover your positions when they were very high volume or illiquid was 
risky. If a trader had a large short/illiquid position then they may prefer to keep it private and deal 
with a trusted counterparty to prevent their potential vulnerability from being ‘squeezed’ by rivals 
who borrow or buy up the required securities to force the short party to pay an exorbitant price for 
them181. The importance of flows was elaborated on further by Interviewees #10, #13 and #17 who 
all indicated that seeing higher volumes of market flow allowed the identification of other’s positions 
and what kinds of information/news were driving prices.  Crucially, the scale and sequence of trades 
after different announcements allows the identification of what kinds of information are being priced 
into the market. Interviewee #10 pointed out that, price changes themselves could provide some 
indications of where market flows are: ‘You can detect the flows from the price action- the price 
                                                 
180
 Mergers and acquisitions, i.e. a major corporate buy-out.  
 
181
 A short position is taken up either through derivatives or through borrowing a security and then selling it at 
the current price in the expectation that the price will have dropped by the time you need to buy it back to 
return to the lender. The obligation to repurchase the asset in the future means there is a significant risk of 
losses if the price moves up, not down as expected in the interim periods.  
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action, in some respects, reflects all the information that’s in the market.’ Interviewee #11 pointed 
out that many trading opportunities for hedge funds arose through information derived from 
networks of informal contacts; ‘My observation is that in the hedge fund market and the market in 
general, a lot is still picked up from market noise. So there’s a lot of information exchanged 
manually and casually. And I’m not talking about insider trading here, I’m talking about the 
identification of opportunities […] But a lot of it comes from informal communication, which is quite 
surprising- [It’s] rubbing shoulders with people in the market.’  
 
These findings suggest that there are three sources of ‘flow’ information; a) internal monitoring of 
trading conducted with/through one’s institution, b) networks of market contacts, and c) analysis of 
price movements. Together, flows are a key source of meta-information, including the identification 
of which variables have the potential to move the market if and when evolving trading 
frames/schemata incorporate them.  Discerning flows is a key process in contingent/game reflexivity 
and allows investors to identify which variables need to be incorporated into trading frames. 
 
Media/sources and information forms that have the potential to move the market 
(Q12) 
 
Responses to this question varied. Ten respondents identified some form of market fundamentals, 
economic indicators, or profit/earnings forecasts/announcements as critical. Two mentioned 
recommendations by analysts and another mentioned comments from central bankers or the 
minister of finance. Several other responses indicated that information was most likely to move the 
market when it violated market expectations or otherwise unanticipated (e.g. 9/11). The overall 
responses emphasised both market information and reflexive information which is broadly 
consistent with the quantitative findings that both are important to institutional investors. Interviewee 
#14 gave an example of receiving several pieces of information normally indicating a price increase, 
finding that the market prices don’t adjust, then using that to draw inferences about underlying 
market activity:  
 
‘If I get four bits of positive news [and] I put all those together, and we haven’t gone 
anywhere, naturally I’m going to think, “Well what’s going on here? […] I’ve had four 
bits of news which are all in my favour and the price hasn’t moved!” […] So every bit of 
price action tells you something. Whether it’s bad news or good news […] there’s 
information in everything. Especially with money, ‘cause in a money game […] if you 
get it wrong, the market’s going to be very unforgiving very quickly. So there’s always 
information in price action.’  
 
Consistent with the observations concerning the evolution of variables and trading frames 
Interviewee #26 also pointed out that the market had to be understood as an unstable, organic 
entity constantly evolving because of new information flows.  Many types of information could 
influence the market, but the degree of influence is not always predictable, and sometimes 
seemingly innocuous data could trigger significant market movements. #26 cites the example of the 
Kiwi dollar appreciating against weak domestic data because of other factors in the US markets 
influencing demand on the global forex markets.  
 
‘Let’s say for example, there’s a strong consensus […] that high interest rates and a 
weak US dollar are going to continue to push the Kiwi dollar higher. But if the weight of 
money, corporate hedging, speculative positions are all positioned one way round, 
then all those buyers are latent sellers. […] It may not take an external event- or it  
could take a very small and otherwise benign external event- to render the system 
completely unstable and create a move totally disproportionate to whatever it was that 
created the stock- it’s the straw breaking the camel’s back scenario.’182 (Interviewee 
#26) 
                                                 
182
 This account of instability is also consistent both with Minksy’s (1977, 1982) financial instability hypothesis 
and Lee’s (1998) account of informational avalanches: Increasing financial values generate positive feedback 
signals and encourage further investment, but the positions underlying the increasing returns become 
increasingly fragile until an otherwise insignificant event crystallizes a symmetry of agency and everyone 
panics. 
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Although few survey respondents mentioned technical factors, several interviewees did point to 
their importance in identifying the preconditions for  turning points in current market trends. 
Interviewee #26 cited an example of predicting a major reversal in the growing strength of the Kiwi 
dollar to US dollar. When this did indeed occur after 1997, the shift was attributed to the Asian 
currency crisis, the boom in hi-tech NASDAQ stocks and increasing demand for US dollars. 
However, #26 points out that the fundamental details were largely irrelevant to his prediction. His 
explanation is worth quoting at length:  
 
‘You didn’t need to know all that information- all you needed to see was that the trend 
was running out of guts and was susceptible to a turn anyway […] It’s quite amazing- 
you look at the news and you read the financial press and whatever: The Kiwi dollar 
went up because of this news item. We’ve got a whole industry that’s geared around 
Western scientific thinking […] Our rational thought pattern is based around linear 
cause and effect. And in reality, the financial markets are not like that. Quite often, the 
currency will have a big move because, let’s say, a commercial transaction of size hit 
the market at a time when it was vulnerable- and you’ve got one of these big 
disproportionately large moves and there was no news.[…] And it happens all the time. 
Sometimes a piece of news happens and the market does completely the opposite of 
what should logically happen- you know, interest rates go up and the currency goes 
down. […] There’s a well worn market axiom-buy the rumour, sell the facts. That’s 
because the market anticipates something, takes position, and as I said, an 
endogenous force is built up within this organic thing called the market- And it’s 
unstable, and it’s susceptible to an opposite side move. And so if the news hits the 
market, [it] causes traders to react in a logical sense, but [if] they don’t get the 
gratification that they were thinking was going to follow through, then that indicates that 
everyone’s one side of [a] position, and then if the market comes back on them and 
goes back into negative territory, they’ll all head for the door very quickly. And you’ll 
get a big stop loss run.’ (Interviewee #26).  
 
Interviewees #26 and #27 also noted that price movements can trigger trading activity when they 
extend beyond the normal parameters of volatility indicated by technical charts. #26 suggests that 
the information that will move markets includes, ‘official data releases, you know, central bank, 
interest rates, meetings, release of CPI or GDP data. Those things are a noise to the market, and 
that noise can, if it’s outside expectations, destabilise the current price system.[…] And like I say, 
the market could move logically, or it could move counter to that logic depending on the underlying 
positioning in the market’. The underlying positioning in the market (i.e. the aggregate structure of 
investor portfolios) is important because it may lead to ostensibly tangential news announcements 
triggering (or appearing to trigger) significant price movements. Interviewee #13 suggested that 
although financial media did not routinely move markets, they did have potential influence through 
the dissemination of market rumours, including the framing/narration of linkages between financial 
market trends and events in other social spheres, even when this involves false correlations:  
 
‘ Now we have to remember that sometimes the market moves for no apparent reason 
[…] If you, as my client, ring me up and say “Why did the market move?”, I can’t say to 
you I don’t know- In actual fact, I can say that now, and I do say that- but others will try 
and stretch for a reason as to why the market moved. And if the market suddenly sells 
off, and it coincided with a bomb going off in Baghdad, it’s very easy to draw the 
conclusion that the market’s now watching for bombs to go off in Baghdad, and that 
becomes a hot point. […] Now it may have been as simple as the fact that the market 
was a bit long anyway- it got itself overbought- there were no more buyers, and it just 
needed to correct. But the link is made- to a catalyst that wasn’t really a catalyst at all.’ 
 
This would suggest that it may not matter which snowflake was actually responsible for triggering 
the avalanche, so to speak. The media’s highlighting of a supposed causal factor may be sufficient 
to sensitise investors to that variable. Concomitantly, Interviewee #26 pointed out that 
information/news which should be price-sensitive according to standard models sometimes has no 
(or even an opposite) effect: ‘The relation between information and market movement is tenuous as 
best- and certainly asymmetrical.’  In other words, the significance of information for prices cannot 
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be inferred from the content of the data alone. Interviewees #13, #15, and #26 all indicated that the 
preconditions indicating intensifying financial fragility and the potential major shifts in market cycles 
might be detected using technical analysis. As #26 suggested. ‘Technical analysts would argue that 
technical analysis indicates when all the good information is in the markets. The timing of the 
information’s crucial- if all the information is already out there, then the only way that the market can 
go is down. It takes new information to be able to move it.’  Major downturns could be identified by 
calculating the point where prices will break through normal thresholds, at which point market 
expectations and positions might be revised and the trend might change: ‘It depends on whether 
you’re able to push [prices] through certain technical levels […] if it looked like it was about to break 
one of those kind of levels, you’d have a good crack at it.’ (#26). This also suggests that the 
anticipation of prices breaking through a significant threshold might encourage trading patterns that 
help to self-fulfil the prophecy183. The fact that some investors are sceptical of the external validity of 
technical charts does not preclude the possibility of traders pre-empting the expectations or 
psychological anchors (Shiller, 2000; Golding, 2003) of other market actors who follow them.  Fig. 
60 below displays the technical charts indicating (top) the spread between the Australian dollar and 
Euro, and  (bottom) the Chicago Board of Trade’s Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) between 2000-
2005184. The technical charts certainly exhibit a distinct correlation between September 2000 and 
September 2004 (red highlight box added). Reuters Graphics technical chart courtesy of ANZ: 
 
Fig. 60   Reuters Screen technical charts correlation 
 
                                                 
183
 Interviewees #15 and #26 and #27 all rejected the notion that the validity of the technical charts stemmed 
from the tendency of traders to collectively respond to them in a self-fulfilling manner. #27 suggested that the 
market was simply too large and complex for such phenomena to arise. However, it was clear that many- if not 
most- traders who doubted the validity of Elliott wave theory still used the charts to anticipate the beginning 
and end of cycles. This suggests that interpretations from chart analysis could feed back into collective 
expectations of when shifts in the current cycle might arise. 
 
184
 Note that the vertical lines comprising the technical graphs indicate the range of price movement (volatility) 
on the respective dates. The VIX is sometimes called the Wall Street ‘fear gauge’ because it is an index of how 
risk is being priced into the market.  
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In respect to analysing price cycles as an emergent, aggregate index of the positions, trading 
frames and institutional agency of investors, Interviewee #26 pointed out that sometimes prices 
between variables unrelated on the basis of any objective fundamental characteristic could become 
correlated through the latent market positions of traders. He provided an interesting example of how 
a key stock index volatility was found to be correlated with spreads between European currencies. 
The correlation is not intended to be interpreted as a causal relation or even as a phenomenon 
related to some underlying set of political or economic events underlying the trend. Rather, the 
relation emerges from the endogenous influence of aggregate trading decisions (none of which 
necessarily made any conscious link between the two markets in the first instance). Nevertheless, 
when market actors notice the statistical relationship and begin to incorporate the expectation that 
two securities are related into their trading frames/schemata (contingent/game reflexivity feeding 
into implicit/performative reflexivity) and cause prices to move (explicit/transactional reflexivity), the 
deployment of capital may performatively render the correlation externally valid; in other words, the 
agency of the traders generates the connection from the model/chart.   
 
A further process that might artificially produce correlations in price movements stems from the 
framing of different securities together as a class of ostensibly similar assets or as a sector 
assumed to exhibit comparable qualities. In line with Bryan’s (2001) findings on how regional 
framing of the SE Asian currency crisis reflexively influenced perceptions of vulnerability, 
Interviewee #28 pointed out that securities were often perceived in terms of ‘commodity blocs’ and 
gave the example of how the Kiwi dollar was included in some traders’ frames but not others185. #28 
acknowledged the potential for correlations to be performatively generated by trading on the basis 
of a calculative frame assuming a relation between certain securities, but he also noted that these 
frames were unstable: 
 
‘The trouble is, those correlations keep breaking down, periodically. One day it’s in, 
next week it’s out, you know. And it’s hard to explain why, you know, why was [the Kiwi 
dollar] tracking the Euro for no apparent reason […] Next week the New Zealand dollar 
is trading in line with the US dollar. A very strange correlation, just to add to that, is [the 
Kiwi dollar] seems to be fairly highly correlated with gold movements […] So that’s 
bizarre- and its hard to explain. And again, it will break down. So it’s almost fads, 
trends- people look for things to trade off. You could almost argue some will use 
[correlations] as a selling point to others to generate trade.’ (Interviewee #28) 
 
The potential influence of such framing was also noted by Interviewee #18, who pointed out that 
offshore investors with an interest in New Zealand securities tended to focus on variables that 
allowed relative evaluation in comparison with indicators from other countries, whereas local 
investors focused more on contextual domestic factors.  
 
‘People who are sitting here in New Zealand who can see what’s been going on- you 
can see prices creeping up, you see house prices creeping up and have an actual feel 
for how the economy’s going on a day by day basis- have tended to be the hawkish 
people. They’re the ones who think that rates are going high or staying high. The 
offshore people, who really only look at the New Zealand probably for, maybe an hour 
a week, that’s a small part of their portfolio- they just look at New Zealand in very 
simple terms. They look at the high interest rates, they look at a high currency, and 
they say, “well this can’t be sustained”. […] Therefore they’re looking at New Zealand 
relative to other markets and on that basis our cash rate looks very high by global 
standards, our exchange rate looks overstretched- and therefore they assume that 
can’t be sustained- that these things are out of equilibrium and at some stage they’ll 
come back.’ (Interviewee #18) 
 
This account is certainly consistent with the arguments concerning the need to validate trading 
frames/schemata and the contingent/game reflexivity involved in discerning precisely which factors 
                                                 
185
 For example, the Kiwi dollar was sometimes included in a bloc including the Canadian, Australian, South 
African and Brazilian currencies, and sometimes in a ‘dollar bloc’ including the other currencies of the same 
name, and sometimes in an Australasian bloc. The correlations could potentially vary depending on which 
prevailing frame was assumed in the markets 
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are currently driving prices. It also reinforces the contention that the prices of securities may 
become correlated through portfolio interlinkage and the frames of global investors independently of 
any relation based on the industrial economy. 
 
Another theme that emerged in regard to the question of market-moving information concerned the 
difference in timing and impact of information derived from public media versus institutional media. 
Several interviews indicated a distinction between news in public media that has an exogenous 
origin with potential financial relevance (such as natural disasters or geopolitical events) and 
rumours circulating through institutional channels that have an endogenous origin within/ directly 
related to financial markets (such as analyst comments, Reserve Bank OCR decisions, or ratings 
agencies announcements). As # 19 suggested, the former may be unknown to the financial markets 
before it appears in the public media (and sometimes before the wire services), while the latter is 
already known to the investment community by the time the other public news media report it. 
Interviewee #25 confirmed that there was limited investment value in public media news stories 
because in many cases, the information will already have been factored into prices by traders’ 
responses to real-time wire updates, particularly for scheduled market announcements:  
 
‘What happens [is] it comes on a Bloomberg or Reuters screen, it moves the market. 
Because the economists are interpreting that for dealers at that point. The newspaper 
story comes out the next morning- so the newspaper story itself doesn’t move the 
markets.[…] Now you may be a senior executive of a corporate. Your decision time-
frame might be twelve months, right? […] So the newspaper will be useful information 
about what’s going on broadly within an economy for those decision-makers- they’re 
strategic decision-makers so the newspaper’s more than adequate for that purpose.‘  
 
The impact of market opinion leader comments can vary, but the potential for the headline to be 
market-moving was noted by Interviewees #12 and #13 and who made the following observations 
(same dialogue) about the market reaction to an (earlier) statement on Reserve Bank policy issued 
by an analyst from a NZ-based investment bank: 
 
#13:  ‘Just before the central bank statement last week, one of the banks […] came out 
with a massive change in their view. And the market really took notice of it, and reacted 
quite violently to this change of view. Now it’s unusual for the market to react to one 
bank, ‘cause you know, we all treat with disdain any other bank. […] But the reason it 
seemed so strange was that it was almost as if they’d been given the nod- and there 
was even some conspiracy theory that they’d been given the nod by the central bank 
that something was going to happen. Now I don’t agree with that and don’t believe it 
happened, but it had a big reaction nonetheless- and it proved actually to be correct 
[…] They moved from going from no further rate hikes to two consecutive rate hikes.  
  
#12: ‘That was an interesting move on [ major bank’s] part, their comments about the 
rate hike, because it actually pushed the dollar up quite significantly, but it’s [since] 
moved down. And that was prior to the actual announcement.’ 
 
#13: ‘That’s right, and it meant that the market had to re-price because the market at 
that stage was probably in favour in no rate hike. So it had to re-price […] it was an 
about-face.’ 
 
This example indicates there is potential for analyst comments to move markets when they are 
reported in the financial media. However, as #13 points out, this is not an automatic occurrence and 
here, it stemmed not from the analyst’s authority as opinion leader but from the perception that they 
were privy to price-sensitive information. Interviewee #17 pointed out that where a major institution 
was recognised as a key player, it could take positions knowing that others would perceive this as 
an important signal: ‘The [other] banks perceive that we see a lot of business. Whether we do or not 
is another thing […] The market gets quite scared when they see big customers doing different 
things. So they think we see a lot of custom and 60-70 percent of the time, it probably is [sic]. So 
there’s a lot of perception that goes on in the market, you know: Painting pictures and trying to 
confuse the market as to what you actually do wanna do.’ 
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Because current prices factor in expectations about market events and price movements, shifts in 
perceptions/expectations can lead to price changes independently of the event itself. Thus the 
processes of contingent/game reflexivity in monitoring other actors can drive prices independently 
of standard fundamentals. 
  
Potential for investment decisions involving contingent/game reflexivity to move 
markets independently of fundamentals (Qs 13, 16) 
 
Many survey and interview respondents indicated that fundamentals remained important factors 
underpinning market activity, and that information related to them would move prices towards an 
approximate equilibrium reflecting the aggregate market response to this information.. However, the 
findings indicate that price movements and the generation of financial values do not reflect market 
fundamentals in consistent manner. Indeed, as Interviewee #14 suggested, even well-established 
fundamentals such as interest rates can have ambiguous effects on prices depending on the 
frames/schemata used to interpret them. Pointing out the potential for the OCR to exert an 
ambiguous influence on exchange rates, #14 observed; 
 
‘If  [the Reserve Bank] had raised rates […] that would have produced quite a violent 
reaction in the currency. Again, we don’t know which way- ‘cause there are two 
arguments as to which way it can go on the back of that. The beauty of it- why 
currency trading is so difficult- is it’s hard to know. Rates are high [so] it should be 
going up- Or, he’s strangling the economy- sell it! You know, it’s quite difficult to tell.’   
 
The importance attached to both market information and reflexive information (and the correlation 
between them) in the quantitative part of the survey suggests an interplay between them. The 
qualitative findings so far provide strong evidence that many factors regarded as ‘fundamentals’ 
evolve across cycles and also that institutional networks and flows are important sources of 
information through which trading schemata and frames are monitored, validated and modified. A 
theme emerging from the comments of the traders and analysts interviewed suggested that over the 
long term, prices would tend to reflect core fundamentals but short to medium term price volatility 
will often be driven by other factors. The complexity here is that the fundamentals considered to be 
the primary price drivers are not static. Thus trading can be triggered not only by new information 
demarcated as significant by prevailing intersubjective codifications, but to shifts in those 
codifications themselves as new variables are incorporated into trading frames. 
 
Core fundamentals might be regarded as the primary drivers of price over an extended period of 
time, but over the short to medium term (at least over a few days to a few weeks), prices can also 
fluctuate as traders respond to a wide variety of information and noise. Although markets will always 
respond to the routine but periodic news of enduring factors such as company earnings, GDP 
figures, inflation, credit ratings and interest rates, the trillions of dollars exchanged daily on financial 
markets cannot be understood solely as a response to such announcements. Interviewee #29 
suggested that although markets generally conformed to equilibrium186 and would reflect 
fundamentals over time, the equilibrium points were always changing, making short-term prediction 
of price movements impossible; 
 
 ‘Economics is normally useless at telling you what’s going to happen in the next five 
months. They’ll tell you where things should trend in a logical sense over the next year 
[but] the information everyone wants is what’s going to happen today and over the next 
few weeks- which no one knows. […] The New Zealand dollar’s above it’s fair, 
fundamental value and the current account [deficit] is higher so it should be drifting 
down, but there’s lots of other flows so it might go up. What the hell’s going to happen? 
[…] Well I’ll tell you now, no one knows what’s happening in a month- that’s the bloody 
holy grail- no one does.’ 
                                                 
186
 Equilibrium here implies that, after taking account of everyone else’s positions and strategies, no market 
actor is motivated to change their own positions and strategies, thus prices will be stable until a new piece of 
information is received (which in practice is on-going). Equilibrium points may not be optimal however. The 
mutual decision of banks not to lend to each other in the credit crunch was a kind of equilibrium in this sense.  
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Interviewee #14 noted the potential for problems to arise from large amounts of capital chasing 
increasingly small margins or seeking gains from small price movements. ‘If you find for some 
reason the markets all end up slanted too one way on any given position, you can end up with quite 
a messy outcome […] You know- everyone charges to the exit at the same time. So emotion can be 
quite a factor in terms of decision-making.’ #14 and #17 also confirmed the potential for trading 
activity and price movements to be triggered by key analyst recommendations and the potential for 
short-term self-fulfilling prophecies. As interviewee #8 noted even rumours that seem insignificant in 
terms of content value could still move markets: ‘It only has to be a fairly small rumour […] Whether 
you decide to act on it or not  is up to you […] You buy the rumour and sell the facts because often 
rumour proves to be incorrect. But if more people believe in the rumour, you’ve got to go with it. You 
know, it goes back to expectations hypotheses- if more and more people believe it, it starts to 
happen.’ 
  
Interviewee #27 pointed out that some institutions deliberately disseminate rumours to take 
advantage of the temporary market reaction; ‘The story is as bogus as anything, but they’ve got a 
certain position- they start a rumour, the market moves on the rumour, gets discredited, and it 
moves back [but] the guy’s got out of his position by then.’  Interviewees #19 and #31 also 
acknowledged that rumours could move markets even when they turned out to be baseless, 
particularly where they have implications for investor expectations of market values. They both gave 
examples of how media reports speculating about agricultural epidemics (such as foot and mouth 
and BSE) triggered price movements due to concerns about effects on exports. Had investors 
waited for confirmation, the market’s collective anticipation/calculation of a new risk factor meant 
prices would already have moved. However, other findings suggested such phenomena were 
neither routine nor attributable solely to the media: As #5 noted, the apparent effect of news also 
depended on how investors (deliberately or otherwise) responded to each other, not just the 
information. Meanwhile, #26 suggested that investors’ use of similar models could potentially 
produce herd-like tendencies but he also thought herding was atypical in the local market, partly 
because other investors could exploit such trends: 
 
 ‘If there were certain sets of algorithms out there that caused a community of funds, if 
you like, to act in unison [and] which had a certain weight in the market, it wouldn’t be 
long before the information got out there that this community of funds had exposed 
themselves to the market. And that in itself would be a weakness, because […] once 
someone’s bought a security they become a potential seller- they’re a latent seller. So 
all you’ve got to do is work out what the risk tolerance of their model is […] and if 
you’re a big enough player, and recognise that there’s a vulnerability, you can go and 
shake them out- You know, bash the market against them […] That would only happen 
a few times and then they would have to adjust or change their models.’ (Interviewee 
#26) 
 
Interviewee #13 commented on Greenspan’s warning of ‘irrational exuberance’ when the Dow index 
was on 7-8000. Many investors who heeded the warning and went ‘underweight’ on equities later 
suffered huge losses when the Dow continued to climb to 11,000. Even though the governor of the 
Federal Reserve would  eventually be proven right, market sentiment proved him wrong in the 
short-term and continued to drive the dot-com bubble. As #13 notes, market prices were driven by 
self-referential perceptions that had no basis in fundamentals:’ The whole tech boom was fuelled by 
people’s perception of something that wasn’t really there. Not only had [the dot-com companies] 
never made a profit, they never had any potential to make a profit. And the whole reason the tech 
boom went was because people were buying them ‘cause they knew that there’d be another fool 
ready to buy them. And it was just fuelled on itself’.  
 
Interviewee #29 similarly noted the potential for market psychology to overcome fundamentals and 
generate self-fulfilling prophecies; ‘Sometimes the market prices will change because everyone 
thinks it’s going to go one way- and so they all go.’ He also pointed to the increased use of research 
surveying investors to identify consensus indicators on monthly price movements. Although these 
might feed back into the market and encourage herding (consistent with Davis’ [2005] consensus 
indicator/panopticon effects), #29 also noted that the survey results had turned out to be a poor 
predictor in some instances because the underlying positions of investors led them to trade in the 
opposite direction to the implied consensus estimate when the results were published. This 
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indicates that market herding and self-fulfilling prophecies are highly contextual phenomena and not 
attributable to any simple function of the financial media or trading practices. Although this makes it 
more complicated to generalise about informational reflexivity in financial markets,  it is far more 
problematic to maintain that market prices correspond to fundamentals in any consistent manner 
because their meaning is interpreted in the context of investors’ own portfolios and awareness of 
other investors’ positions and flows, as well as evolving frames/schemata that redefine or 
reprioritise the fundamentals themselves.  
 
Relations between  journalists, analysts and traders, the potential for 
contingent/game reflexivity (Q17) and double-checking source reliability (Q4). 
 
The literature review had indicated a range of issues arising from the relationships between market 
analysts, institutional clients and financial reporters. It should be noted here that with a few 
exceptions, the analysts interviewed worked closely with their respective trading room colleagues 
on the ‘buy-side’ rather than the sell-side involving external clients. There was therefore limited 
opportunity to explore the kinds of institutional pressures and professional compromises suggested 
by Womack, (1996), Kurtz (2000), and Hong & Kubik (2003). However, several respondents (senior 
traders as well as analysts) did deal directly with the financial media and several had roles that 
involved making official public statements on market conditions. The issues explored here are 
therefore more in line with Rothkopf’s (1999) and Kunczik’s (2002) observations about the potential 
for media representations of market opinion leaders to become self-referential and (in line with 
Davis, 2005) promote market consensus. Interviewee observations about the general quality of 
financial reporting were mixed. Some interviewees did express concerns about how well journalists 
understood of financial complexities, but criticism was usually framed in the context of the small size 
of the New Zealand market which limits the scope for the kind of specialist financial reporting 
possible in the major trading hubs.  
 
Interviewee #31 pointed out the media’s need to attribute causes to market events to produce 
coherent stories, even when nobody really knows which factors were driving price movements. He 
also noted that the angles of stories could evolve throughout the day as more information and 
points of view were incorporated; ‘[The media] have to write this much every day- they’ve got to 
attribute something to something else and you’ll see the stories change as the editions change over 
the day. The story can change quite dramatically because it’s not actually that easy to find out why 
[prices] move.’  #31 also acknowledged that sometimes analysts would suggest explanations of 
market events to reporters to keep them happy even though the account may not reflect what their 
professional opinion: ‘You’ve got to give the journalists something they want- you can’t give them 
something too complicated, too long-winded. They like nice chunks- something that’s really catchy 
to put in there. Sometimes it doesn’t really capture what they believe, but they know that it’ll get 
their name out- that’s why they say it.’ 
 
Interviewee #13 reinforced the view that the financial media’s need to define and explain market 
events can lead to journalists seeking rational explanations for financial events even when none 
really exist, and also finding stories to report when nothing of significance has occurred. He went on 
to explain that he sometimes resorted to inventing explanations to satisfy enquiries from the news 
media, and acknowledged that the media’s demand for copy allowed commentators to ‘talk their 
book’ and promote frames/angles favourable to their own positions: 
 
‘ Look, I’ve had journalists who become extremely annoying- I had a journalist from 
Dow Jones actually- they would ring me up every single day asking me the same 
question, say, “Why did the market move?”. And then they concoct a story that […] 
was tenuous at best. And really, sometimes markets don’t move- there’s just nothing 
going on- And I’d rather they just write there’s nothing going on. […] They may have to 
release a report at 11 o’clock every day on what’s going on in the market […] so to get 
them off your back, you’ll feed them some line about, “look, this happened”- but in 
actual fact you’re not saying it with any great conviction. Bear in mind also that sales 
teams that are talking to media and customers are going to slant the information in 
they way they want it to be presented- because they’ve got positions.’  
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Interviewee #25 pointed to a functional symbiotic relation between reporters and analysts:  
 
‘We’re all on first name terms. It ends up being quite a good relationship- they’re trying 
to gather expert views, expert opinions. But it also means you know who you can trust, 
and in New Zealand, I have never been misquoted. That’s an interesting 
misperception, right, that journalists get it wrong and [are] always misquoting people. 
Well I haven’t, in New Zealand. –Never been misquoted. Not once.’  
 
The fact that this was evidently intended as a complimentary assessment suggests that the role of 
journalists was regarded as providing accurate stenography in quoting expert sources and timely 
provision of basic facts and figures.  
 
These observations raise a further issue accounting for the financial reporter’s need for expert 
sources, however. The symbolic ontology of financial markets is not open to external empirical 
observation/verification and consequently, facts about financial markets cannot be represented or 
verified in any simple manner. Insofar as financial reality is appresented through screen displays 
(Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2005, 2007) and changes in data constitute market events, these are not 
publicly accessible events and still require expert sources to interpret and articulate them. The 
statements of primary financial definers such as key analysts and traders may reflect different 
institutional interests (#13) 187 as well as different emphases on particular trading frames/narratives 
(#5). Media reports feed these back into market processes shaping the events ostensibly being 
described. Interviewee #27 was sceptical about the potential for trading models/schemata to 
become self-fulfilling in any simple sense, but he readily acknowledged the potential for analyst 
opinions to become self-referential. Citing  Soros’ (1994) Alchemy of Finance, #27 commented; ‘it’s 
the reflexivity- it’s the economists that are viewing the world as if they’re on the outside, but they’re 
on the inside. And them delivering their perceptions of the world changes the perceptions of the 
world. I only read half of it and that was enough- you know, he’s exactly right.’   
 
This points to a symbiotic, albeit unequal, relationship between journalist and analyst. Remarks 
from several interviewees who had dealings with the media suggested that although there was 
generally a positive relationship with the media and a reasonable degree of trust (or at least 
awareness of reporters who were considered less reliable) the perceived role of most of the news 
media, particularly the general interest public media, was getting the institution’s view out to the 
desired audience188. Interviewee #25 suggested  the media are looking for expert opinion and 
institutional analysts are generally happy to provide it:  
 
 ‘When we’re being perceived as experts on a well-defined area and we have the 
expertise to talk about it, that’s fine. That’s good for ort profile, that’s good for our 
                                                 
187
 The two journalists interviewed were well aware that financial sources sometimes had a vested interests. 
Journalist #A suggested that information-trading between analysts and journalists meant the relation was, by 
and large, mutually beneficial. Journalist #A recognised that analysts were motivated to build a media profile 
because there was a ‘competition for ideas’ within the markets and a desire to promote preferred 
angles/stories, but normally multiple sources would be cross-referenced before reporting. Journalist #B 
likewise suggested that cultivating a professional relation with sources helped reduce the likelihood that the 
information provided would be misleading. Journalist #B acknowledged the importance of analysts as sources 
as well as their vested interest in gaining a media profile (for which some received bonuses). However she 
insisted that ‘you can tell when they’re talking their book- you’ve got to be a bit cynical’. Despite the desirability 
of exclusive sources, this was not always possible since ‘we all talk to the same people’ and even anonymous 
sources were often easy to identify in a small market. However, #B acknowledged that the expertise of sources 
was often greater than the reporter’s and that some experts were intolerant of journalistic questioning/ criticism.  
 
188
 The case of the Reserve Bank was an exception here. RBNZ regularly consults analysts and traders to 
monitor market thinking, but has very specific controls on their interactions with the media. Where price-
sensitive official statements are made (such as OCR) these are released automatically and RBNZ can directly 
post statements to the wire services. Interviewee #1 pointed out that the OCR system now involves more 
scheduled, formalised communication between RBNZ and the media than under MCI, so there is less general 
contact with the reporters. This has helped avoid ostensibly ‘harmless’ comments from RBNZ on general 
economic issues being taken out of context by reporters and disseminated globally.  
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organisation and it’s good for the general public, because they get an informed view of 
certain issues. […] People’s lives are busy- they don’t have the time to invest in 
everything and they actually want an expert to tell them [and] give them a coherent 
explanation of what this [information] means.’ 
 
However, the analysts have a significant motive here. As Interviewee #14 noted, there was a 
‘massive competitive advantage’ in having one’s institutional analysts ranked highly for their global 
financial research. Quite apart from informing trading, there were other advantages in having 
analysts with a media profile whose news releases would be picked up across a range of news 
media: ‘If you’ve got good relationships with Dominion, Herald, Dow Jones, Reuters, you can send 
them your new piece and they’ll give it some coverage […] Because you want the credibility, you 
want the profile, and you want the influence on the market, [and] the RBNZ.’ Interviewee #18 
likewise noted the desirability for analysts to generate a media profile for their institution to attract 
client business, and there is therefore pro-active effort to generate media attention.  ‘You want top 
business people to think we’re a player in the markets. We want our view to be known to the people 
who are making decisions- like the Reserve Bank, for instance’.  Interviewee #25 likewise 
suggested that,’ The aim would be to get in all the print media as well as the wire services- as well 
as radio as well as television.’ However, he also noted the need to tailor messages to different 
audiences, for example, not being over-technical in statements to the general media. He noted the 
problem of important information being overlooked by reporters if it seemed mundane. 
Consequently, some analysts and institutions deliberately used colourful language to ensure the 
statements get quoted or get a headline. He gives examples of two banks putting out statements on 
the current account deficit using terms like ‘King Kong deficit’ and ‘banana republic’ or ‘biggest 
move in twenty years’ which the news media readily picked up as their headlines, framing the story 
accordingly189.  
 
An important theme that emerges from these findings is the finance institutions’ active interest in 
gaining a media profile and having their views presented in the news to a wider audience. Analysts 
can release statements directly to the wire services and other media in the confidence that these 
will be reported, and there is a perception that cultivating a high-profile image is useful not only in 
attracting client business but in potentially influencing the outlook of other investors and key 
institutions such as RBNZ.  The financial reporters themselves were evidently not regarded as key 
market movers in their own right190, but given the moderate importance and objectivity ratings (> 4) 
ascribed to public analyst comments, it would seem unlikely that that public media coverage is 
perceived to confer any significant power to trigger price movements under most circumstances. 
                                                 
189
 However, #25 also pointed out that this was not just a case of issuing outlandish comments to attract 
attention: ‘You have to be purposeful about how you’re using more extreme words- but there’s a strategy that 
sits behind it […] They will attract attention, even from very subtle shifts in the language that you’d use- it will 
be a strategy; it will be done on purpose. Financial market commentators need to use a broader brush to 
highlight whether it’s really significant. […]  They know exactly what you’re telling them […] That we’re using 
extreme language and this is a twenty-year event- So they clearly understand; “Wow- this has gotta be on the 
business page […] on the front of the business page” […] And all the newspapers understood- they knew 
where to put the story’ (Interviewee #25). Meanwhile, #2 noted a tension between attracting attention and 
maintaining professional credibility; ‘The wildest, most outrageous thing is going to sell. So you want to get 
your name in print but you don’t want to say anything that is bloody unrealistic […] outrageous stuff can get 
your name in print, but it can also get you a bloody big kick up the arse- ‘cause outrageous things have a habit 
of happening. So you need to maintain your credibility there as well.’  
 
190
 #13 and #14 both note the significance of following stories by a particular journalist ‘perceived’ to be close 
to the Reserve Bank of Australia, both emphasising that even though this was merely perception, the stories 
had the potential to move the market; that is, convince traders to buy and sell on the expectation that others 
would take notice of the journalist. Interviewee #13 suggested that it was unlikely that financial journalists in 
New Zealand would have the clout to move the market, but suggested that this was certainly possible in other 
countries, citing cases in Australia where stories by  journalists perceived to have close connections to key 
institutions sometimes triggered market reactions. “You can never categorically say that it’s happened, but it 
seems to be a commonly held view that certain journalists […] are writing under a guide rather than writing off 
their own bat. Hence the reason they will move the markets- it’s generally fairly easy to tell.’ This reinforces the 
earlier example of an analyst moving the market by reversing their views on interest rate policy because of the 
perception that they may have acquired information ahead of other market actors.  
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Interviewee #5 suggested that reporters could inadvertently disseminate market rumours when they 
called different sources to double-check stories, but regarded the top analysts as exerting far more 
influence: ‘If you think a journalist has power, then the research analyst has incredible power- 
because their degree of knowledge will be much higher than the financial journalist’s […] so their 
ability to spread those rumours must be very, very high.’  In contrast, Interviewee #18 doubted there 
was any individual commentator with sufficient credibility to move the market, but pointed out that if 
a high-profile actors made a public statement that went against consensus opinion, other market 
actors would start to second-guess whether they were privy to some information:  
 
‘I can remember times when the markets have moved a couple of points-just a small 
movement- when someone’s had a view which seems a bit strange. And you wonder 
why they’ve got that view […] You know they could be privy to information [so] they 
must know something. So if someone had recently seen the governor of the Reserve 
Bank and then suddenly has a radical change of view, you think, “hang on- what’s 
going on here?” […] There might be a market reaction because people in the market 
might conclude that there’s a risk that there was […] some information in what that 
analyst was saying.’ (Interviewee #18). 
 
The picture emerging here precludes any simple generalisation about the influence of public analyst 
comments presented in the news media. There is evidently competition to ensure that particular 
frames/narratives are recognised by the market, even if this does not always generate significant 
price movements. Other interview data indicated a recognition of the potential for analysts to 
influence the market, coupled with scepticism that any individual would be consistently influential 
because of the plurality of competing expert claims. As Interviewee #10 indicated; ‘successful 
traders or investors want to verify their trading decision by a number of inputs. They’ll want to have 
the view reinforced in a number of ways.’ In line with the quantitative findings, he suggested that 
public news stories would usually be double-checked for correlations with other sources. The fact 
that investors individually use a range of public media and institutional media for validation, also 
suggests the prevailing view of analysts is likely to be picked up and amplified across the market. 
Interviewee #25 acknowledged that analysts monitored each other, and pointed out that when his 
institution changed its forecast on interest rates, they carefully followed the market reaction to see 
whether other analysts would follow their led or maintain the previous consensus. Nevertheless, he 
was sceptical about the potential for interactions among analysts/traders/reporters to generate a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, arguing that news reports merely provided basic factual data whereas 
analysts provided the contextual interpretation:  
 
‘The real raw material is coming from statements from policymakers- whether it be 
politicians on fiscal position or whether it be central bank on interest rates or whether it 
be from Statistics New Zealand on employment conditions, or whatever. That’s the real 
raw material. It turns out that Reuters and Bloomberg are experts at delivering that- but 
they’re delivering numbers. We, at that point, look at them- but we’re delivering not 
numbers, but interpretation, which [the media] will follow through’ (Interviewee #25). 
 
The analysts therefore supply the meta-information needed to make sense of the ‘raw data’. As 
noted earlier, the significance of even ostensibly objective data such as GDP or inflation still 
requires analysis and contextualisation. This is one reason why competing analyst frames/stories 
can be important and require monitoring. Interviewee #2, meanwhile, emphasised the importance of 
networks of personal contacts and relationships, including the need to be aware of what other 
commentators were thinking. However, he also pointed out that there was a need for originality in 
analysis;  
 
‘ If I’m reading everyone else’s stuff and coming up with the same view, then I’m not 
doing my job […] You like to see what everyone else is saying [but] we try to get our 
stuff out bloody quick, so we don’t look at other people’s stuff. I met a guy from [other 
major bank] yesterday- just for a tea and coffee […] We’ve got similar views but 
different views and you’re sort of testing each other in terms of where those views sit. 
So […] he maybe points out something which I’m missing , or I point out stuff he’s 
missing.’ (interviewee #2). 
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Interviewee #18 noted that as analysts exchange their reports around their institutional network 
there is a ‘feedback loop’ whereby they try to find points of consensus and resolve conflicting 
interpretations; ’there’s quite a close relationship between […] the economists operating together to 
come up with a consistent […] view’.  Although this would not preclude the views of external 
analysts being taken into consideration, it also suggests that ‘in house’ exchanges between 
analysts (at least in major institutions) would be primary. Interviewee #5  noted that quality financial 
research would typically circulate within institutional networks before being released to clients and 
other professional investors, and then finally the public and non-institutional investor191. Indeed, 
interviewee #21 acknowledged that he called analysts at other institutions on a daily basis to check 
their positions and outlooks. This indicates that those receiving analyst statements only through the 
public media may find any price adjustments based on them had already taken place. Learning 
what analysts think through institutional media channels would therefore seem be more important 
than reports in public media. Interviewee #13 confirmed that general news media were not 
especially useful here, but suggested that wire service surveys of analyst consensus forecasts on 
key financial indicators such as interest rates could be;  
 
‘Unless there’s a clear trend that [indicates] there’s a herd mentality taking place, then 
I’ll prefer just to make my own decisions based on my own analysis. Reuters, Dow 
Jones, and Bloomberg as well, they all release surveys of what the different banks are 
expecting for interest rate announcements. For every data release they’ll say “here’s 
ten banks, here’s the expectations, this is the average, this is the last number”- so we 
all look at those. I don’t need to worry what any one bank thinks- I’d rather just look at 
the averages.’ (Interviewee #13) 
 
However, this also suggests that even if the individual analyst perspectives might be overlooked, 
the average/ consensus figures are recognised as a factor which, right or wrong, will be price-
sensitive and thus require monitoring. The consensus figures circulated by the wire services 
become the benchmark for gauging whether incoming information confirms or contradicts market 
expectations and is liable to trigger price-movements. The notion that consensus/ market average 
indicators and prevailing trading angles/stories have become institutionalised as a common 
reference point would be consistent with the processes of contingent reflexivity whereby the 
recognition that other market actors are paying attention to a particular variable becomes factored 
into trading frames/schemata. New information will be interpreted in the context of consensus 
expectations and prevailing stories/frames. This might account for analyst views in the media being 
simultaneously regarded as less important than many other sources but also too important to 
ignore. It is in this context that Davis’ (2005) notion of consensus indicator or panopticon ‘effects’ 
might manifest through focusing market attention on particular stories/frames and providing the 
backdrop/context for interpreting financial news. Analysts nevertheless play a potentially important 
role on the trading floor by directly assisting traders to contextualise and interpret incoming data. 
Interviewees #14, #18 and #25 all pointed to the importance of in-house analysts to help traders put 
market events and data in context. Interviewee #29, suggested that traders typically needed to 
respond to short-term flows and anticipate how markets would move over the next few minutes, 
whereas analysts were the providers of context and background. However, analysts can provide the 
frames/narratives used to rationalise trading decisions: ‘[Analysts] give confidence to the trader to 
take a position  […] They perform the role of providing comfort in decisions for customers to 
transact.’ This would seem to suggest their role in providing meta-information is as much 
psychological as it is informative192.  
                                                 
191
 As #5 explained; ‘The smart retail investor will work out a way of having conversations with those analysts- 
‘cause quite often they’ll release things to the institutions at least three weeks before it goes to the retail 
brokers. So the public are always behind […] And the market’s already moved by then. […] Institutions have 
direct access to the analysts, and the [non-institutional] investor doesn’t really know about it.’[…] I think the 
private sector clients can access analysts over the internet. The problem they’ve got is ascertaining the quality 
of the analysis […] So in a way the smaller investor now has the tools to become quite sophisticated- but they 
still have the problem of access to the real brains in the research community.’ 
 
192
 #29 suggested that the utility of analyst perspectives depended on whether their stories/frames correlated 
with those currently assumed by traders: ‘If you rolled in the analysts, they’ve got no perspective […] they’re no 
bloody good […] If you took any analyst, you can ask [a trader]- all that economic information and the e-mails 
you’re given-is it valuable? And he’ll say “Shit, no- I get bloody e-mails from 40 analysts. I only read 2 or 3 ”- 
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Interviewee #12 considered analysts to have become increasingly unreliable and prone to ‘talking 
their books’: ‘They’ve ceased to be objective. They’re too subjective because their own interests are 
at stake.’ He also pointed to the importance of networks of contacts for picking up market rumours 
and exchanging hints about trading opportunities. Significantly, though, this indicates that even 
where analyst bias is recognised, there is still a value in identifying the current stories/ frames 
circulating in the market. Interviewee #29 also acknowledged it was more cost-effective to accept 
the analyses of top economists and key institutions such as the ratings agencies: ‘The ratings 
agencies are a cheap mechanism- it’s like a shared service. Now are [they] getting it right all the 
time? Well, f*ck no- no one gets it right all the time. […] But are they cheaper than your 
alternatives? […] So the ratings agencies are very important- you could say it’s chicken and egg- 
‘cause everyone else uses them.’  
 
The overall pattern of responses indicates that the views of analysts are routinely picked up by the 
public media, disseminated through institutional networks, and shared on the trading floor. There 
would appear to be some potential for self-referential reinforcement of prevailing opinions in the 
manner suggested by Rothkopf (1999). Analysts are a source of potentially significant meta-
information including stories/narratives linking variables to suggest trading angles/frames.  n the NZ 
market context, few financial analysts would have sufficient clout for their statements to routinely 
trigger price movements. Small market movements in response to analyst statements as they 
influence short-term expectations or risk perceptions and traders factor these into their positions 
could occur all the time, but asymmetries in interpretations and agency means that on aggregate, 
they will tend to negate each other. This precludes any simplistic account of herding or prophetic 
self-fulfilment. However, the routinised relation between financial reporters and analyst sources, the 
cross-referencing of opinions through institutional networks, and the constant monitoring of news 
announcements and analyst updates by traders nevertheless generate the preconditions for 
contingent/game reflexivity to arise, as the model below indicates: 
 
Fig. 61 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Why do you read two or three? –“Oh, I find those really good because I’m on the same wavelength as those 
guys and they help me make my trades” –So why don’t we fire the other 37? Well of course, the other 37 are 
hitting someone else.’ (Interviewee #29) 
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Specifically, this would involve self-referential reinforcement of consensus expectations and/or the 
focusing of collective market attention on particular frames/trading angles. Particularly during 
transition points in market cycles (for example, where price movements fail to confirm prevailing 
expectations of continuing growth or decline, and/or where new information indicates opportunities 
for significant profits or risk of significant loss) then the validity of standard models and trading 
schemata (in terms of correspondence between calculations of value in relation to prevailing 
fundamental and current price movements) become uncertain. Although some traders might 
respond by focusing on long-term fundamentals, as the earlier findings indicated, many will intensify 
their monitoring of other market actors, actively seeking to discern any shift in market expectations 
and/or trading frames/schemata and to determine whether to pre-empt an imminent crisis/ bubble or 
to maintain positions and ride out a temporary blip. The critical point here is that the convergence of 
self-referential investor opinions reinforced through mutual monitoring through institutional networks 
and amplification of key analyst opinions through public news media can create symmetries of 
meaning and agency that drive prices in the direction of the emergent consensus/ dominant 
expectation. At that moment, financial market reality becomes indeterminate: It is subject to 
contingent/game reflexivity in the form of mutual monitoring, and explicit/transactional reflexivity 
through the signals of price momentum. At these moments, market ontology is indeterminate and 
vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecy and recalculations of financial valuation. Meanwhile, current 
investment models and trading frames/schemata are destabilised and become subject to 
implicit/performative reflexivity until the period of volatility passes and a reconfigured and 
revalidated set of fundamentals crystallise in line with revised intersubjective codifications.  
 
Official Cash Rate (OCR) announcements and Reserve Bank communication 
practices.  
 
The six-weekly Official Cash Rate announcement issued by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is a 
key event in the financial calendar. The OCR fixes the inter-bank lending rate for the new Zealand 
dollar and influences not only credit/mortgage rates but all financial securities thus denominated. As 
the base interest rate on a sovereign currency (and thus NZ government debt/bonds) the OCR is an 
important fundamental and sets a benchmark for minimum-risk rate of return on capital against 
which other securities are evaluated193. The unusual opportunity to visit RBNZ and talk with senior 
traders, analysts and managers about its media and communication activities was accompanied by 
an equally unusual opportunity to observe the trading floor at Deutsche Bank194 in its preparation 
and response to two OCR announcements. The following is therefore a mini case-study of the 
informational processes surrounding the OCR. It illustrates a number of reflexive processes 
discussed in previous sections, and is particularly interesting because it involves a scheduled 
announcement about a core market fundamental.  
 
Several RBNZ respondents pointed out that the aim of the reserve bank was to achieve monetary 
policy objectives including the provision of liquidity, stability of currency prices and control of 
inflation. Interviewee #28 likened the role of the RBNZ to a sheepdog, trying to round up a flock and 
move it in the desired direction. #31 pointed out that the bank would never deliberately surprise the 
market but sometimes semantics were confused and the weight/ significance attached to particular 
comments or nuances could be misinterpreted. Consequently, the regular monitoring of market 
actors was intended to ensure RBNZ announcements would be decoded in the intended fashion. 
Because the OCR is price-sensitive across a range of securities, any and all communications from 
RBNZ are subject to intense scrutiny by investors. Because financial securities are priced on the 
basis of future expectations, correctly anticipating RBNZ’s intentions can provide an opportunity to 
generate profits, while misreading them can result in miscalculation of financial values and incur 
substantial losses.  
 
                                                 
193
 As Interviewee #14 pointed out, even minor adjustments to the OCR are significant because it provides the 
basic benchmark for calculating the relative value of all other financial securities denominated in the Kiwi 
dollar, including bonds and currency/bond futures.  
 
194
 Interviewees from other institutions also commented on RBNZ and the OCR, so not all comments cited from 
the investment bank side necessarily represent a DB trader or analyst.  
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Interviewee #1 pointed out that RBNZ’s policy of regular OCR press conferences along with issuing 
quarterly Monetary Policy Statements (MPS195) and interim press statements is actually atypical of 
central bank practices, making RBNZ  relatively transparent and direct in the way it engages with 
the market. Interviewee #29 pointed out that RBNZ had several portfolios of (mainly) forex and 
other currency-related assets. #27 pointed out that these included around NZ$4 billion of foreign 
reserves which could be used for market intervention. Although the portfolio managers operated like 
traders in investment banks and had almost identical trading screen arrays, their primary aim was 
not profit optimisation (although making returns on their positions was not prohibited, the fact that 
RBNZ was privy to price-sensitive information meant it could not exploit that information for 
commercial gain). #27 noted that sometimes RBNZ was asked whether it was deliberately 
intervening in the market to move prices in a desired direction. He suggested that the bank had to 
ensure the market understood when it was trading as a routine  adjustment of its portfolios and 
when it was intentionally intervening to move prices and send a message to the market. This 
indicates that RBNZ’s own capacity to trigger price action through transactional/explicit reflexivity is 
itself a channel of communication. As #27 explained: 
 
‘We want it to be visible- if you think about a large corporation that wants to buy half a 
billion or a billion dollars, that’s a big flow for the market. And they want to get it at the 
cheapest price. So they’re going to be very, very quiet about it [and] just take it in 
slowly- it might take a few days, it might take a week if it’s in New Zealand dollars. […] 
And the market will be saying, “God, [other bank] have just been buying all week- 
dunno what they’ve got but they’ve just been buying, buying buying constantly.” 
Whereas we get the market to move a couple of cents and spend maybe a hundred 
dollars- so it’s a different dynamic. We want to be noisy, to make sure everybody 
knows.” 
 
Interviewee #1 emphasised that RBNZ’s functions involved avoiding surprising the market, a point 
readily acknowledged by other institutional investors and analysts. However, #18 pointed out that 
even though RBNZ was understood to have no incentive to mislead the market, sometimes it might 
want to be non-specific or ambiguous where it was itself unclear about market conditions or its 
inclination toward changing interest rates. Nevertheless, RBNZ undertook regular consultations with 
investors to monitor the prevailing thinking in the market and dispositions towards potential RBNZ 
policies. In contrast to the investment institutions’ use of institutional networks to try and gain a 
trading advantage, RBNZ’s monitoring was intended to ensure that when its statements were 
issued, the market interpretation and trading response corresponded with RBNZ’s policy objectives. 
Interviewees #27 and #30 pointed out that although RBNZ makes use of extensive contacts in 
finding out the views and positions of other market actors, this is a one-way flow, and the 
information is used to help the bank discern the likely impact of its statements. There is an implicit 
understanding that RBNZ will treat the information as confidential and not use it to exploit the 
positions of providers. As #27 observed, ‘They respect who we are and understand that it’s one-
way information, in terms of once it comes into us, it doesn’t go out again. They know it’s secure, 
whereas the market is a very, very leaky sieve in terms of information.’ Interviewee #1 further 
explained that to ensure that market thinking aligned as far as possible with RBNZ’s need to 
regulate inflation and currency stability there was a need to understand how statements would be 
interpreted in the context of previous statements and how the market would second-guess RBNZ’s 
intentions: 
 
‘It’s an intriguing dynamism between us and the market, and how much the market 
reads the same data we’re reading […] because they know us and how we operated in 
the past, they’ll anticipate what our reactions are. And how much the market correctly 
anticipates […] is quite an interesting exercise in itself. But that’s where the 
transparency has been quite useful- until you get to turning points, they pretty well 
                                                 
195
 The MPS includes Chapter 1 which announces the OCR and provides a one page summary of the policy 
rationale for any adjustment to interest rates. Other sections include more extensive discussions of key policy 
judgements, the current economic context, financial market developments, and macro-economic outlook. 
Chapter 1 is price-sensitive, so it is published separately from the main section and  most of the staff within 
RBNZ will not know its contents before the official announcement. The printers also operate under special 
confidentiality obligations. 
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know what we’re going to do, probably, because we’re all looking at the same data, 
they know how we operate. When you get to turning points, which is what we’re on […] 
are you going to move from easing to neutral  to tightening, or vice versa? […] You do 
find it’s more challenging for markets to anticipate us, because we’re all in the same 
challenging environment- you know, is inflation about to head up or down or whatever- 
it’s not so clear at certain times.’  (Interviewee #1)  
 
This is a significant observation because it reinforces the point that the meanings of core 
fundamentals can become ambiguous at the transition points in a cycle, or, by extension, during 
periods of uncertainty and volatility (see earlier model of reflexivity). This stems from the fact that 
even where current prices are based on fundamental analysis, it is the expectation of how those 
fundamentals will change in the future that determines market valuation. Where there are different 
perceptions and interpretations of how these will change, or indeed, where there are shifts in the 
perceptions of which variables count as fundamentals, then there would be a greater need to 
monitor the positions and actions of other market actors. Consequently, RBNZ’s attempts to be 
‘transparent’ in their communications get second guessed and cross-referenced with other 
indicators of market agency such as currency and bond futures. 
 
In designing RBNZ statements, monitoring of other institutions even extends to considering how 
different words and language structures influence market interpretation. As #1 explained, ‘no 
prospect of a cut’ may not mean the same as ‘no prospect of an easing’, while ‘in the future’ is 
different from ‘in the foreseeable future’, and ‘OCR’ may seem more specific than ‘monetary policy’. 
He went on to explain that RBNZ recognised that investors examined the structure and content of 
the statements and attached meaning to small points of structural difference (i.e. paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic variation) in the selection of words, the use or non-use of familiar adjectives, or the 
sequence of points. Although there was RBNZ interest in using more ‘plain English’, #1 readily 
confirmed the recognition that every utterance was analysed and second guessed according to the 
prevailing codes. Perhaps ironically, suddenly changing the language of statements into ‘plain 
English’ would probably increase market misunderstandings.  
 
‘If [the Monetary Policy Statement] were to be changed to something else, it would be 
picked up immediately and [investors] would be looking to see what do we mean by 
that. Now we know they look at the words that way, so we’re very careful if we do 
change words. […] We do a lot of thinking beforehand, in terms of the set of words- 
particularly in that [OCR] Chapter- how will they be interpreted. […] It’s an art, not a 
science […] It has become so ritualised and standard as to how we will do things- and 
if you’re not aware of that, you’re missing something, I think.[…] People have learned 
to expect a certain set of phrases, a certain way of talking, a certain timing […] To 
make those changes [to plainer English] people will pick over it, over the entrails and 
say “what do they mean by this?” -it has to go through a transition.[…] And to some 
degree it doesn’t matter […] because traders are working in a market where nuances 
are traded on, correctly or incorrectly, and someone makes money on it, someone 
doesn’t. That’s the nature of what they do out there- you’ll never change that.’  
(Interviewee #1).  
 
Interviewee #30 noted that the RBNZ had a set of standardised statements and commentaries for 
media releases on a range of market eventualities that could be quickly adapted if the need to make 
an urgent comment arose; ‘We’ve probably got something prepared to cope with any particular 
event […] We have a stock of editorial pieces we can get out to people or press statements that can 
be tweaked for particular events.’ He also explained that there was a routine exercise for soliciting 
the views of other institutions, with a focus on the traders whose decisions would directly affect 
prices. The specific focus of the market surveys is on how other actors perceive hawkish, dovish, or 
neutral signals with the aim being to identify the terminology likely to influence interpretations in 
particular directions; 
 
‘The  information that the market analysis people glean from this doves-and-hawks 
type questioning enables the advisory group to tweak the language in the statement, to 
reinforce or de-emphasise. Of course, sometimes it doesn’t work very well. It gets lost 
in translation. […] So in the statement, you can use greater or less conditionality- so for 
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example we could say if economic indicators do not follow as we expected then we 
“may” or “could” tighten them-that’s putting in the conditionality. You could otherwise 
say it is “likely” that economic indicators will confirm our thinking. So it’s just the 
nuancing of the conditionality […] Ideally, you have lots of short sentences with a 
single message in each sentence. Sometimes you get compound sentences which are 
quite long and convoluted and the market misreads those. So there’s a lot of work 
goes into drafting what’s called Chapter One of the Monetary Policy Statement.’ 
(Interviewee #30).  
 
However, despite these efforts, it is apparent that RBNZ and the financial markets are not always 
on the same wavelength. Interviewee #31 pointed out that sometimes other investment institutions 
ignored central bank statements or even the official interest rates where the market disagreed with 
their thinking. He noted the importance of maintaining institutional credibility in order to be effective 
in guiding market activity in the direction desired: ‘credibility is extremely important to a central 
bank. […] We could say something extremely hawkish and no one will believe us. It has to be 
believable.’ Interestingly, this indicates that even where RBNZ believes the market is misguided, it 
is difficult to challenge market consensus directly. Interviewee #27 pointed out that the aim of the 
RBNZ’s research into perceptions of OCR-related statements is  to ensure the market interprets 
and responds to statements in the desired fashion. However, this requires second-guessing of how 
other market actors will second-guess RBNZ’s own statements, and this can mean the other major 
financial institutions respond in a manner contrary to the one RBNZ intended:  
 
‘Sometime’s the market will turn round and say, “No- as a central bank, you’re wrong.“ 
And they’ve done it before. There were probably two statements last year [where] the 
market delivered price action that was completely at odds with what we would have 
expected. And the [RBNZ] statement after that was designed to bring them back into 
line. The market then turned round and said “you guys are flip-flop- you don’t know 
what you’re doing!” […] And they’ll deliver that belief through where they set future 
interest rates, through their price- through actually trading in the market and delivering 
that price in the futures. 
 
One curious incident that unfolded during the course of the researcher’s visits to RBNZ and DB was 
the atypical decision to reissue a previous official statement196 from the Governor (Alan Bollard). 
This was unusual because there was no additional information in the statement; the significance 
stemmed entirely from the fact that the RBNZ had decided to reissue the statement to 
reinforcement the earlier one, and was intended to signify that the market had not interpreted and 
responded to the statement in the intended manner. Interviewee #1 explained that:  
 
‘We haven’t done that for a long time […] That was done because, a few days after the 
Monetary Policy Statement, we felt that one of the messages in there had not really 
been taken on board by the market. There was a lot of other noise going on at the 
time, international data and that sort of thing, and given how close we were projecting 
to be to the top of our inflation band, we thought there was no room for our message 
                                                 
196
 The original statement was issued in the OCR commentary on 28th April 2005. The reissued statement of 3 
May  read as follows: ‘Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard today reinforced his statement of 28 April 2005 
that economic data suggests that underlying demand and inflation pressures remain strong and that, in this 
environment, further policy tightening cannot be ruled out. Dr Bollard was speaking to a Masterton District 
Council Business Community Breakfast Meeting. "Last week I announced that the Official Cash Rate (OCR) 
would remain at 6.75 per cent," Dr Bollard said. "But I reiterated our concerns about the persistence of inflation 
pressures in the economy, which are severely limiting our inflation headroom." Dr Bollard said that over the 
coming weeks the Bank would be reviewing its forecasts in more detail, in particular to assess the strength of 
pipeline interest and exchange rate effects, household demand and ongoing labour market pressures. "This 
assessment will be used to confirm whether further policy tightening is warranted at the June 2005 Monetary 
Policy Statement. Certainly, the current outlook offers no scope for an easing of policy in the foreseeable 
future." ’ 
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not to get through, so we reinforced it. Now apparently, that was the first time a 
statement like that had gone out without an accompanying press conference- without a 
warning that we were going to put something up- since about 1999.[…] You don’t want 
a market surprised by what we’re doing later on if they’ve missed the first signal either- 
and that’s a judgement you have to make.’  
 
Interviewee #31 confirmed that RBNZ had felt the market reaction was not pricing in the possibility 
of higher rates and that the repeat statement was intended to indicate that the market had not 
picked up on this possibility: 
 
‘ It was repeating what we’d said before. But the real information content for the market 
is the fact that we repeated what we were saying before- And that’s not something we 
would do very often. So there is a message in that. […] When the statement was 
released last week […] it was quite disappointing for us because the reaction just took 
quite a long time to happen. Usually, as soon as the headlines come up, instantly the 
traders will start reacting and you’ll see the price action. ’  
 
Interestingly, #1 went on to explain that a key reason that the market appeared not to have priced in 
the hint of a potential OCR hike was because many investors used futures markets as an index of 
consensus expectations: 
 
‘They will watch the pricing in the futures market particularly to see what [expectations] 
that is reflecting. So at the moment what’s been changing has been a view in the 
market, that’s been evident from futures pricing, that an easing could be expected from 
us, if not late this year, very early next year. That’s been running counter to what we’ve 
been saying in these statements in terms of, “hey- the interest rate’s going to be a little 
higher for longer!” They’ve now started to factor that in, so the price is changing. […] 
The expectations hadn’t moved and the prices didn’t reflect [RBNZ’s statement]-in fact 
they moved ever so slightly in the opposite direction. So a statement reinforcing what 
we’d said was judged as a way of [ensuring] it didn’t get too far out of kilter with where 
we thought the monetary conditions needed to be. ’ 
 
This underlines two significant issues; firstly, the potential for futures derivatives denoting prices at 
futures dates to feed back into current expectations and valuations, and secondly, the potential 
influence of offshore investors who, as Interviewee #18 noted, may trade in Kiwi dollar-denominated 
securities according to comparative frames between countries rather than local fundamentals. 
However, the extent to which RBNZ’s repeat statement sensitised investor perceptions to the 
preferred domestic economic framing was a source of contention, largely because, despite the 
hawkish reinforcement, the OCR was not subsequently raised. Although Interviewee #18 
recognised that the Bank would not intentionally mislead, he pointed out that traders at DB had 
been critical of the RBNZ’s repeated statement: 
 
‘The market wasn’t really pricing much chance of a rate-hike […] I think that the bank 
was very keen to make sure that the market was pricing a reasonable possibility- so 
that the market wouldn’t be surprised on the day if that rate hike actually happened. 
Now as it turned out, that communication [repeat statement] is pretty widely criticised 
amongst the traders in our room. Basically from their perspective […] it can be 
misleading. A lot of people read the Reserve Bank’s comments as being almost a cast 
iron guarantee that they were going to hike rates in June. And that subsequently didn’t 
happen. So some people would have said that the bank misled the market.[…] Why 
does the bank do it? The bank just wanted to put some more 50-50 into the market 
and reduce the level of surprise had they hiked.’  
 
On that point, interviewee #1 further explained that; 
 
‘The case where we put out that reinforcing statement I don’t think was to do with the 
language we used. We used fairly tough language by our own terms. There was just 
so much else going on at the time […] The domestic market might read it one way, but 
the weight of investments is coming from offshore, and they had taken a particular 
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view. It may be, for instance, that they were thinking, looking at our economy, looking 
at the cycles, that sort of thing, “You guys are in for an easing- come on!” And all their 
pricing in futures was gearing that way- whereas the domestics were starting to say, 
“Hmmm- I’m not sure of that, now we know what’s going on in New Zealand a bit more. 
And we’re getting that dichotomy of expectations. And so I guess part of our 
judgements has to be have we used the right words, the right tone, the right strength to 
hit both of those markets?’  
 
However, Interviewee #2 evidently thought RBNZ may not have anticipated the impact of the repeat 
statement and suggested that there was sometimes a problematic discrepancy between RBNZ 
statements, OCR decisions and the comments from the Governor:  
 
‘They’re probably not careful enough, actually. I think there’s a misunderstanding there 
over how markets work. What they think they’re trying to say, versus how it’s 
interpreted are frequently two different things. [In] some of their monetary policy and 
OCR statements, there have been dichotomies between what the Governor says and 
what the document says- which leaves the market in a bit of a bind […] The monetary 
policy statement I’ve not read now for a couple of quarters, ‘cause I don’t think it’s that 
much value. Because the Governor- all he says is what’s important. So I know the 
Governor writes his own statement and the monetary policy statement is written by 
other people in the RBNZ […] If you’re looking at the messages emanating from the 
two, in terms of what the Governor actually says versus the document, you can 
sometimes get a bit of a biased or a different view- I think that’s a dangerous place to 
be.’  (Interviewee #2).  
 
Interviewees #1 and #30 went on to explain that the need for conditionality and nuance in RBNZ 
statements stemmed from the need to avoid taking a definitive and completely unambiguous 
position in case market conditions changed and required RBNZ to modify its stance. Reversing a 
previously signalled commitment to a particular policy could surprise the market, suddenly change 
expectations and cause volatility. Moreover, even if RBNZ statements and OCR announcements 
have only short-term impacts on prices, current bank policy becomes manifested in the economy 
over the following 6-18 months. Consequently, committing to definitive monetary policy positions 
over a long-term time-frames was not practical.  
 
The OCR announcement on the trading floor 
 
Two of the visits to DB were timed to coincide with the OCR announcements (on 9th June and 28th 
July 2005) in order to allow the researcher to see the preparation and response to a price-sensitive 
announcement. Of course, the fact that the OCR was scheduled meant there was no surprise to the 
market in the announcement itself, but whether or not RBNZ raised, dropped or retained the current 
rate was not certain and even with public statements providing indications of intent, these were 
never explicit commitments. On both dates of observation, the expectation was for no actual rise in 
rates but for hawkish statements indicating that such adjustments were under consideration in the 
not-too-distant future. Neither announcement surprised the market and the RBNZ maintained its 
current rate. However, the aforementioned reissue of the Governor’s statement prior to the 9th June 
OCR had led to a perception that there was a outside chance of a rate hike. The content, tone and 
vocabulary of the RBNZ’s statements leading up to the OCR had been analysed in forensic detail 
for hints of shifts in the RBNZ’s outlook or disposition. As Interviewees #14, #15 and #18 explained, 
the aim was effectively to examine the economic indicators (such as inflation figures), past and 
present, and then on the basis of the RBNZ’s statements, work out whether developments since the 
previous OCR announcement would predispose RBNZ to move the current rate in any particular 
direction (as well as factor in the likely market response to any particular move). As #15 remarked:  
 
‘I take all the information that [the RBNZ Governor] is getting- all the data releases, 
where the currencies are, anecdotal stuff […]  how the economy’s going, […] the 
housing market, see what’s happening there. Take all that information and then think 
of it as [the Governor] would- and then think out what I’d do. And then assume he 
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thinks along the same lines as I do […] And then I’ll read what other people say, and 
decide whether they’re incorporating all the information I am.’ (Interviewee #15).  
 
The DB trading room had therefore already set up its positions based on their analysts’ 
interpretation of market conditions and the signals coming from RBNZ. This would also be the case 
in other investment institutions, so the expected OCR announcement was already largely built into 
prices. Confirmation of that expectation would therefore generate relatively little price movement. 
This confirms that trading responses to news about fundamentals is not so much a response to new 
information as a post-hoc adjustment of prices which have already built in valuations based on 
market expectations. Interestingly, as Interviewee #14 pointed out, despite the broad consensus 
that the RBNZ was unlikely to hike rates, various investment institutions had different views on the 
actual probability of this eventuality. Because these different perceptions were calculated as risk, 
they were factored into the positions of other investors and thus reflected in prices. Thus even the 
relative degrees of expectations and others’ perceived positions are quantified and traded off in an 
attempt to gain an edge. DB had therefore taken a position to generate potential returns from what 
it considered to be a slightly higher likelihood of RBNZ hiking than the market was pricing in. If that 
transpired, investors underestimating the risk would have to adjust their position. As #14 explained:  
 
‘They’re not easing anytime soon and they’ve made that clear. But the tone of the 
statement was a bit more balanced, so that was the different thing for the market […] 
Definitely, the wild card is if they hike rates- it’ll be interesting, ‘cause the market’s 
given that a 5 to 10 percent chance. But the [DB] economists’ view of the market is 
maybe it’s a 25 to 30 percent chance. So in that way, it’s potentially mispriced.’  
 
The DB trading room used a live Avistar video-conferencing link through to the DB branches in 
Sydney (which was preparing for its own market to open two hours after new Zealand) and New 
York (at the time, there was a substantial currency trading going on in the Kiwi dollar, so the interest 
was global). Although DB has it own electronic forex brokerage system (Autobahn), currency 
trading orders for the OCR were routed through the Sydney operation via the video link, although 
interest-rate securities were traded directly from Auckland.  Meanwhile, the analyst responsible for 
the Kiwi dollar and RBNZ policy was already in Wellington, attending the sequestered meeting at 
the RBNZ where advance copies of the announcement and the accompanying policy statement 
were made available. The trading room would initially see the news headlines of the wire services 
where the statement would automatically display. One of the analysts (Interviewee #18) indicated 
that after the announcement, his role was quickly convey the sense of the RBNZ decision and 
statement to the traders and capture a 30-45 second window of opportunity to trade profitably 
before the rest of the market responded. Indeed, as Interviewee #14 suggested, the traders had to 
react more or less immediately to the announcement and would not have time to actually read the 
RBNZ statement before transacting:  
 
‘In the dealing room here, we’re relying on [analyst names] to read it. In a lot of 
respects, the traders won’t have time to read it- they’ll be dealing […] So you’re selling 
kiwi, the trader’s selling Kiwi and then we’re going, “Oi, talk to us- what’s it say?” That’s 
your immediate 30, 45-second thing at 9 o’clock. […] You’ve got to be that quick 
otherwise you miss the opportunity. So you’re relying on your economists to do that for 
you, and then you’ll catch up with that a few minutes later. So the first thing you want 
to do is trade. So you read it, tell us what the headline is straight away, tell us what the 
gist of it is- dovish, hawkish, neutral- we’ll react and then we’ll read it. So that’s your 
timeline. ‘cause of the speed, you want a speed advantage […] Your ability to break it 
down 30 or 40 seconds quicker than maybe someone else can make you money and 
cost them money- so that’s important.’ (Interviewee #18). 
 
The actual six-weekly OCR announcement is obviously price-sensitive, and as Interviewee #1 
emphasised, Chapter 1 (the section announcing the decision and its policy rationale) is only known 
to a limited group of RBNZ officials prior to publication. Analysts and reporters are given an on-site 
briefing in advance of the announcement but this takes place in a lock-up where the use of 
communication devices which might give investors advance warning of the OCR is prohibited. 
Journalists and analysts may access the documents from 7.00 am under lock-up conditions and are 
only permitted to communicate externally after the announcement is made public. To that end, even 
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the curtains on the windows of the lock-up room are closed to prevent non-verbal communication to 
or surveillance by external parties197. Interviewee #30 likewise pointed out that there are also 
careful checks to ensure that any market-moving information is released electronically direct to all 
the major wire services and other media at 9.00 am to ensure informational symmetry. A copy of the 
one page OCR news release from RBNZ is included below: 
 
Fig 62 
 
                                                 
197
 Interviewee #1 noted that any pre-embargo leak to the markets in an attempt to trade in advance of the 
announcement would probably be readily visible and highly suspicious. He also suggested that one of the most 
effective guarantors of confidentiality was peer scrutiny from rival reporters and analysts. Although scanning/ 
jamming technologies have been considered, these technologies have the drawback of being sensitive to 
legitimate electronic communications traffic in areas beyond the lock-up room. #1 also noted that Statistics 
New Zealand and Treasury need to have embargoes on the release of other price-sensitive data, i.e. CPI 
(consumer price index or inflation) and GDP respectively.  
 252 
The DB analyst attending the OCR briefing at the RBNZ (Interviewee #18) explained his role thus:  
 
‘Well the way it works is when I go down for the policy statements, there’s an analyst 
briefing at 8.00 am. So we go to the lock-up room, we get given a copy of the policy 
statement […]We get to read the statement for about 25 minutes, 30 minutes, and then 
what normally happens is someone like the chief economist, probably the head of the 
forecasting section, they’ll come in the room and just give their two minute potted 
summary of  basically what the bank has done, why they’ve done it, and then it’s an 
open question time for analysts […] really it’s a chance for us to try and get more 
information about why they did what they did and hopefully learn more about what 
they’re going to do next time. […] What happens at nine o’clock [is] the RBNZ pushes 
a button, headlines go to the screen, their dealing room radios down to the analysts’ 
briefing room and says, “right, it’s public”. At that point, we scurry, pick up our cell 
phones and we call back, and we’re trying to get the information back to the dealers 
faster than they can read it […] ‘cause all they will see initially is the headlines, which is 
just a potted summary of the first page. We’ve read the entire document, we know 
what the forecasts are going forward- has the bank built in further rate hikes in its 
projections? What’s it saying about the currency? […] So we’re trying to get, basically, 
the flavour of the entire document, including what we picked up in the analysts’ briefing 
back to the traders as quickly as we can so that, when they’re trading in the market 
seconds after the number, they can put the right trades on.’  
 
As #14 pointed out, because all the previous RBNZ statements and market indicators had been 
factored into everyone’s positions and trade responses to the expected announcement were 
already set up, the initial short-term price reaction would be automatic and near-instantaneous:  
 
‘The market reaction will be immediate. So you won’t have a chance to make money 
as such […] it’s very much a binary thing- That’s where we are- We’ll be there 
immediately. Or we’ll have rallied a few points immediately. But there’ll be nothing in 
between. You won’t be trading every point in between, it’ll just be bang! […] You’ve 
had your two or three weeks to trade on it, to think about it. So now it’s bang- 9 o’clock, 
nine o’clock plus ten seconds, it will have moved.’ 
 
Interviewee #18 identified three further phases of market reaction to the OCR. The main market 
response announcement would continue for 5-10 minutes as traders from the major institutions 
modified their positions. Shortly afterwards, client orders would feed through, causing a second 
wave of price movements. Then later, offshore investors in the Asian and European markets who 
did not need to respond to the OCR in real time might trade on the developments, with a third wave 
of price activity. 
 
On both observation days, the interest rate market had already opened but because all the 
positions and trades contingent on the OCR had already been put in place, there was virtually no 
activity. As the 9.00 am announcement approached, the trading room became quiet, and a palpable 
sense of concentration and anticipation was evident as everyone focused on the screen198. As the 
announcement registered on the screens, there was an immediate verbal calls of ‘No change!’ and 
pre-prepared transactions were executed while constant updates and currency orders were relayed 
through to the other video-linked office in Sydney. Calls from the analyst at RBNZ were put through 
and the analysts in the dealing room called out summary points, such as: ‘as hawkish as they can 
be’ and ‘pretty close to expectations.’ Very quickly, a minor price increase in the Kiwi dollar (20 base 
points) was noted, although this appeared to be attributed to normal adjustment following a routine 
announcement. Sky TV news was on in the background and after the initial activity, the focus 
turned to this because Alan Bollard, the RBNZ governor, was giving his press conference and 
responding to questions. Although the on-site analyst would already have assimilated most of these 
                                                 
198
 The researcher was not permitted to record trading room conversations during the announcements, partly 
because of third party involvement through the Avistar video-links, and partly because of discussion of client 
positions. The observations about the activity during and shortly after the announcement are therefore based 
on notes taken at the time.  
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comments from the report, there was a possibility that the Governor might reveal additional 
information about the RBNZ’s thinking.  There are multiple media forms involved in the anticipation 
and response to the OCR, but apart from the immediate trading response to the announcement, it is 
interesting that the analysts play a critical role in contextualising the information and interpreting 
market responses to events.  
 
The OCR observations (9 June and 28 July) were routine and both announcements aligned with 
expectations. However, the price response was a little more unusual in the latter case and this 
generated some discussion in the dealing room and through the Avistar video-links. Despite the 
unchanged OCR, shortly afterwards, there was a dip in the currency price followed by a swift 
recovery. The traders consulted the analysts about the reasons for the move and checked with 
Sydney through the video-link whether they knew of any flows. It was decided that the price action 
was attributable to another New Zealand-based bank’s trading, rather than an offshore hedge fund: 
‘[Other major bank] were buying- okay, it’s just the locals’. Meanwhile, there were some muted 
curses from one of the interest rate desks (‘There’s b*ggerall change- oh for f*cksake!’) which 
transpired to be a response to the failure of the Kiwi dollar to break through a threshold on a 
technical chart upon which one of the traders had taken a short position (and was now suffering 
some losses). At a rough estimate based on observed trading orders, around NZ$100m was traded 
through to the Sydney office in the 20-30 minutes following the announcement. This was apparently 
routine adjustment to portfolio positions. Interviewee #14 suggested that larger volumes of trading 
would have been involved had there been a surprise.  
 
By 9.30, the NZ trading floor was contributing to the 7.30 morning meeting in Sydney. A focus of the 
conversation was collating explanations for recent market movements and seeking consensus or 
counter-argument. Shortly afterwards, there was some discussion through the Avistar link of a 
rumour involving another international bank apparently engaging in high volume trades in the Kiwi 
and Australian dollars. Interestingly, after discussion, there was a decision to keep the information 
within DB and not share it with clients: ‘We should keep the [other major bank] rumour confidential- 
just disguise it if we tell other people.’ It transpired that the interest in the rumour stemmed from a 
view that the other bank’s trading might be the initial indicator of a larger flow of trades coming 
through the currency markets which had the potential to move prices. It was also unclear whether 
the other bank was trading its own positions or acting on behalf of a client. The apparent reasons 
for maintaining confidentiality within DB were recognition of the potential for the information to 
confer a trading advantage, but also awareness that the rumour of a larger forthcoming series of 
trades could not be reliably confirmed.  
 
These observations again underline the importance of the traders’ interaction with analysts and the 
cross-referencing of views with colleagues within their wider network of contacts. This involved 
discussion of different frames/ angles explaining market events. The significance of monitoring 
other institutions and making use of networks of contacts to pick up market whispers of market 
activity was also evident. Detecting and identifying flows and the potential usefulness of maintaining 
the asymmetry of that information was also evident. Importantly, these functions all entailed 
channels associated with ‘institutional media’. Apart from the televised coverage of the OCR press 
conference, there was no evidence of any use of public media. The real-time focus on shifting 
prices through the trading screens and the factoring in of other investors’ anticipations of and 
reactions to the OCR in one’s own trading positions. Even though interest rates are considered a 
core fundamental, it was clear that anticipating and responding to the market reaction both in 
advance of the announcement and in immediately afterwards also required reflexive information.  
 
The OCR-related interviews and observations indicate the sensitivity of financial markets not only to 
the actions of key institutions but to the expectations/perceptions of their actions and the second-
guessing of their statements. Significantly, financial values are affected by those expectations and 
even relative calculations of outside probabilities of an OCR rate adjustment affect the positions of 
major investment institutions. The RBNZ’s efforts to minimise ambiguity and ensure that their 
statements generate the desired meanings and market responses are offset by two factors; firstly, 
the need to avoid committing too firmly to decisions where changing market circumstances might 
require revision of that decision, and secondly, the need to adhere to the conventions and language 
codes that have evolved between bank and market and become embedded in the intersubjective 
codifications of the investment community.  
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Chapter 12:  Conclusions- Worlds Apart? 
This final chapter will summarise and review the key arguments and findings of the thesis in relation 
to the main aims and research questions, and highlight some of the theoretical considerations that 
arise from the research. 
Theoretical approach and the utility of the intersubjective codifications framework 
The thesis developed an analytic framework based on the conceptions of intersubjective 
codification and communicative reflexivity. This was needed to transcode different political 
economic and cultural economic perspectives and account for the constitutive role of 
communication processes in contemporary financial phenomena. The recognition of the symbolic 
ontology of capital and financial values meant insights from both neo-Marxist macro-structural 
analyses and the micro-cultural analyses of cultural economy needed to be integrated. The neo-
Marxist foregrounding of social macrostructures is not easily synthesised with meaning-based 
accounts of symbolic exchange and the formation of the shared conceptual/interpretative systems 
underpinning mutually coherent financial objects of calculation and valuation. In particular, the 
commodity-based conception of money and labour value in the Marxist account is difficult to 
reconcile with self-referential phenomena such as floating exchange rates. Marx conceived of 
money as a commodity form and regarded fictitious values on the M-M’ circuit as inconsistent with 
the labour theory of value. The labour theory of value must be superseded in order to account for its 
symbolic ontology. However, this is not necessitated by contemporary shifts in the symbolic 
ontology of capital; rather, Marx’s labour value and commodity-based conception of money never 
adequately accounted for the shared codes underpinning money’s fiduciary origins. Indeed, the 
origin of money as a fictitious form of capital in the circuit of accumulation underscores how deeply 
the financial system underpins the industrial economy and other subsystems which also depend on 
money. Although money can indeed be used in manifold ways, on a systemic level, credit-money is 
always vectored back to the private banking sector from which it originated, and in the final 
instance, this will inflect its usage.  
 
The symbolic ontology of money and financial values, and the recognition of shared meanings 
among economic agents requires the integration of cultural economic perspectives. However, the 
cultural economic emphasis on micro-level agency and ethnographic description can obscure the 
macro-level political-economic implications of monetary/financial processes (and in some instances, 
over-emphasise the symbolic aspects of financial relations as distinctive feature of a distinctly 
contemporary postmodern social order). It is important not to conflate analyses of sign-values and 
commodification within the cultural sphere with the more specific symbolic processes of finance 
capital and the generation of fictitious capital values. Simmel’s (1900/1990) conception of money in 
terms of institutionalised networks of trust and generic social power is important here, as is Zelizer’s 
(1994) notion of micro-level earmarking. However, monetary agency must be understood in the 
context of institutionalised channels and modalities of transaction that have already been 
structurally inflected by the origins of capitalist money in credit/debt relations. Likewise, the 
institutional nodes of financial investment demarcate the channels and modalities of trading which 
maintain the global flows of capital in their speculative orbit to reproduce fictitious value. 
 
The framework therefore drew on cultural political economy, particularly the work of Sayer (2001), 
Jessop (2004) and Graham (2006). Significantly, these analyses recognise the utility of 
emphasising symbolic/communicative processes in synthesising political economic and cultural 
economic analyses (Sayer emphasises Habermasian communicative action, Jessop emphasises 
intersubjectivity and semiosis, and Graham emphasises discourses and sociolinguistics). All 
suggested useful conceptions of the constitutive role of symbolic/ communicative processes in  
economic/financial reality. However, all exhibited conceptual limitations related either to notions of 
systemic (dis)embedding, the materiality of semiosis or the (over)emphasis on linguistic processes 
in economic activity. For example, Jessop’s (2004) work on cultural political economy recognises 
the potential importance of incorporating an account of semiosis into accounts of global capitalism, 
but rejects the notion that symbolic codes are sufficient to account for constraints on agency. It is 
Graham’s (2006) analysis of ‘hypercapitalism’ that most clearly recognises the role of 
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media/information technologies and language/discourse in the formation of financial values. 
However, the specific linguistic analysis does not neatly account for how the symbolic ontology of 
monetary forms and fictitious capital expansion involves interaction based on  non-linguistic codes.  
 
The emergent formulation of intersubjective codifications conceives of structure and action as 
mutually constitutive formations which demarcate the channels and modalities of meaningful action 
within a given arena. The term recognises the necessity of individual agents’ mutual cognitive 
recognition of the channels/modes of action in order to coordinate economic exchange and the 
coherent ascribing of meanings (semantic and financial valuation) to transactions. This obviates the 
need to posit ontologically abstracted social structures and allows the potential for the 
intersubjective codifications to be reproduced and indeed, to evolve over time. The formulation also 
allows recognition of an objective material world, but insists that the relations of economic agents to 
that material world (e.g. property rights or valuations) are inevitably mediated. The focus on 
codification immediately brings into focus the role of media, communication and information 
systems and recognises that economic/financial reality cannot be understood as distinct from these 
processes. Indeed, understanding the processes of financial communication and mediation requires 
recognition that their role cannot be adequately understood as representative of external/ objective 
market events but  reflexively constitutive of financial reality.  
Thus money is conceived as abstract purchasing power, activated when monetary symbols are 
deployed within a network of intersubjective codifications within which agents recognise the 
exchange of those symbols as constituting a shift in social relations (e.g. property rights or the 
transfer of liabilities). This links the conception of money into an account of reflexivity in financial 
markets (see below) and the generation of fictitious values that underpin the ‘symbolic fix’ to 
accumulation. Through accounting for the symbolic ontology of monetary forms and fictitious 
values, the framework links together neo-Marxist accounts of contradictions in the financial 
accumulation circuit (M-M’) with cultural-economic accounts of contemporary informational-symbolic 
markets. By recognising; a), the constitutive symbolic ontology of financial transactions and fictitious 
value creation on the M-M’ circuit; b) the intersubjective codifications which underpin trading 
models/frames (and thus risk calculations and market expectations), and; c) the reflexive 
communicative processes implicit in the endogenous feedback loops that generate bubbles and 
crisis, a communication-based framework can also integrate a Marxist account of accumulation 
contradictions with Minsky’s  account of financial instability. In turn, the account of symbolic capital 
and communicative reflexivity transcodes Minsky’s (1977, 1982) account of credit expansion and 
endogenous financial instability linked to feedback loops and tendency toward crisis onto Harvey’s 
(1990, 1999) notion of spatio-temporal fixes. Here, the thesis proposed an additional type of 
accumulation ‘fix’ that recognises the symbolic ontology of fictitious values and the capacity of even 
a marginal/proportional trade in a security to metonymically alter the value of the entire holdings 
when liquidity thresholds are exceeded. The fact that financial deepening, which has seen financial 
market values expand out of proportion to the industrial economy since the 1970s, has been 
accompanied by a series of increasingly severe crises is linked to the inflation and implosion of 
fictitious values. The intersubjective codification formulation also helped conceptualise social 
system boundaries and, coupled with the notion of reflexivity, this allowed autopoiesis to be 
operationalised in terms of self-reproduction through self-referential feedback loops and the non-
reciprocal extension of financial codifications into other systems. 
Institutional investor media and information usage across market sectors 
The thesis provided an empirical description of media/information source prioritisation by 
institutional traders/analysts in making investment decisions across four major financial market 
areas (stocks/equities, bonds/ interest rate securities, currencies/forex, and derivatives).  
 
The analysis of survey findings differentiated between two broad categories of media/information 
sources; Public Media, (including various mass media forms, online and other  information sources 
that would be available to non-institutional investors without great expense or effort) and 
Institutional Media (including high-end specialist/ subscription financial media and also networks of 
financial contacts). It also differentiated between two broad types of information; Market Information 
(fundamental data and technical data on different market levels) and Reflexive Information 
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(including indications of market mood/consensus, opinions of other institutions/ rival investors and 
correlations of those opinions). No individual medium/source was considered irrelevant, but the 
scale variables indicated that institutional media/sources were regarded as more important overall 
than public media channels (5.36 and 4.09 respectively on the 7-point scale). Likewise, no 
information type was considered irrelevant, but the scale variables indicated that market information 
was regarded as somewhat more important than reflexive information (4.98 and 4.57 respectively 
on the scale). The differentiation between public and institutional media and between market and 
reflexive information is theoretically significant because it permits a more accurate and nuanced 
account of the role financial media play in the institutional investment decisions that determine the 
global trajectories of capital flows.  
The thesis correlated trader/analyst meta-knowledge about media/information used in investment 
decisions; i.e. perceptions of the relative perceived importance and objectivity of media/ information 
sources and also the relative perceived importance of different types of information used in 
investment decisions. The pattern of correlations between ratings for perceived importance and 
perceived objectivity were highly inconsistent, and although significant positive correlations were 
found in around half the cases, the majority of these were marginal. This suggests that investors do 
not prioritise media according to whether they provide information about objective market conditions 
but according to whether they provide data relevant to the prevailing codifications and trading  
frames that define which variables/signals are price-sensitive. The overall findings for the scale 
variables indicated that objectivity rating for public media was 4.09 on the scale, compared with 
4.67 for institutional media. There was no correlation between public media importance and 
objectivity, and a marginally significant but weak correlation (.253) between institutional media 
importance and objectivity. Meanwhile, highly significant moderate correlations were found between 
public media and market information (.539) (but not reflexive information) and between institutional 
media and reflexive information (.469) (but not market information).  
The absence of any correlation between institutional media and market information seemed 
counter-intuitive. The findings also revealed an absence of any correlation between financial wire 
services and price data, which was anomalous given the interview and observational evidence that 
this was a key reason for using the wire services. These findings can be explained by the always-
already-available nature of market data in trading room environments (see Stalder, 2001) that 
institutional investors traders take for granted. In other words, the media/information importance 
ratings take account of which forms provide an advantage, and because symmetrically distributed 
market information is available to everyone, the advantage this confers is minimal (although not 
having this data would certainly be disadvantageous). As the interviews confirmed, informational 
symmetry has intensified the temporal compression of trading frames and increased the need to 
respond to new information in real time. The OCR observations likewise found that trading 
decisions had to be made faster than analysts could process and contextualise the information, 
suggesting that short-term trading could not be based on reflective consideration of all the available 
information. The findings therefore do not reflect an absolute mutual exclusivity of function between 
public media and institutional media, it demonstrates that the trading advantage conferred by high-
end financial media and professional networks stems less from the provision of real-time market 
data (which is largely taken for granted in financial institutions) but from other informational 
functions, notably validating trading frames and discerning market flows.  
It would therefore be erroneous to assume news about market fundamentals do not influence 
trading decisions and move prices.  Nevertheless, the continuing relevance of market fundamentals 
should not be interpreted to mean that the neoclassical account is basically correct but subject to 
transitory distortions attributable to noise and investor irrationality. The articulation between 
fundamentals and prices still depends on the prevailing intersubjective codifications and market 
positions/exposures of investors. As the interviews and observations confirmed, even core 
fundamentals like the OCR can be ambiguous (e.g. an increase in interest rate makes the currency 
more attractive relative to other forex but may slow growth in the industrial economy). Furthermore, 
it is apparent that in globalised financial markets, the trading frames of remote/offshore investment 
institutions may not take account of local economic conditions (even those considered fundamental 
by local investors), generating a disjuncture between the behaviour of the global M-M’ financial 
circuit and the local economic realities of the M-C-M’ circuit. For instance, the Kiwi dollar may be 
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traded as part of a bloc of Australasian currencies, or bought in volume by global forex dealers to 
hedge risks in other markets without any regard for local economic conditions (although the latter 
can evidently be affected by the former e.g. global money markets largely determining currency 
value and in some instances, interest rates). Moreover, as the findings of the OCR observations 
underlined, the adjustment of prices in response to variables such as interest rates does not just 
reflect the change in that fundamental variable, but the influence this has on market valuations 
premised on future expectations that are already built into prices. The way in which fundamentals 
affect prices is therefore not consistent with the assumptions of informational efficiency, even 
though new information is assimilated into prices very quickly. Moreover, the importance ascribed to 
reflexive information (including factors such as consensus indicators, market flows and the 
validation of current price drivers) indicates that market fundamentals are subject to reprioritisation 
and (at least over the short term) may be superseded by investors’ self-referential monitoring (i.e. 
contingent reflexivity). Although core fundamentals such as earnings, interest rates and GDP may 
remain central to trading schemata long-term, the findings indicated that their relative priority could 
evolve over time.  
 
Meanwhile, despite the fact that public media/sources were rated as less important than institutional 
media, interview findings suggested that real-time news media such as CNN could still be helpful in 
keeping abreast of unfolding world events that were not specific to the market. This points to the 
need to distinguish between information concerning exogenous, publicly-accessible events with 
implications for financial expectations/ valuations and endogenous developments within markets 
(including price movements, analyst recommendations, interest rate announcements or credit rating 
changes) that must be articulated through market sources whose institutional access to the relevant 
network nodes and market interfaces (e.g. institutional contacts, trading screens) and 
intersubjective codifications allow financial reality to be discerned and enunciated. 
The research also identified convergences and divergences in perceptions of public and institutional 
media and between market and reflexive information across four sectors of financial market trading. 
Overall, the data identified relatively few significant variations in the responses across stocks, 
bonds, currencies and derivatives, although where these arose, the distinction most often occurred 
between stocks and other securities or between stocks/bonds/currencies and 
bonds/currencies/derivatives. The scale variables indicated a significant variation between the 
(higher) importance of public media to respondents trading stocks compared with those involved in 
other sectors, and also between the (higher) importance of market information to respondents 
trading stocks or bonds compared with those trading currencies and derivatives. The relatively small 
sample size means that these findings may not be definitive, but they are consistent with the 
proposition that public media and market information have more significance to investors dealing in 
those market sectors that remain most embedded in the industrial economy. In the case of stocks 
and, to some extent, bonds, the supply of and demand for goods and services with use-value in the 
industrial economy directly influence the variables that traders in these securities refer to in their 
valuations and trading frames. 
Communicative reflexivity in financial markets 
The thesis assessed the implications of the findings for theories positing a reflexive/constitutive 
relation between financial information and market reality. The findings empirically verified the 
operation of the three forms of communicative reflexivity proposed. Implicit/performative reflexivity 
was indicated by the findings on common trading models/schemata, the incorporation of future 
expectations into current prices, the power of official statements (such as OCR or credit ratings) to 
constitute a shift in fundamentals, and the manner in which the framing of securities (such as the 
kiwi dollar) into blocs alters the mode of valuation/trading. The interview data provided evidence 
that trading models/frames have the potential to  performatively shape price movements 
independently of fundamentals. Interviews confirmed the Zealand dollar was influenced by 
overseas investors who disregard the domestic economic context, but trade using models that 
classify and value local securities in terms of broader Australasian/Asia-Pacific categories. 
Observations and interviews also indicated how technical analysis revealed structural correlations 
between markets that could not be rationally explained. If a substantial number of investors 
recognise such patterns, then there is potential for expectations to performatively manifest the 
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relationship through trading. This is consistent with the argument that markets or securities 
ostensibly unrelated through fundamentals can become linked through symmetries of market 
agency and global portfolio constructions (This is consistent with the Asian currency crisis and 
LTCM meltdown, and also the ‘contagion’ of the break-down in codifications imploded the 
valuations of CDOs in the credit crunch).   
 
Explicit/transactional reflexivity was indicated by the findings regarding the generation of fictitious 
values through trading that exceeds liquidity thresholds, the importance of price movements in 
discerning the agency behind flows, and the importance of institutional networks in confirming 
prices. Contingent/game reflexivity was indicated by the findings on analysts’ efforts to promote 
particular market stories/narratives, the need to validate trading frames and discern flows, and 
particularly the periodic revisions of the intersubjective significance of price-sensitive variables that 
feed back into the prevailing codifications. This is reinforced by the marginal evidence of 
correlations between media importance and objectivity. The findings indicate the importance of 
distinguishing between the roles of different financial media/channels in providing different types of 
information and function. They also problematise the neoclassical account of market efficiency and 
the conception of information/market news as representative of objective market conditions. 
Although there is evidence of informational efficiency in the sense that market prices typically adjust 
very rapidly to new information, this does not imply a natural equilibrium. As the interview findings 
underlined, symmetries of market information do not preclude asymmetries of reflexive information, 
or asymmetries in the semantics and agency of traders as they interpret the information in the 
context of their portfolio positions.  
 
The three basic reflexive processes show how communicative/information processes are not merely 
representative but constitutive of financial reality. However, they are not the only ways in which 
communication systems might be considered constitutive of financial market processes. Ten 
constitutive aspects of media systems and communication processed are noted below: 
 
i. Material constitution of the channels of financial communication and action (i.e. the media 
technologies which provide interfaces through which information and capital flows are 
transmitted).  
ii. Reconfiguration of spatial-temporal nodes of financial activity through global communication 
networks, electronic brokerage systems and real-time financial media.  
iii. Public media discourses/rhetoric which shape the common frames of reference through which 
financial phenomena and their relation to political and civic life are broadly conceived and 
legitimated. 
iv. Professional/institutional financial discourses that underpin the formation of the intersubjective 
codifications which allow shared recognition of the channels/modalities/instruments of meaningful 
action within financial markets (including validation of the current stories/ frames/ schemata and 
designation of fundamentals ). 
v. The use of financial theories/ models to shape market expectations and inform calculations/ 
trading decisions may performatively generate correspondence between the flows of capital/price 
movements and the theories/models, notably in the performative inscribing of future expectations 
into current prices . 
vi. Appresentations of screen data including real-time ask-bid indications and price updates (where 
liquidity is assured) and also analyses of data presented in a form that renders financial 
conditions immediately visible and intelligible to market agents. 
vii. Financial transactions themselves which crystallise market valuations in prices (including also 
ask-bid expressions of valuation at which transactions can be undertaken) and which move the 
market where volumes exceed current liquidity.  
viii. Presentations of financial signals/ announcements that symbolically perform shifts in financial 
fundamentals as currently codified, including ratings agency upgrades/downgrades of credit risk, 
and reserve bank interest rate announcements.  
ix. Monitoring/ reflexive anticipation of other market actors’ positions/trading behaviour can move 
prices and also lead to shifts in the frames driving trading (which can feed back into codifications 
and alter what counts as a fundamental).  
x. Self-referential reinforcement of investor opinions as the focusing of attention on key opinion 
leaders and consensus expectations of future prices feeds back into current valuations, 
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potentially generating self-fulfilling prophecy and rendering the truth values of financial 
announcements dependent upon investor reception/response.  
 
These various processes underline the centrality of media and communication to all financial activity 
and suggest that analyses of contemporary financial market that foreground communication 
processes do not just provide esoteric insights from a peripheral academic field, but are 
theoretically indispensable. The evidence of reflexive, constitutive communication processes 
demonstrates the inadequacy of neoclassical/positivist conceptions of informational efficiency and 
the representative relation between objective fundamentals as the independent determinant of 
market prices. However, the evidence precludes a radical account of reflexivity in finance as a 
completely self-referential process wherein the ontology of financial markets is subsumed into the 
simulacra of screen appresentations and driven entirely by the irrational mass psychology of 
investors responding to the epiphenomena of their own trading. The evidence that screen displays 
do have external referents and the finding that market information remains equally, if not more, 
important than reflexive information suggests that conditions in the industrial economy (and other 
social systems) remain significant drivers of financial processes so long as they remain 
intersubjectively coded as fundamentals. The findings therefore suggest an interplay or parallel 
process between endogenous self-referentiality and objective material conditions in the decision-
making of investors and the global flows of capital. 
 
Media influences on investors 
 
On a related theme, the functional distinction between public media and institutional media 
indicated by the findings complicate arguments positing media ‘effects’ on investor behaviour. As 
Davis (2005) suggests, effect-like outcomes of investor media usage must take account of an 
active, elite audience. Perhaps with the exception of non-institutional investors who lack 
alternatives, the findings suggest the kinds of influences suggested by Sant & Zaman (1996), Busse 
& Green (2002), Clark et al. (2005) and Davis (2005) are more likely to be related to investor 
reliance on institutional media/sources than public media forms. For example, although market 
consensus was monitored, the findings suggested following the herd was regarded as undesirable. 
Thrift (2001) and Clark et al. (2005) point to the importance of media discourses in shaping the 
frames that drive trading. The evidence from the survey and interviews provided strong support for 
the notion that trading frames/schemata do evolve and that traders need to monitor what factors 
appear to be currently driving market prices. However, there was limited evidence that this process 
was driven by media discourses in the financial news media. Financial media discourses may 
facilitate the formation of a prevailing sense of market sentiment (e.g. shifts from bullish-bearish) or 
sensitise investors to emerging stories/frames suggesting opportunities for trading. However, rather 
than having a direct influence on investment decisions, it is more plausible that financial news 
carried by public media provides reference points/benchmarks against which the plausibility/ 
significance of information sourced through institutional networks can be contextualised or cross-
referenced. This analysis would problematise Clark et al.’s (2005) assertion that traders are ‘highly 
susceptible’ to external media influences. It would, however, be compatible with Davis’ (2005) 
notion of ‘consensus indicator’ and possibly ‘anticipatory’ effects. However, the kinds of benchmarks 
that investors might derive from public media are rather different here to those Davis links to the 
‘panopticon’ herding effect among fund managers (who were not the respondents in the interview 
sample). Rather than homogenising or heterogenising market opinion, financial reports in public 
media may provide a some form of agenda-setting function by drawing market attention toward 
particular events or themes. However, the salience of any new market story/frame will likely depend 
on articulation by key opinion leaders and be verified through institutional channels. The findings 
suggest public analysts in the news would have minimal direct influence on institutional investors. In 
periods of market volatility or uncertainty, or at the points of inflection in a market cycle when 
investors may be more inclined to monitor the media for signals indicating a change in the 
variables/frames driving prices. Where there is a convergence of opinion among analysts, traders 
and reporters, the media may help generate self-referential amplifications or resonances that 
predispose investors to herding and help precipitate bubbles/panics. Otherwise, though, the specific 
meta-information required to discern shifts in market drivers and validate current trading 
frames/schemata is more likely to be accessed through institutional media channels.  
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Institutional media/channels play a far more direct role in the evolution of trading frames and shifts 
in fundamentals. The interviews and observations confirmed the role of analysts in contextualising 
incoming data and providing the stories/narratives that render new information salient to the trading 
floor by translating it into trading frames (see Beunza & Garud, 2005; Arnoldi, 2006). It is here that 
the contingent/game form of reflexivity is most apparent. A theoretical issue that emerges here is 
the extent to which such functions entail interpersonal networks of contacts as opposed to trading 
screen appresentations that directly constitute and coordinate financial reality (see Knorr-Cetina & 
Bruegger, 2002a, 2002b; Knorr Cetina, 2005; Knorr-Cetina & Preda, 2007). As the findings 
indicated, on the one hand, trading screens constitute a critical interface between traders and 
markets, providing both the real-time information/feedback systems required for real-time 
monitoring of markets and the channels of financial transactions. On the other hand, the notion of 
appresentation suggests that screen displays  condense the entirety of market reality into electronic 
data and bring about a shift from social to post-social relations among traders along with a shift from 
‘network’ to ‘flow’ market architecture. These are not equivalent propositions.  
 
The empirical evidence on price discovery suggests that, even where electronic brokerage screens 
indicate liquid ask-bid spreads, there is an awareness that these are indexical of specific agents 
currently willing to buy/sell. In some instances, it is necessary to use institutional contacts to 
determine the actual price levels where transactions can be undertaken. In this regard the screen 
displays do not entirely lose their external referentiality in regard to market agents. Similarly, as the 
interviews indicated, institutional networks are crucial in discerning ‘flows’ so as to anticipate the 
sequences and volumes of trading activity, and to infer the institutional agencies behind them and 
the kinds of variables currently driving prices. This form of meta-information is derived from 
networks of contacts, most notably those related to the provision of brokerage services to major 
clients. Although this might be solicited through electronic means (such as Bloomberg chat-boxes) 
the intersubjective validation of flows and frames resists explication in terms of immanent screen 
appresentation. This would suggest that the claims of post-social relations and ‘flow architecture’ 
(Knorr Cetina, 2005; Knorr-Cetina & Preda, 2007) should not be overstated. Nevertheless, the real-
time changes in configurations of screen data and the semantic matrix of valuations may well 
become reified as the financial referents of investment models to which traders respond, relative to 
the prevailing intersubjective codifications which coordinate the meanings ascribed to that data.  
 
Indeed, real-time monitoring of current market prices and ask-bid spreads is a key function of 
trading screens.  Insofar as these provide real-time market feedback on trading activity and allow 
traders to intersubjectively perceive and interact with the market through the epistemic displays on 
the screen, then it is reasonable to argue, consistent with Beunza & Stark (2004) and Knorr-Cetina 
& Preda (2007) that screens are constitutive appresentations. This would also apply to screen 
presentations of information that have become so deeply integrated into intersubjective 
codifications, that their deployment symbolically perform changes in a fundamental, such as  OCR 
or credit ratings. Here, the screen displays are constitutive of financial ontology insofar as they are 
the interface coordinating the interactions of investors whose intersubjective codifications define 
and reify the displays as meaningful objects of reference. Thus prices/ask-bid spreads, on-screen 
flows, and OCR/credit rating announcements still have external referents in the form of market 
agents. Note, however, that this does not require a reversion to a positivist conception of 
informational representation in financial markets. The external referent here is not an objective 
material condition, but a cognitive matrix whose semantic coordinates are underpinned by investors’ 
intersubjective codifications.  
 
Financial Autopoiesis and Democratisation: Worlds Apart? 
 
The thesis assessed the extent to which the findings generally support or confirm claims that global 
financial markets have become more publicly accessible/ democratically accountable or become 
increasingly autopoietic/decoupled from other spheres of society. Globalisation was conceived in 
terms of a reconfiguration of the delineations and relations among the polity, economy and 
civic/lifeworld subsystems. Transcoded, these were theorised as shifts in the intersubjective 
codifications defining the channels and modalities of social action that demarcate the boundaries of 
each system. The development of new communication technologies has facilitated significant 
increases in the extension and velocity of social action across geopolitical and subsystem 
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boundaries, producing new spaces and temporalities of social action. The globalisation of financial 
market activity in particular has involved significant increases in the spatial extension, temporal 
compression, and volumes of information/capital flows between the key nodes of the global 
financial network. The globalisation of finance has been accompanied/ accommodated by important 
reconfigurations of the relations between the financial markets and the industrial economy, state 
and civil society.  
 
A conceptual tension emerges here. Recognising the increasing specialisation of economic and 
financial activities distinct from the polity and lifeworld suggests systemic differentiation and 
disembedding. Recognising the socio-cultural aspects of markets may suggest (re)embeddedness 
and a blurring of the boundaries between social systems. However, the exponential increases in the 
scale and complexity of finance since the 1970s should not be interpreted either as the final 
teleological disembedding/differentiation of an immaterial/informational market that transcends the 
material limitations of space and time, or a the collapse of differentiation as the financial system 
increasingly takes on a symbolic inflection, becoming re-embedded in the social-cultural system. As 
Dodd (1994) suggests, the socio-cultural dimensions of monetary and financial systems are 
intrinsic, not just a contemporary development. Meanwhile, as Harvey (1999), Jessop (2001a) and 
Best (2005) point out, financial accumulation regimes remain embedded in systems of governance 
underwritten by state agencies. Indeed, the formation and maintenance of global markets has 
required periodic renegotiations of regulatory arrangements and interventions to manage financial 
market instability. The macroeconomic shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetarism can be 
understood as the state’s accommodation of financial accumulation imperatives. It is necessary 
though, to distinguish between empirical/synthetic and  theoretical/analytic claims concerning the 
reconfigurations of the relations among state, lifeworld, industrial economy and financial system. 
Recognition of the political and socio-cultural dimensions within economic/financial arenas 
themselves is distinct from claims regarding the systemic articulations between economic/financial 
arenas and political and/or socio-cultural arenas. The analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of 
financial phenomena is therefore entirely compatible with an account of autopoietic tendency within 
the financial system.  
 
The concept of autopoiesis has been adapted from its biological origins (Maturana & Varela, 1980) 
by several social theorists to help explain processes in self-reproducing social systems. Jessop’s 
(2001a, 2001b) approach was informative here, particularly in regard to accumulation regimes, 
although several recent adaptations of Luhmann’s (1995) work were also considered. Investors are 
sensitive to epiphenomena of their own trading activities, such as price movements and the models 
that shape trading patterns may have a performative/ self-fulfilling influence. Interestingly, Hessing  
& Pahl (2006) suggest that self-reference and positive feedback loops in the financial system’s 
operations, as evidenced by markets responding to signals generated in/by the financial markets 
themselves, would confirm this autopoietic tendency. Hernes & Bakken (2003) usefully suggest the 
need for a social theory recognising reflexive/recursive processes in order to account for social 
autopoiesis. Graham (2006) duly outlines such an approach and identifies the importance of 
communicative reflexivity in financial markets, suggesting that language and media discourses both 
demarcate system boundaries and help extend the system logics of accumulation into other social 
systems. Leydesdorff (2007) similarly notes that shared epistemologies demarcate the boundaries 
of social systems and points to the potential for communicative processes to extend these across 
system boundaries. The thesis transcoded and extended these perspectives by conceiving of 
system boundaries in terms of intersubjective codifications and operationalising autopoietic 
tendency in terms of different forms of communicative reflexivity, particularly in respect to the 
reproduction of fictitious values through transactions in response to signals generated by trading 
activities themselves.  
 
However, the evidence of reflexivity mentioned earlier should not be interpreted as confirmation of a 
radical autopoiesis whereby financial market become completely self-referential and respond only to 
endogenous noise generated by/within the financial markets themselves. Market information, 
including core fundamentals such as company earnings, interest rates, GDP, and inflation remains 
central to most investment models. Several interview respondents who readily acknowledged the 
potential for informational reflexivity also suggested that prices over the long term would tend to 
converge toward an equilibrium around fundamentals. The findings show that fundamentals may 
undergo transitory shifts in priority but  some core variables may remain fixed in trading frames, 
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typically those with external referents in the industrial economy and polity (e.g. company earnings or 
interest rates). These are subject to interpretation through market models, but some referential 
relation between the intersubjective codifications underpinning the financial system and exogenous 
conditions is implied. On that basis, the finding that market information is significantly more 
important to traders involved in stocks/equities compared with currencies and derivatives would 
suggest the latter securities are less embedded in the industrial economy. As Knorr Cetina & Preda 
(2007) suggest, the increasing complexity of NFIs entails an increasing degree of abstraction from 
the industrial economy (which is consistent with the contrast noted earlier between the variables 
important to stocks and derivatives trading). Indeed, in the case of derivatives, the denoted objects 
of reference are the price movements in other securities, which means they are indexed to 
endogenous signals within the financial system. 
Although the marginal evidence of correlations between media importance and objectivity indicates 
that the neoclassical/positivistic assumptions about information in markets is inadequate, the 
aforementioned interplay between self-referential reflexive processes and responses to external 
market conditions complicates these argument. The cyclical account of financial instability outlined 
by Minsky, coupled with the evidence that many investors intensify their efforts to revalidate trading 
frames/schemata and consensus opinion at the cusp points of a cycle or during periods of volatility, 
suggests that financial autopoiesis will manifest cyclically too. As Minsky (1977, 1982) suggests, 
periods of credit expansion amplify fictitious values and generate positive price signals that feed 
back into market  expectations. This encourages risk to be discounted, leading to cheaper credit 
and increased confidence of further growth in market values. The positive feedback loop occludes 
the increasing structural fragility of fictitious values and vulnerability to an unfavourable 
reassessment of risk when expectations of continued growth are not met. The fictitious increases in 
capital value are calculated as a return on investment (M’), but this is also a mechanism that 
predisposes the financial system toward crisis. Because fictitious values are quite literally a figment 
of investors’ intersubjective codifications/expectations, and sustained through the metonymic 
amplification of values through transactional reflexivity, they are vulnerable to semiotic annihilation 
when expectations are not met and securities are offloaded into an illiquid market.  
The financial system’s predilection for generating unsustainable fictitious values that subsequently 
implode suggests that there may be shifts between the variables driving markets during each 
phase/cycle. As Minsky (1977, 1982) suggests, stable market growth imperceptibly leads to 
structural fragility. It is possible the functional distinction between market information and reflexive 
information suggested by the findings play a role here: During the stable growth phase, investment 
models based on market information (including the technical data indicating previous thresholds 
have been surpassed) drive continued borrowing and investment. However, once market 
expectations are violated and fictitious values begin to implode, the validity of the models/schemata 
emphasising fundamentals is rendered uncertain, and valuations begin to reflect self-referential 
opinions and epiphenomenal signals such as short-term price momentum. Thus during periods of 
stability, the pressure to follow consensus indicators would be lower, whereas during periods of 
instability where the validity of current models/frames breaks down (such as the AAA credit ratings 
for CDOs in the credit crunch) mutual monitoring and self-referentiality would intensify. As the 
findings indicate, validation of trading frames in this second phase would require greater reliance on 
reflexive information from institutional networks or public analysts. The evidence from the empirical 
study duly indicated that many investors, particularly those with short-term horizons, intensify their 
monitoring of media and each other when prices become volatile. Given that the data was collected 
during a period of relative stability, caution is needed before positing what occurs in crises, and the 
data cannot conclusively demonstrate these processes. This  supports the contention that financial 
autopoiesis is itself cyclical in nature and ontologically inseparable from informational reflexivity. 
Most of the time, the financial system may not be a world apart from other social subsystems, but 
the speculative orbits of capital periodically lead financial markets out of conjunction with the 
industrial economy, polity and lifeworld into phases of disjuncture wherein their continued 
reproduction depends on the imposition of their own codifications and priorities onto these other 
subsystems, even when this threatens their own sustainability.  
Although crises may motivate new efforts to control the risk of crises, the financial system’s 
endogenous tendency toward financial instability cannot be excised by more informational 
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transparency or more accurate communication (Best, 2005) because any new models/schemata 
used to calculate risk will change the trading frames and investment decisions driving capital 
investment. As traders begin to discern new patterns in investment behaviour and second guess 
them, these can feed back into the calculative frames, performatively rendering the models invalid 
and generating new forms of risk (see Beck, 1992. 1994; Green, 1999;  Best, 2005; Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2006).  Despite a third incarnation of the Basel Accords being mooted in the wake of the 
credit crunch, the fact that neither Basel I nor Basel II prevented further (and bigger) crises 
suggests that capitalism’s endogenous tendency toward instability has not been recognised by 
financial regulators. The fact that the credit crunch has directly affected North America and Western 
Europe also suggests Harvey’s (2003) proposition that the spatial manifestation of crises might be 
managed to ensure implosions of value occur in peripheral markets was misconceived. However, 
the willingness of capitalist states to spend trillions of public dollars bailing out the banking system 
demonstrates that the repercussions of crises are not confined to implosions of fictitious value 
within the financial system. Although financial instability and bubbles/crises are endogenously 
generated, their consequences are not confined to endogenous implosions of fictitious value on 
balance sheets. The exogenous impacts may include capital flight, currency devaluations, pension 
fund losses, corporate bankruptcies, defaults on sovereign bonds, home repossessions, 
unemployment and increasing hardship in the lifeworld. Financial crises are not subject to civic 
accountability and the citizens whose lives are ruined in the wake of such events have no recourse 
to compensation or legal protection. Transparency regimes and the securitization of risk through 
new financial instruments (see Bryan & Rafferty, 2006) have done little to insulate the polity and 
lifeworld from exposure to financial hazards.  
Public media discourses on finance may play a relatively minor role in respect to institutional 
investment decisions, but their significance to other audiences becomes apparent here. The 
financialization of public discourse has gone hand in hand with the legitimation of neoliberal/ 
monetarist macroeconomic and social policies that have served to prioritise the imperatives of 
capital over those of civil society and indeed, the industrial economy. Financial media discourses 
have played a key role in valorisation of the finance sector and its articulations with state and civil 
society (see Parsons, 1989; Cheney, 1998; Hope, 1998; Fairclough, 2000; Thrift, 2001; Greenfield 
& Williams, 2001, 2007; Graham, 2006). Media coverage of the government bail-outs of the banking 
sector in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the credit crunch has opened up space for 
discourses critical of irresponsible trading practices and greedy bankers that potentially validates 
moves toward tighter regulation. However it is unlikely these will facilitate a deeper public 
understanding of the nature and origins of financial crises, and short of a paradigm shift in 
prevailing macroeconomic policies, the predictable measures currently being mooted are unlikely to 
address the problems at their source (i.e. private control over the systems of credit and shareholder 
capitalism). As Greenfield & Williams (2007) suggest, the financialization of public discourse serves 
to promote the notion that each individual must accept responsibility for their own financial 
wellbeing. Ironically such ideas are likely to be accentuated if governments push through austerity 
measures on welfare and services in response to the debt incurred bailing out the banking sector.  
It is not clear what the long-term impact of the credit crunch will be on non-institutional participation 
levels in financial trading. However, the research findings contradict the neoliberal claim that 
financial markets have become increasingly accessible and democratic. The correlation between 
institutional media/sources and reflexive information, coupled with the evidence that institutional 
investors use networks for the meta-information required to validate frames and discern flows 
suggests these channels are privileged and access to them is asymmetrical. In an otherwise 
informationally symmetrical market, merely having access to real-time market news is insufficient to 
confer any trading edge. Despite public access to NCTs and electronic brokerage systems, the 
meta-information required to filter and interpret the range of data available requires access to 
institutional media channels and networks of contacts. The trading edge conferred by the early 
indications of analyst ‘whisper numbers’, the detection of trading flows and validation of current 
trading frames is simply not publicly accessible, at least within useful timeframes. Non-professional 
investors relying on public media/sources for market information are therefore not competing on a 
level playing field. Coupled with the findings of irrationality and disadvantage among day traders 
(see Busse & Green, 2002; Frieder & Zittrain, 2006; Barber & Odean, 2008) these findings show 
the financial democratisation thesis is empirically untenable.  
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Even if NCTs do enable more people than ever before to engage in trading, it is clear that the 
intersubjective codifications that obtain within the spaces and networks of financial trading rooms  
are themselves institutionally privileged. Although the valuations of financial securities and the 
expansions and implosions of fictitious capital are the outcome of global aggregations of capital 
flows, the market agents who have the greatest capacity to shape market opinion, trading frames 
and the trajectories of speculative capital are the managers of multi-billion dollar investment 
portfolios and elite financial opinion leaders, not individual investors. Moreover, the impact of global 
financial crises on local lifeworlds suggests that the far more significant trend is the exposure of 
ordinary people to complex financial risks which they do not comprehend, consent to, or benefit 
from. The governments which borrowed to bail out the banking sector in the wake of credit crunch 
are now under pressure to reduce their debt levels by cutting public spending. Failure to do so will 
probably result in ratings agency downgradings, bond traders driving up interest rates (increasing 
the cost of future government borrowing) and currency destabilisation. The prospect of IMF-style 
bail-outs and structural adjustment programmes even within North America and Western Europe 
(especially among the more fragile economies in the Eurozone) is likely to increase the pressure for 
further domestic policy concessions to the accumulation imperative, which will not be accountable 
to democratic process. Ironically, the banking sector was not only bailed out by the taxpayers; the 
public debt incurred by the bond issues used to raise the bail-out money is also payable to the 
banking and finance institutions which issued the private credit to government in buying those 
bonds. If this is the democratisation of finance celebrated by the neoliberals, then one would have 
to conclude that the rhetoric and the reality really are- worlds apart.  
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Appendix 1: 
  
Case Studies of Crisis: LTCM and the Credit Crunch/CDOs 
 
The case of LTCM  
 
As Lowenstein (2000), Dunbar (2000) and MacKenzie (2003) have discussed, one of the most 
significant yet under-reported crises occurred in 1998 and centred around Long Term Capital 
Management, a hedge fund set up by several high profile financial experts199. LTCM used their 
status and contacts to raise large amounts capital from investors, and with that base capital as 
collateral, raised credit from a number of major banks on very favourable terms (Lowenstein, 2000). 
LTCM needed a vast quantity of capital to engage in a specialist form of arbitrage. As Dunbar 
(2000) explains, this involved identifying fractional spreads in the market valuation of assets/ 
securities which economic models indicated should converge. By buying the undervalued 
security/asset and using futures to ‘sell short’ the overvalued security/asset, profits will be 
generated when the when the pricing spread ‘closes’. As  a hedge-fund, LTCM designed a portfolio 
of assets/securities whose individual risks mirrored each other (e.g. simply speaking, stock prices in 
the sun-screen company would usually move inversely to those of the umbrella company) to 
balance out the overall risk exposure. In the interim period before the spreads closed, this meant 
that if one part of the portfolio lost value, another should increase proportionally. The pricing of the 
derivatives used to ‘short’ the overpriced security and capitalise on its decline in value was 
determined by computer models designed by the LTCM experts who -quite literally- had written the 
text-book on derivatives pricing.  
 
From its base capital of $4.7 billion,  LTCM initially generated stunning gross profits of 57-59% 
(Lowenstein, 2000), which (in line with Minsky, 1977, 1982), encouraged low-interest/ low-collateral 
lending by its creditors and also attracted close monitoring from other investors seeking to emulate 
their success. The returns were achieved using massive leveraging: With bank credit, LTCM’s 
portfolio was worth US$129 billion- 28 times its collateral base. However, much of this capital was 
represented by derivatives contracts notionally worth $US1.3 trillion. These derivative contracts 
required only a fraction of the underlying security/asset value to enable trading, but their potential 
profitability was in ratio to the movement in the full notional prices Consequently, this massively 
amplified the profits when the fractional spreads in the price of the targeted securities closed. Given 
the extremely generous terms LTCM had extracted from its banking creditors there was no spare 
collateral to protect it from ‘margin calls’ (Dunbar, 2000). This meant that if LTCM lost even 1% of its 
portfolio value, its highly leveraged positions would work in reverse and wipe out its base capital. 
Nevertheless, LTCM’s reputation,  hedging mechanisms and massive returns engendered 
confidence that the probability of such a scenario was so tiny as to merit no concern. 
  
The use of derivatives as risk-insurance stems from the calculation and securitisation of risk, which 
in basic terms means price volatility (see Pryke & Allan, 2000; Bryan & Rafferty, 2006). When 
prevailing market perceptions over-estimate volatility, riskier securities can be purchased at a 
discount and over-priced options (for risk insurance) can be sold short in anticipation of a decline 
(Lowenstein, 2000). LTCM’s strategy involved identifying opportunities to short-sell over-priced 
derivatives contracts offering insurance against volatility, particularly in forex and bond markets. The 
value of the derivatives portfolio involved many counterparties who paid LTCM for options on their 
own securities, providing them with financial insurance against volatility (Gensler, 1999). Ironically, 
LTCM depended on market volatility to generate spreads which it could then exploit using arbitrage. 
As Dunbar (2000) observes, in one trade involving Italian bonds, LTCM used its leverage to 
artificially generate a spread on which it then closed using arbitrage, making a profit in the process. 
LTCM also developed bespoke instruments to facilitate arbitrage in spreads in the future valuations 
of interest swap rates and government bonds. One of these instruments artificially replicated the 
                                                 
199
 Including the renowned Salomon trader, John Meriwether, former Federal Reserve deputy governor David 
Mullins and two economists Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton (son of the social theorist R. K. Merton) who 
had been awarded the Nobel prize for their development of the Black-Scholes equation. 
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effect of short-selling a long-term UK Gilt bond but to exploit the narrow spreads with the other 
arbitrage instrument, LTCM needed to take notional positions in the UK gilt bond market on a scale 
greater than the entire market in ‘real’ gilts (Dunbar, 2000). Such instruments are performatively 
manifested through abstract financial models and the intersubjective codification of the 
counterparties; any reference to commodities, services or assets in the industrial economy is 
obscured by layers of semiosis.  
 
Crucially, the commensuration effect of using derivatives in such trading strategies (see Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2006), along with the effect on prices high volume trading exerts, can potentially generate 
price correlations between different securities that would be unrelated except through the 
performativity of models.  This was to be a key factor in the crisis LTCM generated. In August 1998, 
Russia unexpectedly defaulted on its sovereign bond debt (which instantly became junk) and 
devalued the rouble. As Gensler (1999) points out, this shock to the bond and currency markets 
triggered a widespread rush to off-load riskier positions and invest in more liquid securities. This 
increased volatility across the entire financial market, making many investors seek to off-load riskier 
assets and increasing the value of options insuring against volatility. Unfortunately, this had the 
effect of widening the very spreads that LTCM’s models were predicting should close. LTCM’s 
hedged positions were intended to take account of market changes, but two factors undermined 
this. Firstly, LTCM’s sophisticated trading systems were based on normal models of volatility which 
were disrupted by the market response to the Russian default. Specifically, the hedged portfolio 
designed to balance out LTCM’s exposure to sudden market movement turned out to be more 
closely correlated than expected. This was analogous to the prices of sunscreen and umbrellas 
moving in the same direction. As Lowenstein remarks,’ In times of trouble, markets become more 
closely interlinked and seemingly unrelated assets rise and fall in tandem.’ (2000, p. 120). Dunbar 
(2000) points out that VaR and mark-to-market systems obliged many institutional investors with 
exposure to Russian markets to sell off parts of their portfolios to avoid violating their permitted 
thresholds.  The aggregate effect of this was to drive down the prices of all kinds of securities 
regardless of their mark-to-model value. LTCM itself was not directly exposed to the Russian 
default. However, as Lowenstein (2000) and Mackenzie (2003c) point out, the success of LTCM 
had led many other investment funds to work out the structure of LTCM’s portfolio and emulate it. 
As they began to sell off assets in line with VaR limits, the prices of many of LTCM’s assets were 
driven down simultaneously, disrupting its theoretically hedged structure. Thus an interconnected 
‘superportfolio’ had emerged (MacKenzie, 2003c), wherein the constituent securities became 
correlated, not through any objective link between assets (such as petroleum and automobile sales) 
but through symmetries of information, meaning and agency made possible by NCTs and NFIs and 
the performative potential of trading models. 
 
This was not merely a threat to LTCM’s stability. As its portfolio lost value, mark-to-market 
valuations meant margin calls for more collateral started coming in from creditors. However, 
LTCM’s portfolio was so large, that any attempt to off-load its holdings would reflexively drive down 
their value even further. As noted before, even a 1-2% loss of value could wipe the fund out, 
invalidating US$1.3. trillion-worth of derivatives acting as insurance for the counterparties. Without 
that, there was a risk of systemic meltdown as all the counterparties rushed to the exit trying sell off 
assets to reduce their risk exposure (Gensler, 1999; Lowenstein, 2000, Shireff, 2002). As Dunbar 
observes;  ‘Everyone was trying to shut down, or at least reduce the speed of the complicated 
money machines which had been exploiting discrepancies between the bond, swap and options 
markets around the world […] What hadn’t been realised was that these discrepancies were only 
kept at bay by the machines themselves. The effect was horrific. The leveraged money machines at 
LTCM and all the other hedge funds and investment banks were so big in size and running so fast 
that the sheer act of trying to shut them down made them blow up.’  (2000, p. 204). 
 
LTCM was forced to open its books to its creditors and as news of the precarious state of the fund 
became apparent, bond markets began to lose liquidity. The  Federal Reserve, recognising the 
potential for a global financial meltdown,  brokered a rescue for LTCM. Peter Fisher, one of the 
officials involved remarked that’ I’m not worried about the markets trading down…I’m worried that 
they won’t trade at all.’ (quoted in Lowenstein, 2000, p.189). As Shirreff remarks, ‘Since there was 
no global meltdown it is difficult to prove that there was a real danger of such a thing… But if the 
officers at the US Federal reserve had waited to see what happened, nobody would have thanked 
them after the event.’ (2002, p.11). Coming as it did shortly after the SE Asian currency crisis of 
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1997-98, the LTCM scenario was another factor shaping the revised Basel Accords and the new 
financial architecture intended to ensure such events would not be repeated. 
 
 
The Credit Crunch and CDOs 
 
Ten years on, the systemic crisis that the LTCM meltdown had almost precipitated in 1998 really did 
occur. As mentioned earlier, the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US stemmed from the issuance of 
credit to borrowers who were at high risk of default, who had only the property they were purchasing 
as collateral.  As top US analyst, John Mauldin (2008) explains, the mortgages were then pooled 
and securitised into CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) to spread the risk of non-repayment 
evenly, and these were divided up into ‘tranches’, prioritising repayment for holders of the top 
tranches, while the bottom (and cheapest) tranches would incur the brunt of any losses. This 
allowed the higher-tranch securities to be awarded investment-grade accreditation from the ratings 
agencies. Meanwhile, the riskiest tranches were subject to a secondary round of pooling and 
securitisation, prioritising repayment for the top tranches and again rendering them eligible for 
investment-grade ratings and thus palatable to institutional investors. Thanks to this financial 
alchemy, nuclear waste became effectively transformed into what seemed like gold (Mauldin, 2008). 
Consequently, banks continued to issue credit and CDOs. Institutional investors, including the 
banks themselves (both in the US and overseas) took on billions of dollars’ worth of these 
securities. Not surprisingly,  when interest rates increased, defaults on the sub-prime mortgage debt 
began to accumulate, and as houses were repossessed by the banks (again in line with the 
Minskian model of crisis) the bubble in the housing market that had been driven by availability of the 
cheap credit began to deflate. The lower-tranch CDOs based on these mortgages began to lose 
money, but this was largely factored into their prices. As Mauldin (2008) points out, the discount on 
the investment grade assets based on the secondary securitisation (the nuclear waste) were sold at 
around 70% of their face value. In practice, this meant that the holders not only had relative priority 
for repayment, they could also suffer defaults of up to 30% before incurring any real losses. 
Unfortunately, the ratings agencies’ systems of risk calculation were based not on the discounted 
market price but on the full price. Crucially, this meant that even minor losses relative to face value 
constituted default, and triggered immediate downgrading even though the CDOs were actually still 
profitable.  
 
Consequently, as viable securities were listed as junk-status, many institutional investors were 
obliged to sell them off, collapsing their price and evaporating the value of these assets. Increasing 
market uncertainty and volatility increased the perception of credit-risk, so margin calls and VaR 
adjustments exacerbated the trend. This meant that mark-to-market systems were signalling 
massive de-valuation of assets that were in many cases actually still generating profits in line with 
expectations; thus potentially robust ‘fundamentals’ could be obscured by the very analytical 
systems and abstract metrics intended to facilitate skilful interpretation/evaluation. The complexity 
of the CDOs and their tranches were so complex that many financial institutions and analysts did 
not fully comprehend them well enough assess the level of risk they represented (Maudlin, 2008). In 
effect, the institutional codifications incorporating metrics such as VaR, mark-to-market calculations 
and ratings agency grades as criteria for trading decisions predisposed investors to interpret the 
market signals symmetrically and classify the entire class of CDO securities as either worthless or 
dangerously risky. Although there were some potentially lucrative CDO assets, in an environment 
where even AAA-grade securities could not be trusted not to become junk overnight, the prevailing 
intersubjective codifications provided no adequate frames to differentiate the ‘gold’ from the ‘nuclear 
waste’.   
 
The ensuing climate of mistrust and confusion over CDOs and the uncertainty over the validity of 
the key models and indicators as a guide to the risks entailed was a significant vector through which 
the sub-prime crisis translated into the global credit-crunch. Coupled with mark-to-market and VaR 
systems of risk control, institutional investors holding the securities were obliged to offload 
securities rapidly losing value into an illiquid market that was no longer certain how to value them.  
This is confirmed by a candid statement from BNP Paribas, a European bank which had taken on 
significant CDO holdings in three funds it managed: 
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‘The complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US securitisation market 
has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit rating. The 
situation is such that it is no longer possible to value fairly the underlying US ABS assets […]. We 
are therefore unable to calculate a reliable net asset value (‘NAV’) for the funds’. (BNP Paribas, 
2007, no page) 
 
Numerous banks and investment firms were known to have large holdings of mortgage-based 
assets. As more reports of banks and investment firms in trouble concerns grew about the potential 
implications not only for these institutions but for market stability. Certain key events appeared to 
trigger informational avalanches, where investors’ worst suspicions seemed to be confirmed, 
prompting significant shifts in market confidence and investment outlook. In the UK, Northern Rock, 
which had relied on lines of credit in order to maintain its volume of lending, found these drying up 
along with its cash-flows. Although Barings had previously imploded thanks to the Nick Leeson’s 
rogue trading in 1995, this was a specialist investment bank. In contrast, Northern Rock, was a high 
street bank responsible for the savings of many thousands of ordinary people. News reports of its 
fragility led to the ignominy of being the first UK bank in over a century to suffer a run. The media 
coverage of panicking customers queuing outside branches demanding their money back and talk 
of a government bail-out seemed to confirm that concerns about financial fragility were justified.  
 
In the US, meanwhile, a critical event was the collapse of one of Wall Street’s most famous 
investment banks, Bear Stearns, which was subsequently bought out by J.P. Morgan Chase after 
an emergency loan from the Federal Reserve failed to stabilise it.  As Burrough (2008) points out,  
the events leading up to its demise are both controversial and disputed. What is clear is that the firm 
played a significant role in developing and promoting mortgage securities and had substantial CDO 
holdings. As the housing market slowed, the revenue of its subsidiary managed funds declined. The 
response of one of Bear Stearns’ fund managers (Ralph Ciotti) was not to wind down his positions 
but to start up another fund leveraged against the base capital at a ratio of 100:1 (three times higher 
than Bear’s other funds and almost four times the leverage of LTCM) to profit from the anticipated 
recovery. The gamble failed spectacularly, and the sub-prime crisis left the fund- and Bear Stearns- 
with billions of dollars’-worth of illiquid mortgage securities. Burrough (2008) explains that Cioffi 
attempted to off-load these to uninformed non-institutional investors through a new fund called 
Everquest Financial. However, the scam was uncovered and reported in the financial media, with 
Business Week (11 May 2007) warning that the fund was a potential ‘time-bomb’. Apart from the 
public humiliation, Bear Stearns’ major creditors were incensed. J.P. Morgan Chase defaulted them, 
while Merrill Lynch seized back $1.6 billion in collateral, forcing Bear Stearns to cover the funds’ 
losses.   
 
By late 2007, as other banks began to suffer from the collapsing value of CDOs, they became 
increasingly cautious about extending credit to each other, because it was almost impossible to 
calculate their exposure to further CDO devaluations. Burrough (2008) points out that this left Bear 
Stearns in a bind: Its recent bail-out of its subsidiary funds had left it with a weakened capital base, 
so it needed loans. However, given the negative publicity surrounding those events, any attempt to 
borrow more capital might be interpreted as a sign of fragility. Although some credit was raised from 
overseas, critical reports in the financial media concerning its management maintained market 
suspicions. In March 2008, rumours began to circulate about Bear Stearns having liquidity 
problems, and potential exposure to several hedge funds in difficulty. Despite it having US$18 
billion in cash reserves, Moody’s downgraded the rating of Bear Stearns’ bonds, and its share-price 
began to decline. As the management sought to find out why the negative rumours were persisting, 
they were picked up by CNBC. Although Bear Stearns urgently issued a public denial of any 
liquidity problems, the media coverage served to amplify speculation that something might be 
amiss. As Burrough observes, ‘Publicly speculating on a firm’s liquidity is akin to shouting ‘Fire!!!’ in 
a crowded theater; in catastrophic cases, it can trigger panic selling. It risks, in other words, 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.’ (2008, no page).  
 
When the Federal Reserve announced a programme to lend money to Wall Street Firms to help 
them through the credit crunch, CNBC speculated that this was primarily intended to help Bear 
Stearns, reinforcing the misgivings about its fragility. This was followed by the most contentious 
factor in the firm’s downfall: A sustained series of ‘novation’ requests to off-load financial contracts 
based on credit issued by Bear Stearns began to arrive at  major banks (Goldman Sachs, Credit 
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Suisse, and Deutsche Bank). This appeared to suggest that the market was losing confidence in 
the firm’s liquidity and feared imminent default. As Burrough (2008) notes, the focused nature of the 
novations and the fact that Bear Stearns itself was not being asked to redeem the contracts led its 
management to suggest that there was a conspiracy by speculators to generate rumours that would 
drive down its share value and enable then to profit from short-selling. Whether or not this was true, 
the flurry of novation demands to key banks was both suspicious and influential. Credit Suisse and 
Goldman Sachs issued instructions that their credit departments would have to approve any 
novation requests involving Bear Stearns. This quickly generated more market rumours and on 11 
March 2008 Bear Stearns CEO (Alan Schwartz) appeared on CNBC to try and quell the rumours200.  
As well-known analyst Henry Blodget (2008) observed, two days after the interview, Bear Stearns 
was effectively bankrupt.  
 
As Kurtz (2000) observes, the financial media’s role in reinforcing frames and shaping market 
perceptions carries a potential risk. As reporters attempt to balance the  pressure for real-time 
feedback against the need to check accuracy and confirm stories with sources, news-frames 
selected for headline appeal can exclude vital contextual data. For example, a focus on lower-than 
expected earnings might emphasise the potential for a negative market reaction while mitigating 
factors (such as recent investment in new ventures) get overlooked. The problem is that by the time 
the contextual data is considered, the markets may already have reacted (either to the news or the 
anticipation of other investor reactions), particularly during periods of uncertainty and crisis. 
Unfortunately for Bear Stearns, when Schwarz was interviewed by David Faber, the latter framed 
the discussion by focusing on an anecdote about a trader who had held up a trade with Bear 
Stearns because of concerns about its fragility, directly questioning Bear’s capacity  to undertake 
even basic financial transactions. Schwartz’s assurances that the concerns were unfounded were 
not believed over the accumulating rumours, and crucially, following the CNBC interview, and 
before anyone had time to confirm Schwarz’s statements, Bear Stearns’  creditors began to call in 
their loans (Blodget, 2008; Burrough, 2008). This triggered other key backers to pull out billions in 
credit, crippling Bear’s capital base and leaving it needing emergency loans of US$30 billion, which 
no other institution was able or willing to provide. The market’s reaction had made the rumours true, 
because now Bear Stearns really did have liquidity problems. As Burrough (2008) notes, its 
massive holdings of mortgage securities could not be sold off for cash reserves because these 
could not be valued and the market had become illiquid. The Federal reserve intervened and 
helped broker an emergency rescue whereby J.P. Morgan Chase acquired it at firesale prices 
(US$2 a share compared with a high of US$170, although this was later increased to US$10). 
 
Bear Stearns’ demise illustrates the potential of market rumours to drive price changes 
independently of fundamentals, and also indicates how the relationship between financial media, 
analysts and traders can generate self-referential feedback loops.  In terms of the credit crunch, its 
collapse was significant because it signalled that no financial institution could be considered 
completely safe, and this was underlined by the equally shocking bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. This intensified the reluctance of the banking sector to extend credit to each 
other, and threatened to asphyxiate any firm desperate for credit. The banking sector’s reluctance 
to lend had implications for the money supply throughout the economic system, not just the financial 
markets. There is a strong element of self-fulfilling prophecy here; because the banks were worried 
about market liquidity and debt-risk, they ceased lending, restricting the availability of money/credit 
and ensuring that there were liquidity problems and credit defaults. Moreover, as Minsky (1977, 
1982, 1992) anticipated, the restriction on credit would have profound implications for the fictitious 
values of financial securities inflated by Ponzi-finance. Financial values across an entire range of 
securities were based on future expectations premised on the assumption of continuing flows of 
cheap credit to provide the quantity and velocity of money-capital required to sustain the 
transactions that crystallize asset prices. Restrictions on credit helped ensure the manifestation of 
the very scenario the banks were trying to avoid by restricting credit.  
 
                                                 
200
 Interestingly, Burrough (2008) notes that this was a controversial and delicate manoeuvre. Several senior 
CNBC reporters had touted for the interview with Schwartz. The concern was that CNBC was so internally 
competitive that whoever was given the big interview, others would feel snubbed and react negatively towards 
Bear Stearns. He cites a Bear executive lamenting the lack of ‘adult supervision’ at CNBC. This certainly 
underlines the significance afforded the financial media in a crisis scenario.  
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Underpinning both the sub-prime crisis and the credit crunch was a break-down in the market 
models deployed to calculate financial values and risk. Once these ceased to produce coherent 
meanings among market actors, fictitious market values could not be sustained. Particularly in 
regard to the CDO credit ratings and the calculation financial risk, by a break-down in the 
coherence of the relation between key market indicators (such as credit risk ratings) and variations 
in monetary value, thereby rendering standard investment valuation models invalid. This might be 
regarded as a break-down of semantic symmetry among market actors; despite all the available 
information, there was no way to determine the validity of any frame that would allow investors to be 
sure what it all meant. This nevertheless led to important symmetries of agency, because as the 
potential responses of other market actors became increasingly uncertain, risk aversion developed, 
with the result that everyone wanted to off-load potentially toxic securities and nobody wanted to 
extend credit when there was no way to be sure that any borrower would not be the next to collapse 
and default.  Essentially, then, financial crises can be linked to a break-down in the intersubjective 
codifications that underpin the meaning of financial signals and actions. The annihilation of value 
that occurs in a crisis can be understood as a semiotic rupture in commensuration between the 
symbols denoting future monetary values inscribed into securities so as to frame them as present 
values, and the monetary values currently being realised when those securities are liquidated (i.e. 
that capital accumulation in the M-M’ circuit is failing such that the expectation that M’ > M becomes 
M’ < M). This semiotic incommensuration breaks down the intersubjective codifications and 
matrices of shared meaning needed to sustain the validity of fictitious values, crystallising the 
contradiction in the relation of capital accumulation.  
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Appendix 2:  
 
Typologies of Accumulation ‘Fix’ and Related Role of Media/ Communication 
 
Mode of 
Accumulation 
Fix 
Functions and  
Institutional Forms 
Role of media/ information/ 
communication processes 
 
Spatial- global 
extension 
(imperialism/ 
dispossession) 
• Generation of surplus value on M-
C-M’ circuit. 
• State backed-imperialism 
(sometimes military) in collusion 
with public joint-stock 
corporations.  
• Transnational corporations with 
operations dispersed globally. 
• Sourcing of cheap overseas 
labour and resources 
• Avoidance of domestic taxation 
through 
• Cultivation of new export markets 
to absorb surplus production. 
• Supranational trade forums 
broker removal of domestic trade 
barriers. 
• Coordination/ control of 
international operations by state 
and capital. 
• Media promotion of investment 
opportunities to the public as well 
as private investors. 
• Communication of commodity 
prices across different national 
markets, (especially after 
development of telegraph). 
• Cultivation of consumer demand 
through market research and 
advertising. 
• Promotion of free market norms of 
economic growth (and national 
development in emerging markets). 
 
Spatial- 
colonisation of 
state sector/ 
public services 
(dispossession) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spatial- 
colonisation of 
state sector/ 
public services 
(dispossession) 
• Extend generation of surplus 
value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
• State adoption of monetarist 
policies and privatisation of public 
assets/state services. 
• Break-up of state sector 
monopolies and opening up of 
markets to competition (e.g. 
telecommunications). 
• Reduction of welfare provisions to 
decrease state spending and 
drive down wage demands/ 
maintain unemployment levels/ 
decrease inflation. 
• Private corporations extending or 
diversifying holdings into public 
services. 
• Establishment of  international 
governance regimes (e.g. IMF 
SAPs) require removal of 
domestic trade barriers and 
opening up of markets to private 
competition. 
• Legitimation of monetarist policies 
through policy discourses in public 
media and economic publications. 
• Legitimation of neoliberal norms 
concerning personal financial 
responsibility and private pensions.  
• Legitimation of private/ foreign 
investment as being in the public 
interest. 
• Selective media 
(mis)representation of economic 
issues in developing/ emerging 
markets (including Russia and SE 
Asia).  
• Promotion of new investment 
opportunities in public services. 
• Coordination of foreign 
investments for TNCs buying up 
state assets overseas. 
 
Spatial-
Symbolic: 
cultural 
colonisation 
(cultural 
dispossession) 
• Extend generation of surplus 
value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
• Extension of TNC operations 
including media corporations. 
• Mass production of consumer 
goods marketed globally. 
• Co-option of forms of cultural 
• Normalisation of commodity 
fetishism and consumerist 
identities through public media. 
• Commercial advertising for specific 
brands and commodities to 
generate artificial demand for 
products and services. 
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expression/ identification and 
transformation into commodity 
forms.  
• Fetishization of brands with sign 
value that have minimal connection 
to productive economy (e.g. Nike) 
 
Spatial-
Temporal-  
long-term FDI 
 
• Extend generation of surplus 
value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
• Extension of TNC and Finance 
investment into long-term capital 
projects, especially infrastructure 
development in emerging 
economies. 
• Establishment of international 
trade and financial governance 
regimes to open up markets to 
private/foreign investment. 
• Coordination/ control of 
international operations by state 
and capital. 
• Media promotion of investment 
opportunities to the public as well 
as private investors. 
 
 
Temporal- 
productive 
efficiency 
• Extend/accelerate generation of 
surplus value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
• Use of industrial/ information 
technology to increase 
productivity, reduce wastage, and 
increase logistical efficiency. 
• Information technology/ computing 
used to coordinate TNC activity 
and operate just-in-time systems.  
• Use of IT for real-time market 
information and investment 
efficiency. 
 
Temporal- 
credit 
extension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporal- 
credit 
extension 
• Create money through the 
issuance of credit/debt and 
financial assets through the 
securitization of that debt.  
• Generate surplus value on  M-M’ 
circuit (interest). 
• Use of debt as leverage to 
impose market liberalisation on 
emerging economies. 
• Extend generation of surplus 
value on M-C-M’ circuit. 
• Increase  rate of retail 
consumption through borrowing 
to accelerate accumulation. 
• Increase business investment 
and economic growth by 
encouraging borrowing to support 
business ventures, including 
borrowing for financial 
speculation. 
• Deregulation of banking/ credit 
sector allows convergence of 
commercial and investment 
banking and formation of shadow 
banking system. 
  
• Shift to symbolic monetary forms 
with values inscribed in market 
confidence not material commodity 
value (e.g. gold). 
• IT and computing facilitate new 
electronic forms of money/ 
payment and paperless credit 
systems. 
• Cultivation of consumer demand 
through advertising and promotion 
of commodity fetishism. 
• Cultivation of neoliberal norms in 
regard to credit/debt and demand 
for major borrowing to fund 
mortgages. 
• Maintenance of confident 
investment climate through media 
reports (NB: the media may also 
play a role in reversing that 
confidence) 
 
 
 
Symbolic- 
fictitious values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Generation of financial values on 
M-M’ circuit. 
• Deregulation of capital flows and 
‘big bang’ wiring up of financial 
exchanges promote growth of 
finance in relation to GDP.  
• New financial architecture and 
governance regimes oblige 
transparency/ disclosure to 
increase market efficiency. 
• Creation of economic value to 
• Symbolic generation of fictitious 
values through coordination of 
meanings ascribed  to economic 
actions based on specific 
intersubjective codifications that 
permit financial symbols to become 
constitutive of value.  
• NCTs provide real-time market 
information systems and facilitate 
interlinked exchanges to create a 
global financial market. 
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sustain accumulation through the 
securitisation of revenue streams 
from companies stocks), 
credit/debt (bonds and interest 
rate securities) and currency 
speculation. 
• imposition of market discipline on 
industrial economy and state 
through free capital flows and  
price responsiveness to earnings, 
debt and policy. 
• Provision of electronic platforms for 
global trading activity. 
• Governance regimes emphasising 
transparency increase symmetry of 
market information. 
• Financial media provide the key 
interface between traders, analysts 
and reporters and permit 
intensification of market 
surveillance/monitoring. 
• Financial media also facilitate 
symmetries of information across 
markets and may at times 
engender reflexive/ self-referential 
feedback loops which allows 
market bubbles to be sustained 
(but can potentially lead to crisis). 
• Media discourses legitimate and 
valorise financial markets as a key 
driver of the new economy. 
• Financial media also disseminate 
and legitimate prevailing theories/ 
models/ schemata which are then 
performatively manifested through 
trading practices.  
• Financial advertising and NCTs, 
along with increased financial 
content of public media promote 
expansion of financial participation 
to non-institutional investors. 
 
Symbolic-
Temporal- 
fictitious values 
through new 
forms of 
securitisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbolic-
Temporal- 
fictitious values 
through new 
forms of 
securitisation 
• Extend generation of financial 
values on M-M’ circuit  
• Development of NFIs through the 
securitisation of future 
contingencies in revenue streams 
and price movements in other 
securities (derivatives). 
• Securitisation and transfer of risk 
exposure allowing hedging 
practices and closure of price 
spreads, reducing arbitrage 
opportunities (derivatives) 
• Intensification of market discipline 
and efficiency through enabling 
commensuration across different 
capital forms.  
• Amplification of financial earnings 
through leveraged trading using 
derivatives to take advantage of 
narrower spreads/ arbitrage 
opportunities.  
• Intensification of M-M’ temporal 
cycles upon other forms of 
capital. 
• As above (with less non-
institutional investor participation), 
plus: 
• NCTs combined with financial 
theory produce new modes of 
trading and complex NFIs. 
• Performative aspect of NFIs and 
financial calculation practices 
manifests commensuration across 
different securities based on 
intersubjective codifications 
providing common notations for 
risk. 
• Performative binding of future price 
expectations to current valuations. 
• Commensuration of different 
securities and interlinkage of 
market agency across different 
portfolios reconfigures relations 
among different securities, creating 
non-natural (non-) correlations in 
price movements.  
• NFIs circumvent regulatory 
regimes especially in regard to 
disclosure/ transparency.  
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 Appendix 3: Survey Form 
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